Lithuanians and Poles against communism after 1956 : parallel ways to freedom? by Korzeniewska, Katarzyna et al.
Lithuanians and Poles 
against Communism after 1956.
Parallel Ways to Freedom?
The project has been co-financed by the Department of Public and Cultural Diplomacy 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs within the competition ‘Cooperation in the field of public 
diplomacy 2013.’
The publication expresses only the views of the author and must not be identified with 
the official stance of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The book is available under the Creative Commons Attribution License 3.0, Poland. 
Some rights have been reserved to the authors and the Faculty of International and Po-
litical Studies of the Jagiellonian University. This piece has been created as a part of the 
competition ‘Cooperation in the Field of Public Diplomacy in 2013,’ implemented by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2013. It is permitted to use this work, provided that the above 
information, including the information on the applicable license, holders of rights and 
competition ‘Cooperation in the field of public diplomacy 2013’ is included.
Translated from Polish by  
Anna Sekułowicz and Łukasz Moskała
Translated from Lithuanian by  
Aldona Matulytė
Copy-edited by  
Keith Horeschka
Cover designe by  
Bartłomiej Klepiński
ISBN 978-609-8086-05-8
© PI Bernardinai.lt, 2015
© Jagiellonian University, 2015
Lithuanians and Poles 
against Communism after 1956.
Parallel Ways to Freedom?
Editet by
Katarzyna Korzeniewska,
Adam Mielczarek,
Monika Kareniauskaitė, 
and Małgorzata Stefanowicz
Vilnius 2015
Table of Contents
7 Katarzyna Korzeniewska, Adam Mielczarek,  
Monika Kareniauskaitė, Małgorzata Stefanowicz
Anti-communist Opposition in Poland and Lithuania –  
a Similar, Common or Parallel Phenomenon? 
23 Danutė Gailienė
Traumas Inflicted by the Soviet and the Nazi Regimes in 
Lithuania: Research into the Psychological Aftermath
59 Gražina Gudaitė
Reflections of the Soviet Legacy in the Life of an 
Individual and the Psychotherapeutic Process 
81 Monika Kareniauskaitė
Anti-communist Tendencies in Soviet Lithuania between  
1965 and 1988: Shape, Contents and Development
109 Valdemaras Klumbys
Change in the Concepts of the Relation between an 
Individual and the Regime in Lithuanian Sovietology
141 Jerzy Kochanowski
“We Are too Poor to Stay in Poland for Holidays…”  
Mass Tourism and Illegal Trade in 1960s. The Polish Perspective
163 Regina Laukaitytė
Relations between Lithuanian Monastic Institutions 
and the West during the Soviet Period
183 Michał Łuczewski
Lord and Giver of Solidarity. The Anatomy of a Top-down Revolution
205 Krzysztof Mazur
Inapplicability of the Solidarity Movement. On the Reasons 
behind Rejecting a Project of the Political Social Movement
229 Adam Mielczarek
Solidarity in the Framework of Social Movement Theory
257 Ainė Ramonaitė and Jūratė Kavaliauskaitė
Free from The Soviet Regime: Self-subsistent Society in Soviet Lithuania
285 Paweł Sowiński
Samizdat – the Art of Polish Publishing Resistance
311 Marek Wierzbicki
Playing Politics or Play as Politics? A Study of  
a Portrait of Young Opposition of the 1980s
335 Dainius Žalimas
The International Legal Status of Lithuania and its Resistance to the Soviet Union
375 Marcin Zaremba
Cold, Hot, Boiling. Attitudes of Poles from the  
‘Winter of the Century’ until the Summer of 1980

7Anti-communist Opposition in Poland and Lithuania – a Similar, Common or Parallel Phenomenon
Katarzyna Korzeniewska, 1 Adam Mielczarek, 2  
Monika Kareniauskaitė, Małgorzata Stefanowicz
Anti-communist Opposition in 
Poland and Lithuania – a Similar, 
Common or Parallel Phenomenon? 
The question concerning the extent to which Lithuania and Poland’s path in 
the struggle against communism could be seen as common or parallel, requires 
some justification. On the one hand, there are few studies that would compare 
the experience of the anti-communist dissent in different countries. This phe-
nomenon is most often perceived as unique and impossible to compare. On the 
other hand, in the political and moral dimension, all these particular experi-
ences were in fact a struggle against a common enemy. One more argument in 
favor of the very idea of comparing the experiences of Poland and Lithuania is 
the subjective factor – the image of Poles and Lithuanians as nations leading 
the anti-communist resistance among other communist countries and Sovi-
et republics (including Russia itself), respectively. This was true both in the 
post-war period and later, in the post-Stalinist era, which is the focus of this 
book. In terms of historical knowledge, it is difficult to deny the exceptional 
dynamism of the pro-independence attitudes in both Polish and Lithuanian 
societies of that time.
1 The research has been financed with the resources of the National Science Centre 
awarded in the framework of financing post-doctoral internships under the decision no. 
DEC-2013/08/S/HS3/00508.
2 The research has been financed with the resources of the National Science Centre 
awarded in the framework of financing post-doctoral internships under the decision no. 
DEC-2013/08/S/HS6/00199.
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After the end of the war in Poland, mass resistance of the armed under-
ground structures lasted until 1947, and single formations survived until 1956 
and beyond. 3 After the armed opposition ceased to exist and long before the 
breakthrough of the 1980s, Poland – much more often than other Soviet satellite 
countries – experienced mass anti-government demonstrations (1956, 1968, 
1970 and 1976). The unique feature of the Polish dissent was also the variety of 
its forms – from independent activities of informal groups and communities, 
through the underground publishing movement (which was extremely rich 
both in terms of quantity and form) to organized civic activity, both under-
ground and public. The culmination of these experiences was the rise of trade 
unions independent of the communist authorities – their sheer size of 10 million 
members was unmatched in other communist countries. The introduction 
of Martial Law in December 1981 and forcing the Solidarity Trade Unions 
underground did not stop the opposition – in fact, it often caused just the 
opposite: the independent publishing movement which started in 1976, in the 
1980s produced hundreds of underground books and periodicals in editions 
of many thousands of copies.
In Lithuania, long after the guerrilla war of the early 1950s ended, mass 
demonstrations of discontent did not appear. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, 
the anti-communist dissent was just based on ephemeral activities of small 
groups of young people or individuals, which mostly boiled down to produc-
ing several copies of anti-Soviet leaflets. It was the year 1972 which brought 
changes in this respect: a petition in defense of the freedom of conscience was 
signed by 17 thousand inhabitants of the three million republic. In Kaunas, 
several days of youth demonstrations and riots in May, which took place after 
the politically motivated self-immolation of Romas Kalanta showed that the 
3 R. Wnuk et al., Atlas polskiego podziemia niepodległościowego 1944-1956 (Warszawa: IPN, 
2007).
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Soviet regime could not count on the loyalty of a generation raised in Soviet 
Lithuania. What is more, it also showed that a spectacular, single act of po-
litical protest may trigger mass reactions. Such reaction had no analogue in 
any Baltic State nor Ukraine or Russia. Also Lithuania – albeit in different 
conditions – developed a range of independent publications: in 1972, the first 
issue of The Chronicle of the Catholic Church of Lithuania appeared, and after 
that numerous book titles and several titles of periodicals were published by 
the underground press with editions of varying size and continuity, as well as 
political and ideological orientations: nationalist, Catholic, liberal-intellectual 
or socialist. From 1970s onwards, Lithuanian anti-communist dissent had 
been growing in scope and forms: public statements against the violation of 
human rights by the Soviet regime were made; people undertook activities 
outside the control of authorities: participated in informal religious, folk or 
subculture groups and took part in collective manifestations and demonstra-
tions. It seems that the number and outreach of underground publications in 
Lithuania by far exceeded those published in fellow Soviet republics and was 
rather comparable in its scope with this of other socialist countries, such as 
Czechoslovakia. 4 Due to the fact that the attitudes of dissent in Lithuania were 
relatively frequent and spectacular, the country may be seen as more similar to 
Soviet satellite countries rather than other Soviet republics or Russia itself. The 
process of growing dissent proved to be crucial for the 1988 birth and shaping 
of Sąjūdis – a mass reformist movement which finally led to the emancipation 
of Lithuania from the Soviet Union.
4 See: J. Posset, Česká samizdatová periodika (1968-1989) (Brno: Továrna na sítotisk, 1991) 
and A. Ruzgas, Rezistentų pogrindiniai periodiniai leidiniai (okupacijų metai, 1940–1989): 
leidinių sąvadas (Vilnius: LGGRTC, 2010) for Czech and Lithuanian samizdat perio-
dicals, respectively. According to bibliographies collected by both authors’, there 
was about 30 titles published in Lithuania and about 150 issued in the Czech part 
of Czechoslovakia during 1970 and 1990. Taking into account the proportion of 
inhabitants in both countries, intensity of the phenomenon is comparable.
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Poland and Lithuania, despite their geographical and historical proximity, 
still have little knowledge about this stage of each-others’ history. Even his-
torians tend to look for references for the communist past of their countries 
in their own geo-political environment: the Soviet republics for Lithuania, 
and the so-called ‘people’s democracies’ – in the case of Poland. This fact is 
understandable: the reality of Soviet republics, restrictions of civil liberties 
or the level of control was qualitatively different from those of the satellite 
countries. However, only when some knowledge about the circumstances in 
which the opposition found itself in both these countries is gained, are we able 
to understand what these differences involved.
Yet another issue is how the leader-countries of anti-communist dissent 
perceive and analyze their own experiences, and which approaches and methods 
are applied in both countries in order to reconstruct and reflect upon these 
experiences. However, the point here is not only to exchange knowledge in 
the academic dimension – which, we hope, this volume will aid. The memory 
of the communist period seems to be in its formative phase, and so are its 
coherent and clear narratives. Diverse instruments and means of sharing this 
experience are being tested. Because of this, communism researchers in both 
the countries (and probably also in other countries which have experienced 
communism), whether they want it or not, participate in the shaping of the 
memory of communism to a much higher degree than researchers concerned 
with other periods of history. A dialogue between researchers of different 
nationalities allows perceiving and understanding the above determinants 
in a more accurate way, and it may turn out to be especially valuable if the very 
notion of researchers’ participation in shaping the memory of the communist 
period is in itself analyzed as a research problem.
Finally, the key here is not just transmitting the experience of the anti-com-
munist dissent within the countries that have experienced it – in this case, 
Poland and Lithuania – but also integrating this memory into the memory of 
11
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Europe. Memory is not only a moral issue but also a political one – both in the 
sphere of internal political life of the countries and in international relations. 
Often it is the fall of the Berlin Wall which is the common metaphor for the end 
of communism in Europe. The simplification standing behind it, although it 
is clear and easy to locate in historical knowledge, does not clearly point to all 
the actors who played key roles in the dismantling of the communist system. In 
other words, this metaphor lacks the answer, or even the intention of asking the 
question: Who was it that – metaphorically – tore down the Berlin Wall? Who 
was it that over the years contributed to its gradual crumbling, who scratched 
the mortar and pulled out brick by brick, who made the first breaches in the 
wall? The point is not to take things literally, but to take such a look at the 
history of post-war Europe which would take into account those, who since 
the end of the War, had worked for the restoration of democracy across the 
continent as well as to east of the Oder and the Danube. Ultimately, the above 
is not just a political issue: for countries that have experienced communism, 
the version of Europe’s history in which they are only passive recipients of 
both the symbolic and the real fall of the wall dividing the German capital 
is neither politically beneficial or satisfactory. Last but not least, this version 
does not seem to be true either in a historical or moral dimension. Both the 
political and moral sphere associated with the memory of the anti-communist 
opposition lie outside the competence of a social researcher. However, the 
historical dimension is still there to be investigated. In particular, the question 
who?, how? and where? contributed to the collapse of communism in Europe 
should be answered. Without this vital resource, talking about the politics of 
memory is not possible at all.
Valuable and interesting works on the experience of communism in par-
ticular countries have been and are still being written. In Poland and Lithu-
ania - as well as in other countries, such research is almost always based on 
the assumption that societies were not passive elements of the communist 
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system which collapsed only because of its own failure and the pressure of 
the international situation. However, both in the dimension of politics and 
memory, as well as in the field of academic inquiry, the pursuit of compari-
son, generalization and synthesis are justified. In other words, on the plane of 
memory and politics, groups opposing communism should be seen not just 
as Poles, Lithuanians, Estonians or Hungarians, but rather as representatives 
of the history of the entire continent. One could research communism and 
its opposition in each of the former communist countries, but it is also worth 
trying to investigate communism in Europe as a unified system. Thus, it seems 
justified to ask whether anti-communist dissent in different countries had some 
common, recognizable dynamics, whether it is possible to develop categories 
by which it can be described or whether any uniformity of phenomena and 
processes throughout the area where communism in Europe prevailed could 
be observed. Therefore, an attempt should be made to go beyond the principle 
of research over communism, with a particular country, nation or society as 
the research unit. This volume, though it may not yet be called an attempt at 
creating such a comparison between Poland and Lithuania, has been prepared 
for those who would be interested in drawing such comparative research in 
the future. Our goal was to present interesting insights and areas of research 
which may be useful and valuable not only for studies of the anti-communist 
opposition in Poland or Lithuania, but also for similar research regarding 
other countries.
We, of course, realize that the criterion of what is ‘interesting’ or ‘valuable’ 
may sometimes be burdened with a large dose of arbitrariness and subjectivity. 
This is both the weakness and the privilege of researchers or publishers who 
did not have many examples, models or previous works which they could relate 
to. In this context, first of all, we deemed interesting all these approaches and 
interpretations which are not limited to the reconstructions of the facts, but 
whose authors attempt to use the tools developed in fields other than political 
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history or explore less known or less recognized research areas. We hope that 
we were able to present the most successful attempts of such inquiries which 
are also possible to transfer to the grounds of the research of the experience 
of communism in other countries.
We avoid presenting ‘classical’ works in this volume, but rather turn to those 
which present a fresh approach, also in terms of when they were written. We 
were aiming at presenting interesting and daring insights as well as attempts at 
methodological studies concerning the struggle with communism in Poland 
and Lithuania, especially those which would not have analogies in the other 
country. In this way, we prepared a collection which includes articles written 
by authors representing various disciplines, using different research methods 
and approaches. The fact that the authors and methods are so diverse makes 
classifying the works into chapters or dividing them into separate sections 
artificial. Thus, we decided to arrange the content as a whole in the alphabetic 
order, although there may be, and often is, certain continuity or mutual refer-
ences between some articles.
Hence, the volume includes works of Lithuanian psychologists, Danutė Gail-
ienė and Gražina Gudaitė. In Poland, it seems, the issue of communist experi-
ence did not cause much interest among the representatives of this discipline. For 
the same reason, this volume contains the work of Michał Łuczewski. In a way 
atypical for academic discourse, but bold and original, the author attempts 
to connect categories drawn from philosophy, theology and political science 
in order to reflect on Solidarity. So does Krzysztof Mazur, proposing a philo-
sophical and ethical vision of Solidarity, however, using academic form and 
the methodology from the domain of history of ideas. In Lithuania, this kind 
of approach is rarely applied by researchers reconstructing the experience of 
communism. All three works of Adam Mielczarek, Monika Kareniauskaitė as 
well as Aine Ramonaitė and Jūratė Kavaliauskaitė, though in different ways 
and in different dimensions, are attempts at reconstructing the experience of 
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the anti-communist opposition using a classical sociological approach. These 
authors have applied, respectively, the concept of social movements to describe 
the successive stages of the evolution of the Polish opposition and Solidarity, 
the category of civil society to interpret the attitudes of representatives of the 
democratic opposition in Lithuania and the analysis of the social networks to 
study the origins of the Lithuanian Sąjūdis. We have also selected a few articles 
that have been written using the historical research methodology, but are not 
typical reconstructions of facts. The article by Marek Wierzbicki shows a late, 
decadent and ludic dimension of the anti-communist opposition in Poland 
which clearly does not correspond to its established visions and interpretations. 
Paweł Sowiński recreates the cultural reality of the People’s Republic in order 
to show in how many dimensions the official and unofficial worlds – including 
the world of conspiracy – permeated each other. The value of this text lies in 
the fact that it is a convincing attempt to study and reconstruct the way people 
in conspiracy functioned. In Lithuania, researchers are still searching for the 
right tools to study this segment of the country’s post-war history. Marcin 
Zaremba attempts to determine the ways in which the outbreak of Solidarity 
was possible to predict already in the late seventies. He names not only these 
widely known explanations – the economic downturn and the election of Car-
dinal Wojtyła as Pope – but also includes data from surveys of public opinion, 
notes of the Security Service concerning local sentiment and local gossip, and 
even the impact of the exceptionally cold winters of the late seventies. As the 
Lithuanian authors in their text on the roots of Sąjūdis, Zaremba reconstructs 
these elements of social life, de-mystifying the birth of Solidarity, often seen as 
absolutely unexpected, almost mysterious phenomenon. The articles of Jerzy 
Kochanowski and Regina Laukaitytė show how, respectively, the crossing of 
the state border was an attempt at broadening the scope of individual freedom 
and normalcy in the weakening totalitarian system both in the Polish and 
Lithuanian societies. Both authors have chosen quite different research areas – 
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Kochanowski writes about illicit cross-border trade and Laukaitytė about the 
contacts of closed religious orders in Lithuania with their counterparts in the 
West. However, the subject matter of crossing the border, both in the practical 
and symbolic sense is essential when reflecting on the struggle of individuals 
with totalitarianism. The article of Valdemaras Klumbys is devoted to this 
struggle: the Author, using the example of Lithuania, attempts to present the 
possible spectrum of individual attitudes towards the totalitarian state and 
identify which of them were in fact oppositional ones, and which may not be 
considered as such. This is an interesting attempt at taking the ‘bottom-up’ 
perspective on the functioning of the system. The article by Dainius Žalimas 
is somewhat of a deviation from the chronological framework of this collection. 
However, we decided to include it because it is an interesting work, both from 
the point of view of the subject matter and methodology. The author is a lawyer 
who analyses the post-war anti-communist resistance in Lithuania from the 
point of view of international law. His main research focus is the opposition of 
the immediate post-war period, but we must remember that continuity with 
this period and its commemoration was one of the main ideological motives 
recalled by the Lithuanian opposition of the 1970s.
We have deliberately refrained from presenting texts relating to the Stalinist 
period in this volume, mainly because collections of such texts already exist, 5 
and historians of this period in both countries clearly prefer the political history 
methodology and cooperate in preparing publications, conferences and joint 
research in this field. Our aim was to identify research areas where there were 
yet unused opportunities for exchanging ideas and experience.
To present the scope of research that Polish and Lithuanian scientists 
have undertaken and the ways in which they understand the dissent against 
5 Wojna po wojnie Antysowieckie podziemie w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej w  latach 1944-
1953, ed. G. Motyka et al. (Warszawa: IPN 2012); Opór wobec systemów totalitarnych na 
Wileńszczyźnie w okresie II wojny światowej, ed. P. Niwiński (Gdańsk: IPN, 2003).
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communism in its phase of stabilization, stagnation and weakening, one needs 
to specify the context of this research. It should be noted that the study of 
Polish and Lithuanian cases of communism – including the anti-communist 
opposition – have been conducted by domestic and foreign researchers before 
communism became a historical issue. In Poland, the discussions concerning 
communism after 1956 went on constantly, and were conducted in touch with 
Polish émigrés and their works published in the West, which were relatively 
accessible for the academic elites. 6 Regarding the wider availability of publica-
tions on recent history, the revolution of Solidarity was a breakthrough in this 
respect. It was accompanied by the development of independent publications, 
which on the one hand brought immense and lasting liberalization regarding 
state policy on scientific research, on the other hand provided opportunities for 
readers to share knowledge of the past which had not been subject to censorship. 
History was the leading subject matter of the independent Polish publishing 
movement, and it is estimated that in the last decade of the communist period 
over 1500 books on the subject were published illegally.
As a result, since the early 1980s, one may speak of the continuity of research 
on the recent history of Poland – although still without access to a number of 
sources and with limited possibilities of publication, but with opportunities to 
collaborate with Western researchers who became interested in the phenomenon 
of Solidarity. Achievements in the field of social science research on Solidarity 
alone are vast. They include hundreds of studies published in Polish, English 
and other languages. The impressive amount of source materials – especially 
when it comes to the post-Solidarity period in the history of Poland – could 
form the basis for research into anti-communist dissent in Poland. It is crucial 
that a large portion of these documents had been produced in the environment 
6 A. Friszke, “Jerzego Giedroycia praca u podstaw (1956-1976),” in Przystosowanie i opór. 
Studia z dziejów PRL, ed. A. Friszke (Warszawa: Biblioteka “WIĘZI”, 2007), p. 202-225.
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of the opposition – these are, among others, illegal newspapers and magazines, 
leaflets as well as the documentation produced by opposition groups (Solidarity, 
in particular), which issued official statements and announcements, prepared 
minutes of meetings as well as financial documentationaccounts.
Just as in other post-communist countries, documents produced by the 
Communist Party as well as those connected with the repression that the sys-
tem exerted – personal files, records and transcripts of wiretaps, interrogation 
reports and others – also retain their value as a source to study the anti-com-
munist opposition, especially the one of the pre-Solidarity period. Additionally, 
public opinion polls which have been conducted in Poland since the 1970s may 
be regarded as a valid source of information, also in terms of research on the 
attitudes against the communist regime. Last but not least, a number of mate-
rials were produced after the year 1989. Numerous former opposition activists 
as well as authors associated with former communist authorities published 
hundreds of volumes of memoirs (in different genres) covering the communist 
period, and particularly its late stage.
With regard to Lithuania in that period of time, one may speak about work 
written by the emigrants of Lithuanian origin, mainly in the USA. 7 These few 
works published in exile in English and/or Lithuanian could be located in the 
mainstream of Sovietological research of that time, where methodology was 
used primarily to cope with limited access and reliability of data concerning 
the analyzed, sovietized populations. These days, source materials for studying 
the history of Lithuania under the rule of the Soviets – as well as the anti-Soviet 
resistance – are widely accessible to researchers. KGB documents are available 
on two websites, one of which contains information and descriptions in English 
7 Th. Remeikis, Opposition to Soviet Rule in Lithuania 1945-1980 (Chicago: Institute of 
Lithuania Studies Press, 1980); Lithuania under the Soviets. Portrait of a Nation, 1940-1965, 
ed. V. S. Vardys (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965); V.S. Vardys, The Catholic Church, 
Dissent and Nationality in Soviet Lithuania (Boulder: East European Quarterly, 1978).
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(http://www.kgbdocuments.eu , http://www.kgbveikla.lt/ ); the documents 
themselves are mostly in Russian, less often in Lithuanian. Several clandestine 
periodicals have been re-published in the last decade as well, in collections 
containing a set of all issues. 8 Some are available online. Diaries written by 
important figures of the Lithuanian Catholic Church have also been published 
in full 9 or in parts. 10 These texts of a personal and subjective nature are waiting 
to become the subject of research. However, the main source materials for 
the studying the anti-communist dissent are documents produced by Lithu-
anian communist party and in the institutions associated with the apparatus 
of repression. They are currently stored by Lithuanian Special Archives, The 
Genocide and Resistance Research Centre of Lithuania and the Lithuanian 
Central State Archives.
Paradoxically, the fall of communism did not – either in Poland or Lithua-
nia – cause a wave of research on the life of societies under Soviet or Communist 
rule. In Poland, in the first decade after the fall of communism surprisingly few 
works on Polish communism and its opposition were written. The experience 
of the communist era has often been treated as a burden which is in fact use-
less in the construction of a new democratic order, which did not encourage 
academics to devote specific attention to the recent communist past. This 
attitude remained consistent with the views of this part of the political elite 
8 Lietuvos Katalikų Bažnyčios kronika (Chicago, 1974-1997) and its electronic version at 
http://www.lkbkronika.lt; Laisvės šauklys: 1976-1977 m. pogrindžio spaudos rinkinys, ed. 
A. Terleckas (Vilnius: Kultūros, meno ir mokslo rūmai, 2002); Perspektyvos: Lietuvos 
pogrindžio periodinis leidinys 1978-1981 metai, Vilnius, 2005, Rūpintojėlis : pilnas 1977-
1990 m. pogrindyje išleistų numerių (1-26) rinkinys; ed. B. A. Urbonaitė, (Kaunas: Judex, 
2000).
9 J. Stankevičius, Mano gyvenimo kryžkelės. Atsiminimai (Vilnius: LKMA, 2002).
10 J. Zdebskis, Gyvenimas mąstymuose, Kunigas tarp vagių: iš kalėjimo dienoraščių (Vilnius: 
Lumen 1996).
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previously associated with the opposition, which managed to occupy leading 
positions in the first years of transition. 11
Veterans themselves tried to fill this gap by publishing documents and 
memoirs which often gave rise to wider academic studies. The beginning of 
the 21th century, however, brought a lively discussion on the importance of 
the past era of real socialism and its impact on the Polish present day, which 
resulted in a considerable revival of the interest the recent past. At the same 
time, many of the publications on recent history of the country were also a voice 
in the on-going political disputes about the present. Poland, compared with 
other post-communist countries, seems to be experiencing this phenomenon 
to the highest degree. Both dealing with the communist past and arguments 
regarding the role in its dismantling played by different fractions of the former 
opposition keep returning to the mainstream of political debate in Poland. It 
is those issues which delineate political divisions and prevent the creation 
of a lasting community of memory. They also exert influence upon the ways of 
commemorating the past, and, indirectly, on the way of conducting research.
In both Poland and in Lithuania, the establishment of national institu-
tions responsible for archiving and sharing the legacy of this period have be-
come a positive impulse for research on communist dissent. The Institute 
of National Remembrance (1998) and the The Genocide and Resistance Re-
search Centre of Lithuania (1992) provided both respective countries with the 
infrastructure necessary to ensure proper preservation and accessibility of 
the archival sources which proved essential for scholars studying communist 
past. The above institutions have also been provided with financial and other 
resources which enabled them to undertake large scale research in this area. 
However, probably due to other functions they perform, both institutions prefer 
11 Z. Krasnodębski, Demokracja peryferii (Gdańsk: słowo/obraz terytoria, 2005); 
P. Śpiewak, Pamięć po komunizmie (Gdańsk: słowo/obraz terytoria, 2005).
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conducting studies in political history or the publication of source materials. 
Although methodological innovation is not the aim of the research undertaken 
in these centers, their role in the collection and presentation of data and source 
materials remains important.
In Poland at the time of the fall of communism, there was a widespread 
awareness of gaps in the history of crimes committed by the communist regime. 
For Lithuania, the late eighties and early nineties brought not only democra-
cy and the dreamt-of independence, but were also a time of recovering the 
memory of the victims of the communist regime and their massive commem-
orations. This fact, however, did not cause an increased interest of historians 
in the situation of the Sovietized Lithuanian society and the experience of its 
inhabitants. The origin of the Sąjūdis Lithuanian movement at the turn of the 
1980s and 1990s shows much similarity to the birth of Solidarity in Poland, 
where a lot of emphasis was put on the open discussion about the past and the 
recovery of its themes and facts appropriated by the communist government. 
This situation had a significant influence on the Lithuanian historiography of 
the Soviet period: in the mainstream of commemoration and remembrance 
the image of the Lithuanian nation – an innocent victim of the Soviets – was 
formed. Such a perception of post-war history and the desire to recover the 
memory of the victims of repressions and guerrilla war encouraged research-
ers to explore the newly opened archives and reconstruct the most dramatic 
moments of the past. Thus, in the first decade of independence a dispropor-
tionately large number of studies devoted to the Stalinist period were created, 
and much less attention of researchers was devoted to later periods of time. 
There was also a public demand for some kind of a ‘catalogue of losses,’ which 
would determine how many people were killed, how many were exiled, how 
many repressed and in what way. Researchers of the recent past often regarded 
responding to this demand as their primary task. Producing reconstructions 
of the actual facts seemed the best way to answer this demand.
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Long-term factors also added to this narrowness of methodology during 
the first years of Lithuanian independence. It would not be an exaggeration to 
say that during the Soviet rule in Lithuania its historiography had no chance 
to develop. The barriers which it crashed against were most successfully over-
come by medievalists. Historians researching recent times were, for political 
reasons, forced to work using the criteria and vocabulary which were more 
reminiscent of propaganda than of methods usually employed by scholars. 
As a result, historians had to learn new research methods allowing for gathering 
knowledge other than a simple reconstruction of facts or statistics. Research 
skills were particularly important in studying post-Stalinist era, as archival 
documents of that period no longer more reflect that dramatic, sharp conflict 
between the Communist regime and its opponents characteristic of 1940s. 
Nevertheless, even a decade after gaining independence, reading archival 
resources was – and it still is – conductive to fascinating and fruitful research. 
This fact is understandable, taking into consideration that it was preceded by 
fifty years of hardly any access to source materials.
After more than a decade, the history told only by archival materials was 
no longer enough for historians, especially young ones, who could not rely on 
their own recollections of the communist period. They perceived the 1960s, 
70s and 80s as history, and not a part of their own biographies, and for this 
reason the theoretical background was indispensable in order to research these 
periods of time. It turned out that both the Sovietological works written in the 
West in 1970s and 1980s as well as interdisciplinary studies – that is, using the 
psychological, ethnographic or sociological approach – could be very helpful 
in this respect. Undertaking research topics other than unequal confrontation 
between a society and a foreign power – such as everyday life, the functioning 
of Soviet nomenclature or the informal activities of the intelligentsia – also 
required an extended, more complex methodology. The resulting work was 
not at all consistent with the image of a society which was only a passive victim 
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of an imposed system. In this way, differences in research interests began to 
overlap with a generation gap and to some extent also the variety of interpre-
tations proposed by particular researchers. In the decade after the fall of the 
Soviet Union it brought – to some extent as in Poland – a revival of interest in 
the post-war history of the country among the representatives of humanities. 
In this volume, we are presenting selected works that have been created within 
the above trend.
This volume is also an attempt at responding to this interest. We are seeking 
to reach the widest possible audience of potential readers, but at the same time 
we hope, that we will be able – at least to some extent – to create the missing 
link in mutual Lithuanian-Polish interests. Poles and Lithuanians, especially 
academic circles, have for years been exchanging experiences, opinions and 
knowledge of history of mutual relations, especially from the periods when 
the history of the two nations could be perceived as common. Both countries 
passionately argue about the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, when 
the heritage they once shared was to be divided. Perhaps the discussion of what 
Lithuanians and Poles experienced in the second half of the 20th century quite 
separately, but simultaneously and in similar way, could prove to be interesting 
and fruitful for both parties?
Translated by Anna Sekułowicz
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Traumas Inflicted by the Soviet 
and the Nazi Regimes in 
Lithuania: Research into the 
Psychological Aftermath
On June 15, 1940, on Stalin’s ultimate command, the Red Army entered the 
territory of Lithuania. The first Soviet occupation of Lithuania and the first 
wave of ‘red terror’ began. The order for the destruction of groups of residents 
of the annexed countries signed by Lavrenty Beria, the USSR People’s Com-
missar for Internal Affairs, on October 11, 1939 took effect. 1
Traumatic History
From that point onwards, the history of Lithuania does not keep to the usual 
criteria of periodisation, the internal processes of political, economic and 
cultural transformation, but is divided into periods according to changes of 
the occupying forces: 1940 to 1941 is defined as the first Soviet occupation, 1941 
to 1944 as the period of the Nazi occupation, and 1944 to 1990 as the second 
Soviet occupation. 2
During these interchanging occupations that Lithuania lost about 33 per 
cent of its population. Between 1940 and 1953 – 1,2 million Lithuanian citizens 
were deported, sentenced to death, imprisoned, killed for political reasons, or 
1 A. Anušauskas, Lietuvių tautos sovietinis naikinimas 1940-1958 metais  
(Vilnius: Mintis, 1996).
2 D. Kuodytė, “Traumatizing history,” in The Psychology of Extreme Traumatisation: The 
Aftermath of Political Repression, ed. D. Gailienė (Vilnius: Akreta, 2005), p. 16.
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were made to emigrate. Hundreds of thousands of people experienced unbear-
able suffering, losses of their family members, and long years of humiliation, 
persecution, and torture. It is impossible to describe and name their entire 
traumatic experience with precision. The extended traumatisation encom-
passed physical, psychological and moral injuries.
The first Soviet occupation started with mass arrests, searches for ‘enemies 
of the people,’ and compilations of lists of ‘anti-Soviet elements.’ All the citizens 
of Lithuania who were politically and publicly active in independent Lithuania 
were declared enemies of the occupation regime. On July 17, 1940 the Prime 
Minister of the Republic of Lithuania Antanas Merkys and the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Juozas Urbšys were arrested and sent to prisons of the Soviet 
Union. Members of political parties, heads of public organizations, editors of 
banned newspapers, the former ministers, Polish officers, Jews (Trotskyist) 
and many others were imprisoned in Lithuania. The majority of them were 
shot dead or tortured to death in the Gulag concentration camps.
The first mass deportation of the residents of Lithuania to Siberia and 
northern regions of the USSR began on the night of June 14, 1941. According 
to the lists of the ‘anti-Soviet elements’ and their family members compiled in 
advance, and thoroughly prepared plans of repression, the operative groups 
that carried out deportations assisted by local collaborators (the so-called most 
active Soviet and Party members) suddenly arrested families of the ‘enemies of 
the people’ and transported them in trucks to the loading station. They were 
crammed into windowless cattle trucks guarded by Red Army soldiers. Within 
some days the cattle trucks were filled with deportees and a long journey to 
the east started. A distinctive feature of the first deportations was that men 
were suddenly separated from their families at the railway station and were 
transported to the camps in other freight cars. During those days in June about 
twenty thousand residents of Lithuania – among them teachers, professors, 
students, priests, farmers, members of public organizations, as well as war 
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refugees from Poland (Poles and Polish Jews) – were deported to the remotest 
and most desolate parts of the USSR. The lists of deportees are simply shock-
ing – almost every decent individual was a potential enemy of the regime, as 
nearly every activity in independent Lithuania could be regarded as criminal 
by the occupiers. Forty per cent of the deportees were children under sixteen 
years of age. The majority of victims of these repressions were killed or died. 
Only one-tenth of the initial prisoners returned to Lithuania. 3
The war that broke out between Germany and the Soviet Union put an 
end to the deportations. The Red Army, when withdrawing from Lithuania, 
continued carrying out especially brutal criminal operations and murdered 
political prisoners (for example, in Rainiai, Pravieniškės and other places). 
The last week was the ‘most horrible week of the Soviet occupation. Having 
left 1 100 murdered residents of Lithuania (not including partisans) occupiers 
of one occupation replaced the other. The ideology of terror changed but the 
destruction of the inhabitants of Lithuania continued.’ 4 The illusions that 
people in Lithuania, as well as in Latvia and Estonia, cherished about the Na-
zis recognizing the independent Baltic States were soon shattered. The Nazi 
repressions started.
Jewish people suffered most during the 1941-1944 Nazi occupation. As in 
all occupied countries, the Nazis in Lithuania carried out the Holocaust policy 
with the help of local collaborators. Jews were killed, driven into ghettos from 
where they were transported to the Stutthof, Dachau, Auschwitz, and Kaufer-
ing concentration camps, or were simply murdered en masse as the ghettos 
were being liquidated. According to various data presented by historians, as 
many as 160-200 thousand Lithuanian Jews were killed, the greatest part of the 
3 A. Anušauskas, Lietuvių tautos sovietinis naikinimas 1940-1958 metais (Vilnius: Mintis, 
1996).
4 A. Anušauskas, Lietuvių tautos sovietinis naikinimas 1940-1958 metais, p. 133.
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Jewish community that resided there. Only a few of them managed to evade 
repressions, either by good fortune or with the help of other people. Some of 
them managed to cross into the Soviet Union at the beginning of the war. The 
Soviet regime was not favorable to those who managed to survive in the Nazi 
concentration camps either.
To endure hunger, humiliation, physical and spiritual suffering and survive 
was not everything. The country did not welcome its sons and daughters who 
had gone through terrible suffering with open arms. Half-dead, emaciated 
people were driven into filtration camps – Soviet ones; it was necessary to 
ascertain if they had not fallen into disrepute ‘while collaborating’ with the 
Nazis. If they were not sent to the gulag (though sometimes they were), their 
rights were restricted. The present author had the opportunity to meet the 
people who had tried to remove the branded camp numbers by themselves 
with the help of home-made means because they were afraid to seek medi-
cal attention, they tried to hide their past life in the camps. 5 As the German 
army was withdrawing from Lithuania and the Red Army was approaching 
people ran together with the Germans to the west because they knew what 
was in store for them, having experienced the first Soviet occupation and the 
terrors of repression. This was a wave of forced emigration. Ten thousands of 
Lithuanian people found themselves in the camps of displaced people set up 
in West Germany.
In the summer of 1944 Lithuania was once again occupied by the Soviet 
army. An occupation of almost fifty years began. Killings, terror, mass arrests 
and deportations to Siberia and other eastern regions of the USSR began anew. 
This time the residents of Lithuania resisted sovietization more vigorously: they 
evaded mobilization of the Red Army and waged organized guerrilla warfare 
5 D. Epšteinaitė, Su adata širdyje: getų ir koncentracijos stovyklų kalinių atsiminimai  
(Vilnius: Garnelis, 2003), p. 18.
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against the Soviet Union. Partisans, their supporters and those who tried to 
evade service in the Red Army constituted the majority of the people arrested 
and deported between 1945 and 1947. More than twenty thousand partisans 
perished. It was quite often that disfigured and defiled bodies of the killed 
partisans were left lying in the town squares to intimidate the inhabitants 
and to disclose the family members of the dead, as members of the NKVD 
(People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs) watched who approached the 
bodies or who wept for them. Unable to endure this torture, many mothers 
lost their minds. Members of the partisan families were arrested and deported. 
The guerrilla warfare continued until 1953. Its last participant who refused to 
surrender shot himself in 1965.
The largest deportation from Lithuania took place on May 22-23, 1948. 
Over these two days more than forty thousand people were arrested. This time 
prosperous Lithuanian farmers called kulaks, many of whom were supporters 
of the partisans, constituted the largest part of the deported individuals. The 
Soviets also began the process of collectivization, the campaign to create col-
lective farms. The farmers’ property was confiscated, and some were driven 
into collective farms, but most often they were deported.
The most horrible repressions continued until Stalin’s death in 1953. After 
that, especially after 1956, the regime began to soften somewhat.
The Trauma of Return
Many Soviet and Nazi concentration camps survivors could not return home 
for a long time after their imprisonment had come to an end, or they did not 
return at all. Some of them were simply forbidden to do so. Those who man-
aged had to overcome enormous obstacles and faced political persecution. 
‘I returned to Kaunas in August of 1945. The authorities were not favorably 
disposed towards those who had returned from the German concentration 
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camps, and restricted their rights. We, former inmates of the concentration 
camps, were second rate citizens.’ 6
Stalin’s death in 1953 and prisoner uprisings in the camps precipitated a wave 
of ‘liberalization’ in the camps. 7 Some of the prisoners were ‘released’, although 
this did not mean that they could go home. At first the ‘liberated inmates’ 
were allowed to live only in certain territories, and later, after this restriction 
had been abolished, political prisoners and deportees were prevented from 
returning to Lithuania in every possible way. It seems that the Soviet authori-
ties understood that would be impossible to reform the repressed ‘anti-Soviet 
elements’ and turn them into Soviet citizens. Therefore they did not plan to 
allow them to ever return to Lithuania.
What Nikita Khruschev did was sheer folly favorable to the oppressed only. 
He created dissidents himself, who later had to be persecuted even by his suc-
cessors. Even Khruschev had to impose certain restrictions on education and 
employment of the released individuals so that they could not acquire greater 
influence and would not destroy the society created by Lenin and Stalin. 8 The 
magnitude of the desire to return to the Motherland was incredible.
In 1956-1957 […] after more deportees had been released the thing that 
the KGB men feared most happened: the former deportees abandoned every-
thing and headed for their Motherland. As much as 85 per cent of the released 
deportees left Khabarovsk, Irkutsk, Molotov, Omsk, Novosibirsk, Chita and 
Buryat-Mongolian regions. Trying to put a stop to this flow the local MVD 
divisions did not let go even the ‘liberated’ deportees. The latter were detained 
for five days, kept under ‘administrative arrest.’ Conditionally free children of 
the deportees were not allowed to leave either. Nonetheless, people left Siberia 
6 D. Epšteinaitė, Su adata širdyje: getų ir koncentracijos stovyklų kalinių atsiminimai, p. 102.
7 A. Anušauskas, Lietuvių tautos sovietinis naikinimas 1940-1958 metais.
8 B. Gailius, Partizanai tada ir šiandien (Vilnius: Versus Aureus, 2006), p. 191.
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all the same – without passports and documents certifying that they had been 
released, having sold all their property acquired in deportation. 9
The puppet Communist Party of Lithuania began to fear the returning 
political prisoners. In 1956, the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the 
Lithuanian Communist Party Antanas Sniečkus asked the Central Committee 
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to ban the returning deportees 
from settling in Lithuania and the neighboring territories. The number of KGB 
agents was increased. In 1957 the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme 
Council of the Lithuanian SSR Justas Paleckis signed a decree banning some 
former prisoners from returning to Lithuania. Those who disobeyed it were 
punished with five years of deportation. For this reason the number of the 
former political prisoners from Lithuania increased in Latvia and the Kalin-
ingrad region. 10
During the Soviet period the repressed individuals were discriminated 
against in one way or another and were subject to a great deal of injustice and 
humiliation. Some of them even returned to their places of deportation. ‘We 
arrived in Lithuania in 1958. However, the Chairman of the district Coun-
cil, a Russian, having accused us of seeking for an easier life, did not accept us, 
did not give us residence permit in Lithuania. We were left on the street with 
small children. So we had to go back to Siberia.’ (K.L., a former deportee)
Only 7 per cent of the 1 500 repressed people who were interviewed specified 
that they were received well upon returning to Lithuania. 11 All of the others 
encountered all kinds of difficulties. The property of the majority of them had 
been confiscated and not returned. Their houses had been taken away from them 
9 A. Anušauskas, Lietuvių tautos sovietinis naikinimas 1940-1958 metais, p. 394-396.
10 A. Anušauskas, Lietuvių tautos sovietinis naikinimas 1940-1958 metais.
11 D. Gailienė, E. Kazlauskas, “Po penkiasdešimties metų: sovietinių represijų Lietuvoje 
psichologiniai padariniai ir įveikos būdai,” p. 78-126.
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and strangers were living in them. It was especially difficult to obtain a residence 
permit, a passport and become employed. The KGB watched every move of 
the political prisoners and deportees, questioned their neighbors, carried out 
frequent searches of their homes, interrogated, threatened and attempted to 
recruit them. Those people had to conceal their past and the traumas they 
had experienced even from their children: ‘…we were afraid that the children, 
having found out the truth from their parents should not oppose openly the 
atheistic Communist injustice and do harm to themselves.’ 12 Thus, parents 
became dangerous to their children, and vice versa. Alienation and isolation 
were often a threat even within the family.
Family Drama
The family lost its most important powers under the Soviet regime. From the 
moral-psychological point of view not a single Lithuanian family could live 
well in the Soviet period. The family is the primary institution in ensuring the 
safe development of personality and socialization in an individual. It hands 
down traditions and values of the family, forms the convictions of a child, and 
determines the standards of communal life. Later it becomes necessary for 
other public institutions – the school, the media, and religious communities – 
to become engaged in the socialization process of a personality. In healthy 
societies both the family and the state are interested in achieving as much 
harmony between the family institution and public institutions as possible.
The totalitarian state deprived the family of its major function. First of all, 
it tried to belittle the role of the family on the whole. 13 Soviet individuals had to 
12 S. Večerskytė-Daukšienė, Gyvenimas yra ne žodžiai. Juodųjų dienų sakmės (Vilnius: 
LGGRTC, 2001), p. 371-407.
13 Prijaukintos kasdienybės, 1945-1970 metai: biografiniai Lietuvos moterų interviu, ed. 
D. Marcinkevičienė (Vilnius: Vilniaus universiteto leidykla, 2007).
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put the welfare of his working team, and of society, above their own personal 
interests. The development and formation of a personality was in the hands 
of the state as well. For that purpose it had an ideological system of education 
and the mass media, it controlled youth organizations, and on the whole it had 
total control of all spheres of human life. Memories or values of the families that 
were disloyal to the system could pose a serious threat to their members. Also, 
members of the family could be dangerous to one another. Parents were afraid 
to express their opinion openly in the presence of their children lest the latter 
should breathe a word about it at school or in some other public place. In their 
turn the parents suffered for their children’s ‘anti-Soviet’ actions or utterances.
In this sense, the life of all Lithuanian families was not peaceful. For a family 
to avoid conflict with the state system, to remain loyal to it, adapt itself to it 
and even collaborate with it, it had to bring up its children in an atmosphere 
of lies. The family acquiesced to Soviet propaganda and told its children the 
same fictitious story of the family and the country as their school and all other 
public institutions did. That, or on the whole the parents did not tell the chil-
dren anything, leaving everything to the state and by their example showed 
obedience to the system.
Some families defended their identity and sought to preserve their values 
by isolating themselves from the state as much as they could. In other families 
the parents dissociated from the families themselves – they did not demonstrate 
their feelings or express their opinions, which were at variance with the norms 
of public propaganda. In this way the parents sought to protect their family 
and their children from unpleasant consequences. Such experience, however, 
was restricting and disruptive for the children as well. They did not learn to 
perceive their own feelings and feelings of other people, to form and express 
their ideas, which, in turn, prevented them from taking over their parents’ 
values and feeling part of the family. If a family was disloyal inside, and was 
conformist outside, it handed the model of duality down to their children. 
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The children learned at an early age that they had to think one thing and say 
another and behave accordingly. They heard one thing at home and a different 
thing at school and in public. Hence, there was not a single family who could 
smoothly, harmoniously bring up and educate their children.
The totalitarian state is usually more powerful than the family. Research 
carried out at Harvard into the former citizens of the Soviet Union of two 
generations showed that very often a family lost the battle with the state and 
was unable to resist ideological indoctrination of their youth. 14
However, sometimes it did resist. The young Latvian historian Edvin Snore, 
who shot the famous documentary film The Soviet Story, characterized his 
socialization experience as follows:
When I was a child, my grandmother used to tell 
me a lot about the war and deportation. She had seen 
all that with her own eyes, and I could listen to her 
stories for hours. That was as if the first stimulus to take 
interest in these things, and when I was a pre-pioneer 
and a pioneer I received quite opposite information. 
Russian war veterans were invited to school to tell 
us their stories, which were absolutely different from 
those I heard about the Russian and German occupa-
tions from my grandmother. It was difficult to choose 
whom to believe but I put trust in my grandmother. 15
Now, almost twenty years after our liberation from the totalitarian system, 
we clearly see how grave and long-lasting its damaging consequences actually 
14 K. Geiger, “Changing Political Attitudes in Totalitarian Society: A Case Study of the 
Role of the Family,” World Politics 8 (1956) 2, p. 187-205.
15 lrytas.lt, 11 October 2008.
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are. Today the indicators of the spiritual health of society are overwhelmingly 
negative. Also, it is already clear today that it is easier to ensure the economic 
rather than psychological development of the country and that these processes 
do not run in parallel.
‘Arrested Mourning’
‘Grief work’ (Trauerarbeit) as Freud named it, is a gradual overcoming of grief 
over the loss and parting with a lost person. After the death of a loved one 
grief usually lasts for quite a long time. There are deep traditions established 
in every culture of accepting death and parting with the departed, which are 
an important part of every process of mourning. Funeral rites and prayers 
for the dead carried out together with one’s own family members, the burial 
place and visiting it is the right of each mourner and a psychological, as well 
as a moral, necessity. The organizers of repressions, however, deprived many 
people of this right. In 2001, two famous researchers in the area of psychological 
traumas from the United States, Jacob D. Lindy and Robert J.Lifton, published 
the book Beyond Invisible Walls: The Psychological Legacy of Soviet Trauma, 
Eastern European Therapists and Their Patients. On the basis of the stories of 
psychotherapists from six former countries of the communist bloc they tried 
to describe the scale and contents of Soviet traumatisation, its effect on the 
lives of the families and separate individuals. ‘Both grief and mourning were 
arrested!’ 16 This is how the authors characterized the fact of the Soviet reality, 
pointing out that the families and family members of the people who perished 
due to repressions had no possibility to say a proper farewell to them, to bury 
them and mourn for them. The killed were often buried in mass graves. Their 
16 J. D. Lindy, R. J. Lifton, Beyond Invisible Walls: The Psychological Legacy of Soviet Trauma, 
Eastern European Therapists and Their Patients, (New York: Brunner-Rutledge, 2001), 
p. 24.
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graves and places of killing were unknown, religious rites were prohibited 
from being performed, and even attempts to enquire about the victims or find 
them were dangerous.
Mutilated bodies of the partisans left in the town squares of Lithuania ‘to 
be recognized’, and actually left for humiliation and intimidation, are perhaps 
the most obvious public symbol of the second Soviet occupation. One could 
neither say his last farewell, nor bemoan or bury them. To approach their bodies 
meant to sign a verdict on oneself. Bodies were dumped in a refuse disposal pits, 
or gravel pits, bogs, or wells, or were buried near the NKVD headquarters in 
secret. The family members of many of them still do not know to the present 
day where their loved ones are buried. Some of them know who could tell 
them, because the executors and organizers of those executions are still alive, 
but the latter are stubbornly silent: ‘surely there are still some employees of 
the MGB bodies and stryibki [destruction battalions] alive who know about 
the burial places of partisans very well. They receive pensions from Moscow 
and have sworn to tell nobody anything. And they say nothing.’ 17 The families 
of the people whose places of imprisonment or death are unknown will nev-
er have graves of their loved ones – of a part of the prisoners deported from 
Lithuania and men separated from their families in 1941, as well as of many of 
the dead buried in mass graves, burned in crematoriums, washed away into 
the northern seas.
When the last deportees were taken to other places to fish in 1949 waves 
had started washing away the edge of the brotherly grave and it started falling 
apart. There is no doubt whatsoever that all the bodies were washed away by 
17 A. Musteikis, “J. Lukšos-Daumanto palaikų paieškos.“  
Lietuvos žinios, 2008. 07.08, p. 14-15.
35
Traumas Inflicted by the Soviet and the Nazi Regimes in Lithuania: Research into the Psychological Aftermath
the waves a long time ago. What seas and oceans are they crossing in their 
search of the way to their Motherland? 18
People were afraid of such an after-death fate that they had witnessed be-
falling others: ‘A seventy-year-old Marcinkevičius, feeling death approaching, 
said the following: ‘Abromaitiene, my daughter, bury me somehow so that dogs 
and white foxes should not pull my bones around…’ 19
During the Soviet period monuments and memorials to the people killed 
in the so-called Great Patriotic War were erected but an absolute silence en-
veloped the victims of repressions. Even the Holocaust victims were not iden-
tified, as the murdered people were referred to only as ‘Soviet citizens.’ Up 
until 1990 the names of the Jewish victims were not mentioned at any killing 
site or in any inscription. 20 Jewish cemeteries were destroyed in silence, and 
their monuments and tombstones were removed (for example, in Vilnius they 
were used to build the stairs up the Trade Union Palace hill). Nobody knew 
about mass burial sites, which, as it turns out, were, and still are (as they are 
still being searched for) quite at hand. It was only in 1994 that the Tuskulėnai 
mass burial site was discovered in the very centre of Vilnius. More than seven 
hundred ‘enemies of the people’ secretly killed in the prison of the Vilnius 
NKVD (MGB) between 1944 and 1947 were buried in the territory of the 
former estate. During the entire Soviet period the KGB securely guarded and 
carefully concealed the location. 21 Now this burial site has been investigated 
thoroughly and a memorial has been erected there.
18 D. Grinkevičiūtė, “Lietuviai prie Laptevų jūros,” in Lietuviai Arktyje, ed. J. Markauskas, 
J. R. Puodžius (Kaunas: Naujasis LANKAS, 2008), p. 32.
19 D. Grinkevičiūtė, “Lietuviai prie Laptevų jūros,” p. 26.
20 D. Kuodytė, “Traumatizing history,” p. 13-25.
21 S. Vaitiekus, Tuskulėnai: egzekucijų aukos ir budeliai (1944-1947)  
(Vilnius: LGGRTC, 2006).
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The fall of the Soviet Union put an end to some people’s mourning. Society 
publicly recognized the historical truth, identified the victims and paid hom-
age to them, and took pains to restore justice. What took place in Lithuania 
in 1989 is the most impressive proof of how strong and long-lasting was the 
feeling of mourning, over parting that had never taken place, and how strong 
is the need to have the graves of one’s family members in the homeland. When 
the period of perestroika started, many people took part in the expeditions 
to Siberia and other places of deportation to bring back the remains of their 
family members to Lithuania. ‘Lithuanians are bringing back the remains of 
their deported fathers, mothers, sons and daughters from Siberia, from bare 
islands of the Laptev Sea, from all former gulags. This is the first action of the 
policy of the nation.’ 22
Coffins draped in Lithuanian flags were finally buried in the homeland. 
Then tombstones with three, rather than the usual two, dates – the date of birth, 
the date of death and the date of reburial in Lithuania – appeared in many 
cemeteries of Lithuania. People did not refer to that process as reburial, but as 
bringing back. ‘Going to Siberia was like a real parting with the remote land. I 
brought back that which did not belong to the land of Siberia. I returned feeling 
at ease as now I have nothing left there.’ (A.J., a former deportee)
However, very many people in Lithuania will never experience anything 
like that, as they do not know where their family members are buried. Everyone 
is looking for their own way of saying even a symbolic farewell, of ending the 
process of mourning. Remembrance crosses are put up, hills of remembrance 
and pain, symbolic graves are built, and family masses are celebrated.
22 P. Dirgėla, Tranų pasaulyje (Vilnius: Lituanus, 1989), p. 75.
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The Occupied Ones
The universal terror that started with the first occupation was, of course, in-
tended not only for separate groups of ‘unreliable people’ but also for the entire 
society. It sought to isolate and destroy some people and to intimidate and 
break others, to make them loyal to the occupying regime and susceptible to 
totalitarian management and re-education. The society was becoming passive 
and demoralized.
Painful views of the occupied land reveal themselves in the diary written 
by the partisan leader of Dainava district Baliukevičius-Dzūkas in 1948-1949:
[…] overwhelming poverty! Not a ray of hope 
for a more beautiful life. The only entertainment is 
drinking samogon – (home-made vodka – D.G.) often 
followed by a drunken brawl. The village is completely 
overflown by samogon. It is brewed and drunk by ev-
eryone, even children. Drowned in a sea of blood, tears 
and black despair, the nation seems to have found its 
only solace and temporary comfort in samogon. How 
many idiots, criminals, degenerates, embezzlers, pros-
titutes and morons will these goddamned years bring 
to Lithuania? Some say that the years of the Bolshevik 
occupation and fighting will make the nation stronger. 
What remains will be steel, they say. Perhaps some 
will remain, strong as steel, melted and tempered in 
this struggle. But there will be few of them. These are 
dammed years for Lithuania! 23
23 L. Baliukevičius, Partizano Dzūko dienoraštis (Vilnius: LGGRTC, 2002), p. 112.
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Those who remained to live in Lithuania suffered the consequences of 
nationalization, collectivization, and the so-called ‘iron curtain’ and its iso-
lation from the free world. Freedom of thought and freedom of expression 
and convictions were strictly controlled. People were intimidated. It became 
common for many to lead a ‘double life,’ where what is shown and declared is 
different from what is thought and felt. Some people suffered from it badly and 
tried to oppose it, whereas others gradually adapted themselves to it and in the 
long run stopped feeling any discomfort as a result of such an abnormal life.
In carrying out research into the consequences of traumatisation of the 
individuals who experienced Soviet and Nazi repressions, a control group was 
chosen. It consisted of individuals of the same age as those who were repressed, 
but who had no official status of victim and were chosen at random from the 
Lithuanian Population Register, although they had also felt the aftermath 
of the occupation regime. Even though they had not suffered from political 
repression directly, one-quarter of them indicated that they had lost family 
members due to political repression, and one-third of the interviewed individ-
uals said they were unable to achieve their professional and scientific aims. 24 
Thus, the occupation regime that lasted in Lithuania for decades affected all 
its inhabitants in one way or another – both those who were directly repressed 
and those who ostensibly did not suffer from it.
Therefore it is necessary to carry out thorough scientific investigations in 
order to enable the effects of this long-term and complicated traumatisation of 
the people and society to be evaluated. From the point of view of psychology 
of traumas, the experience of the people residing in Lithuania and in other 
former republics of the Soviet Union is very interesting because people who 
had gone through the most severe traumas – political repression – were forced 
24 D. Gailienė, E. Kazlauskas, “Po penkiasdešimties metų: sovietinių represijų Lietuvoje 
psichologiniai padariniai ir įveikos būdai,” in Sunkių traumų psichologija,  
ed. D. Gailienė (Vilnius: LGGRTC, 2004).
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to conceal their past for a long time, and the entire society experienced the 
systematic effects of a totalitarian regime lasting for five decades.
Taking all this into consideration, in 2000 systematic investigations into 
the effects of the occupying regimes on families and society were launched. 
In 2013, a new stage of investigations was begun, which not only delved into 
assessing the direct aftermaths of traumatisation but also raised much broader 
issues: what are the effects(following the restoration of independence) of his-
torical traumas and social transformations on various age and ethnic groups, 
and on groups of society which have undergone specific traumatic experiences, 
such as people who suffered from January 13, 1991 massacre, liquidators of the 
consequences of the Chernobyl disaster, those who attempted suicide, and 
family members of suicide victims.
Effects of Traumatic Experiences
Investigations into the effects of political repression are difficult to carry out 
as it is almost always the case that such investigations become possible only 
after significant political transformations have taken place and the repressive 
regime has collapsed. (It is true, however, that investigations are sometimes 
carried out in rehabilitation centers for political refugees). Until the trauma-
tizing process is over, it is impossible to give any assessment of the traumatic 
experience itself.
The number of investigations into the aftermaths of Communist repressions 
is not very large. First of all, it is related to a political problem – the recognition 
of communist crimes. After the communist system had collapsed, unlike the 
Nazi system it was not recognized in the western world as a criminal system. 25 
Investigations into totalitarianism as a phenomenon that were commenced after 
25 e.g. H. Olschowsky, “Der weiße Fleck.” Der Tagesspiegel, 18, August 2013.
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the Second World War thus far have been suppressed by political debates about 
the unique or universal nature of the criminal regimes. Therefore, attention 
to the aftermaths brought about by the communist regime, which manifests 
itself in the number of scientific investigations (apart from other features) is 
disproportionally small. Actually, only individual studies can be found and 
almost no systematic investigations are being carried out. In the meanwhile the 
scale of the problem is enormous. Millions of people had fallen victim to Soviet 
and Nazi terror. The occupation regimes lasted for decades and also affected, 
and continue to affect, millions of people. It is very important to understand 
in what ways it affected not only individual persons but also entire societies.
Effects on Public Health
Specialists agree that one of the most important indicators of the psychological 
health of a country is the index of suicides. High suicide rates show that there is 
plenty of psychological pain and distress but very few resources and adequate 
help to overcome them. Hence, a dynamics of Lithuanian suicide rates could 
be read as a peculiar history of a change in our spiritual condition (Fig. 1).
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Fig. 1. Suicide rates (per 100 000) by gender in Lithuania 
between 1930 and 1940 and between 1960 and 2010
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As we can see (Fig.1), during the past 80 years the Lithuanian suicide rate 
has been subject to great changes. The pre-war Lithuanian suicide rate, like 
that in Poland was low. 26 During the period between 1924 and 1939 the mean 
was 8,1 per 100 thousand. Indices of some other European countries (Estonia, 
Latvia, Hungary, Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Switzerland) were 5-6 times 
higher at that time. 27 The suicide rate of males was up to two times higher 
than that of females.
During the Soviet occupation the number of suicides in Lithuania was 
constantly on the increase. Between 1930 and 1939 about 200 suicides were 
committed in Lithuania every year; in 1962 as many as 450 suicides were re-
gis tered; in 1970 this figure had risen to 787, and in 1984 it amounted to 1274 
suicides. During the period between 1970 and 1984, the suicide rate increased 
by 44,6 per cent in Lithuania. When perestroika began in the Soviet Union 
the number of suicides dropped to 25/100 000. During the period between 
1984 and 1989 the number of suicides decreased by 34,5 per cent throughout 
the Soviet Union – from 5,3 per cent in Armenia to 37,9 per cent in Belarus. 28
Such a strong preventative effect of perestroika arouses great interest among 
specialists. No other similar case has been known in the world when the number 
of suicides has decreased so dramatically over such a short period of time. At-
tempts are being made to find out what important factors determined this. Some 
authors 29 think that the most important factor was Gorbachev’s Anti-Alcohol 
26 D. Gailienė, “Samobójstwa na Litwie i w Polsce: potwierdzenie hipotezy weselszego 
baraku,” Nowinki Psychiatryczne 55 (2004), p. 86-87.
27 A. Kelnik, “Samoubijstva v Estonii,” Papers by Tartu University, 859 (1989), p. 64-85; 
D. Gailienė, “Suicide in Lithuania during the Years 1990 to 2002,” Archives of Suicide 
Research 8 (2004), p. 389-395.
28 A. Värnik, Suicide in the Baltic Countries and in the Former Republics of the USSR 
(Stockholm: Gotab, 1997).
29 D. Wasserman, E. Värnik, G. Eklund, “Male suicides and alcohol consumption in the 
former USSR,“ Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica 89 (1994), p. 306-313.
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Campaign. Other investigations, however, do not confirm that. For example, 
in Latvia, ‘a relational trend between the male suicide rate and the alcohol 
psychosis rate during the years 1980-1998 shows that the restrictive alcohol 
policy was an important factor, but not the only major factor contributing 
to this phenomenon.’ 30 In the opinion of the present authors, psychological 
factors played a very significant role. Besides, processes of democratization 
that started in the Soviet Union determined a decrease in the suicide rates in 
other countries of the former Soviet bloc of Eastern Europe even though no 
anti-alcohol campaigns were launched there. It is obvious that democratiza-
tion, along with the mood of hope and optimism it evoked in the society, also 
had a great impact.
Between 1987 and 1991 the suicide rate was relatively low and from 1991 
it began to increase again (Fig. 1). Similar processes took place in Latvia and 
Estonia. From 1990 to 1996 the death rate from suicides increased by 82,4 per 
cent in Lithuania. In 1996, the suicide rate reached almost 47 per 100 000 and 
became the highest in the world. According to this index, Hungary had shown 
the highest rate in the world for many years. As can be seen (Fig. 2), tendencies 
in suicide occurrence are similar to those in Lithuania. After the suppressed 
uprising in Hungary in 1956, the number of suicides there was constantly on 
the increase. The suicide rate peaked in the 1980s, and with the beginning 
of democratization it began to decrease systematically and has thus far not 
increased.
30 E. Rancans, E. Salander-Renberg, L. Jacobsson, “Major demographic, social and 
economic factors associated to suicide rates in Latvia 1980-98,” Acta Psychiatrica 
Scandinavica, 103 (2001), p. 279.
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Fig. 2. Suicide rates (per 100 000) in Lithuania and Hungary between 1956 and 1997
In the meanwhile it was harder for Lithuania, as with the other Baltic States, 
to accept the radical reforms that were carried out following the restoration 
of independence, which shows once again that the psychological situation in 
the former Soviet republics was more difficult than that in the many satellite 
socialist states referred to as the Warsaw Pact countries.
The problem of an unusual occurrence of suicides in Lithuania is related to 
the experienced historical traumas. As can be seen from other indices, males 
appeared to be affected by psychological distress more severely, as fluctuations in 
their suicide rates were much more closely related to all of the political changes 
(Fig. 1). Females turned out to be better adapted. Today men commit suicides 
six times more often in Lithuania than women do, and up to 8-10 times more 
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often in youth and middle age. This has affected the country greatly. Since the 
pre-war years the rate of suicides in the Lithuanian countryside has increased 
9-10 times, whereas in cities suicide rates have decreased (between 1970 and 
1980, the number of suicides in the country increased by 75 per cent whereas 
in urban areas this figure stood at 20 per cent). The countryside suffered from 
the communist regime most because forced collectivization and the almost 
complete destruction of private property undermined the foundations of the 
existence of rural citizen. It ruptured the traditional relations between the 
community and the family, encouraged alcoholism, and drew people into a state 
of deep frustration. Furthermore, during the Soviet period the countryside 
was again impoverished psychologically when collective farmers tried to send 
their children to town where they hoped they would have better opportunities. 
Suicides are widespread in the country today as well. Rural men commit suicide 
twice as often as men in cities, and women take their own lives only 1.4 times 
more often. Since 2003 the number of suicides has begun to decrease, and now 
the suicide rate amounts to about 30/100 000.
Effects on the Repressed
At the present time more than fifty thousand people who have been recognized 
as victims-according to the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the Legal Status 
of Victims of the 1939-1990 Occupations – reside in Lithuania. The fact that the 
status of a victim and compensations related to it are defined by law and that 
there are official lists of victims available is of great help to a scientific research. 
First of all, the participants in the surveys do not relate their participation in 
the investigation to obtaining the status of a victim and possible compensa-
tions, which reduces the possibility of single-sided results and increases the 
scientific reliability of the obtained data. Besides, it provides the opportunity 
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to investigate a representative group of victims by choosing at random from 
the full list of victims.
The study Psychological Aftermaths of Soviet and Nazi Repressions was carried 
out in cooperation with the Department of Clinical and Organizational Psy-
chology at Vilnius University and the The Genocide and Resistance Research 
Centre of Lithuania. A large group of people was chosen at random from the 
list of victims and asked to take part in the investigation. The control group 
also consisted of individuals of the same age who had no status of a victim and 
were chosen at random from the list of the Lithuanian Population Register. 
The activity of the participants in the investigation was especially great and 
accounted for 80 per cent. More than one and a half thousand people invited 
agreed to take part in the investigation. The number of the people who agreed 
to participate in the control group was also very large – about 70 per cent.
The data obtained confirmed that individuals with the official status of a vic-
tim were really much more traumatized than those who were not officially 
recognized. Though the control group consisted of people who had lived under 
the Soviet regime, the results of the investigation showed that the traumatic 
experiences of the people who experienced political repressions directly were 
much more painful than those of the people in the control group. Repression 
prevented them from achieving their life goals of acquiring education and a de-
sired profession (as much as 83 per cent), ruined their health (87 per cent), and 
led to the loss of family members for many (56 per cent). Severe, long-term and 
unrecognized traumatisation led to serious long-term consequences. Apart from 
somatic problems the repression victims often suffered from the symptoms of 
post-traumatic stress. Almost half the repressed people have flashbacks (sudden, 
vivid, distracting memories of the traumatic events). More than one third of 
them have nightmares. Also, features of dissociation are characteristic of the 
repression victims – a certain emotional numbness, a negation of feelings that 
has been manifesting itself up to the present time. Dissociation strategies – 
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deliberate avoidance of thoughts about a traumatic situation, suppression 
of feelings – usually help endure the horrors of traumatisation, but they are 
non-adaptive in normal life.
The former political prisoners had the most difficult traumatic experience. 
As compared with other groups of victims (former deportees; Nazi repression 
victims), the participants in armed resistance, having experienced more torture, 
threats, and physical compulsion, and being in more danger of being killed, 
tried to commit suicide more often. However, they also indicated more factors 
of coping with the situation: political activity, communication with the people 
who experienced the same kind of repression, mental strength, and religious 
belief. Their post-traumatic symptoms manifested themselves more often in 
the features of invasion, whereas in other groups they manifest themselves as 
depression and helplessness. The aftermaths of traumas were more severe for 
women than for men. 31
Children of the Repressed Individuals and 
the Intergenerational Effects of Trauma
This representative investigation into the individuals who were subject to po-
litical repressions formed the basis for studies of the intergenerational effect 
of the trauma. Having started the new stage of the studies – a psychological 
investigation into the adult children of the repressed individuals – the chil-
dren of the repressed individuals who were interviewed at the first stage were 
31 Extensive data of this investigation are published in a collective monograph: 
D. Gailienė, ed., The Psychology of Extreme Traumatisation: The Aftermath of Political 
Repression (Vilnius: Akreta, 2005) and in Evaldas Kazlauskas’ doctoral thesis “Long-
term Psychological Aftermaths of Political Repressions.” Both quoted many times in 
this paper.
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invited to participate in it. This enabled the study of links between parents and 
children regarding their health and the psychological conditions.
As already mentioned, the situation of the repressed families in Lithuania 
and other countries occupied by the Soviet Union differed from the situation 
of other traumatized groups presented in the scientific investigations. Usu-
ally traumatisation of the persecuted individuals comes to an end upon their 
release from a concentration camp or prison, or after repressions of another 
kind are over. In Lithuania, the former deportees, political prisoners and their 
families were subject to further political persecution because officially they 
were considered to be ‘enemies of the people.’ They live in an atmosphere of 
constant tension, stress, distrust and the threat of further repression. Hence, 
the traumatizing experience is dangerous to both the repressed individuals 
themselves and to their children, making it necessary to conceal one’s life 
story. Only 60 per cent of children of the repressed individuals indicated that 
they learned about their parents’ past in their childhood. 32 In Norway, for 
example, 86 per cent of children of the individuals who fell victim to the Nazi 
occupation learned about their parents’ past in their childhood. 33 Their parents 
themselves or their family members – grandparents, uncles, aunts, or other 
relatives – told them about it, or the children themselves were born in depor-
tation. More than one fifth of the children (21 per cent) knew nothing about 
their parents’ deportations and imprisonment until they became teenagers or 
adults. 6 per cent of the children learned about their parents’ traumas only after 
the Singing Revolution had started. Many people who knew about it earlier 
indicated that they began to talk about it more only after the beginning of the 
32 I. Starinskaitė, “Long-term effects of political repressions in Lithuania to second ge-
neration: subjective influence, communication, hopelessness and sense of coherence.” 
(MA thesis, Vilnius University, ZurichU niversity, 2008).
33 E. F. Major, War Stress in a Transgenerational Perspective (Oslo: Universitas Osloensis, 
1996).
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Singing Revolution. Repressions of the parents were a family secret in one 
third of the families. Either it was not discussed with the children at all or it 
was discussed only among the family members, and the children were strictly 
forbidden to reveal it to anybody. 34 This affected the children in different ways. 
Some of them were oppressed by it and they felt fear. Others even took pride 
in the family secret. They felt respect for their parents who instilled a feeling 
of patriotism in them and formed a clear world outlook.
More than 70 per cent of the children of the repressed individuals stated 
that repressions had a very negative effect on their parents’ lives and general 
condition. Foremost among them they mentioned that their parents had ex-
perienced ruined health, nervousness and in particular fear, a constant dread 
and a feeling of menace. However, when speaking about themselves, 31 per 
cent of the children indicated a negative effect on them. Others regarded that 
effect as ambiguous or positive, or they did not know what to call it. 35 Some of 
the people stated that it was difficult to say whether they were affected by their 
parents’ traumatic experience or by a general atmosphere and the restrictions of 
the totalitarian system. For example, those who refused to join the Young Com-
munist League or the Communist Party obviously experienced consequences 
of their actions – they were not admitted to higher education institutions, were 
not allowed to visit the nearest foreign country, and the possibilities of their 
professional careers were restricted to a great extent. It was often underlined 
in the studies of long-term traumatic aftermaths that a general cultural atmo-
sphere and the public’s attitude towards their traumas had a great effect on the 
34 I. Vaskelienė, “Politinių represijų Lietuvoje ilgalaikės psichologinės pasekmės antrajai 
kartai.“ (PhD diss., Vilnus University, 2012).
35 I. Starinskaitė, “Long-term effects of political repressions in Lithuania to second ge-
neration: subjective influence, communication, hopelessness and sense of coherence.”; 
I. Vaskelienė, “Politinių represijų Lietuvoje ilgalaikės psichologinės pasekmės antrajai 
kartai.”
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general condition of the traumatized individuals and their families. Furthermore, 
many individual conditions should also be taken into consideration on which 
the current condition of the children of the traumatized individuals depend-
ed: whether both parents or only one of them were repressed, whether other 
members of the family died or survived, and whether they received support 
from their relatives, friends, etc. The psychological health of the members of 
the same family may vary greatly. When analyzing links between the general 
psychological condition of the repressed parents and their children in one 
of the investigations we selected 22 families in which at least two children, 
brothers and sisters, took part in the interview about their parents’ traumatic 
experience. It turned out that not all brothers and sisters were equally affected 
by their parents’ traumatic experience. 36
Most often the children of the repressed parents felt that the family’s trau-
matic experience exerted a negative effect on the formation of their character. 
Due to their parents’ poor health and nervousness, a more difficult material 
condition, they were also in frail health and were more sensitive. Some of 
them however, pointed to a positive effect of their parents’ experience –that it 
tempered their character, and developed their spiritual strength, resolution 
and moral values. It is interesting to note that the subjective evaluation of the 
effects of the parental traumatic experience on oneself is related to the present 
sense of coherence (encompassing self-confidence, experience of meaningful-
ness, and the perceived possibility to control one’s own life). The children of 
the repressed parents who evaluated the effect of their parents’ experience as 
positive were noted for the highest indicators of the Sense of Coherence (SOC), 
whereas those who assessed their parents’ experiences in the negative had the 
36 S.Bagdonaitė, “Ilgalaikio traumavimo psichologinės pasekmės šeimai: išgyvenusiųjų ir 
antros kartos psichologinės sveikatos sąsajos.“ (MA thesis, Vilnius University, 2010).
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lowest indicators of SOC. 37 Hence, the children who had seen examples of 
strength, firmness and resistance were substantially more mature.
As has been expected, the data obtained showed that the second generation 
was less traumatized than its parents. Their traumatic experience was different, 
as during their lifetime they were subject to fewer traumatic events than their 
parents had been. Assessments of the second generation of Soviet repressions, 
the second generation of the Holocaust and the participants in the control group 
who had no traumatic experience did not differ. Hence, they no longer carried 
the traumatic burden that their parents had carried. Quantitative indicators 
of the mental health of both groups did not differ either. It can be said that no 
psychopathological symptoms were characteristic of them. The participants 
in the investigations constituted non-clinical samples; therefore they did not 
distinguish themselves by exceptional psychopathological features as compared 
with the group consisting of the unharmed individuals. No psychopathologi-
cal symptoms were detected in the majority of investigations into the second 
generation in non-clinical groups carried out in different countries. 38
Differences between the groups consisting of the victims and of relatively 
unharmed groups manifested themselves in more subtle features. Adult children 
of the repressed individuals distinguished themselves by greater irritability 
and sensitivity, and they were apt to react to the events in their lives more 
painfully. Hence, the parents who had been subject to severe and long-term 
traumatisation handed down a certain predisposition towards vulnerability 
to their children. As well, it turned out that the psychological condition of the 
37 R. Stankevičiūtė, “Politinių represijų Lietuvoje tarpgeneracinis poveikis: antrosios 
kartos subjektyviai suvokiami padariniai.“ (MA thesis, Vilnius University, 2010).
38 E. F. Major, War Stress in a Transgenerational Perspective.; M. H. Izen doorn, 
M. J. Bakermans-Kranenburg, A. Sagi-Schwartz, “Are children of Holocaust survivors 
less well-adapted? A meta-analytic investigations of secondary traumatization,”  
Journal of Traumatic Stress 16 (2003), p. 459-469.
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children was related to the general psychological condition of their parents: 
the worse the general condition of their parents, the worse the indicators of the 
general psychological condition shown by their children. Hence, traumatic 
experience and the post-traumatic reaction of their parents were significant 
to the general condition of their adult children. The psychological condition 
of mothers was of special importance – links between the children’s general 
condition and their mothers’ post-traumatic reactions were stronger. 39 Of 
course, the effect of the parents’ traumatic experience manifested itself in 
the symptoms of their general psychological condition. Adult children of the 
repressed individuals felt that their parents’ experience had a profound effect 
on their lives and exerted an impact on the formation of their personalities 
and identities.
Coping and Resilience
How do people manage to endure all that? This question was has been intro-
duced comparatively recently in the history of investigations into psychological 
traumas. For a long time the researchers were more interested in the damaging 
consequences of trauma to ones physical and mental health. However, it is 
becoming clearer and clearer that the effect of the trauma, and especially that 
of a severe and long-term traumatisation, is complicated – it can not only do 
harm to an individual, but it can also awaken ones deepest human resources 
and encourage the growth and maturity of personality.
We asked individuals residing in Lithuania who had suffered from political 
repression the following question: ‘What helped you cope with the difficulties 
of repression?’We asked the individuals in the comparison group who were of 
39 I. Vaskelienė, “Politinių represijų Lietuvoje ilgalaikės psichologinės pasekmės antrajai 
kartai.”
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the same age and had not been subject to repressions the following question: 
‘What helped you cope with difficulties in your life?’ 40 The participants in the 
investigation most often mentioned the following factors (Table 1):
No.  Factors of coping The repressedIn per cent
Control group
In per cent
1. Support of family and relatives 61,7 63,6
2. Support of friends who experienced the same difficulties * 39,6 3,4
3. Belief in God* 72,0 51,7
4. Chance 5,4 1,7
5. Physical strength, health* 16,8 7,6
6. Spiritual strength* 56,1 33,1
7. Political activity* 32,1 2,5
8. Hope* 42,9 25,4
9. Other 6,6 4,2
Note: * p<0.01
Table 1. Factors of coping with difficulties in the victim and control groups (in per cent)
40 D. Gailienė, E. Kazlauskas, “Po penkiasdešimties metų: sovietinių represijų Lietuvoje 
psichologiniai padariniai ir įveikos būdai.”; E. Kazlauskas “Politinių represijų ilgalaikės 
psichologinės pasekmės.” (PhD diss. Vilniaus universitetas, 2006).
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We see that support of the family and relatives is the most important help to 
the people who had not suffered from repressions. The repressed individuals 
also mentioned it very often (61,7 and 63,6 per cent, respectively). However, the 
people who had suffered from repressions often indicated that belief in God 
helped them to endure everything (72 per cent). Religious belief was important 
to Lithuanian people not only in concentration camps and deportation when 
struggling to endure their horrors. The determination of those who stayed in 
occupied Lithuania to believe in God was a sign of resistance and also a sign of 
submission to the occupying power 41 because, as we know, combative atheism 
has always been one of the most important means of a spiritual ‘remaking’ of 
society.
Some people understood the situation quite clearly as an either/or choice. 
Either one joins the Young Communist League, the Communist party, or goes 
on practicing his faith. They remained faithful to their convictions and refused to 
collaborate with the regime. Other people, who had no courage to resist openly, 
regarded going to church and celebrating Christian holidays as a certain kind 
of resistance, at least as a minimal preservation of their autonomy and dignity. 
Besides, the Lithuanian Catholic community was the most active community 
engaged in resistance movements against the Nazi and Soviet occupations. They 
were responsible for establishing and structuring the underground resistance 
during the Nazi occupation, which later turned into a strong armed resistance 
movement in the first decade of the second Soviet occupation (1944-1953). 
Despite repression against the Church coupled with aggressively atheistic 
propaganda, the underground Catholic movement, along with its popular 
41 S. Kraniauskienė, “Tapatybės konstravimas biografijose (kartos ir lyties identitetas 
XX a. lietuvių autobiografijose).” (PhD diss., Vilnius University, 2003); I. Šutinienė, 
“Sovietinio laikotarpio atminties bruožai autobiografiniuose pasakojimuose,“ in 
Socialinė atmintis: minėjimai ir užmarštys, ed. E. Krukauskienė et al. (Vilnius: Eugrimas, 
2003), p. 13-66.
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periodical The Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Lithuania, was the most stable 
and politically articulate movement of anti-Soviet resistance. 42
The individuals who had suffered from repression specified ten times more 
often than the people in the comparison group that it was political activity that 
helped them (32,1 per cent to 2,5 per cent). The current investigations into 
political traumatisation established conclusively that political activity was 
an important and strong protective factor. The first investigations of this kind 
were carried out into people who had been imprisoned for political reasons 
and tortured in Turkey. It turned out that politically active prisoners, as com-
pared with politically inactive ones, suffered from much fewer post-traumatic 
disorders. 43
Politically active people – the former partisans, participants in armed 
resistance movements – constituted the largest part of the individuals in the 
sample of the repressed people in our investigation. The results of the inves-
tigation confirmed the protective importance of political activity: although 
they suffered more and had more traumatic experiences than the individuals 
of other groups under study, their post-traumatic symptoms were weaker. 44 
Even today the majority of the repressed individuals takes a lively interest 
in politics, has firm political convictions, and is concerned about the topical 
issues of public life.
42 A. Streikus, “Democracy and Catholicism in 20th Century Lithuania.”  
(paper presented at the international conference ‘Democracy, Culture and 
Catholicism’, Rome, June 18-21, 2012).
43 M. Basoglu et al., “Psychological Effects of Torture: A Comparison of Tortured with 
Non-tortured Political Activists in Turkey,” American Journal of Psychiatry, 151 (1994), 
p. 76-81; M. Basoglu et al., “Factors Related to Long-term Traumatic Stress Responses 
in Survivors of Torture in Turkey,” Journal of American Medical Association, 272 (1994), 
p. 357-363.
44 D. Gailienė, E. Kazlauskas, “Po penkiasdešimties metų: sovietinių represijų Lietuvoje 
psichologiniai padariniai ir įveikos būdai.” E. Kazlauskas “Politinių represijų ilgalaikės 
psichologinės pasekmės.”
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‘Support of the friends who have experienced the same difficulties’ 
means a special thing to the repressed people. They indicate this source of 
support more than ten times more often than the participants in the compari-
son group do (39,6 per cent and 3,4 per cent, respectively, Table 1). Friends that 
were made in prison and deportation most often remain dearest and closest 
friends for life. They understand one another perfectly and feel special solidarity. 
Kępiński compares the situation of the former camp prisoners with that of the 
people who had suffered from psychosis: after what they had gone through 
both the former and the latter felt as though they could not return to where they 
had been. ‘There are certain limits to human experience and it is not allowed 
to overstep it without being punished; if it so happens that we step “beyond” 
it, it is impossible to return to the earlier state. Otherwise, the fundamental 
structure changes, a human being is different from what he was before.’ 45
It might be that for this reason it is only those people who had gone through 
the same experience that can understand one another best. Investigations into 
severe traumas showed how important people sharing the same fate were. On 
the whole, the individuals who had experienced political repressions specified 
many more factors of coping than the unrepressed individuals did. 46 Their 
traumatisation was severe and lasted for a long time. Most probably they had 
to look for more resources to help them to endure and survive. On the other 
hand, people themselves often feel that their experience cannot be defined by 
negative aftermaths alone. As much as 78 per cent of the repressed individuals 
stated that the ways of coping mastered during repressions were useful to them 
later in life. First of all, the victims indicated that they had become hardened, 
and learned to cope with difficulties. Some of them acquired professional skills, 
45 A. Kępiński, Rytm życia (Kraków: Wydawnictwo literackie, 1978).
46 E. Kazlauskas, D. Gailienė, “Politinių represijų metu patirto sunkaus ilgalaikio 
traumavimo psichologinių padarinių kompleksiškumas,” Psichologija. Mokslo darbai 27 
(2003), p. 43-52.; E. Kazlauskas “Politinių represijų ilgalaikės psichologinės pasekmės.”
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learned to communicate, to understand and sympathize with other people 
better. Many of them indicated the values they had cherished – belief in God 
and love for the Motherland. 47
Social Coping with Traumas
The general condition of traumatized individuals depends to a great extent on 
the general atmosphere of a society. Social recognition of traumas and aspiration 
for justice are necessary to the victims of traumas. This encourages the process 
of coping with traumas. However, society also needs processes of coping with 
collective traumas, which would help restore the ruined identity of separate 
social groups and the whole society. There is no single model to achieve that. It 
goes without saying that social solutions depend on many historical, cultural, 
political and psychosocial circumstances.
The most vivid example of an attempt at social reconciliation of the present 
century is the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, created 
by political will. Seeking to avoid new outbreaks of violence in society, Pres-
ident Nelson Mandela’s Government decided to stop persecuting those who 
were guilty of Apartheid if they pleaded guilty at an open sitting of the Com-
mission. The Commission listened to many stories of the perpetrators, and 
their openness led to issuance of many acts of release from punishment and 
contributed to the reconciliation of society. Attempts were made to apply this 
model in other countries too, especially when it was possible to clearly identify 
47 D. Gailienė, E. Kazlauskas, “Po penkiasdešimties metų: sovietinių represijų Lietuvoje 
psichologiniai padariniai ir įveikos būdai.”; E. Kazlauskas “Politinių represijų ilgalaikės 
psichologinės pasekmės.”; R. Žaržojūtė, “Ilgalaikio trauminio patyrimo įveikos ir 
vidinės darnos jausmo ryšys.“ (MA thesis, Vilnius university, 2004).
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two conflicting social groups among which concord had to be reached. 48 But 
this model raises many doubts – the victims find it very difficult to forgive if 
there is no juridical justice; besides, it is quite often that the criminals’ public 
confessions of guilt are very formal and the real situation of the victims still 
remains worse than that of the criminals. Most probably it is an impossible 
task for a state institution to solve moral issues of guilt and forgiveness. 49 The 
failure of a ‘thick line’ (gruba kreska) political agreement proposed by the 
Head of the Polish government Tadeusz Mazowiecki in 1989 showed that 
quite clearly. Even Germany’s experience of several decades in seeking to 
systematically re-assess its historical past is sometimes criticized because so-
cial measures enable avoidance of personal confrontation with the historical 
past. 50 Historical traumas are complicated: they affect different social groups 
in different ways, therefore it is impossible to adapt a single concrete method 
to their social remaking. Time and conscious social attempts are needed to 
restore one’s ruined identity.
Translated by Aldona Matulytė
48 For example, following the Rwandan Genocide, see: E. Staub, “Reconciliation after 
Genocide, Mass Killing or Intractable Conflict: Understanding the Roots of Violence, 
Psychological Recovery, and Steps Toward a General Theory,” Political Psychology 27 
(2006), p. 867-893.
49 J. Gauck, “Winter im Sommer – Frühling im Herbst. Erinnerungen,” 10 (2011) Auflage. 
Pantheon.
50 Th. Dorn, R. Wagner, “Wiedergutmachung,” in: Th. Dorn, R. Wagner, Die deutsche 
Seele (München: Knaus, 2011), p. 535-540.
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Reflections of the Soviet Legacy 
in the Life of an Individual and 
the Psychotherapeutic Process 
The Soviet legacy is a complicated phenomenon in the life of an individual, 
one which encompasses the consequences of mass collective traumas, as well 
as a specific relationship system that formed under the conditions of the author-
itarian regime. Discussions about the consequences of collective repression on 
an individual have been ongoing both in Lithuania and around the world for 
more than a decade. The investigations show that in many cases experiences 
of repression can be treated as traumatic events, and their consequences are 
often classified using the concepts of post-traumatic stress. In recent years 
more and more discussions have started not only about the individuals who 
had directly gone through collective traumas, but also about the second and 
third generations of the victims and the survivors. Non-integrated traumatic 
experiences can lead difficulties in behavior, relationships and the emotional 
life of an individual, and the language of compulsion can be transmitted from 
generation to generation. Traumatic experiences can manifest themselves in 
subtle ways of passive aggression, and sometimes in less subtle outbreaks of 
destruction. 1
Scientific research shows that the children of parents who have suffered 
from political repression not only show features of a post-traumatic stress, but 
they also have a much wider range of difficulties in adapting to external and 
1 P. Gobodo-Madikizela, “Forgiveness after Mass Atrocities in Cultural Context:  
Making Public Space Intimate,” in Cape Town 2007. Journeys, Encounters;  
Clinical, Communal, Cultural, ed. P. Bennett (Daimon: Verlag, 2009), p. 36-55.
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internal reality. Emotional instability, suicide, alcoholism, loss of personal 
initiative, and depreciation of the role of the male in society and the family – 
these and other features are discovered in studying the Soviet legacy. 2 One 
can form an even broader picture of traumatic consequences when studying 
investigations into victims of the Holocaust and their descendants. The above 
list of symptoms is supplemented by such somatic disorders as breast cancer, 
chronic pain, diabetes, asthma, and eating disorders, the origin of which is 
related in the first place to increased stress reactions, as the majority of the 
victims speak of stress as a constant everyday state. 3 Researchers of traumas 
notice that non-integrated anger can manifest itself in primitive forms of 
coping such as the above-mentioned suicidal behavior, and angry outbursts 
towards family members, even calling them the names of political enemies. 4 
Psychotherapeutic practice and studies of the analyses of long-term cases in 
particular show that the second generation carries a burden of unprocessed 
suppressed aggression. By its nature aggression is an instinctive response to 
an attack and threat; however, in cases of cultural and collective traumas it is 
most often suppressed because, as the analysis of the histories of the families 
shows, demonstration of open resistance (or aggression) to the Soviet conquer-
ors meant death in many cases. The children of the parents who went through 
political repression seem to have serious problems with aggression integration 
2 D. Gailienė, E. Kazlauskas, “Fifty Years on: The Long-Term Psychological Effects of 
Soviet Repression in Lithuania,” in The Psychology of Extreme Traumatisation: The 
Aftermath of Political Repression, ed. D. Gailienė (Vilnius: Akreta, 2005), p. 67-108; 
D. Gailienė, Ką jie mums padarė. Lietuvos gyvenimas traumų psichologijos žvilgsniu 
(Vilnius: Tyto Alba, 2008).
3 H. Wiseman et al., “Parental Communication of Holocaust Experiences and 
Interpersonal Patterns in Offspring of Holocaust Survivors,” International Journal of 
Behavioral Development 26, 4 (2002), p. 372.
4 H. A. Barocas, C. B. Barocas, “Separation – Individuation Conflicts in Children 
of Holocaust Survivors,” Journal of Contemporary Psychotherapy, 11 Issue 1 (Spring/
Summer, 1980), p. 6-14.
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because aggression is identified with destruction and pain, thus suppressing the 
constructive possibilities of its use as well. 5 An analysis of psychotherapeutic 
cases shows that it is not only insecurity that is internalized but also suppressed 
aggression, which externally can manifest itself in the symptoms of depression 
and be a cause of bouts of anxiety and destructive behavior.
Some authors basing themselves on the psychodynamic paradigm indicate 
not only the traumatic legacy but also develop the depth presumptions of this 
phenomenon, which are important in organizing help and providing it. Harvey 
and Carol Barocas, basing their position on the theory of ego psychology and 
ego development, state that if parents or grandparents failed to psychologi-
cally integrate traumatic experience, if they had no possibilities to mourn the 
loss of their relatives, their relationship with their children is marked by the 
shadows of traumatic experience. When analyzing the system of relationships 
of the children of those who had suffered from the Holocaust, it is discovered 
that processes of the development of these individuals are disturbed, and that 
processes of separation and individuation take place in a very complicated 
way because separation is subconsciously understood as death and therefore 
must be avoided. According to many psychodynamic theorists, the ability to 
separate and the ability to tolerate loneliness are an important condition for 
the formation of ego and for the inner relationship system. If this does not take 
place, an increased dependence on other people can develop, or conversely one 
fights for autonomy all his life, giving prominence to the independence of an 
individual. In both cases difficulties in interpersonal relations arise because 
both extreme adaptation and extreme withdrawal can determine a problem-
atic self-assessment or a feeling of isolation, and frustration of the needs and 
problems of emotional functioning.
5 G. Gudaitė, “Psychological Afterefects of the Soviet Trauma and the Analytical 
Process,” in The Psychology of Extreme Traumatisation, p. 108-126.
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When elucidating the trauma transmission phenomenon, proponents of 
objective relations mention the precondition of the mechanism of projective 
identification, which means that a certain experience of the parent is sub-
consciously delegated to other generations and manifests itself in dreams, 
in transference reactions in therapy, or emerges in other forms of symbolic 
language. 6 The Jungian analyst Kristina Schelinsky, when analyzing cases of 
long-term psychotherapy, discovered that this mechanism is useful in explain-
ing some somatic symptoms or even disorders, and it can be of significance in 
understanding counter-transference reactions. The traumatized parents can 
transmit their emotional insecurity to their children, who can internalize that 
insecurity, as well as perceptions of the external reality as threatening. 7
Modern neuropsychological investigations support the hypothesis of 
transmitting the consequences of the trauma from generation to generation, 
which states that children of the traumatized parents have a genetic inheritance 
marked by the trauma at birth. For example, Yehuda and co-authors discover 
these tendencies when comparing the indicators of cortisol and others. 8
Further results of the investigations could be discussed. Investigations 
into trans-generational traumas are a rapidly developing sphere all over the 
world and they generate rather controversial assessments. Wars, oppressions 
and traumas have always been a part of human history. Is the human gene 
pool affected by the cataclysm of the twentieth century only? Mankind has 
survived somehow and found ways of coping with upheaval. Do we find only 
6 D. Rowland-Klein, R. Dunlop, “The Transmission of Trauma across Generations: 
Identification with Parental Trauma in Children Holocaust Survivors,” Australian and 
New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry 32, 3 (1998), p. 358.
7 K. Schelinsky, “When Psyche mutters through matter.” (paper presented at the 19th 
International Congress from Analytical Psychology: Copenhagen 2013 – 100 Years on: 
Origins, Innovations and Controversies, 2013 August).
8 R. Yehuda, L. Bierier, “Transgenerational Transmission of Cortisol and PTSD Risk,” 
Progress in Brain Research, 167 (2007), p. 121.
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pathology when we investigate severe experiences? These and other questions 
arise during discussions about the traumatic consequences. It is most probably 
not by chance that so many investigations are being carried out, and they only 
confirm the dynamic nature and complexity of this phenomenon. A study was 
recently conducted in Lithuania which found that in the studied mental health of 
representatives of the second generation (that is, their post-traumatic reactions 
on the whole), their levels of hopelessness and feelings of inner harmony do not 
differ from the corresponding indicators of mental health of the control groups. 
It is only the indicators of emotional irritability that differ. 9 These results are in 
line with the tendencies of the investigations into the second generation of the 
Holocaust: long-term consequences are established but the second generation 
is not distinguished for its psychopathology. Here we speak about a specific 
‘psychological profile’ which is characterized by increased sensitivity to stress, 
difficulties related to interpersonal relations, separation, individuation, and 
decreased psychological resistance. 10
The analysis of the research shows that the results of the investigations 
depend to a great extent on what methods are used to study this phenomenon. 
Natan Kellermann, in summing up 35 trauma transmission studies noticed 
that when such methods as MMPI (the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality 
Inventory) or 16 factors of the California Personality Inventory are used in the 
investigation no differences between the victims’ descendants and the members 
of the control group emerge. At the same time an in-depth interview which 
goes into the history of trauma, Antonovski’s ‘Life Orientation Questionnaire’ 
shows both increased sensitivity and relationship problems. 11 The author ob-
9 I. Vaskelienė, “Politinių represijų Lietuvoje ilgalaikės psichologinės pasekmės antrajai 
kartai.“ (PhD diss., Vilnius University, 2012).
10 H. Wiseman et al., “Parental Communication of Holocaust Experiences.”
11 N. Kellermann, “Transmission of Holocaust Trauma,” Israel Journal of Psychiatry and 
Related Sciences 38,1 (2001), p. 41.
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serves that almost all psychotherapists who work with the second and third 
generations discover manifestations of the specific consequences of trauma 
and difficulties related to that, whereas these difficulties are not observed when 
investigations are carried out with the help of traditional psycho-diagnostic 
methods. It seems that the creation of a safe space, careful observation of the 
formation of the relationship, an investigation into the family history, the 
analysis of symbolic manifestations (all of this taking place in psychotherapy) 
can be appropriate methods which reveal a complicated picture of the histor-
ical legacy in the psyche of the survivors of the second and third generations.
Manifestation of Collective Trauma within 
the Context of Analytic Psychotherapy
Lithuania, like many post-Soviet countries, suffered from both the Second 
World War and post-war repression. The mere fact that during 50 years of dif-
ferent occupations (the first Soviet occupation in 1940, the Nazi occupation 
of 1941-1944, and the second Soviet occupation of 1944-1991) Lithuania lost 
one third of its population testifies to the broad scope of losses. On the other 
hand, the occupations have come to an end, but the question remains: is that 
legacy of the past still significant to the people of today? If so, how do they live 
with such a legacy? What are the possibilities of psychotherapy within this 
context? What are the dynamics of the traumatic consequences in long-term 
psychotherapy?
Joining the discussion about the transmission of the consequences of col-
lective trauma, we carried out a study which sought answers to these questions. 
A search for answers to those questions is important to both psychotherapeutic 
practice and the development of theoretical suppositions, especially when 
we seek to achieve a deeper understanding of the destructive and regressive 
behavior of an individual. We analyzed 64 cases of long-term analytical psy-
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chotherapy in our study of over three years. We devoted special attention to 
the analysis of dreams (in particular series of dreams), to family history and 
to revealing dominating models of prevailing relationships. These methods 
were chosen not only because of the abovementioned peculiarities but also 
due to the theoretical paradigm on which analytical psychotherapy is based.
C.G. Jung’s theory of analytical psychology and the analytical psychotherapy 
based on it have several specific features which are significant when working 
with collective traumas. First of all comes the concept of the unconsciousness, 
which, according to the authors of this paradigm, is explained by separating 
several levels: personal, family, cultural and collective. This separation means 
that in seeking to understand an individual’s motivation and choices, not only 
the personal perspective of the individual but also the role of the family and 
culture in the individual’s life are analyzed, as well as the manifestation of the 
universal tendencies of human nature. These levels are significant, especially 
when we work with symbolic material, and when we seek to open up traumat-
ic experiences encapsulated in the unconsciousness. 12 They can be personal, 
cultural or collective. Another important principle of this psychotherapeutic 
direction is that a deeper understanding of the unconscious is sought not only 
on the basis of determinism but also following the principles of teleology and 
synchronicity. Their implementation means that during psychotherapy attempts 
are made not only to find the cause or explanation of difficulties but also to 
reveal the resources of the individual or that psychic heritage which had not 
been harmed by the traumas. It is necessary to reveal and develop the strength 
of an individual in seeking to overcome consequences of the destructive legacy. 
Jung’s analytical psychotherapy pays special attention to symbolic material. 
The symbol can integrate in itself both the aspects visible to consciousness and 
12 U. Wirtz, “The Symbolic Dimension in Trauma Therapy,” in Spring 82: Symbolic Life 
(New Orleans: Spring Journal, 2009), p. 31-52.
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those of unconscious experience: it can be a good bridge joining these spheres 
of psychic functioning. 13 The ability to speak and read the language of symbols 
is important when analyzing the consequences of cultural or collective traumas. 
Many practitioners and trauma researchers notice that suffering experienced 
during the trauma is so horrible that it is impossible to be expressed by means 
of words. It is only in such indirect ways as dreams, visions or other forms of 
symbolic language whose expression leaves a certain freedom of choice of 
meaning for an individual that it is possible to come into contact with this 
experience. Such a viewpoint and its implementation are especially suitable 
when confronting the Soviet ideology, which recognized neither the idea of 
ambiguity nor freedom to uncover different meanings of the phenomenon. 
Based on the exaltation of materialism and objectivity, it denied in essence the 
value of individuality and the subjective inner world of a person. Within this 
context, fostering of the subjective world becomes an important task when 
confronting the consequences of the Soviet legacy.
Hence, does the theme of collective traumas remain important to the 
modern individual? Does this theme arise in the process of psychotherapy? Our 
investigation showed that evidence of political repression in family histories 
appeared in 44 cases, almost 70 per cent of all those we analyzed. When ana-
lyzing descriptions of family histories it turned out that the closest relatives 
(parents or grandparents) had experienced collective torture. In seven cases 
torture resulted in death, in other cases grandparents or parents were deported 
to Siberia, were imprisoned for political reasons, were regularly persecuted by 
the KGB, were killed or physically traumatized because of their participation 
in resistance, and/or suffered from the Nazis during the Second World War. 
How do these facts emerge in the process of psychotherapy?
13 C. G. Jung, “Approaching the Unconscious,” in Man and his Symbols (New York: Laurel, 
1977).
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At the initial stage of psychotherapy our clients did not speak about the 
facts of collective trauma suffered in their family history, and psychological 
difficulties were never related to political repression or to the effect of their 
traumatizing consequences. A lack of self-confidence, anxiety, fear and other 
symptoms were related to the current situation in the family, relations at work, 
etc. When analyzing the cases it turned out that this taciturnity had been 
determined by different motives.
Some of the clients knew the facts of historical events, although their emo-
tional relationship to them was rather vague. For example, some clients knew 
that both their parents and grandparents had been deported to Siberia, but they 
accepted this as a normal thing: ‘The majority of the families had experienced 
this.’ Others did not find it important or they treated it as a finished matter: ‘I 
wrote down my grandmother’s reminiscences a long time ago.’
Another group of clients knew the traumatic facts of the family history 
but they spoke of them unwillingly, as an unrealized feeling of shame was 
obvious in their attitude. For example, Jokūbas’ father was killed by the KGB 
in the 1950s but at the beginning of psychotherapy Jokūbas said only that his 
father had died when Jokūbas was still a child. The patient did not want to say 
anything more lest he create the impression that something was wrong with 
his father. Later it turned out that his father had been treated at a mental hos-
pital, so Jokūbas began to doubt whether he himself was healthy. It was only 
later when the patient decided to look for the documents and learned that his 
father had been treated at Cherniachovsky Hospital that his relation with his 
father’s history and himself changed.
The attitude in which the first prevailing feeling was shame and irritabil-
ity was also expressed in those cases where the family history was confused 
because it was not clear who was on which side. The grandparents’ generation 
had suffered under the Soviet occupiers, whereas the parents adapted to the 
circumstances, and quite often even occupied responsible positions in Soviet 
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nomenclature. Members of this group felt shame (‘it is not clear what about’) 
and at least at the beginning of therapy avoided questions about their parents’ 
and grandparents’ past.
Hence, our study showed that a certain defensiveness in relation to the 
collective traumas manifested itself in many cases. This attitude is often related 
to the strategy of survival. Dissociation, repression of traumatic experience, 
and sometimes denial were important strategies of survival at least for the 
parents’ generation. Concealment of wounds and at the same time of one’s 
own reactions and values was an important thing in order not to once again 
become a victim. A fear of authority, which is perceived within this context 
both as destructive and as dangerous, and various forms of avoidance behav-
ior were a rather typical model of relationships for many clients whose family 
members had suffered from political repression. 14 An even more complicated 
explanation of defences is revealed in those cases where the family history was 
rather confused. The generation of grandparents suffered, and the generation 
of parents adapted itself successfully. We noticed that to overcome the trau-
matic consequences these various compensatory measures were employed: 
rationalization, the formation of reaction or a reverse reaction, and strategies of 
changing one’s identity. Jonas’ history is a vivid example of that: his father was 
killed by the KGB, and Jonas himself tried to adapt himself to the Soviet system. 
As he studied in Moscow, he found a Russian girlfriend and planned a prom-
ising future with her there. On completing his studies, however, he gave up 
everything and returned to Lithuania and started to live a life that was not so 
successful. During psychotherapy the client said that he had had a dream after 
14 H. Dieckmann, “Some Aspects of the Development of Authority,” Journal of Analytical 
Psychology 22,3 (1977), p. 230-242; G. Gudaitė, “The Dynamic of authority images 
in the Context of consequences of Collective trauma.” (paper presented at the 19th 
International Congress from Analytical Psychology: Copenhagen 2013 – 100 years on: 
Origins, Innovations and Controversies, 2013 August).
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which he understood that it was impossible to continue living like that. Jonas 
could neither retell the dream itself nor how he interpreted it but he remem-
bered clearly that feeling of clarity which changed his life. It is obvious that 
the decision came from his unconscious and it seems that it was necessary to 
change his compensatory strategy of adaptation. This episode illustrates one of 
the most essential consequences of the traumatic legacy – a disturbed feeling 
of continuity. The link with the killed ones breaks and attempts are made to 
not repeat fate of the parents; the compensation, however, is finally perceived 
as a betrayal. Such understanding only increases anxiety and feelings of guilt 
and inferiority which are difficult to control. A disturbed feeling of continuity 
was present in other cases as well: when analyzing consequences of collective 
traumas not only entire episodes of the family history but also reminiscences 
colored with shame, hopelessness, guilt and anger that had escaped the memory 
came to light. It seemed that attempts were made to forget not only the fact 
of losses but also the hopelessness and regressive behavior of the relatives. It 
is not a secret that excessive use of alcohol, which could be called one of the 
regressive forms of overcoming a crisis, reflected itself in the histories of our 
patients. As Jolita told us, her grandfather’s excessive drinking might have 
stemmed from the need to appease the pain of his ruined life, but his children 
and grandchildren felt shame over him staggering through the streets of their 
small town.
To sum up, we have discovered rather firm defensive systems in the cases 
of traumatic experiences: dissociation, denial and repression. We have also 
uncovered different compensatory strategies, the reverse reaction, regression 
reactions, which manifest themselves in passivity, childlessness or learned 
hopelessness in crisis situations.
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Psychotherapy and Changes in 
Traumatic Consequences
Psychotherapy begins when reality is recognized, when those histories which 
had stayed in the unconscious for a long time and indirectly affected the life of 
an individual are finally begun to be told. Our study revealed that that the first 
references to those untold histories are made in symbolic forms. Repeating 
dreams or a series of dreams in which images of the experience of collective 
traumas were clearly reflected enable hypotheses of the collective trauma to 
be put forward:
I saw the war in my dream again. The pogrom again. 
Many people are driven into a field, shooting will start 
again. I am afraid to be shot dead.
The soldiers surrounded the house on all sides. I know 
that now they will start looking for us. We have to hide.
I went down into the basement of the house. Old peo-
ple were laid down there. They had been killed. I do 
not know how but I knew that somehow I was related 
to that.
These and other episodes of the dreams emerged (and repeated later). The 
patients themselves said that such dreams had a devastating effect and per-
plexed them. The scale of destruction perplexed them, as well as the fact that 
most often many people took part in them (the hypothesis about collective 
trauma, one of the definitions of which is the fact that traumatic events en-
compass a group of people, can be derived from that). The dreamers felt that 
images of their dreams were related to the historical events but naturally the 
following question arose: ‘what does all that have to do with me?’
In the psychotherapeutic process we sought to give an answer to this ques-
tion when analyzing the family history. Sooner or later the episodes of memo-
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ries emerged, which were another factor that confirmed the hypothesis of the 
consequences of political repression emerging in psychic life. In some cases 
people looked for their historical roots actively by, for example, questioning 
their surviving relatives, or visiting archives to search for information about 
their family history. In this way a picture emerged of the history of a family 
and the life of an individual which were both in one way or another affected by 
the political repression which took place in the Baltic States after the Second 
World War.
Donald Kalsched, one of the most prominent modern specialists on traumas, 
wrote in his analytical perspective that trauma in itself does not destroy the 
totality of one’s psyche. The psyche fragments itself as a defense mechanism. 
When the consequences of the trauma are analyzed it seems that the system of 
defense is as traumatogenic as the trauma itself. The system of defense focuses 
on the strategy of survival, and therefore it interprets any attempt to grow and 
become an individual as dangerous. 15
In many of the analyzed cases, insecurity and a fear of death, avoidance 
based on a fear of being seen, a low level of self-confidence, low self-esteem, 
emotional immaturity, emotional problems, and overreacting to adaptation 
to the external world was reflected. We noticed many cases where any attempt 
to grow and be independent of a certain internal part was treated as dangerous 
and was to be punished. The Soviet ideology, based on a materialistic worldview 
which in essence did not recognize the importance of individuality and all the 
more so the importance of the inner world (which was identified with the spiri-
tual world) was of great significance to the formation of this emotional attitude.
Attempts to overstep the systems of defense and restore memories and 
history were, at least partly, referred to as the first stage of psychotherapy when 
15 D. Kalsched, The Inner World of Trauma. Archetypal Defenses of the Personal Spirit 
(London: Routledge, 1996); D. Kalsched, Trauma and the Soul. Psycho-spiritual 
Approach to Human Development and its Interruption (London: Routledge, 2013).
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working with the consequences of political repression. Most often this stage 
included members of the family as well. In almost all cases the older members 
of the family were happy to be able to tell us about their past experience. Some 
of them wrote their memoirs because they knew that their written work would 
be read by at least a few people. The patients and their older relatives looked at 
the photographs of the past, and the names of persons who had been anony-
mous for a long time came back to them. It seems that an attempt to fill in the 
gaps of history was important not only to our patients but also to their families. 
Some of the clients said that after these reminiscences had been shared, after 
this communal experience, the general atmosphere within the family changed.
Our study showed that one of the most significant aspects of overcoming 
post-traumatic consequences was a growing consciousness of the memory 
episodes, and simultaneously of one’s own identity (as well as cultural iden-
tity) related to them. One of the purposes of Soviet repression was to create 
the Soviet Man and Soviet Culture, persistently and consistently obliterating 
the traditional moral values, spiritual practices, etc., which are attributed to 
culture in the broadest sense. Soviet culture denied the importance of the past, 
denied the basic needs of an individual, and was unable to serve the human 
being. However, it is ultimately culture (including ethnic) that helps reveal 
both the deepest nature of the human and the foundations of basic human 
dignity. More and more often, modern authors tend to admit the importance 
of culture when confronted with the manifestations of destruction. 16 In the 
psychotherapeutic process, when confronted with feelings of inferiority, guilt, 
shame or other consequences of trauma it is important to restore the secrets 
related to traumatic experience; of no less importance, however, is the resto-
ration of those historical episodes which strengthen a feeling of dignity and 
16 H. Hjelmeland, “Suicide Research and Prevention: The Importance of Culture in 
Biological Times,” in Suicide and Culture. Understanding the Context, ed. E. Colucci et 
al. (Park: Hogrefe, 2013), p. 7.
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self-confidence. An individual feels a certain way when he/she knows that his 
relatives were killed, that everything was seized from them, that they were 
tortured, and that when the political tension abated they alleviated their pain 
by drinking, unable to simply straighten themselves out. However, the feeling 
is quite different when one knows that he/she is a descendant of those who 
managed to survive a rather miserable existence, who avoided collaboration 
with the Soviet ideology and its authorities, and who somehow managed to 
maintain spiritual practices as well. This changed both a feeling of one’s self-es-
teem and dignity and perhaps lessened the shame which is discussed at the 
beginning of this article. A versatile restoration of history is significant to the 
restoration of a sense of identity and of continuity.
On the other hand, however, the experience of psychotherapy shows 
that a detailed restoration of the history of both an individual and their fam-
ily is not always possible, especially when it comes to overcoming defences. 
Confrontation with consequences of collective traumas is in essence a field 
where we encounter powerful forces of destruction. This does not only mean 
the restoration of history but in individual cases also a meeting with the very 
reality of death, which nobody can change. Therefore it is not surprising that 
people try to defend themselves against that highly intuitively, in the same 
way as against pain or horror, which could be a natural reaction in cases of 
collective traumas. Analysis of our cases shows that the restoration of facts 
and history at a rational level was accessible to many patients, although deeper 
changes encompassing transformations of emotional life (insecurity, aggression, 
shame) and changes in inner relationships (e.g. the dynamics of relationships 
with the authority) are not always a success. Dynamics of collective traumat-
ic consequences is a highly individual thing in psychotherapy and its flow 
cannot be explained by psychological mechanisms alone. Our study showed 
that when analyzing the phenomenology of experiencing the consequences 
of collective traumas, moments of transcendental experience occupied an 
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exceptional place in this process. Reflections of our clients showed that these 
moments also gave a feeling of relief, and a greater strength for coping with 
difficulties, a hope that life would improve in the future, as well as a feeling 
that their suffering had had meaning. However, we can neither foresee nor 
model these moments in any way. They just happen and clearly illustrate that 
the sufferings of an individual as well as the processes of transformation are 
affected by intangible forces.
I would like to illustrate this with an episode in the case of Agota, whose 
peculiar culmination was the following dream:
I am in a house in which, as far as I know, pogroms 
happen. The conquerors drive everyone outside, shoot 
some of them dead and let the rest go on living. An or-
dinary pogrom. I am also driven into that field and I am 
afraid that they will shoot me dead. We are laid down 
on the ground. There is a woman next to me. I realize 
that we are no longer outside but in a grave – I nestle 
myself to the ground, I feel even its smell. Suddenly 
somebody releases me and I understand that I am no 
longer afraid to die, that this depends on the Supreme 
Being. If they shoot at me, this will take a short minute 
and I shall endure that pain. I start praying and tell that 
woman that I am also saying prayers for her. Shots ring 
out above, they come to an end. I understand that this 
time it was not my turn. I look around, other people 
are also rising from the ground, and there isn’t a single 
one killed, only wounded.
As Agota analyzed this dream, reminiscences from the history of her family 
arose, along with other associations. She said that her relatives on her mother’s 
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side had been killed in a resistance movement and that this had been the fa mi-
ly’s secret for a long time. Despite the fact that both her father’s and mother’s 
families had gone through deportation to Siberia and there were no ideological 
disagreements in the family, Agota remembers her father’s words, which he 
said as the political situation began to improve: ‘there is nothing to be proud 
of if you failed to survive. It is much more important to find ways of how to 
survive, even during the war years.’
This dream had an enormous effect on Agota’s sense of security in her 
current life as well. According to her, something had changed indeed. One 
can raise suppositions whether that woman who she found herself in the grave 
with was a representation of the historical past, something that came from her 
mother’s experience of post-war repression, or that she perhaps was something 
from her present-day life. We shall never know for sure, but perhaps it is the 
very experience of revealing some important moments rather than the causes 
that are of importance: for one thing, there is the very fact of the reality of 
death. This sounds paradoxical but it seems that this is a crucial moment in 
the process of healing of trauma, one that opens a different side of existence. 
Being in the grave soon gives Agota the feeling of a strong relationship with 
the earth. Earth, which contains the greatest opposites of being: both life and 
death. And it seems that then something happens that is referred to in ana-
lytical psychology as a transcendental event – fear disappears. The activity of 
the Supreme Being is perceived as reality.
The analysis of our cases showed that hints about the experience of the 
transcendental reality revealed themselves in other cases as well. Sometimes 
this emerged as a ritual performed in pre-Christian, Baltic religion, some-
times as a Biblical motif, sometimes as a reference to the life of Christ, and 
sometimes as a sacrificial ritual. These and other images can be interpreted as 
an adequate reference to recognizing the dimension of transcendental being. 
In psychotherapy we do not usually analyze the contents of such experience, 
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rather we raise the question: what does it mean to the life of an individual if we 
recognize that this reality is also a part of life? The analysis of our cases shows 
that this experience is significant to the processes of revelation, integration 
of losses, finding new ways to carry on, and the reestablishment of integrity – 
especially within the context of collective traumas. Agota’s subsequent dream 
is an excellent illustration of this attitude:
I was travelling home but unexpectedly I found myself 
near some barbed wire, behind which there was a large 
house. I knew that it was Brezhnev’s house, the temple 
of Socialism. A cement canal was dug with bricks built 
up around it. Upon approaching it I was surprised be-
cause there was no water in the canal, but there were 
stairs in it. I went down to the bottom, the walls were 
very high; it was dark and slippery. I stopped so that 
my eyes could get used to the darkness. Then I took 
several steps, it became lighter, and moss appeared on 
the concrete. The house had been built a long time ago. 
I moved ahead cautiously. The walls became somewhat 
smaller, more light appeared. Having looked more 
intently I saw small shoots of grass, which had man-
aged to cut through the concrete. That was something 
miraculous that such fragile grass overcomes such 
massive, it seems, immovable concrete. I looked at 
that tender grass. It seemed that it had increased in 
volume. I moved on. The canal turned into a road 
winding though the meadow.
Agota retold this dream cheerfully, amazed at how the unconsciousness could 
‘think of it in this way.’ The metaphor of grass cutting through concrete is very 
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eloquent indeed. It reflects the physical reality (grass really can overcome 
concrete) but it can also be an excellent parallel to the development of psy-
chic life. This dream seems like a fairytale with a happy ending. The image 
of grass cutting through concrete reflects the vitality of life. The plot of the 
dream shows that despite barriers, despite the manmade temples and attempts 
to cement over the natural given one goes onto the road and into a meadow, 
which are interpreted as symbols of the proliferation of life in many sources. 
This dream sounds like a hopeful metaphor and, most probably, not only to 
Agota. The powers of life are stronger than the obstacles created by a political 
regime, at least in the subjective world of an individual. The dream does not 
only reflect a happy ending, it contains a reference to overcoming defences (a 
barbed fence, a concrete canal), and it contains determination of the ego to move 
forward and take risks (to descend into the depth and darkness of the canal). 
On the other hand, the ego of the dream moves slowly, cautiously, without 
losing vigilance. Our experience shows that this disposition is important not 
only on the path of an individual but also in the psychotherapy of traumatic 
consequences: it is important to notice it in a timely manner and adequately 
assess the defense systems, as sometimes it is possible to pass around them, and 
sometimes it is necessary to go deeper so as to understand what they protect. 
There are different ways and their choice depends on many things; perhaps the 
most important thing, however, is the very principle to go on moving, to look 
for a way out, sometimes patiently and without haste, sometimes resolutely and 
taking risks, although never losing the vigilance needed to enable one to see 
manifestations of destruction in time, as well as resources of hope and growth.
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Summing up
Our practice and the analyzed cases show that the paradigm of analytical 
psychology forms a suitable basis for working with the consequences of a col-
lective trauma. Analysis of the cases shows that episodes of non-integrated 
trauma can be passed down from generation to generation. It shows that it is 
not only reminiscences that are transmitted to other generations but also the 
methods an individual employs to cope with situations in which destruction 
took the upper hand. Rather rigid defensive systems are noticed in the cases 
of the second and third generations and a long time is needed to discover ones 
relationships with history, with one’s family, and with the cultural subconscious.
When we work with the representatives of the second and third generation, 
the image of a collective trauma is complicated, and it is quite often that we 
cannot give an answer to the questions who is a victim and who is a perpetra-
tor. In the psychotherapeutic process it seems that both carry a heavy burden: 
pain of loss, anger towards the aggressor, a cry for justice, shame over betrayal, 
guilt over collaboration, despair and helplessness in perceiving the power and 
consequences of collective destruction and a collective shadow – all these 
motifs come to light when we face the consequences of a collective trauma 
and political repression.
The individuals who grew up within this context have so-called blind spots, 
secrets related to traumatic episodes or to a shameful experience. The recreation 
of these untold stories is not a simple process. As we have seen in some cases, 
an individual takes risks when he goes deeper into his unconsciousness, as 
they might experience pain and fear as well as shame and mourning in order 
to achieve greater integration or connection. Our study shows that sometimes 
it works and sometimes it does not work. Sometimes an individual has the 
power to face destructive manifestations and change one’s activity at least 
in his/her psyche, and sometimes one does not have that ability, but none-
theless it is important to try, because an individual’s attempt is an essential 
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step in dis-identifying oneself from the attitude of victim. Political repression, 
life under the conditions of the authoritarian regime can be treated not only 
as a traumatizing experience but also as a condition which in essence affects the 
system of the individual’s relationships (internal and external), as well as his/
her emotional life. Psychotherapy is a suitable way to develop an individual’s 
system of relationships and also a feeling of well-being.
In conclusion I would like to draw attention to the significance of hope in 
our work. I should think that one of the duties of a psychotherapist is to see 
hints of hope and continuity. We have to be vigilant and to direct ‘our third eye’ 
not only toward revealing the secret or suppressed severe sufferings but also 
towards the possibility of the potential, towards that moment which promis-
es a better future in which we can recover experience of basic trust. In essence, 
another person cannot heal a wound; a human body and psyche are made so 
that they carry the possibilities of recovering within themselves. Our task is 
to help discover those possibilities.
Translated by Aldona Matulytė
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Anti-communist Tendencies in Soviet 
Lithuania between 1965 and 1988: 
Shape, Contents and Development
Opposition against the overpowering of the private 
life by the public life in the context of suppression of 
freedom by the totalitarian state produces a variety of 
forms of cultural resistance. These forms are systems 
of symbolic codes that expressively interpret a certain 
perceived injustice, assuming the present social inca-
pability to resolve it otherwise. 1
In 1940 the Republic of Lithuania was drawn into a political and social space 
formed by two totalitarian regimes, the USSR and Nazi Germany. From the 
first year of the occupation, the Soviet authorities started destroying the ex-
isting social order and creating a new one. 2 According to the classical theory 
of totalitarianism, one of the main tasks of these transformations is to create 
state which is not separate from the society, but in which all types of social 
and political life of individuals were at the state’s disposal and nothing existed 
beyond its symbolic borders. 3
1 G. A. Barhaim, Public-Private Relations in Totalitarian States (London: Transaction 
Publishers, 2012), p. 157.
2 Lietuva 1940–1990: okupuotos Lietuvos istorija, ed. A. Anušauskas  
(Vilnius: LGGRTC, 2005).
3 Z. Norkus, Kokia demokratija, koks kapitalizmas? Pokomunistinė transformacija 
Lietuvoje lyginamosios istorinės sociologijos požiūriu (Vilnius: Vilniaus universiteto 
leidykla, 2008), p. 212.
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This definition also includes attempts to exercise unlimited control of both 
the private and public lives of individuals. In such a state no political action can 
be developed and it is hardly possible for a private or public discussion to be 
held free from the all-embracing totalitarian ideology. The existence of space 
where such kind of communication could be developed is extremely dangerous 
to totalitarianism. That is why the oppositional ideas and the development of 
alternative spaces that do not fall under the state control in such countries 
is a relevant research subject, capable of telling us much about the formation 
and genesis of totalitarian societies.
The subject of this article is the phenomenon of various types of anti-Soviet 
activities existing in Soviet Lithuania from 1956 to 1988 (the formation of the 
Reform Movement of Lithuania). 4 The basic aim of the article is not limited 
to a meticulously and carefully carried out reconstruction of this phenomenon, 
as well as its description, characterization and typologisation. I also sought to 
find a relevant theoretical perspective which could serve as one of the possible 
methodological tools able to explain the formation, shape and contents of 
anti-communist tendencies in the society of the Lithuanian SSR 5 in the late 
Soviet era.
It was those subjects which I sought to describe and understand, and with 
the help of classical theories of sociology, Soviet and Communist studies, and 
new scientific insights into the period, I formulated three main questions:
1. What type and shape of anti-communist tendencies existed in Soviet 
Lithuania?
2. Why could these tendencies exist and develop in such a strictly controlled 
society as a communist state?
4 In Lithuanian: Lietuvos Persitvarkymo Sąjūdis, usually referred to as Sajūdis.
5 I use terms Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic, Lithuanian SSR and LSSR as 
synonyms.
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3. How did they develop, what form and content did they take and how were 
these anti-communist tendencies related to trends in the whole of the 
USSR and the Eastern Bloc?
Hence, in the research I try to remove the phenomenon of the anti-communist 
activities in the Lithuanian SSR after 1956 from the limited and narrow local 
theoretical, methodological and conceptual contexts and to put it into more 
universal ones. It is important to stress here that this research was carried 
out in an inductive way. The initial strategy was openness to every possible 
theoretical approach, or to a complex of several approaches. Thus, the main 
research method was not based on efforts to measure how the phenomenon of 
the anti-communist activities in the Lithuanian SSR fit into the framework of 
one or another influential and fashionable theory. On the contrary, I sought to 
find out and describe the main features of the subject of the research. And only 
then was the qualitative methodological and theoretical analysis carried out.
Gradually the research led to understanding that the idea of the public sphere 
was one of the most relevant theoretical backgrounds capable of measuring the 
processes that took place in Communist Lithuania. This concept introduced 
by the famous German sociologist Jürgen Habermas 6 and later developed by 
other researchers is linked with both classic and most recent theories exploring 
totalitarian societies in the present research.
In this research the public sphere is defined as a space constituted by crit-
ical inter-individual communication capable of creating an alternative to the 
state-dominated public and even private discourses. 7 The existence of this 
space under the conditions of a totalitarian regime is the main methodological 
6 J. Habermas, The structural transformation of the public sphere. An Inquiry into a Category 
of Bourgeois Society (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1991).
7 L. Dahlberg,“The Habermasian Public Sphere: A Specification of the Idealized 
Conditions of Democratic Communication,” Studies in Social and Political Thought 10 
(2004), p. 3-6.
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problem I am trying to solve by proposing the use of a combination of already 
existing and well-known theories analyzing the public sphere and those devoted 
to the analysis of totalitarian societies.
Another important concept in this research is anti-communist tendencies. 
It is much broader than other notions, common in Lithuanian historiography, 
such as: anti-Soviet resistance, passive resistance, unarmed resistance, ect. 8 
All types of anti-communist tendencies, whether active or passive, could cre-
ate a greater or smaller alternative space which can be identified as the public 
sphere. Hence, the basic concept in the article of anti-Soviet tendencies includes 
all the above-mentioned forms of anti-communist activities and refers to all 
forms of actions and words, performed or said with the intention of criticizing 
or eliminating the Soviet system during the period of 1956-1988.
Anti-communist activity pursued in Soviet Lithuania after 1956 is not a pop-
ular topic 9 in contemporary Lithuanian historiography. In the Lithuanian 
historical memory ‘armed resistance’ or, in other words, the partisan war is 
treated as especially important. 10 The anti-Soviet actions taken after 1953 have 
not been investigated extensively enough because after the collapse of the 
USSR Lithuanian scientists were engaged in the intensive work of collecting 
historical data and describing the phenomenon in the language of historical 
facts in the course of the two previous decades. Besides, the fact that social 
8 Ž. Račkauskaitė, “Pasipriešinimas sovietiniam režimui Lietuvoje septintajame-
aštuntajame dešimtmetyje,” Genocidas ir rezistencija 2 (4) (1998), p. 52-54.
9 More on the historiography tradition of anti-communist activities in Soviet Lithuania 
in: Ž. Račkauskaitė, “Pasipriešinimas sovietiniam režimui Lietuvoje septintajame-
aštuntajame dešimtmetyje,”; Monika Kareniauskaitė, “Lietuvos neginkluotojo 
antisovietinio pasipriešinimo antrosios sovietų okupacijos metais ištakos ir veiksniai,” 
Genocidas ir rezistencija 2 (30) (2011).
10 For example, one of the research programs carried out by the Genocide and Resistance 
Research Centre of Lithuania is called ‘The Unarmed anti-Soviet Resistance, 1954-
1988.’ See more in: http://www.genocid.lt/centras/lt/1497/a/.
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sciences in Lithuania are comparatively young 11 helps to explain why anti-Soviet 
tendencies in Lithuania during the period of the oppressive Soviet rule have 
not yet been extensively studied on the basis of latest modern scientific con-
cepts related to investigations into modern and late-modern societies, whether 
democratic, authoritarian or totalitarian.
Most Lithuanian authors agree that the development of anti-communist 
activities in Soviet Lithuania was not a uniform process. There were several 
main ideological groups: the ethno-cultural movement, the Roman Catholic 
activists (bishops, priests, religious and lay people), the nationalistic under-
ground, and the liberals. The ethno-cultural movement was semi-legal. Three 
other forms were strictly persecuted by Soviet law and the KGB, particularly 
for their main method of activity, which was the underground publishing and 
dissemination of samizdat 12 (illegal press – M.K.). In this article I shall use 
several examples of Lithuanian historiography to represent basic research car-
ried out into the various above-mentioned groups of anti-communist activists. 
Almost all of these groups are depicted in the above-mentioned volume edited 
by Jūratė Kavaliauskaitė and Ainė Ramonaitė. 13 This article also concentrates 
11 In the LSSR the social sciences and humanities were under a high degree of state 
control and ideologization and so had very limited conditions to develop and to forma 
critical approach. After the collapse of USSR, it had to destroy the old paradigms 
and build new ones almost from the start. See more in: A. Švedas, Matricos nelaisvėje. 
Sovietmečio lietuvių istoriografija (1944-1985) (Vilnius: Aidai, 2009), English translation 
of this study will be published in due course, undet the title: In the Captivity of the 
Matrix. Soviet Lithuanian Historiography, 1944-1985.
12 I use term samizdat, which etymologically means‘self-published,’ to describe all forms 
of illegal publishing and dissemination of illegal press in Soviet Union.
13 J. Kavaliauskaitė and A. Ramonaitė, ed., Sąjūdžio ištakų beieškant: nepaklusniųjų 
tinklaveikos galia (Vilnius: Versus aureus, 2011), see also the article by those authors in 
this volume.
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on research by Egidijus Jaseliūnas 14 orientated towards the phenomenon of 
illegal publishing and the Catholic movement; work by Valdemaras Klumbys 15 
on the liberal stream of the anti-Soviet movement; and an article by Živilė 
Račkauskaitė, 16 which analyses all streams of the movement between the 1960s 
and 1970s.
The main historical sources of this research are authentic documents of 
the Lithuanian underground (usually printed on the pages of the samizdat 
press) and the underground periodicals. The Chronicle of the Catholic Church 
in Lithuania (hereinafter referred to as LKBK) published from 1972 through 
1989, the longest-running Lithuanian samizdat periodical. It was published and 
disseminated by a network of nuns, priests, and other religious and lay people. 
It contained mainly facts about the violations of the universal human rights 
in the Lithuanian SRR and all over the USSR. 17 Starting with the violation of 
the rights of the believers, the periodical in the course of its existence devel-
oped into a more universal discourse and encompassed not only violations of 
religious rights but also of human rights in general. 18
Nonetheless, seeking to achieve as great degree of objectivity as possible, 
the reflection of the reality in LKBK has to be compared with the images of the 
reality found in the publications of other anti-communist groups. That is why 
14 E. Jaseliūnas, “Periodinės savilaidos formavimasis: sovietinio disidentizmo reiškinys 
ir Lietuvos katalikiškasis judėjimas,” Genocidas ir rezistencija 1(11) (2002); E. Jaseliūnas, 
“Vatikano II Susirinkimo nutarimų įtaka katalikiškojo pasipriešinimo formavimuisi 
Lietuvoje,” Genocidas ir rezistencija, 2 (12) (2002).
15 V. Klumbys, “Pogrindžio leidinys Perspektyvos (1978–1981): intelektualiosios savilaidos 
pradžia Lietuvoje,” Genocidas ir rezistencija 2 (12) (2002).
16 Ž. Račkauskaitė, “Pasipriešinimas sovietiniam režimui Lietuvoje septintajame-
aštuntajame dešimtmetyje.”
17 A. Streikus, Sovietų valdžios antibažnytinė politika Lietuvoje (1940-1990),  
(Vilnius: LGGRTC, 2002), p. 251-252.
18 Lithuanian Special Archives, f. K-1, ap. 58, b. P16577, vol. 6, p. 63
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I use another important source, Perspektyvos, an illegal periodical published 
by the liberal section of the movement between 1978 and 1981, known as one 
of the most intellectual and sophisticated periodicals of the Lithuanian sam-
izdat. Although published by the liberal stream, it reflects other streams in the 
movement as well. 19 I will use the published version of the source. 20
The documents found in the Lithuanian Special Archives and the pub-
lished documents are important as well. The Archives contain documents 
that were drawn up and disseminated by the representatives of the Lithuanian 
anti-communist underground (such as proclamations or protest declarations).
Public Sphere in the Communist Regime? 
From Theory to the Case of the LSSR
If we seek to go deeply into understanding various anti-communist tendencies 
in the Lithuanian SSR after 1956, it is necessary to start with the analysis of the 
regime and the society. It is also important to reconsider different theories and 
concepts, which could serve as an effective tool for explaining the anti-com-
munist tendencies in LSSR.
In its original meaning, the main subject of my article – the public sphere – 
is a specific area in social life where individuals come together to freely discuss 
and identify societal problems, and influence political action through that 
discussion. It is ‘a discursive space in which individuals and groups congregate 
to discuss matters of mutual interest and, where possible, to reach a common 
judgment. There are many examples of such spaces – this type of discussion 
can be developed in direct tête-à-tête communication, as well through the 
19 V. Klumbys, “Pogrindžio leidinys Perspektyvos (1978–1981),” p. 179.
20 Perspektyvos. Lietuvos pogrindžio leidinys. 1978-1981 m. (Vilnius: Gairės, 2005).
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mass media.’ 21Also, the existence and shape of the public sphere is the tool 
that helps the existence or absence of a ‘civil society,’ which is not equal to the 
state, to be identified. 22
At first sight, the use of the concept of the public sphere to identify the 
processes which took place in the Communist state seems very problematic for 
two reasons: a) the theory of the public sphere was created and developed by 
Habermas observing and studying Western democracies; hence, doubts arise 
about it being directly applied to studies of the communist states of Eastern 
Europe; b) in a classical understanding of the communist societies there are 
many doubts about whether such a social discourse as the public sphere could 
exist there under the conditions of strict state control or even total dominance 
of the Communist Party.
There are other theoretical limitations too. The concept the public sphere 
in its original meaning refers to the ‘bourgeoisie public sphere,’ a specific space 
of democracy based on communication, developed during the modernization 
of European society and the growing power of the bourgeoisie as a social class 
in the 18th century. 23 However, Jürgen Habermashas reconsidered his theory 
many times. According to Habermas, scholar Matt Cooke in his recent the-
oretical works, instead of ‘attempting to derive critical norms from specific 
historical moments (…) aims to unearth the general structures of action’ and 
to understand ‘the everyday communicative practice.’ 24
21 G. A. Hauser, “Vernacular Dialogue and the Rhetoricality of Public Opinion,” 
Communication Monographs 65 (2) (1998), p. 86; G. Th. Goodnight, “The Personal, 
Technical, and Public Spheres of Argument,” Journal of the American Forensics 
Association 18 (1982), p. 214-227.
22 J. Habermas,The structural transformation of the public sphere. An Inquiry into a Category 
of Bourgeois Society (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1991), p. 18-25.
23 J. Habermas, The structural transformation of the public sphere, p. xvii-xix.
24 L. Dahlberg, “The Habermasian Public Sphere,” p. 5.
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Thus, at the present time, the concept of the public sphere is not necessarily 
linked to concrete historical circumstances, nor to the geographical and cultural 
sphere in social sciences and humanities. It is not tied to the initial theory and 
is used within many different contexts. Soviet and Communist studies also 
try to reconsider the processes in the communist states in light of this theory. 
One such theoretical example useful in our research, the work by Gabriel A. 
Barhaim, is focused on a distinction between public and private spaces in 
totalitarian societies. Barhaim links the concept of the public sphere with the 
classical paradigm of totalitarianism. According to the author, the dichotomy 
between public and private spheres was accentuated by both Hannah Arendt 
and Jürgen Habermas. Furthermore, both of them identified the public sphere, 
first of all, with political action. 25
According to Barhaim, many different kinds of phenomena exist in the 
social and historical reality where the public sphere is able (or unable) to exist: 
in the street or agora, within a political party or a workers organization (as 
in the case of Solidarity in Poland), or in the mass media. For example, the 
samizdat can be treated as an illustrative example of the public sphere if it 
fulfils at least several necessary conditions, which will be discussed at length 
further. This definition of the public sphere is very broad. Under the conditions 
of communism and state control it even includes unconventional events or 
informal clothing fashions. 26
According to Barhaim, the situation of so-called ‘weak totalitarianism’ 
is necessary for the existence of an alternative space and the public sphere. 
However, the formation of the public sphere in a communist state is different 
from that in other societies: there the state controls and restricts the public 
sphere and suppresses the private one. This suppression, however, contrary to 
25 G. Barhaim, Public-Private Relations, p. 121-122.
26 G. Barhaim, Public-Private Relations, p. 122.
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the case of a classical form of totalitarianism, 27 can lead to the formation of an 
opposite public discourse. 28
As we see, under the conditions of non-democracy, the concept of the pub-
lic sphere can be understood as a specific sphere, free or liberated from state 
control, in which various forms of protest and sometimes of political action 
pursued by individuals can be developed. Of course, this understanding differs 
from the classical definition of the public sphere. In the situation of democra-
cy a political action in the public sphere can influence the general line of the 
state policy, and it has political power to affect real structural changes. 29 As 
we will see later, under the rule of communism the public sphere can have an 
impact on the attitudinal changes taking place in the society, and to include 
new participants in that sphere. Although it could hardly influence communist 
leaders and the general political line of the Communist Party.
Today the concept of the public sphere in Soviet and communist studies 
is treated as an effective tool used to measure processes that take place in the 
communist societies. But there is another serious methodological problem: 
was the society of the Lithuanian SSR, even in the late Soviet era, in a state of 
‘weak totalitarianism,’ in which some alternative discourse could be borne? 30 
The social sciences today have the tools to answer this question and to explain 
the processes in Soviet states after the death of Stalin. It seems that, preserv-
ing some features of the classical totalitarianism, such societies were able to 
develop new types of communism. According to Lithuanian sociologist Ze-
nonas Norkus, Soviet Lithuania after the death of Stalin gradually gained some 
27 Described, first of all, by Hannah Arendt.
28 G. Barhaim, Public-Private Relations, p. 161.
29 J. Habermas, The structural transformation of the public sphere.
30 H. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: The World Publishing Company, 
1958), p. 341-342.
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features of a political regime called ‘national patrimonial communism.’ The 
common decline of communism and transformation of the communist soci-
eties in the 1960s here led to the one important process: the growing impact of 
ethnic Lithuanians in the Communist Party of Lithuania. Besides, the earlier 
Communists genuinely and strongly believed in ideology and were ideological 
and high-principled, whereas later Communists lost their belief. They were 
pragmatic and belonged to the Party only to derive benefits or make a career. 
They belonged to the ethnic majority of society. These changes brought new 
tendencies, and space for expressing national feelings came into legal being. 
It was not as great as in Poland or Hungary, but it existed. 31
Of course, this space was still strictly controlled by the Communist Par-
ty. However, there was a theoretical possibility that this space could be used 
as a tool to generate some marginal and alternative ideas and practices under 
the conditions of reduced state control: in ‘the national-patrimonial commu-
nist’ regime the authorities usually encounter some opposing social groups. 32
It is important to mention that under these conditions the strategy of the 
authorities differs from that under a totalitarian regime. The authorities do 
not suppress the opposite tendencies but come to a certain compromise with 
the society. In general the authorities manage to achieve general passivity of 
the majority of the society, although they do loosen their control over certain 
spheres of life. Most often such spheres are related to historical national heritage 
and architecture, archaeology and ethnic culture. Here the society can feel free 
from communist rhetoric and propaganda. Theoretically, such a compromise 
31 Z. Norkus, Kokia demokratija, koks kapitalizmas? Pokomunistinė transformacija 
Lietuvoje lyginamosios istorinės sociologijos požiūriu (Vilnius: Vilniaus universiteto 
leidykla, 2008), p. 258-259.
32 Z. Norkus, Kokia demokratija, p. 257.
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should prevent the society from taking real political action and bringing about 
direct confrontation with the regime. It creates the illusion of relative freedom. 33
In the case of Soviet Lithuania the above mentioned ‘regional’ or ‘ethno-cul-
tural’ movement which started in the 1950s fits into this category perfectly. It 
was not openly opposed to the Soviet system but focused on Lithuania’s his-
tory, ethnology, traditions, celebration of traditional feasts, and the visiting of 
historically, politically and culturally significant sites, etc. The authorities, at 
least at the onset of the movement, did not see that as dangerous and did not 
expect a limited amount of nationalism to provoke real political action. On 
the contrary, that could be seen as a suitable method of allowing the active 
part of the society to express the need for social activities and, in this way, to 
neutralize its civic ambitions. However, the ‘ethno-cultural’ movement was 
gradually losing its former formality and became much more dangerous than 
the Soviet leaders could have imagined. Some of its members were included 
in the dissident social networks. The convictions of some of the members of 
the ‘ethno-cultural’ movement formed in social environments where not only 
legal forms of national feelings were expressed but also where opposite ideas 
spread by way of illegal printing and distribution of the samizdat. 34
Thus, the changed nature of totalitarianism could be treated as part of the 
evidence and explanation of a critical and opposite discourse, which Jürgen 
Habermas called the public sphere and which existed and developed in the 
Communist LSSR.
33 Z. Norkus, Kokia demokratija, p. 257.
34 A. Ramonaitė, “Paralelinės visuomenės užuomazgos sovietinėje Lietuvoje: 
katalikiškojo pogrindžio ir etnokultūrinio sąjūdžio simbiozė,” in Sąjūdžio ištakų 
beieškant, ed. J. Kavaliauskaitė and A.R amonaitė, p. 33-59.
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The Formation of Anti-communist Tendencies: 
the Origin and External Features of the 
Public Sphere in the Lithuanian SSR
As I have already shown, the changed nature of totalitarianism can be treated 
as evidence that features of a special critical and opposite discourse, the public 
sphere, could exist and develop in the Communist Lithuanian SSR. Meanwhile 
the reconstruction of specific historical circumstances which influenced the 
formation of the public sphere helps to give an answer to the question of how, 
with certain features of the public sphere and social networks developing, it 
could exist in such a society where the authorities sought ‘to dismantle horizon-
tal interpersonal relations of human being, [and] to destroy the independent 
organizations and communities.’ 35
Considerable doubt still exists as to whether those regimes which came to 
power in Lithuania in 1940 and later were able to transform society by turning 
it into a fully totalitarian one. The Nazi occupation lasted for only four years. 
And the USSR occupied Lithuania after its totalitarianism had counted more 
than two decades. Hence, the processes which took place in the main part of 
the USSR in 1917 and afterwards had to be repeated; however, this was done 
in a hurry and under different conditions, which reduced qualitative changes 
and transformation indicators. Moreover, Lithuania and the Baltic States in 
general had historical backgrounds that considerably differed from those of 
other territories of the USSR. The Baltic States have been territories of Western 
Christianity for centuries and Catholicism played a significant role in Lithuania. 
Totalitarian transformations of these states were not so great, and they can be 
referred to as different. This is another reason why anti-communist tendencies 
could spread faster there.
35 A. Ramonaitė, J. Kavaliauskaitė, A. Švedas,“Savaimi visuomenė prieš totalitarinį 
režimą?” in Sąjūdžio ištakų beieškant, p. 12.
94
Monika Kareniauskaitė
In the historical background there are more conditions leading to the 
understanding that the public sphere could be a suitable tool to explain the 
anti-communist tendencies in the Lithuanian SSR after 1956. The history of 
peaceful Lithuanian anti-communist activities started even before the death 
of Stalin. However, the background of such tendencies and activities was es-
tablished during the armed resistance against the Soviet regime (1944-1953). 36 
During the armed resistance specific ideological discourse (based on Lithuanian 
nationalism, the idea of the necessity for an independent state with a demo-
cratic shape) began to develop, as well as new, non-armed resistance methods: 
foundations of unarmed resistance organizations, dissemination of leaflets, and 
printing of various underground documents and newspapers. 37 The resistance 
was crushed by the Soviet regime. But the ideology of the participants in armed 
resistance, which was an alternative to communist propaganda, was gradually 
transferred to other groups in the society. 38 This discourse later became the 
foundation, leading to formation of the public sphere.
One method of spreading alternative information was the publishing of the 
underground press. Developed by armed resistance participants, this method 
was actively used by members of the non-armed anti-communist resistance 
in the 1960s and, by the impact of Russian dissidents, gradually gained the 
form of samizdat. 39
36 B. Gailius, Partizanai tada ir šiandien (Vilnius: Versus Aureus, 2006).
37 B.Gailius, Partizanai tada ir šiandien, p. 13; Ž. Račkauskaitė, “Pasipriešinimas 
sovietiniam režimui Lietuvoje septintajame-aštuntajame dešimtmetyje,” p. 52; 
N. Gaškaitė-Žemaitienė, “Lietuvos laisvės kovos sąjūdžio strategija,” p. 38; Lietuva 
1940-1990: okupuotos Lietuvos istorija, p. 425.
38 A. Dabrovolskas, “Lietuvos akademinio jaunimo antisovietinis pasipriešinimas 
šeštajame-septintajame dešimtmetyje,” Genocidas ir rezistencija 1(29) (2011), p. 132; 
N. Žemaitienė, “Pogrindinė organizacija Laisvę Lietuvai,“ Genocidas ir rezistencija 1(9) 
(2001), p. 118.
39 Lithuanian Special Archives, f. K-1, ap. 58, b. 44614/3, t. 6, l. 303.
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In the LSSR the size of the public space as an alternative to communism 
and the ideology of its members changed with the passing of time. At the 
beginning it could be hardly identified as public sphere. It was ideologically 
uniform, had no features of self-reflexivity or possibilities for discussion and 
exchange of various opinions. 40 However, during further development of an-
ti-communist tendencies in LSSR the main ideological features, values and 
ideas changed considerably, from closed nationalism to the spirit of universal 
values and human rights. 41
After the ‘transitional period,’ in which the main type of activity was that of 
underground youth organizations, 1956 marked new inspiration and a change 
in the Lithuanian unarmed resistance movement. This was related to more 
general processes in the entire Eastern Bloc: the Russian dissident movement, 
the de-Stalinization launched by Nikita Khrushchev, and the Hungarian rev-
olution. The anti-communist activities of the 1970s and 1980s were impacted 
mostly by the events in Hungary and Poland in 1956 and by the Prague Spring 
in Czechoslovakia of 1968. Oppositional tendencies manifested themselves 
in various legal and illegal organizations, and associations, circles and under-
ground discussion clubs flourished in the above-mentioned ‘ethno-cultural’ 
movement. 42
Thus, we see that the 1950s and 1960s was a time of consolidation and dif-
ferentiation of the social groups engaged in different forms of anti-communist 
activities. Different ideological content became the basis for forming the various 
streams of the movement: Catholic, liberal, nationalistic and ethno-cultural. 
40 L. Dahlberg, “The Habermasian Public Sphere.”
41 From the open letter to Albertas Laurinčiukas, editor of the main LSSR periodical, 
Tiesa, 1979. 03. 25, quoted in: Aušra 4 quoted in: Nenugalėtoji Lietuva. Antisovietinis 
pogrindis. Kalba dokumentai, vol. 2 (Vilnius: Valst. leidybos centras, 1993), p. 130-131.
42 Ž. Račkauskaitė, “Pasipriešinimas sovietiniam režimui Lietuvoje septintajame-
aštuntajame dešimtmetyje,” p. 59.
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At this time the discourse formed by these activities was becoming more and 
more like the theoretical public sphere of Habermas.
Today the links between the Hungarian Revolution and the formation of 
the public sphere in the Lithuanian SSR are corroborated by science, whereas 
links with the Polish experience have not been thoroughly researched. I see the 
possibility to put forward a hypothesis about relations with the past of Poland. 
This is made possible by the fact that Lithuanian organizations use the same 
rhetoric and semantic constructions as the members of the Poznań protests. 43
The relations with Russian dissidents were established in the 1960s. In 
the 1970s the idea that it was important to defend human rights came from 
Russia to the Lithuanian SSR. The phenomenon of the Russian samizdat also 
contributed greatly to the underground press in Lithuania with regards to 
methods, traditions, contents, form and dissemination. 44 The turning point 
in anti-communist activities came in 1972. Publishing of the most important 
underground periodical – LKBK– exerted a great impact on this process. LKBK 
united Russian and Lithuanian dissidents in a common network through which 
the underground publications reached the Western countries. The underground 
press of both countries wrote about their anti-communist movements. 45 Estab-
lishing close relationships with the Russian dissident movement was one of the 
main reasons why the Lithuanian anti-communist movement took a different 
turn and acquired a new ideological quality, new valuable features and began 
to develop new forms of activity. 46
43 J. R. Bagušauskas, Lietuvos jaunimo pasipriešinimas sovietiniam režimui ir jo slopinimas 
(Vilnius: LGGRTC, 1999), p. 187-188.
44 V. Klumbys, “Pogrindžio leidinys,” p. 185.
45 S. Tichomirovas,“Sergejaus Kovaliovo veikla disidentiniame judėjime ir ryšiai su 
Lietuva,” Genicidas ir rezistencija 1(21) (2007), p. 121.
46 E. Jaseliūnas, “Periodinės savilaidos formavimasis,” p. 9.
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A new period in the Lithuanian anti-communist movement was also strong-
ly affected by the Prague Spring. 47 Mass demonstrations provoked by the 
self-immolation of 19-year-old Romas Kalanta were a clear reflection of that 
event. 48 Further development of the anti-communist movement was marked 
by the growth of the underground press; the establishment of the Lithuanian 
Helsinki Group in 1975 and other organizations aimed at fighting against the 
violations of human rights in the USSR and the Lithuanian SSR; the establish-
ment of the Lithuanian Liberty League in 1978 (the main organization among 
the members of the anti-communist movement of the nationalist wing); and 
other activities. The development of the anti-communist movement in the 
territory of Lithuania was also influenced by such factors as Western youth 
counterculture (hippies), the Second Vatican Council, and illegal Western 
radio stations, some of which broadcasted programs in Lithuanian, reading 
passages from the Lithuanian samizdat press. 49
All these changes in the inner discourse of anti-communism ideas were 
the reason for forming discursive space similar to the public sphere.
In the 1950s anti-communist tendencies in the Lithuanian SSR took the 
shape of different social networks. The 1970s in particular were marked by rapid 
growth in alternative activities. The evaluation of such activities, as Ramonaitė 
47 Clandestine Perspektyvos published in 1978 the article on Prague events, see: “Prahos 
pamokos” in Nenugalėtoji Lietuva, p. 37-38.
48 M. Kareniauskaitė, “Romas ir kalantinės atminties ir užmaršties verpetuose,” Naujasis 
Židinys-Aidai 5 (2012), p. 347-351.
49 J. R. Bagušauskas, “Užsienio radijo laidos tautos kovoje dėl laisvės sovietinio režimo 
metais,“ Genocidas ir rezistencija 2 (10) (2001), p. 63-71;  
E. Jaseliūnas, “Periodinės savilaidos formavimasis,” p. 7-44; E. Jaseliūnas, “Vatikano 
II Susirinkimo nutarimų įtaka katalikiškojo pasipriešinimo formavimuisi Lietuvoje,” 
p. 61-80; Ž. Račkauskaitė, “Pasipriešinimas sovietiniam režimui Lietuvoje 
septintajame-aštuntajame dešimtmetyje,” p. 52-69.
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showed in her research, was determined by the symbiosis of two important 
components: the Catholic underground and the ethno-cultural movement. 50
On account of this symbiosis, two ideologically different social and cul-
tural environments in which anti-communist trends manifested themselves 
were linked into a single close interpersonal network. Many members from 
one circle (e.g. Catholics) took part in the activities of another circle (e.g. eth-
no-cultural). This is interesting, as these members were ideological opponents 
and many of their fundamental values varied; nonetheless, they carried out 
activities together. 51
Symbiosis is very important to our research. It shows that various anti-com-
munist tendencies did not exist separately; they were linked into a common 
discourse or a network of communication. It seems that the conditions nec-
essary to form the public sphere could really develop in these social networks. 
The LKBK started a new period and it became a symbolic mediator between 
different underground streams.
50 A. Ramonaitė, J. Kavaliauskaitė and A. Švedas, “Savaimi visuomenė prieš totalitarinį 
režimą?,” p. 11; A. Ramonaitė, “Paralelinės visuomenės užuomazgos sovietinėje 
Lietuvoje,” p. 33-58.
51 A. Ramonaitė, “Paralelinės visuomenės užuomazgos sovietinėje Lietuvoje,” p. 50, 52.
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Inner Characteristics of the Anti-communist Discourse
I have shown that different forms of free communication and an alternative 
discourse existed in Soviet Lithuania. Now I am going to explain why this 
discourse can be defined using the concept of the public sphere and describe 
the limitations of this treatment.
According to Jürgen Habermas, the author of this concept, the public sphere 
was seen first of all as a specific discourse of free communication that was not 
subject to state control. 52 Hence, the possibility of one or another space in 
social reality being identified as an example of the public sphere lies in special 
characteristics of communication which help us to identify whether any space 
can or cannot be regarded as a public sphere. His follower L. Dahlberg broad-
ens the understanding of the public sphere. In analyzing Habermas’ texts he 
discovered that the public sphere was defined as a specific discursive space that 
had six main characteristics: a) the reasoned exchange of problematic validity 
claims, b) reflexivity, c) ideal role taking, d) sincerity, e) formal inclusion and 
discursive quality and e) autonomy from state and corporate power. 53
As we see, Dahlberg did not conceive of these characteristics, as they were 
formulated in Habermas’ texts. However, we cannot refer to these characteris-
tics as strictly Habermasian either. Habermas established this framework, but 
we use the version as it was extended and concretized by Dahlberg, who took 
Habermas’ initial version as the basis but added something of his own to it.
The first feature means that participants in the public sphere should initiate 
discourse and evaluate the discussion or debates when they already have a strong 
and reasoned initial position. The topic under consideration should not be of 
local importance only; it has to be meaningful to a broader group of the society, 
even to those who do not directly participate in the discussion. This means 
52 T. McCarthy quoted in: Habermas, The structural transformation, p. xi-xii.
53 L. Dahlberg, “The Habermasian Public Sphere,” p. 2.
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that all arguments in the public sphere ‘have to be addressed not only to those 
taking part in the conversation but also to all others potentially affected by 
the claims under consideration, to a “larger,” “ideal” or “virtual” community 
of discussants.’ 54 To be understood as valid, the discourse of argumentation 
in the public sphere should be addressed ‘to the universal audience,’ or to be 
‘universalizable.’ Even in cases of ‘less universal’ claims, participants speak to 
the ‘virtual’ public concerned. 55
Was the anti-communist discourse able to overcome the local level and move 
on to universal argumentation? Actually, among the Lithuanian underground 
activists such type of reasoning was highly common. We see in the samizdat 
and various underground documents that the underground activists maintain 
to be representatives of the rights of ‘all the nations of Eastern Europe.’
It is worth remembering that the Lithuanian dissi-
dent movement, especially its Catholic part, defined 
themselves ever more often as defenders of universal 
human rights (and in fact they gradually became such). 
Attempts to appeal even to the individuals who were 
heavily involved in the prevailing Communist social 
order, for example, teachers of a communist school, can 
be treated as efforts to turn the discourse into a more 
universal one. Those teachers were responsible not 
only for basic education of an individual but also for 
the formation of Communist values of the young gen-
eration. 56
54 J. Habermas quoted in: L. Dahlberg, “The Habermasian Public Sphere,” p. 7.
55 J. Habermas quoted in: L. Dahlberg, “The Habermasian Public Sphere,” p. 7.
56 The Declaration of Lithuanian Liberty League, 1978. 06.15 in: Lietuvos Laisvės Lyga: nuo 
„Laisvės šauklio” iki nepriklausomybės (Vilnius: Naujoji Matrica, 2006), p. 119.
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This so-called ‘Letter to the Teacher’ was published in LKBK. In it a symbolic, 
abstracted figure of a father, which represents much broader contexts, tries to 
prove to another symbolic figure, the ‘opponent’, that communist values are 
not absolute, that there are hierarchically higher values and aims. 57 Thus, the 
Lithuanian anti-communist underground seems to have succeeded in ‘translat-
ing their particular injustices into a more universal language of civic justice.’ 58
Reflexivity is another condition under which the public sphere is able to 
exist. It means that during such communication ‘the participants question 
and transcend whatever their initial preferences may be.’ 59 So, the participants 
are not passive but can be affected by strong and reasoned arguments of the 
other side.
Proof of reflexivity of the discourse of the anti-communist activists of the 
Lithuanian SSR could be seen as a solution to the following conflict: Catholics 
started publishing more articles devoted to national issues because nationalists 
reproached them for their lack of activity. When the Catholic underground 
started to publish LKBK, the nationalistic underground activists were critical 
of its contents, as they focused insufficiently on ‘national’ issues and failed 
to raise the idea of the political independence of Lithuania. 60 The Catholics 
responded to this criticism. Although the national problems did not become 
as important as the activists of the nationalistic underground had expected, 
the number of publications devoted to it was gradually on the increase. For 
57 “Laiškas mokytojui,” Lietuvos Katalikų Bažnyčios kronika, vol. 1, 7 
(1973), p. 285-288, http://www.lkbkronika.lt/index.php?option=com_
content&view=article&id=13&Itemid=29#k7n1 (accessed June 26, 2013)
58 Alexander quoted in: G. Barhaim, Public-Private Relations, p. 161.
59 J. Habermas quoted in L. Dahlberg, “The Habermasian Public Sphere,” p. 7.
60 “The appeal of lay people to the publishers of ”The Chronicle of the Catholic Church 
in Lithuania,” August 4, 1975 in Lietuvos Laisvės Lyga: nuo „Laisvės šauklio” iki 
nepriklausomybės, ed. Gintaras Šidlauskas, vol. 2 (Vilnius: Naujoji Matrica, 2006), 
p. 262-271.
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example, in 1980, the protest document addressing the Lithuanian national 
issues under the title ‘Lithuanians defend their language’ was published. 61
We can see that the discourse of the underground press in the LSSR was 
reflective and its reflexivity made the discourse similar to that of a classic public 
sphere. The participants in it were at least partially ‘willing to question and mod-
ify their own positions in the light of other relevant claims and reasons, which 
in turn demands taking the position of the other.’ 62 Of course, the principle of 
reflexivity worked only inside the discourse. The anti-communist activists were 
not ready to rethink, for example, the values of the official ideology. However, 
even the concept of communism was not always treated as exclusively negative. 
For example, the ideas of Gintautas Iešmantas, whose articles were printed in 
Perspektyvos, were aimed at creating an alternative, more faithful version of 
Communism or, at least, of the socialist reality. 63
The third condition for the public sphere to exist is ideal role taking: ‘in a ra-
tional discourse the participants put themselves in the position of all those po-
tentially affected by the claims under consideration, and consider the situation 
from these other perspectives.’ So, the participants in the discourse have to 
be ‘open and sensitive to how others understand themselves and the world.’ 64 
This discourse ‘demands a commitment to working through differences.’ 65
The above-mentioned ‘Letter to the teacher’ is a characteristic example 
of a situation where dissidents try to understand the position of their ideological 
opponents participating in the mainstream discourse.
61 “Lietuviai gina savo kalbą,” Lietuvos Katalikų Bažnyčios kronika, vol.6, no. 
41 (1980), p. 111-113, http://www.lkbkronika.lt/index.php?option=com_
content&view=article&id=86&Itemid=69#n6. (accessed June 26, 2013).
62 L. Dahlberg, “The Habermasian Public Sphere,” p. 8.
63 V. Klumbys, “Pogrindžio leidinys,” p. 198-199.
64 L. Dahlberg, “The Habermasian Public Sphere”, p. 8.
65 L. Dahlberg, “The Habermasian Public Sphere”, p. 8.
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There is one more example illustrating ideal role taking. The traditional 
Lithuanian identity in the first half of the 20th century was defined through 
linguistic and ethnic criteria, and also in a defensive and negative manner. To be 
Lithuanian in the interwar period Lithuania was the same as not to be Russian, 
German, Polish or Jewish. In the anti-communist discourse we see a com-
pletely different view. ‘Traditional ethnical narrowness’ in the environment 
of Lithuanian dissidents and other anti-Soviet activists was transcended, first 
of all, owing to direct contacts and communication with The Other. These 
contacts and communication were maintained owing to joint activities with 
the Russian dissidents. 66
Sensitivity towards the other was also expressed in the growing attention 
to the Holocaust and concern about the problems of Jewish people. For ex-
ample, the Lithuanian resistance activist from the nationalistic wing Antanas 
Terleckas was very confused by and angry with an article in the underground 
periodical Aušra, 67 in which the responsibility of the Lithuanian people in 
the killing of Jews during the Holocaust was negotiated. He responded to it 
by initiating a discussion presenting the opposite attitude. 68
This example of a discussion developed in the intellectual samizdat discourse, 
uncontrolled by the Soviet authorities, is a typical example of a discussion in the 
public sphere as defined by Habermas. It does not only reveal reflexivity and 
sensitivity to the position of the other, but it is also orientated towards a strong 
argumentation based on dimensions such as truth and consciousness.
66 Lietuvos Katalikų Bažnyčios kronika vol. 2, no. 15 (1975), p. 357-365, http://www.
lkbkronika.lt/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=21&Itemid=38#356. 
(accessed June 25, 2013).
67 A. Žuvintas, “Lietuviai ir žydai (Atviras laiškas Tomui Venclovai),” Aušra vol. 
3, 9 (49) (1978), p. 149-154, http://www.lkbkronika.lt/index.php?option=com_
content&view=article&id=338&Itemid=222. (accessed June 26, 2013)
68 A. Terleckas, Laisvės priešaušryje. Rezistento prisiminimai 1970-1986 (Vilnius: LGGRTC, 
2011), p. 12.
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This situation illustrates another feature of communication necessary in 
the public sphere – sincerity, whereby the participants in this discourse use 
only true arguments, and ‘all relevant information’ is ‘given honestly.’ So, un-
der such conditions, ‘all communicative action presupposes truthfulness of 
expression. ‘In this type of communication ‘discursive openness’ is chosen 
instead of ‘deception’ and ‘argumentation is premised upon honesty.’ 69
This way of arguing and developing a discussion was the basic virtue and 
value declared by the publishers of the Lithuanian samizdat. ‘Samizdat whose 
roots were hidden in the Russian samizdat stuck to the basic principle that only 
information based on facts should be published. The information published 
in the samizdat, especially Catholic ones, had to be checked and verified.’ 70 
Non-Catholics acted and developed their argumentation in a similar way, 
avoiding ‘myths, stereotypes and rumors.’ 71
Also, to form the ‘public sphere,’ formal and discursive equality is needed. 
It means that the public sphere is a place ‘open to all participants potential-
ly affected by the claims under consideration’ and ‘each participant is given 
equal opportunities’ to express his/her arguments, opinions and attitudes. 72 
Cultural, social and other inequalities should not be obstacles to participation, 
but opportunities to put forward arguments and to be heard and understood. 73
This principle was very well expressed by the publishers of Perspektyvos, a pe-
riodical which declared in its program thesis that ‘it would provide its read-
ers with the possibility to express their opinions and attitudes.’ 74 This means 
69 J. Habermas quoted in: L. Dahlberg, “The Habermasian Public Sphere,” p. 8-9.
70 E. Jaseliūnas, “Periodinės savilaidos formavimasis,” p. 29-31.
71 A. Terleckas, Laisvės priešaušryje, p. 138-139.
72 J. Habermas quoted in: L. Dahlberg, , “The Habermasian Public Sphere,” p. 9.
73 L. Dahlberg, “The Habermasian Public Sphere,” p. 9.
74 Perspektyvos 1 (1978), reprinted in: Perspektyvos. Lietuvos pogrindžio leidinys, p. 34.
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that the periodical did not only have a turn for reflexivity but also questioned 
vertical and hierarchical one-sided relations common in the traditional mass 
media, where the power to express various ideas and attitudes is granted only 
to the publishers and writers. Under these conditions the readers have no such 
opportunity and can only express opinions in an indirect way, for example by 
refusing to buy one newspaper or another if they disagree with its contents.
In this way Perspektyvos tried to achieve equality not only between authors 
and participants in direct discourse, but also between them and the audience. 
So, it is not by chance that another important program thesis of Perspektyvos 
was to emphasis their search for a renewal of society based on the principles 
of true democracy. It was also stressed that any article could be printed in 
the periodical if it adhered to the following principle: ‘respect the opinion of 
another even if you disagree with it.’ 75
Some features of the growing equality can be found even in the Catholic 
stream. First of all, it was influenced by the Second Vatican Council, which in-
creased the role of laymen in the life of the Church and inspired them to become 
enterprising rather than passive. However, the anti-communist discourse, as 
we saw, sometimes violated the principle of discursive equality, as seen in the 
abovementioned situation when publishers of the Catholic samizdat rejected 
the texts of the representatives of other ideological steams.
The final condition of the ideal example of the public sphere is autonomy 
from state and corporate power. 76 I believe that the fact that the anti-communist 
activists in the Lithuanian SSR created discourse that was autonomous and 
free from the communist state power is discussed more than once in this article 
and does not need any separate argumentation.
75 Perspektyvos 1 (1978), reprinted in: Perspektyvos. Lietuvos pogrindžio leidinys, p. 34.
76 L. Dahlberg, “The Habermasian Public Sphere,” p. 10.
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Hence, the alternative discourse in the LSSR lacked some conditions under 
which the public sphere could function perfectly. It was illegal and could not 
affect the official ideology. However, it seems that the Barhaim’s hypothesis 
can be confirmed by this research: restrictions on the public sphere in a Com-
munist state and restrictions on the private sphere can lead to opposition and 
resistance to these restrictions. And this opposition can be expressed as the 
formation of an alternative public discourse and in an alternative space of 
relatively free inter-individual communication. 77
Conclusions
After 1956 Soviet Lithuanian society underwent a transformation of the former 
totalitarianism. The regime gained even more features of ‘national-patrimonial 
communism.’ Under such conditions the opportunities for the formation of 
the alternative space of communication and ideas emerged.
There were several social and ideological sources that formed the basis for 
an alternative anti-communist discourse. Firstly, alternative space and several 
small groups of individuals able to create an alternative discourse existed in the 
Lithuanian SSR from the very beginning of armed anti-Soviet resistance. Sec-
ondly, in the late 1950s the so called ‘ethno-cultural’ movement became a space 
of legally expressed nationalism. Thirdly, the main human and intellectual 
resource to contribute to the formation of anti-communist discourse was the 
Catholic Church and its persecuted believers. We also have to mention various 
circles of intellectuals and intelligentsia, the underground debate clubs and 
ideologically suppressed scientists and artists.
The consolidation of the alternative space in the LSSR started in the 1960s 
and it reached its culmination in the 1980s. At that time the discursive reality 
77 G. Barhaim, Public-Private Relations, p. 157.
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produced by the individuals who took part in social networks of the anti-com-
munist activities and spread anti-communist ideas gained features of the com-
munication type called the public sphere. It goes without saying that the kind of 
public sphere developed in a non-democratic Communist state differed from 
that developed under the conditions of democracy. The essential differences 
lay in the openness of the discourse to the public and the ability to influence 
real political action – in the anti-communist discourse of the LSSR this did 
not exist because of the communist monopoly on information. Also, the de-
velopers of this discourse were subject to different forms of repression, and 
it is hardly possible that the majority of the society could have been strongly 
affected by it. However, spreading these ideas by such means as radio could 
increase the number of people involved and add them to those familiar with 
the anti-communist public discourse through reading the samizdat.
Hence, as we have seen, the discourse of anti-communist activities in the 
Lithuanian SSR led to a better understanding between different underground 
groups and was the space in which democratic debates between different ideo-
logical streams could exist and be evaluated, even under the Communist system. 
Owing to these debates democratic values could be strengthened.
Tramslated by Aldona Matulytė
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Change in the Concepts of the 
Relation between an Individual and 
the Regime in Lithuanian Sovietology
When discussing concepts of an individual’s relation with the Soviet regime in 
Lithuanian science and public opinion, we have to analyze not only the Soviet 
period and the history of its studies but also the post-Soviet Lithuanian society 
and changes to it. It is not easy to say whether such an analysis reveals more 
about the Soviet period or about the present. The history of understanding 
the Soviet period is the history of an attempt to understand (and very often to 
justify, consciously or unconsciously) oneself during the Soviet period. Most 
often it was the people who lived under direct rule by the occupying powers 
who tried to understand that.
This work is an attempt to find an answer to two questions: a) how is the 
relationship between an individual and the regime in the Soviet period (and 
the Soviet period on the whole) treated in post-Soviet historiography and pop-
ular writing and b) how and why has this treatment changed? Hence, attempts 
will be made to show both the situation of the Soviet period and a change in 
Lithuanian Sovietology. To achieve these objectives it is best suited to ana-
lyze a change in the definitions of the concepts of resistance and conformity 
and their neighboring terms. Of course, the greatest attention will be paid to 
the behavior of the cultural and political elite, as that was and still is the most 
often investigated subject.
Only the main concepts and trends in interpreting an individual and the 
regime during the Soviet period will be discussed in this work. The article will 
deal only with the most significant, most accurate works on Sovietology that 
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best reflect relevant tendencies, therefore one should not expect to find a de-
tailed historiographical review of this theme here; that is a task for a larger 
volume of work.
Thus far the Soviet period has often been perceived of as a disease which 
struck down the societies that suffered from it, not only from the outside through 
the occupying force but also from the inside, through a change in people’s men-
tality, values, and culture in a broad sense, the formation of homo sovieticus. It 
is often said that the Soviet period traumatized both individuals and the entire 
society. On the other hand, the downfall of the USSR radically changed the 
economic, social and cultural living conditions of the people. Both the Soviet 
period and the secession from the Soviet Union can be assessed as a trauma 
and a shock, which left traces in the consciousness of both individuals and the 
society. Therefore it seems expedient to look at the post-Soviet sovietological 
literature through the prism of recovering from the trauma, the shock or the 
event that caused grief. Different researchers see different stages of recovering 
from trauma; the present work is based on the concept of five stages presented 
in the classical work by Elisabeth Kübler-Ross, through which a dying or re-
covering individual must pass 1 – negation, anger, negotiation, depression and 
finally, reconciliation and hope.
It should be noted at once that these stages are not clearly separated one 
from another in sovietological literature, as manifestations of a new study did 
not oust the manifestations of the earlier ones. Works of different stages were 
published at the same time, sometimes taking into consideration the chang-
ing circumstances and sometimes ignoring them. And the separation of the 
stages itself has been willfully made by the present author; hence, it is highly 
subjective, especially when one has to convey one’s own ideas.
1 E. Kübler-Ross, On death and dying: What the dying have to teach doctors, nurses, clergy 
and their own families (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), p. 240.
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I. Rejection
After the Soviet period had become a thing of the past (symbolically for us 
it happened before the restoration of independence in 1990) it was necessary 
to establish our relation with it. The very first reaction was to emphasize its 
complete strangeness. In emphasizing the fact of occupation the imposition 
and strangeness of the regime are brought to light. Oppression and compulsion, 
repressions of the regime and the genocide directed against the Lithuanian 
nation are accentuated especially strongly. The totalitarian paradigm of Sovi-
etology was especially suitable to underline that. But more vocabulary of the 
totalitarian paradigm rather than the results its scientific work was used at that 
period. The strongest emphasis was placed on the period of Stalin’s rule, when 
repressions and resistance peaked and were most obvious.
It was sought to lay special emphasis on the novelty of the newly restored 
state and the absence of links with Soviet Lithuania. The specialist in religious 
studies Gintaras Beresnevičius ironically identified the causes of such a situa-
tion as follows: ‘there are collaborators both on the left and on the right [of the 
political party spectrum – V. K.], hence, it has been unanimously agreed that 
there nothing there prior to Sąjūdis.’ 2 And all that was there must be turned 
into something as alien as possible. For example, the word tarybinis turned into 
‘Soviet’ in the public space thus linguistically accentuating the alienation of 
the regime. Incidentally, using the anonymous semi-euphemism ‘those times’ 
to refer to the Soviet period as if not daring to directly call it by its true name 
became popular in the society.
Rejection was peculiarly convenient for many because it indirectly denied 
the fact that they had been sovietised. Sovietness was turned into such a stig-
ma that it was especially difficult for an individual to admit to himself to have 
been Soviet. The negative legacy of the Soviet period was often spoken of in 
2 G. Beresnevičius, “Dešimtmečio mitologija,” Šiaurės Atėnai, 2002.01.05.
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an abstract way, although nobody specifically applied sovietness to himself/
herself; it was merely applied to others. An especially strong dichotomy into 
‘we’ and ‘they’ formed, where the former represented universal goodness and 
the latter meant all that was evil in the past. During the first stage ‘they’ were 
more alien: the Soviets, Russians. They occupied, brought oppression, tried to 
destroy us and we suffered, resisted and survived. Of course, there were traitors, 
collaborators, but, we, the nation, were unanimous in rejecting the Soviet re-
gime. Therefore the facts of resistance and oppression were accentuated quite 
naturally because this epoch was a mere struggle or period of suffering. The 
title of the sources of the Soviet period and the series of investigations Lietuvos 
kovų ir kančių istorija (The History of Lithuanian Struggles and Suffering), first 
published in 1994, best illustrates this understanding. The citizens of Lithuania 
only either fought against the Soviet regime, or suffered from it.
During the period of rejection it is complicated to speak about classifications 
of people’s behavior or all the more so about the exact terms. Actually there 
was no scholarly sovietology then. The above-presented image existed in the 
public space and popular writing rather than in scientific literature. Therefore 
it is almost impossible to speak about terminology during the first stage: any 
words used were highly indefinite, unclear and inaccurate. This stage did not 
last long as rejection is usually the shortest phase in tolerating pain. It could 
not be otherwise: the Soviet era lasted too long to be passed over in silence. 
And once one had admitted that the Soviet period did not only exist but that 
its elements had survived to the present day, all that remained was anger.
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II. Anger (and some negotiating)
It meant that the Soviet regime was accused of all past and present difficulties, 
and attempts were made, directly or discreetly, to find the concrete perpe-
trators. The occupiers alone could not be guilty, as the Lithuanians helped 
them. So, the term ‘collaborator’ was taken up and used alongside the term 
‘resistance member’, and applied especially willingly to political or ideological 
opponents. During the first stage after the Soviet period had become a highly 
negative category from the moral point of view, any term automatically meant 
an assessment of behavior, positive or negative. And this gave rise to the ‘rubber’ 
terms, which were extended seeking to adapt them to oneself or to others in 
order to absolve or to condemn.
It should be noted that accusations made in the Soviet period have re-
mained influential to the present day, and not only in the public space but also 
in scientific literature. Recently a psychological study into the aftermaths of 
the trauma in Lithuania of the Soviet period appeared under the eloquent title 
‘What have they done to us?’ 3 We see the same division of us/them and laying 
all the blame on ‘them’, which is a personified but unidentified enemy. The 
way the question is raised shows that thus far the Soviet period has not been 
accepted as one’s own, that the distinction between we – the victims – and 
them – the butchers – still exists.
This was the first model of the relationship with the Soviet past. It can be 
referred to as the radical, accusing standpoint. It was strongest during the 
first decade of independence although, as we have seen, it has remained in-
fluential to the present day. According to Vladimir Tismaneanu, in the entire 
post-communist space there existed ‘a vengeful myth whose fulfillment would 
presumably create a community of presumed just avengers versus a minority of 
3 D. Gailienė, Ką jie mums padarė: Lietuvos gyvenimas traumų psichologijos žvilgsniu 
(Vilnius: Tyto alba, 2008), p. 244.
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villains and rascals. It is based on the assumption that the communist society 
was divided into two main groups: them and us.’ 4
One can discern a third stage in the search for the guilty, that of negotiation: 
if we sacrifice those who were guilty during the Soviet period, everything will 
go well for us. The only thing to be done is to carry out universal lustration, 
which will cleanse the society of the most active figures of the past, and having 
sacrificed them, the most guilty, Lithuania will throw off the oppressive burden 
of the past and will become non-Soviet indeed. Then it will be reborn anew 
and prosper. However, who is to blame for our sufferings?
The most obvious candidates to be guilty ones were collaborators. This 
opinion has become established in the public sphere and actually it has taken 
the place of political ideology that united the nation in the constantly changing 
post-Soviet reality. Collaborators, however, could have been defined in very 
different ways. For a long time there was no exact definition at all: at first it was 
only the highest officials of the regime administration, then all members of 
the Communist Party, then on the whole almost all the residents of Lithuania 
were referred to as collaborators because according to such understanding, 
collaboration means ‘being in the network of everyday life established and 
controlled by the occupying authorities.’ 5 The broadness of the definition 
depended on the desire to justify oneself or accuse others.
Scholarly attempts to define collaboration were rather delayed. Vytautas Ti-
ninis’ definition seems to be quite successful, where a collaborator is defined as:
an assistant to the occupiers, a traitor of the Mother-
land, an official, a clerk or an employee of the central 
4 V. Tismaneanu, Fantasies of Salvation: Democracy, Nationalism, and Myth in Post-
Communist Europe (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1998), p. 17.
5 E. Wittig-Marcinkevičiūtė, “Koks skirtumas tarp Nijolės Sadūnaitės ir Antano 
Sniečkaus?” Kultūros barai, 10 (2003), p. 23.
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and local authorities (administration) of the occupied 
state who carries out instructions (policy) of the occu-
pying authorities and who forcibly makes its citizens 
(compatriots) obey the will of the occupiers. People 
who most often on account of political and ideological 
convictions [I would add venally – V. K.] have betrayed 
their Motherland, its independence and begun to col-
laborate with the occupiers of their own free will are 
considered to collaborators. 6
This definition, however, very well suits only the beginning of the occupation 
period. Until the early 1950s the alternative to Soviet power existed in the 
Lithuanian countryside as partisan resistance. Therefore the fighting parties 
were clearly defined and it was more or less clear what behavior was allowed 
and what was condemned. An individual belonged to either one camp or the 
other. The question of what to call the majority of the rural population who 
tried to avoid both parties so that they could survive and not suffer arose only 
very rarely. The division into us/them indicated that our people were against 
the Soviets and supported the partisans.
However, after Stalin’s death when partisan resistance was suppressed 
and the repression abated the situation began to change. In order to identi-
fy a collaborator it is necessary to say that he is on the side of the enemy. And 
how can the boundary between ‘our people’ and ‘enemies’ be established when 
they all live in a single society, and when people are already more or less used 
to the new system? It seems rather strange to speak about collaboration of an 
individual who was born in the Soviet period under that regime. Throughout 
history ‘collaboration’ is most often applied to a period of short-term occupa-
6 V. Tininis, “Kolaboravimo sąvoka Lietuvos istorijos kontekste,”  
Genocidas ir rezistencija, 1(9) (2001), p. 71.
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tion that lasts for several years, when hostile parties are very clear-cut. It seems 
complicated to apply it to a regime which was in power for more than 10 years. 
Therefore attempts have been made to chronologically limit the application 
of the term ‘collaboration.’ In the opinion of Algis Kasperavičius, this term 
can be used more or less until 1957, although activity that has deserved this 
designation existed later as well. 7 No agreement has been reached on this 
question and the term ‘collaboration’ was applied to the entire Soviet period 
during the depressive phase as well.
The antipode of collaboration – resistance – was even more difficult to de-
fine. Almost no questions arose about partisans, members of the underground 
organizations, or dissidents. However, when only three (and actually two) 
possibilities were left – to be repressed, to resist or to collaborate – all those 
who could not boast of having been repressed could try to become at least 
resistance fighters. Hence, the term resistance expanded like collaboration did, 
and various concepts of resistance emerged: cultural, 8 passive, 9 moral-cul tu-
ral, 10 internal, 11 etc. The term passive resistance encompassed all of them. Two 
definitions clearly demonstrate the broadness and, in fact, the vagueness of 
its concepts. The literary critic Vytautas Kubilius stated that such resistance:
7 A. Kasperavičius, “Kolaboravimas: chronologinės ribos,” Genocidas ir rezistencija, 1(9) 
(2001), p. 88.
8 For example: K. Stoškus, “Dar apie kultūrinę rezistenciją: liudininkų parodymai,” 
Literatūra ir menas, 19 April 1997.
9 Ž. Račkauskaitė,“Pasipriešinimas sovietiniam režimui Lietuvoje septintajame-
aštuntajame dešimtmetyje,” Genocidas ir rezistencija 2 (1998), p. 52.
10 Term used by a writer – Henrikas Algis Čigriejus: G. Mikelaitis, ed., Tikėti ir rašyti, 21 
šiuolaikinis lietuvių rašytojas apie tikėjimą, kūrybąir save (Vilnius: Aidai, 2002), p. 56.
11 Mentioned as especially wide-spread: K. Girnius,Tauta, išbandymai, dorovė: tarp 
komunizmo ir demokratijos (Vilnius: Naujasis židinys-Aidai, 2011), p. 221.
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encompassed many phenomena of life. This also in-
cludes religious education of children at home. This is 
the preservation of the principles of good, morals and 
honesty in the families. This is talking about Lithu-
ania’s past at schools. This is reviving folk songs and 
dances. This is spiritual radiance of free personalities 
who do not curry favours with anybody. 12
The historian Živilė Račkauskaitė defined passive resistance in a narrow sense 
as related ‘to non-conformist attitudes that prevailed among the intelligentsia 
in the sphere of culture and encouraged people not to serve the system [sic!], to 
resist it passively (in the true sense of the word), to avoid any collaboration.’ 13 
The first definition is really very broad and, again, it is clearly moral; however, 
practically it is impossible to apply. How can the preservation of the princi-
ples of good and morals in the family be investigated? Moreover, this concept 
states that he who resists is good and honest, thus identifying two different 
things: morals and political morality. The second definition, although it is 
more scientific and somewhat narrower, is also of a clearly normative nature. 
The question of how an intellectual could avoid serving the system while being 
financially and socially completely dependent on it, when almost any educated 
job was related to ideological indoctrination, was not asked. The statement in 
the definition that non-conformist approaches prevailed among the cultural 
intelligentsia also deserves mention. This assessment of one’s own activity 
during the Soviet period was widespread among the cultural elite.
The majority of members of the cultural elite regarded their professional 
activity during the Soviet period as resistance. It was especially easy to apply 
12 V. Kubilius, “Rezistencijos ešelonai: paskutinysis – kultūra,” in Gairė – pilnutinė 
demokratija: Į laisvę fondo dešimtmetis Lietuvoje, ed. V. Valiušaitis (Kaunas: Į Laisvę 
fondo Lietuvos filialas, 2001), p. 258.
13 Ž. Račkauskaitė, “Pasipriešinimas sovietiniam režimui,” p. 52.
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this concept of resistance to culture, which developed national consciousness 
and maintained the life of the nation, and naturally became the most effective 
means of self-defense in the eyes of the cultural elite. Actually the fruits of 
professional labor of a large number of specialists in the humanities and men 
of letters cannot be attributed to collaboration. It often maintained a sense 
of nationality or oppositional attitudes in the society. According to Vytautas 
Kubilius, the echelons of armed and passive resistance were followed by the 
line of cultural resistance. Culture ‘became the only legal way of the nation’s 
self-image and self-expression, strictly regulated by the Soviet authorities but 
preserving a small part of freedom inherent in the cultural phenomenon’ because 
‘culture, which expresses the principles of humanity and preserves the nation’s 
historical memory, is dangerous to the totalitarian system.’ 14 Meilė Lukšeinė, 
who called this kind of behavior valenrodism, had a similar opinion: ‘there 
were people in our country who worked especially consistently, persistently, 
expediently, calculating minimum losses of the compromise to maintain the 
nation’s dignity – namely dignity – and life.’ 15
However, the authors of the concept themselves realized that understanding 
culture as resistance was especially fragile: ‘if the aim of resistance is to do away 
with occupation, Soviet Lithuanian art could not and did not seek to achieve 
that. […] The collective instinct of self-preservation emerged: […] now it was 
necessary to protect every creative force from destruction.’ 16 Nonetheless, 
attempts not to treat some behavior of the cultural elite as resistance failed 
to become established in the society. Let us take for example one such failed 
concept, escapism, where ‘people closed themselves in their small narrow cave 
14 V. Kubilius, “Rezistencijos ešelonai,” p. 258.
15 M. Lukšienė, Jungtys (Vilnius: Alma littera, 2000), p. 218.
16 V. Kubilius, “Rezistencijos ešelonai,” p. 261.
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of speciality and did what was necessary to do. They performed their function 
to the nation but actually they have run away from it! They are aside!’ 17
The preservation of the nation’s strength turned into a negative assess-
ment of active, armed resistance still in the Soviet period because it destroyed 
the nation’s strength: people perished or were imprisoned instead of creating 
something. Thus ‘pure’ resistance, clearly visible armed struggle, began to be 
assessed as ruinous to the nation, posing a threat to its physical (partisan) or 
cultural (active unarmed) survival. Even plain overstepping of the boundaries 
of creative freedom established by the regime could be seen as having attracted 
too-careful attention of the authorities and disturbed quiet cultural work. In 
this way active resistance was begun to be treated as non-resistance (wrong 
resistance) with respect to the nation’s survival because it posed the threat 
of it being destroyed. This concept of resistance and non-resistance enabled 
not only non-resistance to be justified but also to see one’s own timeserving 
activity as non-conformism, as secret resistance without victims.
Hence, in place of a clear opposition of collaboration vs. resistance another 
less strict opposition became prevalent: non-collaboration vs. non-resistance. 
After the strict boundary between resistance and collaboration had become 
effaced, tension between the pressure to see resistance everywhere and be-
haviors during the Soviet period that were often determined by pragmatic 
motives was reduced. Furthermore, during the Soviet period resistance raised 
the social status of an individual in post-Soviet Lithuania, and this mechanism 
was conducive to this. In this way a moderate model of assessing the Soviet 
past was formed.
The situation, however, when the concept of resistance became infinitely 
expanded, enabled anyone who simply did their job during the Soviet years 
to state that he/she maintained the nation’s life in this way because if he/she 
17 M. Lukšienė, Jungtys, p. 216.
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had not worked the strangers, Russians, would have come and that would have 
been much worse for Lithuania. The former Soviet ruling circles, the members 
of the nomenclatura, and all those who sympathized with them took advantage 
of this. A nomenclative discourse formed, which emphasized that during the 
Soviet period they ‘worked for Lithuania, too,’ 18 and resisted the occupiers by 
sabotaging harmful directives of the Centre and by seeking to promote the 
welfare of all Lithuania.
The representatives of this discourse eliminated any differences between 
resistance and collaboration. For example, the then Speaker of the Seimas, 
Artūras Paulauskas, totally identified them with each other; ‘If we had not had 
collaborators, that passive resistance, today we would have had neither schools 
nor the Lithuanian language.’ 19 Most often this approach manifested itself in 
reminiscences and popular writing; however, there were also historical works 
which tried to substantiate this concept in a scholarly way. Perhaps the most 
significant of them was the work of the former Party historian Konstantinas 
Navickas. 20
The supporters of the moderate approach to the Soviet period were unit-
ed, contrary to the radical ones, by the accentuation of resistance rather than 
by a search for the guilty ones. There is no need to look for personal guilt because 
to a greater or lesser degree it can be found in everyone, as all equally lived in 
the Soviet years, all are equally either guilty or not guilty of that. The occupiers 
18 That is the title of memoires voliume published by former first secretary of Lithuanian 
Communist Party: A. Brazauskas, Ir tuomet dirbome Lietuvai: faktai, atsiminimai, 
komentarai (Vilnius: Knygiai, 2007), p. 382.
19 A. Paulauskas, Seimo Pirmininko kalba iškilmingame Kovo 11-tosios minėjime Operos 
ir baleto teatre [Interactive]. 2009. Internet access: <http://www3.seimas.lt/pls/inter/
w5_show?p_r=4411&p_d=13914&p_k=1> (accessed December 20, 2012).
20 K. Navickas, Lietuvių tautos savigynos patirtis: Lietuvos nepriklausomybės praradimo 
ir atgavimo istoriografinė apžvalga (1938-1993): Monografija (Vilnius: Mokslotyros 
institutas, 2003), p. 291.
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were to blame for all the misfortunes of Lithuania and we, Lithuanians, were 
victims, we suffered from the regime and all of us, beginning with ordinary 
workers and ending with the KGB agents and the highest officials of Lithuania 
resisted Moscow as much as we were able to. 21 By the way, one interesting thing 
is that some representatives of this discourse considered not only the newly 
arrived Russians but also all Jewish people to be guilty. 22
The impact of the moderate approach on the society was on the increase. 
It could not have been otherwise, as the official discourse on the struggles and 
suffering failed to reflect the everyday experiences of the Soviet years of the 
majority of the ordinary residents of Lithuania and their personal memories 
of that period in any way. However, both the moderate and radical approaches 
remained highly politicized and in essence served as a means of ideological 
and political struggles in attacking and defending rather than of learning about 
the past.
During this stage totalitarian rhetoric and a paradigm that were not highly 
reflective prevailed. Lithuania’s experience was hardly compared with the history 
of other countries of the USSR or the Soviet Bloc, and the cornerstone works 
of the totalitarian paradigm were used rather rarely in scientific research. It is 
interesting to note the fact that even the members of the nomenclatura used 
the terms of the totalitarian paradigm and sometimes even made reference 
to The Origins of Totalitarianism by Hannah Arendt. This shows the strength 
of the discourse on the struggles and sufferings in the public sphere. It was 
impossible to disregard it.
Though there were different approaches to the Soviet past and varying, 
sometimes even contrary, definitions of the same terms, they coincided in 
21 J. Rudokas, “Okupantų talkininkai – tautos išdavikai, patriotai ar totalitarizmo aukos?” 
Naujoji Romuva 1 (538) (2002), p. 62-67.
22 e.g.: J. Sadaunykas-Sadūnas, Geltonos vanago akys: Autobiografinis romanas (Vilnius: 
Žuvėdra, 2002).
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denying the sovietisation of the people. All attention was directed to political 
and resistance history; the processes that were taking place in society were 
not investigated and nobody went more deeply into the changes that occurred, 
neither into people’s behavior and values nor into their mentality at that time. 
Therefore there was hardly any (self)-reflection about how people participated 
in creating the Soviet variant of culture, about to what extent their creative work 
was useful to the regime – such a confession was actually impossible within 
the context of accentuating resistance. Scientific research was often strongly 
ideologies and mostly encompassed investigations into partisan resistance and 
Soviet repressions, quite rarely touching upon the more complicated problem 
of collaboration. This problem was talked about in general, in popular writing, 
but this phenomenon was not studied in more detail, since it could offend and 
hurt too many living individuals.
III. Depression
There is only one step from anger to depression. In this case it was enough for 
the chasm between ‘we’ and ‘them,’ Soviet collaborators, to disappear, it was 
enough to feel the profound impact of the Soviet regime exerted not only on 
single individuals but also over the entire society or at least on its largest part. 
There were too many signs of sovietness in the new state to attribute them to 
separate collaborators. Having realized this, the situation turned into a stale-
mate: the Soviet period has not disappeared, there is so much of it within us, it 
has become so firmly rooted and has penetrated so deeply into all of us that it 
is even handed down to younger generations. It seemed that it was impossible 
to escape it. Anger turned into disappointment and even into despair: if the 
society is simply saturated with the Soviet ideology, if there is so much of it, how 
can we speak about a new, non-Soviet Lithuania, and how would it be possible 
to create it? Depression was unavoidable and it filled the pages of both popular 
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writing and scientific works. Shame over the fact that the Lithuanians had been 
so successfully adapted and that they still were so Soviet-like grew along with 
it. ‘Unrealistic guilt or shame which often accompanies the depression’ 23 is 
characteristic of depression.
It is not important whether during this stage the authors wrote about the 
Soviet years or about the present – they saw the majority, if not all, causes of 
the present-day evil in the Soviet years. It might sometimes seem that the 
problems of today are found first and then attempts are made to look for their 
genesis during the Soviet period. The Soviet years are to blame for a high suicide 
rate, for alcoholism, and for the election not being won by those who should 
have. It seems that negation turned into its own antithesis, and now the Soviet 
regime retrospectively seems to have been omnipotent, which has created or 
influenced almost everything. It seems as though the fear instilled during the 
Soviet period, which the euphoria of the Sąjūdis movement and restoration 
of independence suppressed during the first stage, and which aroused anger 
during the second stage, turned freely into a terrible fear of the future and 
depression during the third stage.
Perhaps the most significant work of the depressive stage is the book Ne-
nutrūkusi styga (The Unbroken String) by Nerija Putinaitė, 24 therefore it was 
cited to reveal the mass mentality of Lithuanians, their cultural, moral and 
public self-image, which determined concrete choices of an individual during 
the Soviet period. Hence, a step further than a simple division of human be-
havior into positive/negative was taken: attempts were made to find out what 
cultural and social mechanisms determined human behavior and how they 
did so. Alongside collaboration, the term compliance was also used in that book.
23 E. Kübler-Ross,On Death and Dying, p. 70.
24 N. Putinaitė, Nenutrūkusi styga: Prisitaikymas ir pasipriešinimas sovietų Lietuvoje  
(Vilnius: Aidai, 2007).
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However, the predominant theme of the book is depression. Its main part is 
devoted to describing the various manifestations of compliance of Lithuanians 
and the extent of the nation’s sovietisation. Reading the book one can feel the 
author’s moral terror at the extent to which the Soviet regime had penetrated 
the people’s thinking, values and behavior. The very title of the book asserts 
that the string that links us to the Soviet period has not yet been broken. It will 
only be possible to break off the emotional link with the Soviet period after we 
have discovered our moral responsibility. Investigations into the Soviet past 
again have to serve the present, only in this case it should serve as an incentive 
to be reborn morally.
The impact of the Soviet ideology is also made absolute in this book. It is 
stated that the mechanisms responsible for preventing competing ideologies 
and value-based systems from emerging in the USSR operated effectively, 
therefore people could only practice forms of nationality and expressions of 
national feelings approved by the regime. It is not strange at all that the Soviet 
reality is seen in the book as a result determined by ideology when no moral 
supports or those of the truth survived in the society because the Soviet worl-
dview erased the boundaries between the truth and lies.
In this way one of the most important questions relating to the society of 
Soviet Lithuania (and not only) was raised: did only Soviet morality exist then, 
or were there also alternatives which encouraged people to behave differently 
from what the regime demanded. Empirically it can be seen that there were 
people, and not only a few of them, who distinguished good from evil not ac-
cording the criteria of the regime but according to their own personal system 
of values. Seeing the enormous influence of the regime everywhere, there was 
hardly any sphere in which alternatives to Soviet values were developed. The 
author treats the use of Aesopian language, the creation of symbols that were 
alternative to the official ones and the informal abuse of the authorities in a cir-
cle of friends as compliance strategies only. But did not the same alternative 
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Soviet values grow in silence and without any noise of resistance? However, 
admittance that compliance could have created a field for the alternative does 
not match normative moralization at all, which prevailed in the considerations 
of the Soviet period during the depressive stage as well.
Putinaitė perceives compliance as an interim state between collaboration 
and resistance, although she does not separate it from collaboration. Under-
standing of compliance strategies is also confusing in the book. This is ‘the im-
planted specific world outlook and certain value-based standards,’ which allow 
the Soviet reality to be justified by means of moral and rational arguments. 25 
The conformist ‘did an everyday job, which maintained the functioning of the 
system and drew the line between the people who were acceptable and unac-
ceptable to the system,’ and those people who maintained ‘the functioning of 
the Soviet regime’ rather than all the citizens are to be regarded as conform-
ists.’ 26 However, even this definition remains unclear without explaining what 
is meant by ‘to maintain the system.’
This book’s understanding of resistance is even vaguer: it can manifest 
itself both on a moral plane and a worldview plane, in everyday life, ‘in refus-
ing ambiguities, artifices and compromises in personal life dictated by the 
Soviet situation.’ 27 Though in principle this understanding seems exact, it is 
actually intangible and cannot be proved, as anyone can claim to have done 
so. Perceiving a way of life as resistance is unnecessary to resistance, as the 
author states. In this way consciousness is rejected, which is an essential thing 
when speaking about resistance. All the more so, ‘to oppose the world in which 
artifice dominates means to perceive its defectiveness even if it were impossible 
25 N. Putinaitė, Nenutrūkusi styga, p. 9, 44.
26 N. Putinaitė, Nenutrūkusi styga, p. 261, 271.
27 N. Putinaitė, Nenutrūkusi styga, p. 253.
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to avoid it in certain situations.’ 28 Hence, there remains no requirement to 
refuse artifices; one has to perceive their immorality only. In this case perhaps 
the majority of the Lithuanians were members of the resistance, even those 
who were stealing from their workplaces, although they understood that they 
were behaving badly.
Still, the author found a way out of this confusion: those resisting had to 
belong to an alternative social structure. The author goes further by stating 
that the conformists and the resisting ones were two different groups of people, 
related by different socialization and solidarity. Those who resisted preserved 
the alternative values, and were morally and socially in solidarity with the re-
pressed heroes of resistance. The Sąjūdis movement was formed of such people, 
and they gave an impetus to the Rebirth. Putinaitė cannot even imagine that 
‘a crowd of passive conformists’ 29 could have restored independence. Perhaps 
there could be no other answer to the question of how alternative values could 
have survived, when it was thought that the regime had totally re-created the 
society and completely governed the process of that re-creation.
Actually this answer means that during the Soviet period two societies with 
different socialization and solidarity existed in Lithuania. This answer, i.e. the 
concept of ‘two Lithuanias,’ was rather popular during the depressive stage. 
It allowed a simple explanation to be given regarding why so many artifices 
of the Soviet period have survived to the present day, and why Lithuania has 
failed to become a European state. The sovietised Lithuania of conformists 
dominated and the other, resisting Lithuania, was very small. This concept 
testifies to the transitional period from accusation to depression when attempts 
are made to maintain the difference between ‘we’ and ‘them.’ Only the number 
of ‘them’ – the sovietised Lithuanians – is so overwhelming that the depression 
28 N. Putinaitė, Nenutrūkusi styga, p. 278.
29 N. Putinaitė, Nenutrūkusi styga, p. 269.
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becomes progressively worse. Maintaining self-respect is of great importance 
to overcoming depression. 30 One should think that it is regarding oneself as 
‘the best’ part of Lithuania that performs this function.
Still, it was during the depressive stage that a very important step towards 
destroying the perception of a dichotomous Soviet past (by the way, such 
perception of the world is characteristic of a totalitarian, authoritarian indi-
vidual) was taken.
A strict division into only collaboration and resistance did not correspond 
to the reality and actually blocked the way to investigating the past, squeezing 
it into a too-strict framework that distorted the past. Therefore this situation 
was untenable and could not last long. As far back as 1992, the art critic Alfonsas 
Andriuškevičius stated that in Lithuanian art of the Soviet period:
one can find several clear conformists and somewhat 
fewer radical non-conformists: but what to do with the 
middle, which constitutes the absolute majority? In 
other words, the greatest part of the gifted Lithuanian 
artists of different generations who created during the 
said [Soviet] period took part in the cultural game 
controlled by the authorities, followed its rules, even 
made use of the privileges applied to the participants 
in the game […]; however, at the same time they (these 
artists) were destroying the dogmas of the so-called 
social realism, were scolded by the authorities for that 
and sometimes they were even punished. 31
30 E. Kübler-Ross, On Death and Dying, p. 70.
31 A. Andriuškevičius, Lietuvių dailė: 1975-1995 (Vilnius: Vilniaus dailės akademijos 
leidykla, 1997), p. 12.
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It was this, the largest group of artists, that Andriuškevičius called semi-non-con-
formists. In this way a scale of possible behaviors was actually constructed, where 
those whose activity contained features of the activities of both negatively as-
sessed conformists and positively assessed non-conformists found themselves.
Also, it should be noted that although the term collaboration, which is 
first of all a political category, was not applied to artists, the weight given to 
the term of a conformist was so negative that it actually corresponded with 
the weight carried by the concept of collaboration. One can guess that this 
determined the choice of the term itself, which accentuated non-compliance 
(it was possible to refer to the same phenomenon as semi-conformism) – the 
further from terrible compliance the better.
An article by the emigrant historian Kęstutis Girnius, 32 in which the term 
compliance is defined as a universal behavior characteristic of all the strata of 
society, finally formed a new approach. Having placed all possible behaviors on 
the integral scale, collaboration and resistance found themselves at its opposite 
poles, and the majority of behaviors could be identified as compliance. How-
ever, if Girnius defined collaboration and resistance very clearly (collaboration 
is ‘a certain relation of a citizen of the occupied country with the occupying 
authorities, which manifests itself in helping to consolidate it, doing away with 
its opponents or at least neutralizing them,’ this includes active participation 
and work as a high official in the occupying institutions, cooperation with 
the KGB, or public justification of the crimes committed by the authorities, 33 
while ‘resistance can manifest itself in (a) belonging to an underground orga-
nization which fights against the occupant with arms or peaceful means, for 
example, printing newspapers or proclamations, (b) open demand to restore 
32 K. Girnius, “Pasipriešinimas, prisitaikymas, kolaboravimas,” Naujasis židinys–Aidai 5 
(1996), p. 268-279; reprinted in: K. Girnius, Tauta, išbandymai, dorovė. p. 215-238.
33 K. Girnius, Tauta, išbandymai, dorovė, p. 217.
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the independence of the country, (c) protests against the essential elements of 
the occupying regime and major violations of human rights, and (d) personally 
expressed solidarity with those who fell into disfavor with the authorities due 
to (a), (b) or (c).’ 34 He avoided giving a more exact definition of compliance. 
He proposed two measures of assessment: an individual’s attitude towards 
his speciality (whether an individual avoided ideology and politics in his/her 
scientific activity – the more he/she avoided, the less compliant he/she was) 
and his/her relation with the Party and the structures of the government (the 
degree of participation in the activities of the Party of the official structures: 
the more active the individual was, the greater his/her compliance was). 35
Still, this triad had many drawbacks as well. The most important thing 
was that it confronted an individual with the Soviet reality regarding com-
pliance and reconciliation with the regime as more or less immoral behavior 
(depending on the degree or nature of compliance). The same tension between 
the extreme positions of this axis remained essential on the trinomial scale 
too, because according to a degree of distancing from them, the activity of an 
individual was assessed more or less in the positive or in the negative. Besides, 
this scale suited intellectuals and Party activists, although it was impossible 
to adapt it to the majority of the people who were not engaged in the work of 
Party organizations and did not manifest themselves in public, but who were 
not members of resistance either.
Eventually, compliance did not only include very many different practices 
of life but also, by its very definition, imposed on people the concept of the 
Soviet regime as something external, imposed, with which it was necessary to 
comply because it was alien to the people. All that rather accurately reflected 
the reality following the occupation, during the period of armed resistance to 
34 K. Girnius, Tauta, išbandymai, dorovė, p. 220.
35 K. Girnius, Tauta, išbandymai, dorovė, p. 223.
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the occupation. However, in the 1960s Soviet daily life ceased to be something 
strange to the majority of the people. It was not necessary good or satisfying, 
nor did it meet their needs, but it was the only actual reality, and no other real 
alternatives were to be found.
Meanwhile, during the depressive period as well, the supposition was made 
that an individual could (and had to) remain non-Soviet, and he who was en-
gaged in the Soviet system the least was morally ‘best.’ The implied statement 
naturally followed from the idea that the less an individual was engaged in the 
system, the closer he was to resistance. One fact was disregarded, that as often 
as not the people who believed in the ideology became dissidents after they 
had become disappointed in the ideology, both in Russia and in Lithuania. If 
the concept of ‘two Lithuanias’ was not followed the emergence of Sąjūdis is 
impossible to explain, other than as a miracle.
Hence, during the third phase the vocabulary of the totalitarian para-
digm and the understanding of the Soviet period as the ‘evil empire’ prevailed. 
And a number of the texts of that phase were written by the same authors who 
had written the texts of the earlier stage, that of anger. Only during this stage 
were investigations into political history replaced by the investigations into the 
society, especially that of culture, and deep sovietisation of the society, such 
as changing of the national identity in a direction beneficial to the regime, was 
analyzed. 36 The Soviet society was seen as being ruled, created and controlled 
from top to bottom in a hierarchal way, which had few possibilities of choice 
and effect on the ruling circles, which could only obey, comply or resist, and 
resistance was treated as the only way of exerting an impact on the regime. 
Although it was written 37 that society could exert pressure on the ruling circles 
36 A. Streikus, “Sovietų režimo pastangos pakeisti Lietuvos gyventojų tautinį identitetą,” 
Genocidas ir rezistencija 1(21) (2007), p. 7-30.
37 e.g. D. Blažytė-Baužienė, “Kultūrinė autonomija sovietinėjeLietuvoje: realybė ar 
regimybė?” Metai 8-9 (2002), p. 131-146.
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and that it was due to such pressure that permissibility limits in culture were 
expanded, in reality all this was presented as secondary in a reality dominated 
by the regime’s oppression. An individual was also treated accordingly, as a cog 
in a huge totalitarian machine, as a subject rather than an object of history. 
Hence, in essence the influence of the Soviet ideology still exists, where the base 
determines the superstructure and where an individual determines nothing.
IV. Reconciliation
Reconciliation came together with a new generation of researchers, with those 
whose childhood was marked by Sąjūdis. However, they did not become en-
gaged in political struggles that took place at the beginning of independence, 
in which the card of the Soviet past was played so intensely. Though many of 
them remember the Soviet period personally, that epoch, although it arouses 
sentiments of their childhood, is dead for them, contrary to the older generation. 
Therefore they personally do not need to reconcile themselves with it – a society 
reconciles with the past through its work. They do not feel any internal pressure 
to justify themselves for their behavior during the Soviet period, therefore for 
them this past differs little from any other historical epoch. It is true they un-
derstand that they have been influenced by the Soviet period, but they accept 
it as a consequence of a natural flow of history rather than as a blot of shame.
These researchers inherited from the depressive stage an interest in those 
deep processes that are taking place in the society. However, it is not so much 
the official processes that had been determined by the decisions taken by the 
authorities but deep informal processes, which are not so closely related to 
the policy of the regime, that arouse their interest. In their view an in di vi du-
al is no longer a weak-willed and colorless humble executor of the regime’s 
instructions who has hardly any possibilities to make choices. An individual, 
and their various groups in particular, are seen as ‘negotiating’ with the regime, 
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expanding the permissibility limits, being able to even exert pressure on the 
ruling circles and win concessions.
The single-plan scale of collaboration-conformism-resistance became too 
narrow. It was not enough to introduce additional intermediate gradations 
so as to reflect the widest possible variety of human behavior. Therefore it 
was proposed to divide the poles of compliance and resistance into different 
planes. 38 This enabled us to show that compliance on one plane could match 
resistance on the other one. Hence, three horizontals of behavior were distin-
guished: compliance, opposition and resistance. The same individual could 
act within all of them once.
All three types of behavior were possible in everyday social life (perceiv-
ing it as being in a social network encompassing all spheres of life, as well as 
social norms, the requirements of a non-political regime such as traffic rules). 
Social everydayness included the largest part of human life, and actually the 
entire life of the majority. Such things that are unavoidable when living in 
any society, that did not depend on an individual’s viewpoints are referred to 
as social compliance (such as fulfillment of universally obligatory ideological 
requirements like membership in the Young Communist League during the 
late Soviet period), social opposition (most often a scarcely reflected disregard 
of social requirements, such as larceny or misuse of public assets; membership 
in youth subcultures, which earlier was sometimes attributed to resistance to 
the regime; or manifestations of opposition to the regime on a mundane level, 
such as telling anecdotes, criticizing the regime in kitchen conversations or 
listening to foreign radio stations). Failure to fulfill the routine ideological 
and political requirements of the regime in quotidian social life can be called 
38 Here and further from: V. Klumbys, “Lietuvos kultūrinio elito elgsenos modeliai 
sovietmečiu.” (PhD diss., Vilnius University, 2009), p. 29-73.
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social resistance (for example, refusal to join the Young Communist League 
based on religious and national motives).
Compliance that oversteps the boundary of relations with the regime that 
are unavoidable in everyday social life begins with ideological compliance – at 
least a minimum fulfillment of the ideological rituals that in one way or another 
the regime demanded compliance with (such as ideological introductions to 
books, quotations of Marxist classics, ideologies titles and dedications, and 
displays of gratitude to ‘the Party and the Government’ in public speeches 
and articles). Without them individual activity was hardly possible in public, 
although an individual could avoid this by refusing to do work that required 
that. At the same time ideological conformists avoided political relations with 
the regime such as Party membership or occupying important posts. When 
people overstepped that boundary they would do extra work, more than was 
obligatory, in order to be seen in public (active direct support of the policy of 
the regime by deeds, creative work, voluntary participation in a public politi-
cal activity, membership in the Communist Party, work in political and Party 
institutions of the regime, cooperation with the power structures). One can 
speak about their activist compliance. They formed the nucleus of the activists 
of the regime and cooperated actively with the regime as the representatives of 
the regime accepted them as their very own; however, very often they became 
foreign to other intellectuals who were not so actively engaged in the activities 
of the regime. Therefore the declaration of clearly indoctrinated creative work 
can be attributed to the behavior of this level. Political conformists (who can also 
be referred to as collaborators) are activists who acquired power, who could 
exert influence on the policy of the regime. Quite often they became members 
of the nomenclature, as they entered the sphere of power.
Opposition and resistance activities were separated following the reaction 
of the regime: during the Soviet period no punishment was imposed for oppo-
sition activity although it could provoke criticism. Despite the disapproval of 
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the regime, which linked opposition and resistance, these two phenomena are 
different. Opposition supplemented compliance and resistance was its antipode. 
Behaviors attributed to opposition encompass mostly those actions that were 
not directed directly against the regime in the cultural sphere. Resistance was 
clearly political and therefore it was antagonistic to compliance, whose role was 
also political. Institutional and semi-legal behaviors of opposition are distin-
guished alongside the already mentioned social oppositionality. Institutional 
opposition means activity in Soviet institutions carried out for Lithuania’s 
benefit in the economic, cultural, political, personnel, and education spheres. 
It is also appropriate to mention here the use of anti-Soviet implications in 
publicly declared creative work, as well as artistic semi-non-conformism and 
the search for a modern artistic form. Declaration of poorly ideologies or ab-
solutely non-ideologized creative work, as well as a struggle for cultural heri-
tage and the aspiration to cherish nationality no matter how sovietised it was, 
and regret for the loss of a disappearing rural culture were important traits of 
institutional opposition until the 1970s. Criticism of the regime in the Soviet 
public life, according to Dina Spechler, the formation of ‘something similar 
to public opinion’ 39 is also to the point. ‘Work for Lithuania’ declared by the 
nomenclaturists is also appropriate here, at least part of it. The artist Aloyzas 
Stasiulevičius defined institutional opposition especially precisely; during 
the Soviet period he responded to the surprise of Polish artists who said that 
they did not see social realism in the works of Lithuanian artists with these 
words: ‘you know your understanding of social realism is very narrow. Social 
realism is the flow, which depends on the biceps – there is as much of it as you 
manage to stretch.’ 40
39 D. R. Spechler, Permitted Dissent in the USSR: Novy Mir and the Soviet Regime  
(New York: Praeger, 1982), p. 270.
40 V. Klumbys’ interview with Aloyzas Stasiulevičius, December 17, 2003.
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Semi-legal activity operates on another level of oppositionality: active 
participation in organizations that, although formally Soviet, were poorly 
controlled by the regime, as was participation in poorly organized movements, 
which often had a national character such as clubs devoted to local lore, eth-
nographic movements, and discussion. On the one hand, lack of control of the 
regime would separate this activity from institutional opposition, while on the 
other hand, this activity was not repressed. But semi-legal activity could be 
strongly criticized by the regime, and receive stricter reactions from authorities 
than activities of institutional opposition.
Actually some participants in the local lore movement are to be attribut-
ed to resistance rather than to opposition. Their activity fluctuated between 
semi-legal opposition and the underground resistance. There were small groups 
of the reliable ones in the clubs devoted to local lore, ethnographic movements. 
Members of these groups were related to the underground, and they acquainted 
the more reliable young people from clubs with samizdat.
People were subject to severe repression for taking part in underground 
activities, and for public resistance the guilty ones were to be warned and re-
formed. None of the intellectuals were severely punished for opposition activity 
after the permissibility limits had become established during the post-Stalin 
years. The underground activists stated that they knew that sooner or later 
they would be subject to repression. Only especially strong mechanisms which 
provoked resistance could encourage people to overstep that threshold. Most 
probably religion was the strongest mechanism, followed by national values, 
whereas values related to human rights or freedom of conscience were of less 
significance. The cultural elite could serve the national values by engaging in 
the activities of institutional opposition. This, alongside other circumstances, 
prevented them from becoming engaged in resistance. Participants in resis-
tance most often perceived their activity as resistance, which cannot always 
be said about the activity of those who were engaged in opposition activity. 
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Participation in the underground organizations which fought against the Soviet 
regime in different ways, participation in samizdat activities, and the demand 
for independence or protest against the policy of the regime can be attributed 
to underground activity. Public activity distinguishes public resistance from 
underground resistance when ideas directed against the regime are expressed 
in public, announcing one’s authorship. This is the highest level of resistance 
because public activity meant almost unavoidable repression (if not accusation) 
and negative material and social consequences, while the underground activist 
could expect to remain undiscovered. Some representatives of the cultural elite 
contributed moderately to the underground resistance, but they categorically 
avoided any public resistance.
These three types of behavior were often interlaced in the life of a concrete 
individual. The majority of the participants in opposition activity were both 
ideological and even activist conformists; some of them were participants in 
semi-legal opposition while at the same time taking part in the underground 
resistance. Some ideological conformists behaved in a similar way as well. There 
were also people who were ideological conformists, institutional oppositionists 
and participants in the underground resistance at the same time. For example, 
the teacher of geology Associate Professor – Vytautas Skuodis did not only 
edit an underground periodical, but was also engaged in the activities of insti-
tutional opposition in which he sought to develop national self-awareness and 
to teach people the history of the nation. At the same time he unavoidably had 
to perform ideological rituals, thus he was an ideological conformist.
It is natural that attributing specific activities to a certain category depends 
also on the time period when that activity is pursued. The book Soviet Lithuania 
by Justas Paleckis was published in Russian in 1949 in which attempts are made 
to legalize a positive assessment of the participants in the Lithuanian national 
rebirth in the 19th century alongside ideological clichés during the Stalin years, 
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can be valued as resistance, and during the late Soviet period it undoubtedly 
would be attributed to activist compliance.
This abolition of the integral scale of behavior allows the complexity of 
the reality to be reflected much more precisely. Furthermore, many colors and 
nuances appeared in the relationship between an individual and the regime. 
However, this was not the only attempt to classify behaviors of the Soviet 
period, and soon it was the broadest classification.
There were more detailed classifications as well. For example, Aurimas 
Švedas distinguished three main models of opposition behavior even in the 
approaches of the historians of the Stalin era: dissociation, non-participation 
and apoliticality; non-reflected and deliberate affronts; as well as deliberate 
arguments with the ideology following the official rules. 41 However, the for-
mer is more like the above-discussed strategy of compliance. This is only one 
of the examples testifying to the fact that there was no longer any attempt 
to adhere to similar concepts. Each researcher started creating his/her own 
terms and classifications in seeking to reflect the finest nuances of behaviors 
as accurately as possible.
Besides, during this stage not only arguments about the definition of col-
laboration actually disappear (and the term itself is used much more rarely) 
but conformism/compliance loses its condemning weight. This term simply 
becomes an ordinary neutral term, one of those which are intended for ana-
lyzing and systemizing various human behaviors. On the whole, instead of 
attempts to condemn, to identify the righteous and the malevolent, it is sought 
to simply make clear how people lived at that time.
41 A. Švedas, Matricos nelaisvėje: sovietmečio lietuvių istoriografija (1944-1985)  
(Vilnius: Aidai, 2009), p. 79-102; English translation of this study will be published 
in due course, undet the title: In the Captivity of the Matrix. Soviet Lithuanian 
Historiography, 1944-1985.
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Western Sovietological concepts also began to be intensely applied, and 
the post-revisionist trend gained special popularity. Besides, various other 
theories concerning the Soviet past based on the achievements of different 
sciences (sociology, political sciences, philosophy, and philology) began to 
be applied. Paradoxical terms such as ‘disruptive compliance of colonialist 
constructs’ (this concept has been borrowed from post-colonialism studies) 
also began to be applied. Thus it was sought to understand and reflect the 
Soviet society and regime, as well as all the complexity of their relations, as 
accurately as possible:
the subtext, or the Aesopian language, is a good ex-
ample of the ambivalent cultural production: the text 
of a work of art testifies to the artist’s conformism, and 
the allegorical message underlying the subtext is aimed 
in the opposite direction – that of opposition. […] it is 
not only the artist’s situation or the status of the work of 
art in the colonized culture that is ambivalent, similar 
contradiction is characteristic of the very structure of 
the regime and censorship. 42
All these changes mean gradual reconciliation with the Soviet past, despite the 
fact that manifestations of other stages are still present in the public sphere. 
Reconciliation, however, does not mean that moral issues are no longer raised. 
They are raised, however, in a more nuanced way, trying, first of all, to under-
stand and see the phenomena from different perspectives rather than seeking 
to justify or accuse. This is impossible without having admitted the impact of 
the Soviet period on the society and every individual who lived at that time; 
42 E. Klivis, “Ardomasis prisitaikymas: cenzūra ir pasipriešinimo jai būdai sovietinio 
laikotarpio Lietuvos teatre,” Menotyra 17, 2 (2010), p. 128.
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all the more so, without fear of pointing out not only negative but also positive 
things that took place then.
Treating the Soviet period as the past is becoming ever stronger, and 
subjecting the investigations to current political and ideological struggles is 
becoming weaker and weaker. And the fear that has penetrated into the mar-
row of everyone’s bones during fifty years, fear which made the Soviet past so 
menacing that urge is still voiced to pull down some of the Soviet ideological 
monuments, which have survived in Lithuania as though they posed a threat 
to Lithuania’s independence, this fear is abating. And this means that finally we 
can make bold to say that in some respects we are actually still Soviet people. 
Perhaps this means the hope of being cured of the Soviet period?
Translated by Aldona Matulytė
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“We Are too Poor to Stay in Poland for 
Holidays…” Mass Tourism and Illegal 
Trade in 1960s. 1 The Polish Perspective
Introduction
Speaking about ‘socialist’ tourism and illegal trade, which phenomena are 
closely connected, one usually concentrates on the 1970s and 1980s, forget-
ting that the turning point in this case was both the ending of the 1950s and 
especially the whole decade of 1960s. It should also be emphasized that illegal 
trade associated with tourism is a much more complex and multi-dimensional 
phenomenon than most suspect. 2
The reasons for this unusual outbreak of economic activity, which to a larger 
or smaller extent swept all societies of socialist countries from the second half 
of the 1950s onwards is definitely worth investigating. How was it influenced by 
issues connected with modernization and social changes that also happened 
1 The issue was previously tackled in the article: “Jesteśmy za biedni, aby urlop 
spędzać w kraju. Masowa turystyka i nielegalny handel w latach sześćdziesiątych 
XX w. Perspektywa polska,” Roczniki Dziejów Społecznych i Gospodarczych, LXVIII 
(2008), p. 125-150; “Wir sind zu arm, um den Urlaub im eigenem Land zu verbringen. 
Massentourismus und illegaler Handel trade in den 1950er und 1960er Jahren in Polen,” 
in „Schleichwege“. Inoffizielle Begegnungen sozialistischer Staatsbürger zwischen 1956 und 
1989, ed. W. Borodziej, J. Kochanowski, J.von Puttkamer, (Köln 2010), p. 135-151; Tylnymi 
drzwiami. „Czarny rynek“ w Polsce 1944-1989 (Warszawa 2010), p. 302-313.
2 At the beginning of the 1960s this type of trade became the subject of research for Po-
lish sociologists. See J. Węgleński, Wyniki badań nad handlem trade uprawianym przez 
uczestników wycieczek zagranicznych (Warszawa 1964) or A. Siciński, ed., Społeczeństwo 
polskie w badaniach ankietowych (Warszawa 1966).
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behind the Iron Curtain, which radically changed the scale of peoples’ needs? 
And finally, to what extent the wider opening of borders after 1956 caused that 
the internal, autarchic strategies of survival developed by particular societies 
gained a trans-border character? This article does not aspire to exhaust the 
subject, but rather intends on focusing on the historical process (and not on 
its sociological, psychological or cultural aspects) as well as on the situation 
specific for Poland. The article barely touches upon subjects which require 
deeper and synchronized comparative research as well as revaluing some notions, 
including that of ‘social resistance,’ and the survival strategies that it includes. 
The comparative attempts to investigate the issue of social resistance have been 
limited to only a few countries of the Eastern Bloc, and to such phenomena as 
armed resistance, diverse forms of political opposition or opposition within 
churches. 3 If everyday survival strategies were at all perceived in the context 
of resistance, they were seen from a national, if not regional, perspective. 4 We 
can only assume – on the basis of intuition and general knowledge rather that 
systematic research – that in survival strategies of the socialist countries there 
were more similarities than differences caused by diverse local conditions. In 
all socialist countries farmers avoided mandatory deliveries and sold their 
3 Ł. Kamiński, A. Małkiewicz, K. Ruchniewicz, “Opór społeczny w Europie Środkowej w 
latach 1948-1953 na przykładzie Polski, NRD i Czechosłowacji. Wstępny raport z badań” 
(primarily research report, Wrocław, 2004). On German Democratic Republic (East 
Germany), see: U. Poppe, R. Eckert, I.-S. Kowalczuk, ed., Zwischen Selbsbehauptung 
und Anpassung. Formen des Widerstandes und der Opposition in der DDR (Berlin 1995). 
Both works include rich bibliography.
4 From the Polish perspective, see: D. Jarosz, “Stalinizm polski 1948-1956: strategie 
przystosowawcze,” in Polacy wobec PRL. Strategie przystosowawcze, ed. G. Miernik 
(Kielce, 2003), p 57-74; G. Miernik, “Strategie przystosowawcze chłopów polskich do 
systemu władzy w latach 1948-1956 (na przykładzie województwa kieleckiego),” in 
Polacy wobec PRL. Strategie przystosowawcze, p. 117-147; M. Tymiński, “Nadużycia 
i manipulacje. Strategie przystosowawcze pracowników przedsiębiorstw 
przemysłowych (1950-1970),” in Polacy wobec PRL. Strategie przystosowawcze, p. 165-182; 
J. Kochanowski, Tylnymi drzwiami. „Czarny rynek“ w Polsce 1944-1989 (Warszawa 2010).
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produce in cities unofficially, cities had illegal craft shops which could pro-
duce anything thanks to illegal deliveries of raw materials from state-owned 
sources, workers in state factories pretended that they were working, making 
their beggarly wages a little better by engaging in petty theft or producing their 
own goods with the use of state materials and machines. Drivers regarded 
state-owned trucks or buses as their own transport companies, and the fuel 
they saved was sold to the owners of private cars. Officials falsified reports, 
payrolls, contracts of sale or business trips bills. And literally everyone made 
use of informal connections, whether with friends, family, or anyone else, in 
order to get the goods and services they needed. 5
The authorities, of course, declared that they would fight such behaviors, 
but these were often dummy actions, especially at local levels. It was widely 
realized that a sound compromise in this area is one of the conditions for main-
taining social peace, especially in the light of the fact that also behind the Iron 
Curtain together with modernization the scale of aspirations also changed, 
exceeding the simplest, everyday consumer needs. This process had started 
at the beginning of 1950s, and could be seen in the admiration for ‘Western’ 
goods, and giving these goods an extremely high rating in both personal and 
collective hierarchy of values. In Warsaw, Bucharest, Prague, Moscow or Sofia 
these goods were an object of desire, and colorful candy, chocolate or beer 
packages were often treated as interior design elements well until the end of 
5 J. Kochanowski, ed., “Szara strefa Października. Notatka o nielegalnych dochodach w 
Polsce 1956-1957,” Przegląd Historyczny, XCV (2004) 1, p. 77-96.; A. Arp, VEB – Vaters 
ehemaliger Betrieb. Privatunternehmer in der DDR (Leipzig 2005); F.J.M. Feldbrugge, 
“The Soviet Second Economy in a Political and Legal Perspective,” in The underground 
economies. Tax evasion and information distortion, ed. E. L. Feige (Cambridge 1989), 
p. 297-338; A. V. Ledeneva, Russia’s Economy of Favours. Blat, Networking and Informal 
Exchange (New York 1998); B. Rumer, “The „Second” Agriculture in the USSR,” Soviet 
Studies 4 (1981), p. 560-572.
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1980s. 6 In the isolation of Stalinist era, such goods were either smuggled – and 
smuggling was a phenomenon even Stalinism could not do much about – sent 
from the West, imitated by illegal local producers or produced both by private 
and state-owned factories, which were slightly upgraded.
At the end of the Stalinist era the pace of civilization changes and mod-
ernization in the whole Eastern Bloc increased, as the countries, missing the 
outside world, tried to make up for the period of stagnation. The mechanisms 
of imitation, mainly of the West, were developing, and they were very signifi-
cant when it came to shaping the true consumerist aspirations of the society. 7 
Many years of isolation of socialist countries created ‘fire-victim effect’ – an 
urge among its citizens to recreate their property that they had lost in the ‘fire,’ 
but according to the principles developed in countries of mass consumption. 
These patterns reached people through films, television, press, magazines, tour-
ism, family visits, etc. 8 These ever higher aspirations were difficult to realize in 
their own country, and the potential for using local strategies to satisfy them 
was limited, even though the strategies were constantly improved. So, when 
cross-border trade opportunities emerged, they were immediately noticed, 
accepted and systematically modified and perfected for the next three decades. 9
6 L. Chelcea, “The Culture of Shortage during State Socialism: Consumption Practices 
in a Romanian Village in the 1980s,” Cultural Studies 16 (2002), p. 35.
7 J. Misala, Nieoficjalna wymiana handlowa obywateli polskich z zagranicą (Warszawa 
1989), p. 4; K. Karcz, “Efekt naśladowania zewnętrznych wzorców konsumpcji jako 
czynnik utrudniający sterowanie spożyciem indywidualnym,” in Narzędzia polityki 
gospodarczej i społecznej w procesie kształtowania konsumpcji, vol. I (Katowice 1987), 
p. 201-205.
8 J. Szczepański, “Zagadnienia konstruowania i realizacji modelu i wzorów konsumpcji 
socjalistycznej,” in Badania nad wzorami konsumpcji, ed. J. Szczepański (Wrocław 
1977), p. 33. On opportunities for crossing the border and leaving the country, see: 
D. Stola, Kraj bez wyjścia? Migracje z Polski 1949-1989 (Warszawa 2010).
9 See: A. Wessely, “Traveling People, Traveling Objects,” Cultural Studies 16 (2002), p. 5-6.
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The proof of increasing needs as well as the attempts to fulfill them outside 
one’s own country is the increase of transborder traffic in socialist countries 
since 1950s, which was much higher than the world average. In 1950 the number 
of world tourists was estimated to be 25 million people and in 1968 it reached 
154 million. According to the data provided by the Polish Central Customs 
Office, international tourist traffic in Poland involved 24.1 thousand people in 
1950, and at its peak in the 1960s – 2811,1 thousand. This means that numbers 
in Poland increased over 116 times, while in the global scale the increase was 
just six fold. 10 The increase was so dramatic because the inhabitants of ‘peoples’ 
democracies’ had been completely cut off from the outside world, and there 
were many more other factors which encouraged people to travel than these 
connected with typical western developmental changes, that is, taking holidays 
and wanting to get to know other countries. The Communist authorities were 
well aware of these expectations since the beginning of the 1960s, and believed 
that ‘keeping their people satisfied’ was very important, so international tourism 
(which was limited to other socialist countries) was treated as a political issue.
However, the authorities in Moscow, Prague or Berlin could not allow 
people – for obvious reasons – to fulfill their biggest dream of unrestricted 
travel to the West. Only the inhabitants of Yugoslavia were allowed such relative 
freedom since the beginning of the 1960s. 11 They did not refrain from visiting 
socialist countries either, taking active part in the unofficial trade exchange. 
For other socialist countries in Europe the only element of ‘new consumer-
ism’ were trips to their ‘fellow states.’ Of course, this consent on the part of 
10 Archiwum Akt Nowych, Główny Urząd Ceł, 23/397, p. 134, Kompendium statystyczne 
administracji celnej 1946-1974, Warszawa 1975.
11 B. Luthar, “Remembering Socialism. On Desire, Consumption and Surveillance,” 
Journal of Consumer Culture 6 (2006), p. 229-259; A. Švab, “Consuming Western Image 
of Well-being – Shopping Tourism in Socialist Slovenia,” Cultural Studies 16 (2002), 
p. 63-79.
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the authorities had to be spiced with an appropriate dose of ideology. On the 
other hand, tourist agencies – state or cooperative-owned – were not charities, 
and they wanted to make profit, or at least minimize losses. In the second 
half of 1960s the conscious goal of Hungarian, Czechoslovakian, Romanian 
or Bulgarian authorities was developing incoming tourism from capitalist 
countries and outgoing tourism to socialist ones. National banks were also 
very sparing in granting other socialist countries their own currency for the 
purpose of tourism. Even if they had enough socialist currencies in stock, the 
banks would limit the amount that would be sold to the country’s own citi-
zens, and by adding a high tourism tax they made people develop their own 
economic activity. Thirdly – and this issued is indirectly connected with the 
previous one – holidays in Poland were cheaper and often subsidized by the 
state, but the money spent at this occasion was spent once and forever. Going 
abroad, even if it was slightly more expensive, could, with only a little bit of 
creativity, make the expenses return or even generate profit, a part of which 
was usually invested in another trip. Taking into account market imbalance, 
different scale of prices and shortages in socialist countries making profit was 
not a problem. This was especially true because, as it was observed in the 1960s, 
‘certain economic rules operate regardless of the existing geographical divi-
sions, and they penetrate country borders and customs barriers.’ 12 Socialist 
countries were unable to eradicate form peoples’ minds ‘the desire to get rich 
12 S. Banaszek, M. Czerepiński, Przestępstwa przemytnicze i zasady ich zwalczania 
(Warszawa 1969); IPN BU 01521/784, p. 25.
147
“We Are too Poor to Stay in Poland for Holidays…” Mass Tourism and Illegal Trade in 1960s. The Polish Perspective
quickly. The capitalist way of thinking had not been eliminated… .’ 13 In this 
case, ‘capitalist thinking’ started to cross borders with unusual effectiveness.
Factors: Time, Space, Figures
One could risk saying that from the point of view of tourism, the 1960s start-
ed a little earlier. Already in 1955, Poland and Czechoslovakia concluded an 
agreement concerning tourism, which made it possible to travel hassle-free to 
the conventional borderland zones. Thanks to cheap and easily available permits, 
Poles could enter Czechoslovakia twice for six days and exchange a certain 
amount of Czechoslovakian korunas. Citizens of Czechoslovakia enjoyed 
similar privilege. The massive flow of tourists throughout the southern border 
started already in the years 1957-1958. In the year 1959 the so-called passport-in-
serts were introduced, which, together with a passport, were a document that 
enabled people to travel. These and the Polish-Czechoslovakian agreement 
of the dropping of visas at private travel for the citizens of both countries 
(introduced on August 24, 1960) made travelling even easier.
At the beginning of the 1960 other countries began participating in the 
socialist tourist exchange. On October 19, 1961 Poland and communist German 
Democratic Republic (GDR) signed a protocol on encouraging tourism and 
introducing the so-called holiday tourism, which included trips made from 
midnight of the day before Sunday until 12:00 of the day after, provided that 
accommodation had been reserved. The results were modest at the beginning, 
mainly because of resistance on the German side. Political issues certainly 
13 IPN BU 01521/784., p. 29. Sławomir Mrożek wrote in his diary on December 9, 1962: 
‘How Poles do it, how they moonlight, is quite unclear to me. The official sources say 
that the situation is still quite critical, but one senses that people are moonlighting. 
Above all, people are not ashamed to admit that they are earning and buying. Which is 
quite contrary to how it was just a few years ago.’ S. Mrożek, Dziennik, vol. 1. 1962-1969 
(Kraków 2010), p. 21.
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played a role here, and among others, the memory of the year 1956 in Poland. 
The information of ‘mass’ tourism between the Poland and Czechoslovakia 
reached East Germany, awakening hopes and becoming a reason to pressurize 
the authorities. Finally, from January 1, 1963 the tourism convention between 
Poland and East Germany came into force. Even though Berlin subjected it 
to strict regulations, fearing its unpredictable consequences, the number of 
tourists crossing the western border (especially to Poland) was on the increase.
The agreement of July 1964 dropped tourist visas between Hungary and 
Poland, which made travel between these countries extremely popular (see 
the chart.) This was an element of Hungarian social politics, which began in 
1964 (and included ‘family tourism’ between Hungary and Slovakia, thanks 
to which 600 thousand people travelled to Hungary, and 500 thousand in the 
opposite direction. 14 If tourism and illegal trade concentrated between Poland, 
Hungary, East Germany and Czechoslovakia until 1965, after that year the 
tourist and economic traffic with countries like USSR, Bulgaria, Romania 
and especially Yugoslavia increased significantly. 15
Just like the beginning of the decade of 1960s was a bit ahead of the cal-
endar, so was its ending. The crisis of this first spontaneous and chaotic wave 
of tourism in socialist countries took place in the years 1967-1968. On the one 
hand, countries started saving money – in Romania or Hungary as a part of 
market reforms, in Poland because of growing economic downturn. Another 
factor was the Prague Spring and the intervention of Warsaw Pact army in 
14 This increase was really significant: if in 1963, 569 775 people travelled from Hungary 
and 921 021 travelled in the opposite direction, in 1964 these numbers were 148 5712 
and 1 799 932, respectively. T. Dessewffy, “Speculators and Travellers. The Political 
Construction of the Tourist in the Kàdàr regime,” Cultural Studies (16) 2002, p. 44-62.
15 On the role of Yugoslavia, see: P. J. Patterson, “Dangerous Liaisons. Soviet-Bloc 
Tourists and the Yugoslav Good Life in the 1960s & 1970s,” in The Business of Tourism. 
Place, Faith, and History, ed. P. Scranton, J. F. Davidson (Philadelphia 2006), p. 186-212; 
Luthar, “Remembering Socialism”; Švab, “Consuming Western Image.”
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Czechoslovakia, which had a huge impact on tourism – both individual tour-
ism and unofficial trade exchange were temporarily impeded. A revival came 
after 1970, when the borders between Poland and East Germany as well we 
between East Germany and Czechoslovakia were opened in 1972, which is 
quite a separate issue.
Table
Tourist traffic through the borders of Poland:
Source: Rocznik Statystyczny (further: RS) (Warszawa 1960); Archiwum Akt Nowych, Główny 
Komitet Kultury Fizycznej i Turystyki, 16/93, k. 6; 16/6, k. 30.
* (k) – convention traffic
**Does not include Polish transit traffic through Hungary.
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19
6
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19
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19
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19
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19
6
6
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6
8
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69
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Incoming 
tourism
78,1 115,5 147,0 184,0 404,4 878,2 1162,9 1280,1 1712,7 1974,9 1888,8
Socialist 
states
together
64,1 80,4 100,7 130,0 350,0 733,6 972,8 1054,3 1487,0 1732,2 1609,5
CSSR 42,1 (k*) 28,5 (k) 25,2 (k) 51,8
221,5
(k)
230,3 (k) 355,8 467,5 643,0 489,2
East 
Germany
37,5 330,6 525,6 542,6 539,1
Hungary 10,1 53,1 107,4 92,2 116,0 115,5 131,7
Outgoing 
tourism
256,7 236,3 163,8 216,4 446,5 577,3 778,4 949,9 728,1 814,4 871,3
Socialist 
states 
together
242,7 177,3 151,3 175,0 395,4 505,8 702,7 858,3 635,7 706,1 757,2
CSSR 88,2 (k) 21,6 (k) 27,7 (k)
51,8 
ncluding
45,6 (k)
187,3 (k) 221,7 (k) 307,7 278,0
163,0 
including 
54,1 (k)
102,2 150,0
East 
Germany
31,1 78,4 128,7 189,6 163,0 200,7 173,8
Hungary 13,1 57,7 99,2 191,1 71,9 75,7 88,0
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The Implementation
If from the point of view of food consumption Poland was not much behind, 
the gap concerning industrial consumption between Poland and of the capi-
talist countries, as well as some socialist countries, like Czechoslovakia, was 
dramatic. 16 Our market demand for industrial goods is immense […] – it was 
written in 1957 – everything or almost everything is difficult to get: sponge, 
chewing gum, nylon socks or artificial jewelry. 17 During the next decade the 
changes were mainly quantitative and not qualitative. Items of high quality 
were almost only available abroad, with prices often many times lower than 
in Poland. Professional smugglers or sailors, who had enough capital, made 
mass purchases of items like raincoats or watches in the West. Other items 
were provided by tourists.
It is hard to say whether it was individual tourists or package ones who were 
more involved in illegal trade. It seems that geography and organization were 
the main factors here. For example, in the border conventional zone, mass trade 
was the domain of package tours, organized by often specialized tour operators, 
as well as workplaces. Such tours usually lasted one day, and the destination 
was the nearest city across the border with enough shops. The participants 
usually had the maximum amount of foreign currency that they were allowed 
to exchange. 18 This phenomenon was quickly used by Czech tradesmen, and 
16 V. Holešovský, “Personal Consumption in Czechoslovakia , Hungary and Poland, 
1950-1960: a Comparison,” Slavic Review 24 (1965), p. 622-635; M. Rogowiec, B. Tylec, 
Kierunki przemian konsumpcji w latach 1960-1973 w wybranych krajach RWPG 
(Warszawa 1977).
17 Prawo i Życie, issue 15, 14.07.1957.
18 Archiwum Akt Nowych, GKKFiT, 16/83, J. Krynicki, “Ocena wyników badania 
ankietowego wśród turystów strefy konwencyjnej PRL-CSRS” (comp. by R. Łazarek), 
Styczeń 1963, p. 203, 204.
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second quality goods were sold in stores near the border, because it was widely 
known that ‘Polish tourists will buy it anyway.’ 19
On the other hand, Czechs and Slovaks did not need special encouragement 
to buy cold meats, chocolate, cigarettes or vodka available in Poland. 20 Czecho-
slovak citizens also traded on the other side of the border, taking advantage 
of the Polish regulation that if goods worth less than 6000 zlotys were sold to 
the state, no customs documentation was needed. In 1958 alone, goods worth 
1,2 million zlotys (a very significant amount of money these days) were sold 
to a state owned chain of shops in the Podhale region. 21 Goods which were 
worth more were often passed from hand to hand.
More attention should be devoted to the border between Poland and 
Czechoslovakia, and especially the section that had already existed in the 
interwar period, mainly because very intense tourism and trade existed there, 
and the coping strategies used before had to be modified to the largest extent. 
Main border crossings on the southern border of Poland were located in this 
section – like the one at Łysa Polana, which was crossed by 900 000 people in 
1968. In the regions of Podhale, Żywiec, Śląsk Cieszyński where the inhabitants 
of both sides of the border were connected by strong economic, historical and 
often family ties, the cross-border trade was a time-honored custom. The issue 
was emphasized in the report of the Supreme Chamber of Control concern-
ing economic crime in 1959, which said that: ‘among highlanders, smuggling 
19 E. Orkiszewski, “Turystyka, podróże, lecz nie tylko…,” Tygodnik Demokratyczny 31 
(1958).
20 Archiwum Akt Nowych, GKKFiT, 16/83, p. 165.
21 E. Orkiszewski, “Turystyka, podróże, lecz nie tylko…”
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is observed to be a profession.’ 22 When, in the second half of 1950s tourism 
became highly popular, local smuggling customs underwent a radical change, 
and social roles were reversed: ‘In the days of old Poland [before 1939 – J.K.] we 
did some smuggling – highlanders declared at the beginning of 1960s – kind 
now we do, too, but folks from Warsaw and Łódz are doing it for us.’ 23
This fact was confirmed by the observations of customs officers. In the year 
1959 the Border Guards caught 865 smugglers crossing the border illegally, in 
the year 1960 – 171, and in 1966 – 139. Smuggling itself had not decreased, it 
was only done in a way that was slightly more legal – that is, through tourism. 24 
Tourism gave a precious alibi on both sides of the border, which made smuggling 
much easier by establishing contacts abroad and organizing trafficking chan-
nels. These methods were often used when smuggling farm animals, mainly 
horses, which was characteristic for the Polish-Czechoslovakian border area. 
Potential buyers came to Poland as tourists, chose animals, paid for them and 
waited for the animals to be delivered illegally through the border.
Similar methods were used when ‘importing’ to Poland. A Pole crossed the 
border legally, using a permit, passport insert or even a passport. When he was 
in Czechoslovakia or Austria, for example, he bought goods and returned with 
them to the country illegally, or transferred the goods at the border to a smug-
22 Najwyższa Izba Kontroli, Wydział d/s Nadużyć Gospodarczych, „Informacja o 
przestępczości gospodarczej w 1959 r.,” (Warszawa 1960), p. 19 (copy owned by the 
Author). See: A. Buńda, “Pogranicze mniej formalne czyli nielegalne przekraczanie 
granic na Podhalu,” in Góry i góralszczyzna w dziejach i kulturze pogranicza polsko-
słowackiego (Podhale, Spisz, Orawa, Pieniny). Historia, ed. J. R. Roszkowski, R. Kowalski 
(Nowy Targ, 2005), p. 127-134.
23 Herder Institut Marburg, Pressearchiv, P 6221, RFE Research, 2823/61, 3.09.1961, 
„Gorale” (the Highlanders) – the privileged class in Poland. Tourists got 500 zlotys 
(which was half the amount of a monthly salary) for carrying 20 kilos of goods across 
the border. A. Buńda, “Pogranicze mniej formalne czyli nielegalne przekraczanie 
granic na Podhalu.”
24 S. Banaszek, M. Czerepiński, Przestępstwa przemytnicze, p. 59.
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gler, and the he returned to Czechoslovakia and crossed the border back to 
Poland legally. 25 Goods smuggled from capitalist countries (like gold or clothes 
from Italy) were given to several smugglers in the conventional zone, who, 
in a relatively safe way, brought the goods to Poland as conventional tourists. 26
Polish Highlanders did not abandon their traditional occupation of smug-
gling, of course. Between the autumn of 1968 and autumn 1971 a few Highland-
ers from the Podhale region smuggled 39 horses, 12 cattle and huge quantities 
of bed linen, bed covers or curtains. For these animals and goods they got 1,1 
thousand of non-iron shirts, 11 rolls of a synthetic fabric that was in demand 
in Poland and gold coins, mainly Austrian ducats. 27
Already in 1960s Zakopane became a Mecca for those coming from Czecho-
slovakia, Hungary or East Germany seeking an opportunity to take holiday 
that was perhaps not that luxurious, but free from the government surveil-
lance. A well known columnist, Stefan Kisielewski, in the summer of 1970 
wrote the following words about Zakopane: ‘It’s full of East Germans, Czechs, 
Hungarians and even Russians. I don’t know how they are bearing with this 
place, but it seems to be a good deal, if they keep coming.’ 28 At the end of 1960 
and beginning of 1970 each year almost 300 thousand guests from socialist 
countries stayed in private apartments, reaching an economic compromise 
profitable for both sides: the visitors often paid for their stay with goods, and 
they made profitable exchanges, also currency exchanges.  29
25 S. Banaszek, M. Czerepiński, Przestępstwa przemytnicze, p. 102, 105.
26 A. Kłodzińska, “Waluciarze,” Życie Warszawy, 10-12.04.1971.
27 A. Teneta, “Konie kraść?” Dziennik Polski, 294, 10.11.1972.
28 S. Kisielewski, Dzienniki (Warszawa 1998), p. 427.
29 J. Kochanowski, “Socjalizm na halach, czyli Patologia stosunków społeczno-
ekonomicznych i politycznych w Zakopanem (1972)” Przegląd Historyczny XCVIII 
(2007) z. 1, p. 71-96
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If, like in the case of Polish-Czechoslovakian border area, existing smuggling 
procedures were simply adapted to the new circumstances, in case of travelling 
further away from Poland, completely new strategies had to be developed. For 
example, joining individual tourists in groups was introduced, which ensured 
better orientation, safety and smooth border crossing. 30 In Bulgaria and Ro-
mania, which saw more Polish visitors since the 1960s, and where the largest 
percentage of tourists was involved in trade, people were interested in both 
coarse products of Polish industry 31 and goods smuggled by Poles from Austria 
or Italy (watches, for example.) Travels to Hungary – which became very pop-
ular since 1965 – package tours were replaced by individual, self-financed trips.
To a large extent such activities seemed more acceptable, because this was 
the way that inhabitants of Romania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, 
East Germany or Hungary behaved in Poland, and in other countries – like 
Hungarians in Czechoslovakia, for example. It is difficult to ascertain in a re-
liable way to which extent these were grass-roots activities and to which they 
were indirectly inspired by the state which gave its inhabitants the possibility 
to travel, and the duty to exchange currency on their own. In 1968 it was said 
that ‘financial authorities of the CSRS [communist Czechoslovakia] allow their 
citizens to exchange only 200 zlotys for their stay in Poland, regardless of its 
duration. This state of affairs intensifies illegal trade.’ 32 But it is difficult to say 
how popular this solution was. Much more often it was a conscious decision 
30 S. Banaszek, M. Czerepiński, Przestępstwa przemytnicze, p. 83.
31 Already at the beginning of 1960s ‘what sold’ in Bulgaria was common knowledge. 
The already mentioned research by Jan Węgleński shows that ‘A respondent who was 
buying bed covers in the Clothes Hall in Kraków, did not have to pick and choose, 
because the seller immediately asked: to USSR or to Bulgaria? And she packed two 
covers, which were indeed in high demand in Bulgaria.’ J. Węgleński, Wyniki badania 
nad handlem, p. 14. On trade tourism travels to Bulgaria and Romania among Poles, 
see: “Kapiści,” Dziennik Ludowy 244, 12.10.1962.
32 Archiwum Akt Nowych, GKKFiT, 16/84, p. 135.
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of Czech or Slovak tourists, who – as Poles would report – did not accept any 
cheques in zlotys, but goods. ‘They sell them here, sleep and eat in private guest 
houses and pay with goods.’ 33
In the second half of the 1960s this became a real problem, especially be-
cause the number of people coming to Poland from other socialist countries 
grew much faster than the numbers of Poles travelling. In 1967, compared 
with 1966, the number of incoming tourists grew by 25 per cent (to 1 330 807), 
and exceeded the number of outgoing tourists by 495 681. This did not lead 
to the increase of income in foreign currency. 34 The income per one tourist 
from socialist countries decreased from 19,69 foreign currency zlotys (230,37 
‘normal’ zlotys) in 1966, to 18,38 foreign currency zlotys (215,04) in the year 
1967. As a result, the negative balance of tourist exchange between Poland and 
socialist countries was 68,2 million foreign currency zlotys, and just a year 
later – 113,3 million. 35
The income also decreased in the countries whose media concentrated on 
illegal trade activities of Polish tourists – Hungary and Czechoslovakia. For 
example, Hungarians officially spent 8 times less than an average Polish tourist 
holidaying at Balaton lake – in 1968 – 21,09 and 182,50 foreign currency zlotys. 
‘This proves – a Polish official wrote – that Hungarians pay for their stay in 
Poland mainly by selling goods at attractive prices or trading currency illegal-
ly.’ 36 It was enough to visit Katowice train station to realize that this was true. 
33 E. Orkiszewski, “Turystyka, podróże, lecz nie tylko… .”
34 At the end of 1960s one foreign currency zloty – a conventional currency, used by the 
Polish People’s Republic in international settlements – was equal to 0,225 ruble and 0,25 
USD.
35 Archiwum Akt Nowych, GKKFiT, 16/3, Rozwój ruchu turystycznego z zagranicą 1965-
1970, p. 44.
36 Archiwum Akt Nowych, GKKFiT, 16/93, p. 190.
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Crowds swarmed before my eyes – Romuald Teyszer-
ski wrote about the Katowice train station in 1968. – 
Those from abroad were calmly sitting, our folk – walk-
ing around nervously, crushing polo shirts, non-irons 
and sweaters […] in their hands. Sellers – Hungarians, 
Czechs, Yugoslavs, and Austrians – were well aware of 
the recent prices of goods. […] Foreigners were trading 
almost by wholesale. They wanted to sell their goods, 
earn quick money and travel around Poland. […] On 
arrival, they were quickly informed by their acquain-
tances that this was the trading place. To reach it, they 
didn’t even have to leave the station building. 37
Economic losses encouraged the Polish authorities to undertake decisive, 
but rather one-sided actions. In 1967 a series of restrictions on excessive for-
eign currency expenses was introduced, and as a result, the expenditure on 
tourism to socialist countries decreased. The foreign currency allocations were 
decreased, restrictions were placed on the amount of Polish zloty that could be 
taken abroad and only one trip per year was allowed. In case of conventional 
tourism, the amount of foreign currency that could be exchanged was limited 
to 80 zlotys per day. As a result, the deficit decreased to 77,5 million in 1967, 
in 1968 to 22,1 million and in 1969 – 14,3 million of foreign currency zlotys. 38
These restrictions had not limited the number of incoming tourists or the 
scale of illegal trade that both sides were involved in. They only encouraged, 
especially Polish tourists to be more effective and search for new strategies of 
coping with the limitations. For example, when in 1970, as a result of the above 
37 R. Teyszerski, “Złote jajo po polsku,” Kierunki, 36, 8.09.1968.
38 Archiwum Akt Nowych, GKKFiT, 16/3, Rozwój ruchu turystycznego z zagranicą 1965-
1970, p. 44.
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mentioned restrictions, high cost of the Hungarian currency and tourist ser-
vices in Hungary the price of two-week long was 1000 zlotys more expensive 
than similar holidays in Bulgaria or Romania, Polish tourists immediately 
changed their holiday destinations and adapted their trade strategies to new 
local conditions. As a result, the negative balance of tourist exchange between 
Poland and other socialist countries rose over three times – from 23,2 million 
of foreign currency zlotys in 1970 to 72,2 million in 1971. 39
The Effects
The most important effect was definitely the fact that both traveling and unoffi-
cial trade exchange became a widespread and widely accepted phenomenon in 
the 1960s. Smuggling – as Maciej Krasicki observed in 1967 – freed from moral 
dubiousness, became the indicator of smartness, intelligence and resource-
fulness. ‘Today, you can’t compare smuggling with ordinary theft without 
causing social upheaval.’ 40 It was during this decade that ‘tourist trade’ became 
the force fuelling mass tourism, and a way to spend relatively cheap holidays 
abroad. Trade activity – ‘tourism’ is a bit of a misnomer here 41 – enabled more 
people of limited means, or traditionally less mobile because of their social 
status to travel abroad.
39 Rocznik statystyczny 1982 (Warszawa 1982), p. 496.
40 M. Krasicki, “Przemyt turystyczny,” Polityka 38, 23.09.1967.
41 This is clearly shown by dialogue recorded by journalist in the low tourist season: ‘I 
have friends who often go abroad in their own car. I asked them once where they went 
this summer. – To Bulgaria – the husband said. – To Romania – the wife corrected 
him. He was not entirely sure. However, he knew the price relations very well, and he 
boasted that no trip of theirs has ever cost him a penny.’ “Kapiści,” Dziennik Ludowy 
244, 12.10.1962.
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Anyway, in the second half of the 1960s, Poles began to use the saying: ‘We 
are too poor to stay in Poland for holidays.’ 42 But at the same time, already at 
the turn of the decades (1950s and 1960s) such trips became a source of quite 
high untaxed income, only a part of which was invested in another trip. 43 One 
is not able to estimate the scale of this surplus, taking into account the number 
of participants and the geographical area. A network of trade connections was 
established, which involved all European socialist countries, with branches in 
the West and other continents. Sometimes smuggling bore all signs of a pro-
fession, requiring a high degree of managerial skills, market intuition, not only 
mediation, but a lot of creativity which helped to sell goods at a profit.
What the Polish media described as ‘routes’ – the fur route to Bulgaria, 
clothes and cosmetics route to Romania, crystal and currency route to Yugosla-
via, linen route to Hungary 44 – actually just covered a human network, which 
passed information from ear to ear: what? when? how much? from whom? This 
phenomenon was not limited to small groups of people, like in the second half 
of the 1950s, but literally millions.
Although the major part of tourist trade in the end of 1960s consisted of 
simple, pre-industrial goods-for-goods or goods-money-goods type of exchange, 
conducted somewhere on a Budapest square, Black Sea beach or mountain 
chalet, it was also subject to specialization. Mass tourism, which often crossed 
the Iron Curtain, made possible a truly professional reconnaissance of markets, 
developing lists of goods in shortage, estimating needs and possible profits and, 
as a result, developing new trade strategies, independent from state institutions 
and the whole system. It turned out that grass-roots creativity could cause a true 
42 G. Gałuszczyńska, “O ludziach, metodach i sposobach myślenia,” Prawo i Życie, 6 
(1966).
43 W. Nowierski, “Komisy nie powinny być centralą skupu przemycanych towarów,” 
Express Wieczorny 271, 15.11.1961.
44 M. Krasicki, “Przemyt turystyczny.”
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economic miracle, deserving a Nobel prize: the officially non-exchangeable 
currencies like Soviet rubles, Hungarian forints or Czech korunas were not 
only suddenly exchangeable, but also worth their value in gold. Because what 
brought true profits was not only a simple sale of Polish crystal glass, cosmetics 
or sausage and buying local (socialist) goods for the money, but investing the 
rubles, forints or korunas on free markets and exchanging them in Vienna, 
Trieste or West Berlin for gold, which was the most profitable good in Poland. 
One may theorize that similar mechanisms were at work in other socialist coun-
tries. As a result, already at the end of the 1960s an unofficial stock exchange of 
money and goods originating from socialist countries was born, and the rates 
of exchange depended on international conditions. 45 Potential profit was one 
of the basic factors making the given country attractive for ‘tourists’ and influ-
encing the decision of which strategy to adopt. 46 Depending on the route and 
type of transaction there were national specializations as well – for example, 
smuggling goods and currency was to a large extent the domain of Yugoslavs. 47 
Mass smuggling of toys and other wares produced by Polish craftsmen was 
taken over by the Roma people of Czechoslovakia. 48 These phenomena are 
reflected in the records of fiscal proceedings for customs offences – by the way, 
the numbers of these are strangely low in the case of Hungarians. In the first 
45 There was a characteristic corelation between the exchange rate of the Czech koruna 
and the Prague Spring events, during which the demand for korunas in Vienna and 
West Germany was high, and it was doubtlessly connected with mass ‘tourism’ from 
Austria and West Germany to Czechoslovakia, which caused an increase in the black 
market koruna rate in Poland, mainly in the border areas. AIPN, KG MO, 35/1740, p. 2, 
KG MO, Informacja o efektach ścigania przestępstw dewizowo przemytniczych w 1968 
r., 8.1.1969.
46 J. Oleś, “Przemyt wartości dewizowych,” Akademia Spraw Wewnętrznych, Instytut 
Kryminalistyki i Kryminologii (Warszawa 1978), IPN BU 01521/2035, p. 65-70.
47 J. Koczorowski, Walka z przemytem, p. 34-35.
48 Wiadomości Celne, Styczeń 1970, p. 9-10.
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half of 1969, 2318 criminal cases were initiated on the motion of twelve largest 
customs offices. 49 Out of these, 985 regarded citizens of Poland (for the amount 
of 3 363 800 zlotys), Czechoslovakia – 349 (696 800 zlotys), Yugoslavia – 349 
(1 352 800 zlotys), USSR – 70 (241 200 zlotys), Romania – 25 (91 200 zlotys), 
Bulgaria 18 (79 200 zlotys), Hungary – 17 (48 800 zlotys), East Germany – 5 
(4 700 zlotys), other countries – 228 (2 891 700 zlotys) and cases where the 
perpetrators remained unknown – 326 (1 969 800 zlotys). One may suspect that 
the last category was mainly composed of inhabitants of socialist countries. 50 
In 1970, 4 440 such proceedings were initiated against inhabitants of socialist 
countries: 3253 against Poles, 554 – against Yugoslavs, 394 against Czechoslovak 
citizens, 92 – against USSR citizens, 70 – against Bulgarians, 29 – Romanians, 
27 – against East Germans, 21 – against Hungarians. 51
The effects were to a large extent schizophrenic. The authorities – for their 
own peace of mind – allowed for tourism to develop, acknowledging illegal 
trade as a necessity, which freed them from the obligation to provide the cit-
izens with the goods they desired – both material goods and services, like 
holidays. However, this phenomenon quickly got out of control and in 1960s 
assumed the scale that could provoke international problems. If ‘tourist trade’ 
was criticized in the media with the use of legal and ethical arguments, in 
official correspondence it was mainly the economic side that was pointed out.
In 1968, the first unofficial ‘customs wars’ between socialist countries took 
place. This year the Main Committee of Physical Culture and Tourism urged 
the government to intensify customs control regarding individual tourists from 
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Hungary, in order to ‘prevent 
49 Chałupki, Cieszyn, Kudowa, Kuźnica, Łysa Polana, Małaszewicze, Warsaw Airport, 
Międzylesie, Rzepin, Zebrzydowice, Zgorzelec, Żurawica.
50 Wiadomości Celne, Styczeń 1970, p. 6.
51 Kompendium statystyczne administracji celnej 1946-1974 (Warszawa: GUC, 1975) 
Archiwum Akt Nowych, GUC 23/397, p. 213.
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them from bringing in the goods to be sold in Poland in order to cover the 
cost of holidays. 52 Romanian authorities also intensified their actions against 
Polish traders in 1968. In this case their aim was not the protection of their 
own market, but rather discouraging Poles from occupying Black Sea resort 
apartments, which could fetch much more money, and in foreign currency, 
from German or French tourists. 53 Media from particular countries started 
propaganda campaigns criticizing trading tourists from other socialist coun-
tries. Such actions aimed at integrating their own society in view of a kind of 
external threat. But between the lines, one can see the fear of a grass-roots, 
spontaneous and uncontrollable integration between societies. However, it 
was too late to fight this phenomenon effectively. Within one decade Poles, 
Hungarians or Romanians managed to establish a lasting foundation for a truly 
mass ‘cooperation’ in 1970s and 1980s.
Translated by Anna Sekułowicz
52 Archiwum Akt Nowych, GKKFiT, 16/93, p. 190. In January 1969, Polish authorities 
started to demand that Hungarians coming to Poland have enough Polish currency to 
cover the holiday expenses, and created a formal means to deny entry to the ones that 
failed to prove it.
53 Archiwum Akt Nowych, GKKFiT, 16/1, p. 234.
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Relations between Lithuanian 
Monastic Institutions and the 
West during the Soviet Period
The Catholic Church in Lithuania experienced one of the most difficult pe-
riods of its existence under the Soviet occupation, especially in the Stalin 
years (1944-1956). Unlike the People’s Republic of Poland where the Church 
although terrorized by the pro-communist regime still preserved its structure 
(a network of parishes, the religious press, monastic institutions, scientific 
institutions), the confessional policy of the regime in the Lithuanian SSR left 
behind the Iron Curtain was much more brutal. The structure of the Church 
suffered greatly, and its social status and legal position changed completely. The 
regime achieved its goal – the Church was forced to live according to Soviet 
laws that were hostile to it.
During the early post-war years the dissemination of religious periodicals 
and books was forbidden, the number of functioning churches and theological 
colleges was radically reduced (only one of the colleges was left functioning and 
it was watched and controlled by the KGB), and a ban on priests catechizing 
children came into force, among other severe restrictions. Very soon, in 1948-
1949, all Catholic monasteries were destroyed. Their property was nationalized, 
the monks and nuns were forced to disperse and had to earn their living on their 
own. In the spring of 1949, the officials of the Soviet Lithuanian authorities 
reported to their central authorities in Moscow that Catholic monasteries ‘had 
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liquidated themselves’ in the republic. 1 Although the disappearance of six men 
and nine women from monastic institutions (not including the Archdiocese 
of Vilnius; in July 1940 there were 281 men and 490 women there apart from 
the novices and candidates 2) was officially treated as a spontaneous process, 
this was achieved only through means of brutal compulsion.
Lithuanian monastic institutions adapted themselves to the conditions 
of underground life. In the course of almost five decades not only did they 
not decline, but some of them grew considerably, and new orders of women 
appeared. Similarly to the Lithuanian Church, one of the acutest problems of 
their existence during the Soviet period was relations with the Vatican and 
canters of orders and congregations that existed in foreign countries. Direct 
diplomatic relations between the Vatican and Lithuania were severed as far 
back as 1940 when Nuncio Luigi Centozo was forced to leave the Soviet-occu-
pied country. After World War 2free correspondence was terminated, and the 
attempts of some priests and nuns to pass on the news in secret to the Vatican 
about the condition of the Church in Lithuania through the foreign Dean of 
the Moscow Catholic Church ended in arrests and deportations. This situation 
led to searches for new secret contacts. Many confidential relations between 
the West and Lithuania were maintained through Poland. In this article we 
shall try to elucidate when, in what ways and to what extent the Lithuanian 
monastic institutions managed to overcome the border cordons, and what role 
the Church of neighboring Poland played in their attempts to break away from 
Soviet isolation. Another object of this investigation is a second secret channel 
of communication which ran through the Lithuanian monastic institutions 
1 Information report of Bronius Pušinis, Representative of the Council for Religious 
Cults of the Lithuanian SSR Council of Ministers of Quarter I, 1949, Lithuanian 
Central State Archives (hereinafter referred to as LCSA), fund R-181, inventory 3, file 22, 
leaf 29.
2 R. Laukaitytė, Lietuvos vienuolijos: XX a. istorijos bruožai (Vilnius 1997), p. 91-92.
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that existed in the countries of Western Europe and North and South Amer-
ica, as well as the importance of relations to the orders and congregations of 
Lithuania, which operated underground.
The issues related to the activity of the monastic institutions of Lithuania 
during the Soviet period have received much attention: since the restoration of 
the Republic of Lithuania in 1990 leaders of male and female monastic institu-
tions have been simply flooded with forms and questionnaires. They have been 
urged to describe their life because no authentic documents of that period have 
survived, for understandable reasons. The monastic institutions, which came 
out of the underground, shared their history more actively at the end of the 20th 
century, 3 and at the turn of the 21st century several historical studies devoted 
especially to this problem appeared. 4 However, contacts of the Churches of 
Lithuania and Poland, like those of the monastic institutions that functioned 
both in the occupied Motherland and in exile during the Soviet period have 
not been specifically studied, meaning we can decide about secret relations 
3 Data on female monastic institutions in the Soviet times were generalised in: Dievui 
ir Bažnyčiai. Trumpa Lietuvos moterų vienuolijų apžvalga, ed. L. Rimkevičiūtė 
(Marijampolė 1997); Lietuvos Šventojo Kazimiero seserų kongregacijai – 75 (Kaunas 1995); 
L. Jagminas SJ, “Vienuolijų veikla Lietuvoje nepriklausomybės ir pokario metais 
(1918-1990),” Lietuvių katalikų mokslo akademijos suvažiavimo darbai 15 (1995), p. 97-
118; Lietuvių saleziečių istorija, compiled by K. Juknevičius SDB (Kaunas 2000); 
A. P. Dydycz OFM Cap, Kapucyni na Litwie (1756-1993), (Rzym 1994).
4 R. Laukaitytė, Lietuvos vienuolijos: XX a. istorijos bruožai, p. 133-158; A. Streikus, 
Sovietų valdžios antibažnytinė politika Lietuvoje (1944-1990) (Vilnius 2002), p. 115-118; 
A. Pažėraitė, “Lietuvos vienuolijos totalitarinio režimo sąlygomis,“ Lietuvių katalikų 
mokslo akademijos suvažiavimo darbai, 18, 2 (2003), p. 755-777.
166
Regina Laukaitytė
of the monastic institutions only from scanty hints found in the archives and 
historical literature. 5 They will serve as the main research sources for this study.
Lithuania was the only republic of the USSR with a Catholic majority, and 
it had a dense network of parishes and monasteries and a rich cultural heritage 
inseparable from Catholicism. During the Soviet period great ideological 
forces were exerted to discredit that heritage and to eliminate the Church 
from public life. It was sought to impoverish it and to control its activity. The 
situation of the Church changed radically in 1948-1949 after church proper-
ty had been nationalized and a selective campaign of registering churches, 
monasteries and priests had been conducted, having intimidated the priests 
and ordinaries. By the end of 1949 two waves of repression had passed, during 
which first bishops were arrested, then managers of dioceses appointed by the 
former following Canon Law; only Bishop Kazimieras Paltarokas was left in 
his post. As at the same time the campaign of destroying Catholic monastic 
institutions was launched the latter could expect support neither from the 
Church nor from a public devastated by the campaign of mass deportations.
As mentioned above, harsh compulsory measures were taken, especially 
against male and female monastic institutions. Their members were terrorized, 
as they were ordered to vacate the nationalized houses within several days, 
singeing taxes were imposed on them, and they were dismissed from work at 
schools and kindergartens. Similar measures against the monastic institutions 
were soon taken in Poland as well, although those were much more moderate. 
Only some unregistered monastic institutions were made to withdraw into 
5 H. Strzelecka SJE, Służebnice Jezusa w Eucharystii na terenach Związku Radzieckiego 
w latach 1945-1991 (Warszawa 1994), p. 129-146; A. Pajarskaitė, ed., Švenčiausiosios 
Mergelės Marijos Nekaltojo Prasidėjimo vargdienių seserų vienuolija (Kaunas 2012); 
S. Bytautas OFM, Lietuvių pranciškonų (OFM) identiteto raiška pastoracinėje veikloje 
1940-1990 metais. (PhD diss., Kaunas 2011), p. 116, 119-120.
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the underground, 6 whereas in Lithuania’s case, all male and female orders had 
to do so. In 1948 a method of forceful transfer of monks and nuns to specially 
chosen locations was used there: Lithuanian nuns who refused to leave their 
homes in Kaunas were transferred by force to Kulautuva and the nuns from 
four Polish monastic institutions in Vilnius were moved to Juodšiliai. 7 In 1949 
priests of the monastic institutions were forced to relinquish their monastic 
property in writing. It was only after the Commissioner of the Council for 
Religious Cults of the Lithuanian SSR Council of Ministers had received such 
written statements that he issued certificates to priests granting them the right 
to work in parishes. 8 Analogously, the way to the only theological college in 
Kaunas was blocked to the young monks. All monastic institutions in Lithu-
ania experienced a period of turmoil and despair, many dispersed members 
lost contact with the leaders of monastic institutions for an extended time, and 
the latter lost contact with their centers and the Vatican.
Nevertheless, monastic life did not come to an end: later the security organs 
periodically disclosed the nuns, and demanded that they should be dismissed 
from work at schools, kindergartens, etc. 9 After the first wave of repression 
had subsided the nuns and the monks tried to settle in small communities of 
6 I. Lewandowska, Działalność Sióstr od Aniołów w Polsce w latach 1945-1980 
(Łomianki 2012); M. Ordon,“Represyjna polityka władz komunistycznych wobec 
zgromadzenia braci sług Maryi Niepokalanej w okresie Polski Ludowej,” in Divina et 
Humana, ed. A. Dębiński, W. Bar, P. Stanisz (Lublin 2001), p. 159-175.
7 Information report of the Comissioner Bronius Pušinis of Quater II, 1948, LCSA, fund 
R-181, inv. 3, f. 17, l. 38-39.
8 Secret letter of the Commissioner Bronius Pušinis of 2 February 1948 to the Chairmen 
of Executive Committees of towns and regions, LCSA, fund R-181, inv. 3, f. 20, l. 21.
9 Secret official letter of the Chairman of the KGB of the Lithuanian SSR General Major 
Juozas Petkevičius of 29 January 1975 to the Chiefs of KGB Divisions of towns and 
regions of the Lithuanian SSR On Strengthening Secret Service-Operational Work in 
Fighting against Hostile Activities of Monks and Nuns, Lithuanian Special Archives 
(hereinafter referred to as LSA), fund K 1, inv. 46, f. 205, l. 35-36.
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two or three individuals. Every month they gathered secretly for recollections, 
and once or twice per year for longer recollections. The governing body of 
the monastic institutions operated in secret (after the war, with no possibility 
to organize new elections according to the requirements of church canons, 
leaders in many provinces carried out their duties for several terms of office). 
The novitiates of the monastic institutions, which were closed after the war, 
began to come to life again one after another right after Stalin’s death in 1953. 
Female novices usually lived in their homes and met for secret lessons several 
times per month.
The activity in the underground did not prevent new monastic institutions 
from forming: in the 1950s and 1960s as many as five new female congregations 
appeared in Lithuania, and bishops granted the rights of diocesan congregation 
to three pious societies that had been functioning for several decades in the 
country; moreover, in 1947 and 1957 two completely new orders were founded 
whose aim was to help the priests and to catechize children.
Operating under the conditions of the underground, the monastic institu-
tions were faced with an important dilemma: to go on being apostolic, to carry 
out their special tasks, or to be limited to a personal sanctity of the members. 
In essence, it was an existential question: the monastic institutions which were 
more active in society would be destroyed; however, isolation also posed the 
danger of decay. Opinions on this issue differed, and it was quite often that 
even members of the same monastic institution understood their mission 
in a different way. The positions of the Heads of the Lithuanian Church differed 
as well: some ordinaries, seeking to avoid confrontation with the aggressive 
authorities, the KGB, oriented monastic institutions towards a spiritual life, 
the life of prayer. For example, in 1967 Bishop Juozapas Matulaitis-Labukas 
demanded that the duty to work with children and youth should be crossed out 
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of the Constitution of the Congregation of Sisters of Eucharistic Jesus. 10Many 
non-conformist priests, the Bishops Vincas Sladkevičius and Julijonas Ste-
ponavičius who were removed from their posts urged the monastic institutions 
to take an active part in the life of the Church, to engage in apostolic work even 
beyond the borders of Lithuania.
The most characteristic sphere of the activity of the nuns was assistance 
to the priests – they helped the priests in parishes, catechized children in se-
cret, multiplied and disseminated religious literature, and rallied the youth 
into circles. Unable to perform their apostolic duties in Lithuania, the priests 
of the monastic institutions tried their best to work in other republics of the 
USSR. The initiators of the missions were the priests who, released from the 
forced labor camps in the middle of the 1950s, stayed of their own fee will to 
serve the Lithuanian deportees and Catholics of other nationalities. Later, 
in the 1970s and 1990s, leaders of the monastic institutions sent the priests 
who could not work in Lithuanian parishes on missions (those priests who 
were consecrated in secret or who were deprived of the certificates of the cult 
clerks). In particular many Jesuits and Marian priests went on missions, and 
beginning in the 1980s, Franciscan priests as well. Though the local authorities 
were opposed to their activity, the KGB persecuted them, the priests gave the 
Sacraments to hundreds of thousands of Catholics, and several parishes were 
registered. Although they faced opposition and persecution from the local 
KGB in authority, the priests gave the Sacraments.
At the beginning of the 1970s Lithuanian nuns began to embark on mis-
sions. Members of the Congregation of Sisters Servants of the Jesus in Eucha-
rist founded by the blessed Archbishop Jurgis Matulaitis MIC, devoted the 
greatest efforts to those missions. The geography of their activities included 
10 K.-J. Kuodytė, “A short History of the Congregation of Sisters of Eucharistic Jesus.” 
(manuscript, copy of the article in the author’s archives), p. 2.
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Georgia, Kazakhstan, Tadzhikistan, and the cities of Siberia. Sisters of the 
Congregation of the Servants of the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus also took an 
active part in the missions: from 1973 as many as 10 nuns had lived in Armenia, 
Georgia, Kazakhstan and Tadzhikistan. 11 The Congregations of St. Casimir, 
the Poor Sisters, the Sisters of the Eucharist Jesus, of Divine Providence sent 
some sisters on missions as well. After the downfall of the USSR the work 
of Lithuanian monks and nuns in the missions broke off as wide programs 
of apostolic work in Lithuania itself began, and ordinaries appointed by the 
Vatican began taking care of the Catholics in the former USSR.
Isolation behind the Iron Curtain could not last forever. The Lithuanian 
Church had to look for ways of getting in touch with the Vatican, and the 
monastic institutions with the leaders of their orders and congregations. The 
latter had no reliable information about the lives of the monks who had stayed 
in Lithuania. In the post-war years people intimidated by mass repressions 
avoided corresponding with their family members and relatives who had fled 
abroad. After Stalin’s death, however, when the regime became softer, they 
started looking for one another, and relations were restored.
The relationship with neighboring Poland has played an important role in 
the history of the Lithuanian Church and monastic institutions. On the one 
hand, the Catholic Church in the People’s Republic of Poland was beyond all 
comparison much freer than that in the Soviet Union. During the first post-
war years in Poland the pro-Soviet regime tried to use the influence of the 
Catholic Church on society to their advantage, meaning the religious policy 
was much more tolerant. For example, state holidays always began with masses 
in churches with high officials taking part.
11 K.-J. Kuodytė, “A short History of the Congregation of Sisters of Eucharistic Jesus,” 
p. 12-13.
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After the pro-Soviet regime had become established, the monastic in-
stitutions in Poland faced their most relentless persecution during the years 
of Stalin’s rule, 12 but later their situation stabilized. Both male and female 
monasteries survived in Poland, as did a number of their schools of general 
education and a network of hostels, although greatly cut and systematically 
reduced. Nevertheless, their existence created conditions to effectively re-
spond to the political changes of the regime – after the ‘thaw’ the number of 
schools where religion was taught was on the increase in Poland (for example, 
in 1959, as many as 80 per cent of Polish schools were teaching religion 13). The 
borders of Poland were not as tightly controlled as those in the Soviet Union 
and priests could go to study or work in Western countries. Later they returned 
and continued their careers in their motherland where theological colleges 
operated in dioceses, and in Lublin several thousand students studied at the 
Catholic University, which maintained close contacts with similar scientific 
institutions abroad. Such ‘liberalism’ of the regime was unimaginable in the 
USSR, while in Poland the conditions of the functioning of Church institu-
tions almost equaled those in the West. The official Lithuanian Church was 
controlled, and people were allowed to go abroad on trips unrelated to KGB 
tasks only in rare cases (in this case they served as a cover for the security offi-
cials accompanying them). It was only in the underground that it was possible 
to carry out authentic activity – catechization, the religious press, theological 
studies and monastic institutions – in Lithuania.
12 J. Kowalik, “Polityka władz PRL wobec zakonów,“ Chrześcijanin w świecie 1 (196) 
(1994), p. 136-157; A. Mirek, Siostry zakonne w obozach pracy w PRL w latach 1954-1956 
(Lublin 2009), p. 99-174; Zakony w Polsce Ludowej, Przez Morze Czerwone, 2009, część 
VII; E. Kaczmarek, “Prymas Wyszyński – obrońca zakonów wobec prześladowań 
władz Polskiej Rzeczpospolitej Ludowej,“ Teologia i moralność, 10 (2011), p. 155-165.
13 E. K. Kryńska, S. W. Mauersberg, Indoktrynacja młodzieży szkolnej w Polsce w latach 
1945-1956 (Białystok 2003), p. 43.
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However, the most significant factor for Poland was that many Polish priests, 
monks and especially nuns lived in the territory of the USSR. About 90 per 
cent of the territory of Vilnius Archdiocese was within the boundaries of the 
USSR after 1944. With mass migration of the Polish population to Poland 
occurring, the majority of the priests and monks left. Nonetheless, they main-
tained secret contacts with the members of the monastic institutions who had 
stayed in the USSR and in the Lithuanian SSR and who felt that they belonged 
to the jurisdiction of the Polish Vilnius Archdiocesan Curia right until 1991 
(which moved with the metropolitan Romuald Jałbrzykowski to Białystok in 
1945). This Curia preserved contacts with the priests of Vilnius Archdiocese 
who had stayed in the Belarusian SSR and the Lithuanian SSR, took interest 
in the situation of the Church in the USSR and the fate of Polish monks, and 
provided information to the Vatican. 14
One can judge from the clues in the sources and scientific works that con-
tacts between the monks of Lithuania and Poland were maintained by encoded 
letters, accidental relations or even by means inspired by the KGB. 15 However, 
beginning in 1965 some leaders of the monastic institutions went from Lithua-
nia to Poland and met with the authorities of the congregations, visitations of 
Lithuanian monasteries began, and representatives of Lithuanian monasteries 
14 Relatio de statu huius partis Archidioecesis Vilnensis quae intra fines URSS exstat, 
1977, Śmierci się z nas nikt nie boi. Listy kapłanów archidiecezji wileńskiej z ZSRS, ed. 
A. Shot, W. F. Wilczewski (Białystok 2012), p. 356, 358-359.
15 The KGB of the Lithuanian SSR tried to monitor and control relations with Poland, 
even to take over the initiative. For example, at the end of 1957 the KGB organised a 
trip of a Marian priest – agent “Algis” – to Poland where he, through the monks, had 
to establish relations controlled by the KGB with the authorities of the congregation 
in Rome (Top secret letter of the Deputy Chairman of the KGB of the Lithuanian 
SSR Leonardas Martavičius on December 24, 1958 to the Deputy Chairman of the 
KGB of the USSR K. Liniov, LSA, fund K 1, inv. 3, f. 501, l. 76).
173
Relations between Lithuanian Monastic Institutions and the West during the Soviet Period
sometimes went to take part in general chapters. 16 Thanks to these relations 
and the care of the Białystok Curia more than half of the female monastic in-
stitutions that operated in that region during the interwar years have survived 
up to the present day. Polish priests and monks took care of the sisters as well, 
constantly visiting the Soviet Union from the 1960s into the1980s. 17
During the years of Soviet rule the monks’ secret relations with Poland 
was a rare opportunity not only for Polish but also for Lithuanian monastic 
institutions to seek out contacts with the West. It should be noted that this per-
spective was new and radical in the Lithuanian Church, and it required a change 
in the people’s way of thinking. During the interwar years due to the argument 
over Vilnius, Lithuania and Poland did not maintain any diplomatic relations 
16 For example, in 1965, general seniors of Lithuanian and Polish branches of the 
congregation of the Servants of Jesus in Eucharist met in Warsaw for the first time, 
in 1969-1987, when updating and improving the Constitution of the Congregation 
sisters of both countries considered the variants of its text. Similarly, around 1960, 
the Senior of the Congregation of the Servants of Mary ofthe province of Lithuania 
went to Poland, and in 1967, a member of the General Council arrived in Lithuania as 
a visitor for the first time. In 1970, three sisters of the Congregation of St. Catherine 
left for the centre of the monastic institution in Braniewo where they could learn of 
the changes that had taken place in the life of monastic institutions after the Second 
Vatican Council; in the summer of 1972 the new Constitution, the statute of the 
province and other important documents were received from Rome. In 1974 the nuns 
of that Congregation met for the first time after many years with the leader of that 
monastic institution, who was in Vilnius as a tourist. See: H. Strzelecka SJE, Służebnice 
Jezusa w Eucharystii na terenach Związku Radzieckiego w latach 1945-1991, p. 129, 147-
148; information of the senior deputy of the Congregation of the Sisters Servants of 
the St. Virgin Mary Immaculate Rita Bernotaitė of June 7, 1995, an official letter in the 
author’s archives; Chronicles of the Monastery of the Congregation of the Sisters of St. 
Catherine, l. 30, 570, 581, a copy in the author’s archives.
17 For example, in 1979-1987 Vilnius Benedictines were visited by father Bruno Zygmunt 
Pawłowicz OFM Conv, the Dominicans – by Polish Dominicans, the home of the 
Sisters Servants of Jesus in Eucharist was visited by the sisters of those monastic 
institutions who provided apostolic help. See: A. Słowik, Najważniejsze jest niewidoczne 
dla oczu (Niepokalanów 1994), p. 241, 245; Account by s. Miriam Jedynak OP, taken 
on June 7, 1995 is stored in the author’s private archives; H. Strzelecka SJE, Służebnice 
Jezusa w Eucharystii na terenach Związku Radzieckiego w latach 1945-1991, p. 23-24.
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(until the latter’s ultimatum in 1938). It was out of the question that the country’s 
monastic institutions could belong to the provinces of Poland or that contacts 
should be maintained between them. Therefore the monasteries, which had 
been operating in Lithuania from the tsarist times, were made to refuse the 
Polish language; branches of non-public female congregations (established by 
Honorat Koźmiński) seceded from Poland and founded their own provinces. 18 
Other newly established orders and congregations could not invite Polish 
individuals. During the Soviet period such opposition started to weaken: the 
monastic institutions tried to establish relations with the centers in Poland and 
in this way they not only sent personal messages but also to found out about 
the changes in the universal Catholic Church.
It is difficult to say what role the heads of the Polish Church played in the 
life of the monastic institutions of Lithuania. Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński had 
the authorization of the Vatican to head the Catholic and Uniate Churches 
in the territory of the USSR, and after the Cardinal’s death another Primate 
of Poland, Józef Glemp, took over this responsibility. It seems that Cardinal 
Wyszyński was slow in undertaking any initiative on the situation of the Catholic 
Church in Lithuania. Most probably he lacked reliable contacts and information, 
as well as possibilities to realize his authorizations (to block them the Soviet 
KGB tried to enlist the help of not only of the security bodies of Poland but 
also those of Lithuania, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, in order to use the very 
fact of appointment to deepen the disagreements between the Lithuanians 
18 From the tsarist times 16 secret congregations established by father Honorat 
Koźmiński operated in Lithuania, including three, which became integrated 
into ethnic Lithuanian society: the Congregations of the Servants of Mary, the 
Congregation of the Servants of the Sacred Heart of Jesus and the Congregation of the 
Daughters of the Most Holy and Immaculate Heart of the Blessed Virgin Mary. During 
the interwar period they officially became registered and acted as societies, and in 1923, 
1927 and 1934, respectively, their independent provinces were founded in Lithuania.
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and the Poles both in exile and in Lithuania 19). It was only at the beginning of 
the 1970s that Cardinal Wyszyński authorized Father Pranas Račiūnas MIC 
to lead the female monastic institutions of Lithuania. 20 This invigorated their 
lives and their apostolic activity as Father Račiūnas, who had connections 
to the underground, began to solve their internal problems (the issues of the 
formation of the nuns, updating of the Constitution) and encourage them to 
be more active in their apostolic duties. With the underground Church gaining 
strength as the number of the priests of the monastic institutions graduating 
from secret studies increased, the female monastic institutions became stronger 
and their activity became more intense.
After Lithuania re-established its statehood, it turned out that some mo-
nastic institutions, hitherto unrelated to Poland, entered the jurisdiction of the 
Church of that country (Lithuanian Capuchins, 21 male and female Salesians, 
the Dominicans, Sisters of St. Elisabeth, and the Servants of Mary). The Church 
authorities of Lithuania and members of the monastic institutions accepted 
19 Certificate of the Chief Commissioner of Subunit 2 of Department 4 of the Second 
Supreme Board of the USSR KGB Major Salov of July 11, 1962, LSA, fund K 1, inv. 3, f. 
534, vol. 3, l. 127 and next.
20 “Prano Račiūno 50 metų kunigystės kelias,” Šaltinis, 1/2 (1994), p. 28.
21 Acquaintance of two Capuchins with the Polish monks of this Order in one parish near 
Grodno opened the way to relations with the centre of the Order (in 1979, the General 
Definitor Antoni Dydycz OFM Cap visited the Capuchins of Lithuania for the first 
time and handed over the new Constitution of the Order to them), and later the monks 
of the newly reborn Order were attached to the region of Krakow, see: A. P. Dydycz 
OFM Cap, Kapucyni na Litwie (1940-1994), in Pranciškonai Lietuvoje XX a.: šviesa spindi 
tamsoje, ed. by M. A. Dettlaff OFM Conv, (Vilnius 2011), p. 119-121.
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this situation ambiguously. 22 On the whole, in 1989-1990, the Church of Poland 
demonstrated a great interest in apostolic work in Lithuania, especially in 
Belarus and Russia where there was a great shortage of priests. Priests, monks, 
nuns, and catechists went to the territory that earlier belonged to Poland. In 
some localities their activities revived a national discord that had abided during 
the Soviet period; the newcomers were accused of trying to Polonise the local 
population. Finally Vilnius Archbishop Ordinary Julijonas Steponavičius set 
down the condition that the arriving priests should speak local languages. 23 
This suspended migration of the priests. Moreover, unrestricted possibilities 
for Lithuanian monastic institutions to maintain relations with other foreign 
countries opened up; the Lithuanian nuns who arrived from the USA under-
took an active initiative to renew them in accordance with the requirements 
of the new Canon Code (1983). The new contacts downplayed the importance 
of relations with the monastic institutions of Poland.
A comparatively liberal pro-Soviet regime in the People’s Republic of Po-
land attracted the attention of Lithuanian emigrants from the very beginning 
of the Soviet occupation. The Lithuanian inhabitants of the so-called Suwalki 
triangle were in its centre. The security bodies of Poland and Soviet Lithuania 
22 Due to low membershipthe male monastic institutions were attached to the provinces 
and vicarages of other countries. Monks of other nationalities arrived in Lithuania.  
The Lithuanian monks, especially those of the older generation, opposed such 
changes. For example, the Lithuanian Dominicans gave a very cold welcome to two 
Polish monks who came to Vilnius, and they refused to send their novices to Poland 
(they chose sending them to the Czech Republic). The authorities of the Lithuanian 
Salesians also expressed their opinion that ‘infiltration of foreigners did not and do 
not help,’ they forecasted that it would cause Lithuanians to become a minority in the 
community of the Salesians, see: A. Borowik, “Czy dominikanie wrócą do Wilna?” 
Znad Wilii, 2 (1992); “Vilniaus dominikonų bendruomenė turi išlaikyti lietuviškumą,” 
XXI amžius, 37 (1995); K. Juknevičius, Lietuvių saleziečių istorija, p. 318.
23 K. Renik, Podpolnicy. Rozmowy z ludźmi Kościoła na Litwie, Łotwie, Białorusi i Ukrainie 
1990-1991 (Warszawa 1991), p. 85, see interview with the Dean of  Vilnius Church of the 
Holy Spirit Aleksander Kaszkiewicz.
177
Relations between Lithuanian Monastic Institutions and the West during the Soviet Period
had noticed that books published in the West, as well as charity, reached the 
Sejny-Suwałki-Puńsk region, and the Lithuanian activists in exile were con-
stantly visiting it. The Lithuanians residing in that region managed to send 
some literature over to the Lithuanian SSR and vice versa, to receive illegal 
material from the USSR and pass it on to the West. 24 The clergy and the mo-
nastic institutions in emigration were also interested in the potential of the 
Polish region – as far back as 1965 the possibilities for Lithuanian girls from 
Suwalki triangle to go to the USA to study and join the Lithuanian convents 
there had been considered. One or two such undertakings were realized. 25
Ten Lithuanian monastic institutions operated in exile (mostly in the USA, 
Canada and South America). Half of them were founded in the first half of the 
20th century, while others were created when small groups of monks fled from 
Lithuania in the summer of 1944 as the Soviet occupation was approaching. 
The Lithuanian monastic institutions established relations with their branches 
operating in exile at the end of the 1950s. Correspondence started and material 
assistance provided by the monks in exile reached Lithuania. Strong sentiments 
towards the oppressed motherland, the aspirations to support the persecuted 
Church and their acquaintances that had stayed in the Motherland – nuns, 
monks, and priests – urged them to maintain these relations. By means of 
encoded texts monastic news was exchanged, and information about the ‘un-
24 J. Banionis, Lietuvos laisvės byla Vakaruose 1975-1990 (Vilnius 2002), p. 150-154.
25 Minutes of the sittings of the Supreme Council of the Congregation of the Sisters of the 
Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary, March 23, 1965 and October 21, 
1972 (Archives of the Monastic Institution in Putnam, CT).
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cles’ (the familiar priests) and others was conveyed. Material support from 
the emigrants to the Lithuanian Church increased with every passing year. 26
More reliable news from occupied Lithuania reached the Vatican at the 
beginning of the 1960s when the heads of the Lithuanian Church went to take 
part in the meetings of the Second Vatican Council for the first time. The So-
viet regime did not allow the Lithuanian bishops who were deprived of their 
posts in the hierarchy of the Church and were settled in secluded parishes to 
go abroad. Only managers of dioceses went to the Sessions of the Council 
in 1962-1965. Though there are abundant data about their relations with the 
Soviet security bodies, the priests who went to the Vatican, especially the 
administrator of Vilnius Archdiocese Česlovas Krivaitis, conveyed the initial 
information about the real situation of the monastic institutions in Lithuania, 
and helped establish relations with it.
We knew nothing definite about one another for a long 
time. It was only during the Second Vatican Council 
that some Lithuanian priests were given permission 
to fly via Moscow to Rome. Upon their return, Mon-
signor Česlovas Krivaitis in particular, brought exact 
news about my colleagues in Rome and elsewhere in 
the world. 27
26 For example, in 1960 and 1961 the branch of Poor Sisters in the USA spent more than 
2 500 USD providing support to Lithuania. They rendered assistance to 54 sisters. 
Supported with valuable parcels the nuns of this Congregation in Lithuania acquired 
a house and a car as far back as 1964; in 1980-1984 a total of 71 707 USD was spent on 
Lithuanian Sisters. More about it see in: R. Laukaitytė, Marijos Nekaltojo Prasidėjimo 
vargdienių seserų vienuolijos šaka Amerikoje (Vilnius 2012), p. 50, 74.
27 V. Aliulis, “Lengva ranka rašyti atsiminimai,” in Nuo Murmų iki Čikagos by V. Rimšelis 
(Kaunas 2012), p. 229.
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Thus wrote the Marian Vaclovas Aliulis about the renewed relations, the begin-
ning of correspondence between the Marians residing in Rome and those in 
the USA. Česlovas Krivaitis, who participated in later sessions of the Council, 
became a kind of a messenger – he did not only provide information but also 
brought books, prayer-books published by the monastic institutions in exile, 
as well as money to Lithuania.
With the regime softening somewhat, in the 1960s Lithuanians living 
abroad started coming to Lithuania as tourists almost en masse. There were 
many monks and priests among them. Though the first trips were short and 
filled with tension (after excursions in Moscow and Leningrad the tourists 
could spend five days in Vilnius, going sightseeing and being able to meet their 
relatives only in the hotel), they strengthened communication between the 
monastic institutions considerably. For example, direct relations between the 
Poor Sisters and the branches operating in the USA and Canada were renewed 
in 1973. Fifty-six years later they began editing their constitutions together, 
and during regular trips instructions issued by the leader of the Congregation 
who resided in Lithuania were received. Since 1980 delegates from the USA 
and Canada have participated in every general chapter that has taken place in 
Lithuania. 28 Contacts between the first Lithuanian female congregations – the 
Sisters of St. Casimir founded in 1907 in the USA – and Lithuania were restored 
in 1978, 29 and in 1982 the Leader of that Congregation visited Lithuania for the 
first time. Even upon her return to Chicago she avoided speaking about her 
meetings with the sisters in Lithuania. 30 Other monastic institutions behaved 
in a similar way: for security purposes it was recommended not to mention 
28 R. Laukaitytė, Marijos Nekaltojo Prasidėjimo vargdienių seserų vienuolijos šaka 
Amerikoje, p. 64-67.
29 J. Žemaitytė, “Pažaislio seserys,“ Katalikų pasaulis, 10 (1995), p. 14.
30 V. Brizgys, Gyvenimo keliu (Vilnius 1993), p. 306.
180
Regina Laukaitytė
any names of the nuns in Lithuania in the records and to keep the documents 
related to them separate. And later, when Michail Gorbachev’s perestroika 
started to open the Lithuanian borders, more visitors began to arrive in the 
USA. In the monasteries, however, precautionary measures were still taken, 
as monasteries contained a great deal of information about contact between 
the emigrants and the underground Church in Lithuania, the organization 
of relief, and ways of smuggling secret religious literature, such as Lietuvos 
Katalikų Bažnyčios kronika (The Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Lithuania), 
which interested the security apparatus.
As familiar monks and nuns arrived from the West, their moral and financial 
assistance encouraged the scattered members of the monastic institutions of 
Lithuania, especially some small male monastic institutions, 31 to rally and return 
to life again. Later, after the independence of the Republic of Lithuania had 
been restored and the monastic institution had emerged from the underground 
and had become engaged in social work, the experience and intellectual and 
financial potential of the monastic institutions in exile became an especially 
important factor in restoring the life of monastic institutions.
31 For example, in 1968, the priest Antanas Sabaliauskas SDB from the USA, where he 
worked with the Spanish Salesians, visited Lithuania; in 1972, the first Jesuit Vincentas 
Pupinis SJ came from Brazil; in 1979 Father Viktoras Gidžiūnas OFM from the 
USA visited the scattered Franciscans. These contacts encouraged the underground 
monastic institutions to act more intensely, and helped to solve financial shortages, 
see: K. Juknevičius SDB, Lietuvių saleziečių istorija, p. 42; A. Saulaitis SJ, “Deimantinė 
apaštalavimo sukaktis. Lietuviai jėzuitai Amerikose 1931-2006,” Laiškai bičiuliams 
Spring (2006), p. 23; S. Bytautas OFM, Lietuvių pranciškonų (OFM) identiteto raiška 
pastoracinėje veikloje 1940-1990 metais, p. 116.
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Conclusions
The isolation of the Lithuanian SSR was unable to bar the way to people’s 
personal contacts, and the Iron Curtain intimidated but in essence did not 
cut off the country from the remaining world. The courage of the people and 
their willingness to put their lives at risk in unflagging attempts to smuggle 
information and documents overcame the isolation. The Lithuanian monastic 
institutions, being vitally interested in contacts with their centers and mem-
bers abroad, managed to break through the cordons of isolation and involve 
themselves in the changes taking place in the universal Church. In the mid-
1960s the authorities of the monastic institutions and the Vatican had sufficient 
information about the fate of the monastic institutions in Lithuania, and had 
communication channels at their disposal. It is true, however, that the reliability 
of the latter often raised doubts.
Many secret Church contacts from Lithuania ran via Poland where the 
religious policy of the pro-Soviet regime was much more tolerant. The Vatican 
tried to take advantage of this situation too, as it granted authorization to the 
leaders of the Polish Church to be in charge of the functioning of the Catholic 
Church in the USSR. The underground Polish female monastic institutions in 
the Lithuanian SSR received the greatest spiritual care and material assistance 
from them. However, contacts with the Polish monastic institutions were often 
the only opportunity for the Lithuanian male and female congregations to 
overcome the isolation and get in touch with the authorities of their monastic 
institutions. As during the interwar years, such contacts were assessed am-
bivalently. In some monastic institutions discontent with close relations with 
Poland and dependence on it was expressed more clearly, whereas in others it 
was not voiced so openly. Nonetheless, relations between the monastic insti-
tutions helped, without doubt, people of both nations to come closer, to share 
the culture of the lives of the people called to monastic life.
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During the Soviet period rather strong relations between the monastic 
institutions of Lithuania and their branches operating in exile, mainly in North 
America, were established. Functioned secretly for several decades, they cre-
ated conditions to keep abreast of the changes taking place in the universal 
Catholic Church, ensured stable financial foundations, and at the same time 
encouraged the Lithuanian monastic institutions to be more active. With the 
monastic institution coming out of the underground and becoming engaged 
in social work after 1990, the experiences of the monastic institutions in exile 
and their intellectual and financial potential became a significant factor in 
restoring the monastic life in the country.
Translated by Aldona Matulytė
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Lord and Giver of Solidarity. The 
Anatomy of a Top-down Revolution
‘Let your Spirit descend! Let your Spirit descend! And renew the face of the 
earth. The face of this land!’ 1 We have heard these words so many times, we 
have stopped understanding what they mean. We well know that John Paul II 
helped us to ‘count up,’ and ‘restore our dignity,’ that he became ‘the king Poland 
dreamt of,’ and finally created a movement which led to the establishment of 
Solidarity. However, we have continuously convinced ourselves about all that 
to the point where our ideas became platitudes.
Nonetheless, underneath the clichés, which are quoted at each and every 
round anniversary, lies the reality. This reality seems so peculiar that we have to 
mollify it by means of metaphors and intellectualization. John Paul II wanted 
to administer confirmation to history.
A thousand years ago Poland accepted Christianity, and through that, he 
observed, ‘we, the Poles, are born as humans of “flesh and blood” (John 3,6) 
of our parents, [we have been] conceived and born of the Spirit (John 3,5).’ 2 
After a thousand years, he call the Holy Spirit to descend once more, and by 
confirmation strengthen our faith.‘ Allow me, thus,’ he continued ‘to per-
form laying on of hands on all gathered here today, all my fellow countrymen, 
like a bishop who administers confirmation. This gesture symbolizes accepting 
and sending the Holy Spirit given onto the Apostles by Christ himself, who 
came to them after Resurrection by “doors being shut” (John 20,19) and said: 
1 Jan Paweł II, Przemówienia. Homilie. Polska 2 VI 1979-10 VI 1979  
(Kraków: Znak, 1979), p. 33.
2 Jan Paweł II, Przemówienia. Homilie. Polska 2 VI 1979-10 VI 1979  
(Kraków: Znak, 1979), p. 243.
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“Receive the Holy Spirit” (John 20,22). This Spirit, the Spirit of salvation, re-
demption, conversion, and holiness; the Spirit of truth, the Spirit of love, the 
Spirit of fortitude — inherited from the Apostles — was sent by laying on 
hands for all generations of people living on Polish soil.’ 3 In the way the sac-
raments create people of God, this time they were to create us, Poles. We were 
to be transformed into a new community, a community of saints, a Church. 4
Laying on hands for the entire nation? Confirmation of history? This seems 
like madness. Let us think straight for a second now, calmly and without meta-
physical exaltation. A ‘Slavonic Pope’ comes to an atheistic country, and out 
of nowhere, summons the Holy Spirit. And what is supposed to happen? The 
Holy Spirit comes and exchanges the authorities? Heals the finances? Chases 
away the Russians beyond the Ural Mountains? This is not the way things are 
handled today. The Middle Ages ended some time ago.
Transgressions of John Paul II
But even from a theological point of view, the actions of John Paul II were 
seen as a series of hazardous transgressions. Sacraments were also individual 
in their character. We always stand alone before God. Meanwhile, the Pope 
administered a mass confirmation. The grace was given to the whole nation. 
The Pope treated baptism in similar way — as a mass sacrament which intro-
3 Jan Paweł II, Przemówienia. Homilie. Polska 2 VI 1979-10 VI 1979 (Kraków: Znak, 1979), 
p. 243-244.
4 Similar interpretation of Solidarity’s coming into being, see: E. Ciżewska, “Religijność 
Solidarności okiem socjologa,” Teologia Polityczna 5 (2009-2010); M. A. Cichocki, 
“Solidarność jako Lud Boży,” in Władza i pamięć, ed. M.A. Cichocki (Kraków:OMP, 
2005); D. Karłowicz, “Solidarność jako Kościół,” in Koniec snu Konstantyna, ed. 
D. Karłowicz (Kraków: OMP, 2004); Z. Stawrowski, “Doświadczenie Solidarności jako 
wspólnoty etycznej,” in Lekcja Sierpnia. Dziedzictwo Solidarności po dwudziestu latach, 
ed. D. Gawin (Warszawa: Wyd. IFiS PAN, 2002).
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duced the Polish people to history as a nation aspiring to God. ‘Baptism means 
immersion in God, the One which is (Exodus) — the One “which is, and which 
was, and which is to come” (Rev. 1.4). Baptism is the beginning of meeting, 
communing, and uniting, which continues as an introduction throughout 
our whole life, and is fulfilled only in eternity.’ 5 Baptism refers to the future, 
and to be more precise, to confirmation which fulfils it, and combines both of 
them in the ‘dual sacrament.’ 6 Therefore, in 1979 the Pope not only reminded 
us of the year 966, when Poland accepted the Cross, but also brought this 
event back to himself. In this way, the period between these two moments in 
history became a sanctified time, a part of the account of salvation. Shifting 
the essence of the sacrament from an individual to the community by the Pope 
was visible at the administration of confirmation in 1979. In this way, John Paul 
II restricted his actions only to an episcopal prayer for the descent of the Holy 
Spirit, without going into the ceremony of confirmation, i.e. anointment. He 
called the Holy Spirit upon us but did not give us its seal. He could not do it. 
There is no way to anoint an entire nation. The ritual of confirmation remained 
out of necessity unfinished.
John Paul II committed yet another transgression. The sacrament of confir-
mation makes ‘an indelible spiritual mark’ 7 on a human, and thus, like baptism, 
it may be taken only once in a lifetime. The Pope, however, was aware he was 
administering confirmation on the Poles for second time, as the first took place 
with the death of St. Stanislaus in 1079.
Similarly to when a baptized member of the Church becomes a mature 
Christian through the sacrament of confirmation, our nation was given such 
5 Jan Paweł II, Przemówienia. Homilie. Polska 2 VI 1979-10 VI 1979 (Kraków: Znak, 1979), 
p. 238-239.
6 Catechism of the Catholic Church, § 1290.
7 Catechism of the Catholic Church, § 1304.
186
Michał Łuczewski
an event in history which constituted an act of confirmation for Poland. St. Sta-
ni slaus, who lived nearly a century after Poland accepted the Cross, spilled his 
blood, and today symbolizes remaining true and bearing testimony to Christ. 8
By administrating confirmation for the second time, the Pope suggested 
the sacrament transferred onto the field of history needs to be continually 
complemented. Unlike with an individual, a nation cannot be confirmed only 
once — the sacrament needs to be repeated again and again.
However, this was not the end of John Paul II’s transgressions. In order 
to receive a sacrament, one needs to fulfill strictly defined conditions. Were 
the Poles prepared for confirmation at that memorable moment? Confirma-
tion is administered only to the initiated. The initiation is the baptism. Was 
everybody baptized? How can you interpret the Pope’s gesture? Perhaps, it 
could be compared to the absolution given by a priest in a state of necessity, 
i.e. in articulo mortis. The papal confirmation was administered in the face of 
discernible, widespread, and mortal danger. 9 Such a situation does not de-
mand the subject to be fully aware of it — this type of a sacrament may also 
be received by children. 10
8 Jan Paweł II, Przemówienia. Homilie. Polska 2 VI 1979-10 VI 1979 (Kraków: Znak, 1979), 
p. 241.
9 See I. Krzemiński, Solidarność. Projekt polskiej demokracji (Warszawa: Oficyna 
Naukowa, 1997), p. 164.
10 Catechism of the Catholic Church, § 1307.
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Messianism for Everyone
Traditional theology sees a ritual performed by the head of the Roman Cath-
olic Church as suspicious, if not totally heretic. And perhaps this would be the 
case, if not for the decisions of the Second Vatican Council, and John Paul II’s 
contribution in this revolution. The basic intention of Vatican II was renewal 
in Church by going back to its roots. The Church proved itself once again as 
the People of God, pastoral people, prophetic people, and royal people. 11 As 
‘everyone is appointed for the new People of God’ 12 to ‘establish a single family 
and single People of God’ 13 in Christ, the role of the head of the Church had 
to change. The Holy Father had to give up the traditional, Weberian model of 
bureaucratic authorization of power, which could not mobilize or unite people 
anymore, in favor of charismatic leadership. Charisma is always created outside 
of the social systems. It dismantles traditional rituals and oversteps current 
Law. This was, in my opinion, the essence of the liturgical reform of the Se-
cond Vatican Council. Its basic aim was to increase ‘active participation’ of the 
congregation, 14 and to achieve this goal the Church needed to go outside of the 
binding forms. The actions of John Paul II in 1979 became a part of this trend.
The most important semantic shift in Catholic theology to come along 
during this process was the return of messianism. It is no coincidence that 
Vatican II defined the Catholic Church as the ‘messianic people’ which brings 
salvation and hope to the world. 15 The Bible points to three messianic fig-
ures: a prophet — the one who see God’s Truth; the king — the one who 
11 Sobór Watykański II, Lumen gentium, rozdz. II; See also excellent comments in: 
Y. Congara, Kościół, jaki kocham (Kraków: Stowarzyszenie Pomocy Wydawnictwom 
Katolickim na Ukrainie Kairos, 1997).
12 Sobór Watykański II, Lumen gentium, no. 13.
13 Sobór Watykański II, Ad gentes, no. 1.
14 Sobór Watykański II, Sacrosanctum Concilium, no. 50.
15 Sobór Watykański II, Lumen gentium, rozdz. II.
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defends it by sword; and the martyr — the one who sacrifices his life. These 
three characters are embodied in Christ, who was favored by the Holy Spirit 
in the fullest. The Pope not only ‘follows Christ’ but also acts in persona Christi, 
meaning he receives the Holy Spirit and through that gathers and unites the 
people around him. John Paul II was the first ‘Pope-pilgrim’ in the 2000-year 
history of the Church, following in the Apostles’ footsteps, and evangelizing 
people in far-flung corners of the world. No one ever before him, in the history 
of mankind, has mobilized people on such a scale. ‘The completeness of Spirit 
was not supposed to be reserved only for the Messiah … it was supposed to 
be given to the whole messianic people.’ 16 In this light, the essence of confir-
mation becomes clear. It becomes a ritual which offers its fullest potential to 
all the congregation. 17 The anointing with sacred oil refers us directly to the 
ritual of anointing a king. 18
The messianism renewed by John Paul II meant going back to the beginnings 
of Christianity, its Jewish roots. Messianism stopped being only a question of 
an inner transformation, a spiritual conversion, and became once again a so-
cial matter. Similarly to Judaism, it became a process ‘performed in the public 
sphere, on the historical scene, and through the medium of society.’ In the 
process, Christian eschatology transformed from being an individual concern 
to becoming ‘a national matter.’ 19 We deal here with an extremely interesting 
reversal. The events of the holy history of Christianity, such as the Flood, the 
Crossing of the Red Sea, or the Exodus, became the figures of Reality (death and 
16 Catechism of the Catholic Church, § 1287.
17 Catechism of the Catholic Church, § 1287.
18 J. Danielou, Wejście w historię zbawienia. Chrzest i bierzmowanie (Kraków : 
Stowarzyszenie Pomocy Wydawnictwom Katolickim na Ukrainie Kairos, 1996),  
p. 148-152.
19 On differences between Judaic and Christian messianism, see: G. Scholem, Judaizm. 
Parę głównych pojęć (Kraków: Inter Esse, 1991), p. 152, 158-159.
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resurrection of Christ), and simultaneously the figures of sacraments (baptism, 
the Eucharist, confirmation). In this way, the history of salvation of a nation 
became the history of salvation of a catechumen. 20 John Paul II referred the 
sacraments back to the history of the world and salvation. A sacrament is not 
only a figure but above all a ‘successful sign’ connecting us with Christ.
John Paul II brought on this conceptual revolution in view of trends visible 
in Polish romanticism which had promoted such concepts as ‘national sacra-
ments,’ or even ‘the Sacrament of a Nation.’ Cyprian Kamil Norwid, a nationally 
esteemed Polish romantic poet, beloved by the Pope, looked on the history of 
the Polish nation from the angle of baptism, the Holy Communion, priesthood, 
and marriage. 21 A similar perspective was adopted by Piotr Semenenko, a lead-
ing Polish theologian of the Roman Catholic Church in the 19th century, the 
co-founder and superior-general of the Resurrectionists. According to his 
teachings, the sacraments were to place Poles in the history of salvation — 
making them children of God through baptism, counseling, strengthening, and 
encouraging them in confirmation, and achieving fulfillment on earth through 
the priesthood. 22 According to the vision of Joachim of Fiore, Polish romantics 
waited for the arrival of the third age — after the period of the Father, and of 
the Son, the era of the Spirit was supposed to arrive. After over a millennium, 
John Paul II not only waited for the Spirit, but summoned it.
The sacrament is administered in order for God to manifest himself, and 
lead us to salvation. In order to move closer to these aims, John Paul II needed 
to go beyond traditional rules. By calling God to send down his Spirit, the 
Pope infiltrated the mystery of the Trinity, and the relationship between the 
20 J. Danielou, Wejście w historię zbawienia.
21 R. Zajączkowski, Głos prawdy i sumienie. Kościół w pismach Cypriana Norwida 
(Wrocław: FNP, 1998), p. 158-171.
22 K. Macheta, “Misterium paschalne Polski według założycieli zmartwychwstańców,” in 
Polska teologia narodu, ed. Cz. Bartnik (Lublin: KUL, 1988).
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Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. In this way, he mediated the relations of 
love connecting the Holy Trinity, and acted as their internal go-between. The 
Pope might have seemed a bit reckless. But his ‘madness’ pushed the Kingdom 
of Heaven to fulfill his requests. 23
Did we not experience the descent of the Holy Spirit, back then, in June of 
1979? Was the time of Solidarity not the ‘swoosh of the wind,’ the descent of 
the Holy Spirit, the Polish Pentecost, and the ‘loosening of tongues’? 24 Besides, 
does not any solidarity, even non-political, result from the action of the Spirit? 
A ritual performed by the head of the Roman Catholic Church was deemed 
by many as suspicious, if not entirely heretic.
Solidarity of Spirit
Our natural state is a struggle for everything. We fight for money, better jobs, 
prestige, and larger homes. The unity we have lost can only be restored if we 
find a common enemy. However, such a unity is false. It is based on the funda-
mental gesture of elimination, and after some time, it falls apart. The community 
crystallizes, only to revert to its natural state. Struggle is its source and destiny.
Through such a perspective true solidarity must seem like a miracle, a result 
of quite, imperceptible, but clearly a real intervention of God. 25 The appeal to 
‘bear ye one another’s burdens’ (Ga 6,2) requires the novelty of Epiphany. It 
may not come from the fallen history but should be presented from ‘Christ’s 
23 Matt. 11,12.
24 E. Ciżewska, Religijność Solidarności, p. 196; T. G. Ash, Polska rewolucja. Solidarność 
1980-1981 (Warszawa: Res Publica, 1990), p. 47 (Polish translation of The Polish 
Revolution: Solidarity by T.G. Ash). See also: R. Rojek, Semiotyka Solidarności. Analiza 
dyskursów PZPR i NSZZ Solidarność w 1981 roku (Kraków: Nomos, 2009), p. 139.
25 See: M. A. Cichocki, “Solidarność jako Lud Boży,” and Z. Stawrowski, “Doświadczenie 
Solidarności.”
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law.’ This is how Solidarity was looked upon by its most eminent theologian, 
Father Józef Tischner, who pointed out that in order to understand its mean-
ing one ‘has to reach for the Bible, and look for the movement’s origin there.’ 
This type of solidarity does not belong to nature, but transgresses it, for it is 
‘born from the pages and spirit of the Gospel, and does not need an enemy or 
an opponent to grow and reinforce. Such solidarity is for everyone, but not 
against anybody.’ 26
When analyzing Solidarity in phenomenological terms, Tischner points out 
its three essential elements. ‘Solidarity does not need to be imposed on a per-
son from the exterior by means of violence.’ This virtue is born spontaneously, 
from the heart. 27 But what does this really mean? How may a heart be spared 
in a world full of violence? First of all, solidarity arises from a call of another 
person who needs our help. But because words might always be rejected, an-
other factor is needed: conscience. ‘True solidarity is always the solidarity of 
consciences.’ 28 Our own conscience will tell us the answer to the call. However, 
our conscience may be deceiving, and we may abuse it. For example, when 
Edward Abramowski, a Polish philosopher from the 19th century, wrote about 
social change, he meant human needs. 29 This is not the meaning Tischner 
implied. For him conscience is not another name for egoism, but a place for 
revelation of good and bad. Its correct recognition is the third element, and it 
should be rooted in God, as only God may protect us from self-deception, rouse 
our consciences, and make us care about it. All in all, it seems that solidarity 
is nothing more than an answer to a call from God.
26 J. Tischner, Etyka solidarności (Kraków: Znak, 1981), p. 6.
27 J. Tischner, Etyka solidarności, p. 6.
28 J. Tischner, Etyka solidarności, p. 6.
29 E. Abramowski. “Procesy zmian społecznych,” in Abramowski, ed. U. Dobrzycka 
(Warszawa: Wiedza Powszechna, 1991).
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If this is the essence of every type of solidarity, then in the case of soli-
darity which includes not just two or three persons but a whole antagonized 
community, the experienced has to be multiplied. The Spirit needs to descend.
When coming to terms with the Solidarity movement and Polish trans-
formation, both in terms of the Holy Ghost and a more general theological 
perspective, our first reaction is to reach for Centesimus Annus, a papal encyc-
lical on the year 1989, annus mirabilis. However, one would be hard-pressed to 
find theological reflection there. John Paul II emerges as more of a specialist 
in religious studies, a social thinker, sociologist, political studies export, and 
economist than as the leader of Christianity. Consequently, this miracle we 
have witnessed seems more ordinary and becomes a miracle only in our belief. 
If we would to understand it on a proper level, we need to go back to not to 
social encyclicals but to the theological ones, mostly Dominum et Vivificantem, 
which is the most extensive meditation on the Holy Spirit. In this encyclical, 
John Paul II points out the three basic truths: (1) the Holy Spirit was given to 
the Church, (2) the Spirit convinced the world about sin and, (3) the Spirit gives 
life. Although we cannot always understand these truths, Solidarity became 
an empirical test for each of them.
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The Spirit of the Church
John Paul II starts his encyclical from a renewed creed in the Holy Ghost, as 
the source of the Church. The dogmatic basis for this faith is the Gospel of St. 
John, where Christ says to the Apostles:
If you love me, you will keep my commandments. And 
I will pray the Father, and he will give you another 
Counsellor, to be with you forever, even the Spirit 
of truth, whom the world cannot receive, because it 
neither sees him nor knows him; you know him, for 
he dwells with you, and will be in you. I will not leave 
you desolate; I will come to you…But the Counsel-
lor, the Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send in my 
name, he will teach you all things, and bring to your 
remembrance all that I have said to you. (14, 15-18, 26)
Although Christ is gone, the Apostles may establish the Church, because 
Christ will be with them in the form of the Holy Spirit until the end of days. 
Although the Spirit transgresses the Church, and may also come down on 
heathens, as it ‘blows where it wills,’ only the Church may ‘see’ and ‘know’ 
it. If the Church collapsed, no one would see the Holy Spirit. Nobody could 
manifest and represent it. However, according to the promise, the Holy Spirit 
shall always support the Church.
From this point of view, it is clear that for the Holy Spirit to imbue the people 
of Solidarity, the Church had to exist. Somebody needed to ask for its grace, 
and somebody had to be ready to accept it. It is a huge paradox that among all 
of other countries under the Soviet rule, only in Poland did the totalitarian 
communist government fail to lead to the fall of the Church, but strengthened it.
But Poland turned out to be an exception not only during times of to ta li-
tar ianism. It was always special. Truly, the strength of our Church seems to 
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be the outcome of providence. It has always overcome all waves of laicization. 
The Reformation, which developed rapidly in our country, made the Church 
close ranks, and led to the Counter-Reformation and evangelism of the masses. 
The national revolutions in 19th century, which were anti-Church everywhere 
else, were connected to faith in Poland. When industrialization hit our country, 
Polish workers did not abandon their convictions like their colleagues in the 
West. Paradoxically, the situation of the Polish Church was more difficult be-
fore World War II than during the era of communism. In the interwar period, 
the Church had to oppose the adherents of Piłsudski (with ideologists such as 
Adam Skwarczyński wanting to create a national church, independent of the 
Holy See), as well as struggle with anticlerical parties representing the middle 
classes (the modern, realistic National Democratic Party) and anticlerical par-
ties representing the lower classes (radical peasants’ parties, which sometimes 
even proposed reversion to paganism). After WW II only one opponent was 
still standing: the communist government. Its repressive machine eliminated 
the former state elites on the one hand, and on the other, forced the middle 
and lower classes to choose between the government and the Church. In this 
way the number of important political subjects was limited, and the people 
who wanted to preserve their independence had to cooperate with Cardinal 
Wyszyński. The Church became the only strong opposition to the totalitarian 
oppression. During the 1970s and 1980s, after the Second Vatican Council, 
while Europe was undergoing a social revolution and laicization, Poland was 
religiously revived. 30
30 See: M. Łuczewski, “Polskie odrodzenie religijne i doświadczenie totalitaryzmu. 
Analiza fenomenologiczna,” Teologia Polityczna 5 (2009-2010); M. Łuczewski, “Do 
diabła z mesjaszem! Teologia polityczna polskiej transformacji,” Czterdzieści i Cztery 1 
(2009).
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The religion sociologists would attribute this phenomenon to the extremely 
strong credential structures of the Polish Church. Its strength lied in extremely 
wide social legitimization, and its message could not be easily disregarded.
At the same time, as the Church became more powerful, its intellectual 
opposition with its competitive lay ideology lost its substantial grounds. Due 
to the thaw and the events of March 1968, the left-wing intelligentsia started 
to criticize the totalitarian system, as it lost its previous institutional autho-
rization, and had to seek a new body for authentication. As the intellectual 
Leftists stopped being loyal to the Party they could form new relationships, 
which would be unthinkable for declared communists and members of the 
state apparatus. Finally, its social basis was extremely poor, and wanted to 
overcome its alienation, meet workers and peasants — the people of Poland. All 
these factors made it necessary to cooperate with the Church, which stopped 
being its ideological opponent, and could legitimize it in front of the heart 
and minds of People.
Such a situation needed mediators between the Church and the left-wing 
ideologists, the religious and non-religious circles. This brought on the highly 
important roles of such figures as Bohdan Cywiński, Andrzej Kijowski, Jacek 
Salij, Jan Andrzej Kłoczowski, Jan Zieja, Józef Sadzik, and Józef Tischner. 
However, the most important negotiator was John Paul II. Each of these per-
sons was charismatic, graced by God, making them into a moral and religious 
community. Thanks to them the Holy Spirit stayed within the Church, and 
permeated to the people.
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The Spirit of Truth
The Church lasted and promoted the Truth, which at each stage of the com-
munism era in Poland became a truth for more and more people. The Truth 
revealed by the Spirit is, according to the words of Christ, the truth about sin, 
justice, and judgment. ‘Concerning sin, because they do not believe in me; 
concerning righteousness, because I go to the Father, and you will see me no 
more; concerning judgment, because the ruler of this world is judged.’ (John 
16, 7-11). In other words, the Church ‘convinces the world’ about a transcendent, 
objective reality, which is the perspective for judging the lord of this world.
For the communists such a truth was a real danger. They were the ones to 
determine what was good, and what was not, what was justice, and what was 
judgment. The system did not tolerate any external perspectives. It tried to le-
gitimize a version of reality without any alternatives, which would be accepted 
as (a) real, (b) moral, and (c) unanimous with the people. In order to do that it 
had to eradicate any rival sources of legitimization, especially the religious ones. 
It had to eliminate the sacred, which would transgress the system, and provide 
an external evaluation body for the system. The sacral reality was dangerous 
for the communists, as through it a person, in the words of Andrzej Kijowski, 
rises above oneself to reach a higher state of its vital forces and capabilities — 
extended sensitivity, increased susceptibility to stimuli, heightened obedience, 
and unusual physical resistance. Of good and bad. Each congregation is sacred, 
if its participants are transformed; if it makes them strong enough to take an 
action, which was not possible to be performed individually. 31
The totalitarian system was afraid of such social mobilization, and had to 
eliminate other sources of sanctity. Consequently, the system became a religion, 
but its principles, its sacred things, were inner-worldly.
31 A. Kijowski, Tropy (Poznań: W drodze, 1986), p. 35.
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The ideology of totalitarianism marked the boundaries for lives of Polish 
people under the Soviet and communist rule. But as with any worldly ideology, 
it was incomplete, and the social order supported by it was under constant 
threat. The threat of chaos includes all phenomena which deprive our lives of 
meaning: death, suffering, evil, fear, and anxiety. The paradox of this situation 
was that no matter how hard the totalitarian ideology tried to fight against the 
chaos, at the same time it produced it. The authorities wanted to be real but 
they produced the experience of unreality; it wanted to be moral but produced 
the experience of evil; it wanted to look like it was done according to the peo-
ple’s freedom but produced the experience of constraints and enslavement. 
Only religion was able to describe and articulate each and every one of these 
experiences. Only religion could oppose the chaos and protect the sense in 
the world by stretching a ‘sacred canopy’ 32 over it. Eventually, in spite of its 
anti-Christian attitude, totalitarianism had consequences for Christians, as it 
could not cope with the problems it created, and those could only be solved by 
Christianity. By fighting religion, the system made it more and more necessary.
Realizing that the system is unreal, evil and enslaving may be interpreted 
as a gift from the Spirit of Truth. This gift seems to be universally accepted. The 
communist state become popularly known as an ‘illusion’ (Tischner), ‘nihility’ 
(Konwicki), ‘pulp’ (Andrzejewski), ‘another world’ (Herling), and ‘delusion’ 
(Miłosz). The sense of unreality was so overwhelming that it entered the ac-
ademic discourse. And so, Alain Besançon describes the socialist economy 
as a ‘phantom,’ 33 and Jakub Karpiński saw communism as a ‘propaganda of 
32 P. L. Berger, Święty baldachim. Elementy socjologicznej teorii religii (Kraków: NOMOS, 
1997) – Polish translation of Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion 
by Peter L. Berger.
33 A. Besançon, Anatomia widma. Ekonomia polityczna realnego socjalizmu (Warszawa: 
Krąg, 1984).
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unreality, or ‘imagined reality.’ 34 Jadwiga Staniszkis went even further, and 
in ‘ontology of socialism’ pointed out the Hegelian Schein, i.e. semblance, 35 as 
the main analytical category. It is no accident that one of the first social realist 
books was Reality by Jerzy Putrament. 36 At the same time Kazimierz Brandys 
published his Unreality — the first book in Poland and entire Eastern Block 
issued independently of censorship. 37 It is a story of an educated person from 
the communist system — precisely from Reality to Unreality.
The resonance of Catholicism was also based in rational interpretation 
of each experience generated by the totalitarian state, and combining them 
into a cohesive entirety. The system could not describe its own failures. It could 
not talk about evil, enslavement, and unreality, only about errors and misinter-
pretations. The evil, enslavement, and unreality was described by Catholicism.
The Spirit of Life
In the time of totalitarian enslavement, the Church breathed new life into Poles, 
making Poland itself again, creating a national community. This aspect may be 
interpreted in the context of actions of the Holy Ghost, which is the Spirit of 
unity. This is the best example of the Spirit’s action through nature, and how 
it improves nature to receive grace.
34 J. Karpiński, Doświadczenie komunizmu we współczesnej kulturze polskiej, 2005, http:// 
www.omp.org.pl/index.php?module=subjects&func=viewpage&pageid=349 [31 
sierpnia 2010 r.1.
35 J. Staniszkis, Ontologia socjalizmu (Kraków: Ośrodek Myśli Politycznej, 2006), p. 22. 
(English version published as: The Ontology of Socialism, 1992)
36 J. Putrament, Rzeczywistość (Warszawa: Czytelnik, 1947).
37 K. Brandys, Nierzeczywistość (no publishing place: Niezależna Oficyna Wydawnicza, 
1977).
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The religion pointed out the evil and the enslavement of the system. But 
moreover than that, it gave both general directives and very specific guidelines 
on how to protect oneself from this evil. The communist system tried to legiti-
mize itself not through special actions but by tedious, ceaseless activities. ‘There 
were no such words for us as morality or ethics,’ says an officer of the communist 
secret police. ‘We did not use such words. They made no sense to us, as we used 
immorality for our cause, and fought against morality. The more immoral the 
behavior, the better for us, as we could get close to persons and infiltrate them. 
The people who were guilty of something were the most important for us, as 
they made the best future agents.’ 38 The secret police usually took advantage of 
secrets from three well-tried fields: money, alcohol, or sex. These secrets usu-
ally coerced people into the system. Catholicism protected people from such 
offences, which easily might have become a pretext for extorting cooperation 
with the regime. Religion gave guidelines on how to behave in a totalitarian 
reality. Acting on those precepts, it was the Catholic nation, in contrast to the 
believers in communist ideology, which could take a proper attitude and see 
the ‘traces of devil claws.’ This is why there were more Catholics among the 
intellectuals in opposition.
In building its community, the Church used the sources of social movements. 
And every movement, if it wants to be efficient, needs to fulfill three criteria: 
it needs to lead a campaign, i.e. not limit itself to a single action; use a certain 
repertoire to mobilize people, and formulate ideology that will inspire others. 
All these elements were perfectly used by the Church. 39
First to consider is the campaign. When in 1956 the thaw came, the Church 
began the mobilization campaign. It started by renewing the vows for the Polish 
nation at Jasna Góra in August 1956, and finished with the celebration of the 
38 Teczki, czyli widma bezpieki, ed. J. Snopkiewicz (Warszawa: BGW, 1992), p. 123.
39 See: M. Osa, “Stwarzanie Solidarności,” Pressje 21 (2010).
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Millennium of Polish Acceptance of the Cross in 1966. The Church did not 
limit itself to a single mobilization action but organized a continual series of 
activities as preparations for multiple celebrations throughout 1955, 1956-1957, 
and 1957-1966. The arrival of John Paul II to Poland was only another element 
of a campaign laid out for decades.
Secondly, it was the repertoire. The Church demonstrated superior orga-
nizational skills and used an extremely modern repertoire of means. Apart 
from the most obvious, such as masses, processions, or funerals, it also worth 
pointing out the building of chapels and churches, which mobilized huge 
masses of people. Consider the involvement of John Paul II in the erection of 
the Ark in Nowa Huta, Krakow. In order to mobilize the congregation, there 
were many celebrations concerning coronations of statues of saints. This was 
accompanied by a dynamic development of Marian piety who were treated as 
the ‘core of power,’ supported by Cardinal Wyszyński. In pastoral practice the 
mottoes concerning the Virgin Mary turned out very efficient. The final spec-
tacular means by which the Church promoted itself was through pilgrimages. 
Already in 1966, Pope Paul VI was supposed to visit Poland for the Millennium 
celebrations. Only John Paul II, however, was able to use this tactic on a scale 
that could exceed anything the communists had to offer.
Thirdly, was the employment of mobilizing ideology. John Paul II in this 
aspect directly used innovations introduced by Stefan Wyszyński, i.e. the 
theology of nation, which gave shape to Polish Catholicism after WWII. Our 
nation gained God’s sanction, and became the Nation. In his work, Wyszyński 
referred to the history of the chosen nation, putting himself in the shoes of an 
Old Testament prophet. One should look similarly upon John Paul II. 40
40 D. Gawin, “Naród zwycięski. Jan Paweł II jako prorok Polaków,” Teologia Polityczna 3 
(2005-2006), p. 131-135.
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In his line of thinking, the nation was presented as eternal, moral, and 
one. The basic element which united the nation, gave it its moral value, and 
complemented holy time without beginning or end, was the Roman Catholic 
Church, which is at the same the Polish Church.
The theological strength of a nation according to John Paul II was based on 
meeting all the criteria needed for an efficient ideology of a social movement. 
Furthermore, mobilization ideology encountered a paradox which could only 
be solved by the Pope. If the ideology is to be effective, it must present a given 
community as (a) numerous, (b) united, (c) moral, and (d) committed. The 
first two principles, however, are in conflict with the last two. If we care about 
the numbers and the unity of a movement, we need to quieten the issue of 
commitment as it may lead to the introduction of divisions in the movement 
(there are different types of morality), and limit its influence (rigorous morality 
may discourage many potential followers). On the one hand, we would have 
numerous and united movements which would lack distinctiveness, on the 
other hand, the movements would be distinctive but lacking any influence 
whatsoever.
This paradox may be illustrated by two visions of Polish national identity 
which meet head-on again and again in Polish history. According to the first 
vision, which we will call nominalistic (a name adapted for our purposes from 
the works of Jadwiga Staniszkis), Poles are a homogenous community, numerous 
and united, with all its members equal. You either are a Pole or you are not. A 
competing notion, categorized again by Staniszkis as closer to Thomism, pres-
ents Poles as a heterogeneous community, where you could belong in a greater 
or lesser degree depending on your morality and commitment within the given 
concept of these two features. In such a way Polishness becomes gradable — 
you can be a Pole to a greater or a lesser degree.
The contradiction between these two visions of our nation was solved by 
the theology of the nation provided by John Paul II, which let social movements 
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fulfill all its criteria at once (even these which stood in contradiction with 
each other). On the one hand, Catholicism was the common denominator 
for Poles. From the Pope’s perspective, the nation is a peculiar organism with 
us as its members. When divided, it stops being a nation. This is why striving 
towards unity, as overcoming differences between states was considered as 
patriotic duty. Such people as Jan Strzelecki, Jacek Kuroń, or Adam Michnik, 
who wanted to commune with the Polish people, also needed to get closer to 
Christianity. There was no other way, as the Polish people were Christian. Also, 
the Catholic religion gave Poles moral value and commitment. Not only it did 
it unite people (the realistic moment, referring to the present identities) but 
also transformed them (the utopian moment, referring to the future identi-
ties not yet fulfilled). Religion shaped the nation into a community of values, 
showing the moral ideal worth committing to (‘transformation of conscienc-
es’), and eliminating those opposed to this ideal (‘people with consciences’). 
Without a reference to religion, which gave the nation its moral spine, people 
would be only a nominalistic community of individuals, unable to extend their 
imagination beyond the social system (without a moral ideal), and incapable 
of common action (without commitment). Religion presented its importance 
towards mobilization especially well in extreme situations. If the cause we are 
fighting for is hopeless, if we feel marginalized, cast outside of the economic 
and political system, then we are more likely to invoke the sacred in order to 
muster our strength. When everything fails, we seek God’s support. In 1979 
this was the case.
The Solidarity movement shows all aspects of manifestation of the Holy 
Spirit, as described by John Paul II. Thanks to the Church, a new communi-
ty, a new consciousness, and a new morality have emerged. People started 
gaining hope, and overcoming their fears. The fetters of ideology were broken, 
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and the people were freed. The reality became spiritual. 41 All of the Polish 
defeats of the 20th century came suddenly into view as labor pains of the Holy 
Spirit. In the country where alcohol was the main problem-solver, suddenly 
everyone was sober, as people got drunk on the Spirit. In the where the sta-
tistics of suicide were hidden, suddenly people wanted to live, because the 
Spirit is the Animator. In the country that was doomed to fail by many other 
states, people got up off their knees by getting down on their knees, because 
the Spirit is the Lord.
But what is more peculiar is the fact that in order for all this to happen, we 
did not have to do anything special. We did not have to do anything. All hap-
pened through us. Faith is grace, thus an individual cannot act on his or her own; 
one only needs to hear the call from God. ‘Christ only once,’ writes Kijowski, 
influenced by the Pope, ‘entered the history of the human race, with its states, 
families, and individuals; and it returns as a recurring topic in a discussion, 
in a way that gives us exploration and affirmation of ourselves. The important 
thing is that it is us who get back to the topic, not the other way around.’ 42 By 
remaining completely passive, paradoxically, the individual is given faith and 
strength by the Holy Spirit. This is what top-down revolution is all about.
Translated by Łukasz Moskała
41 See: I. Krzemiński, Solidarność, p. 17, 49, 53, 68, 76, 150, 175; R. Rojek, Semiotyka 
Solidarności, p. 164.
42 A. Kijowski, Tropy, p. 36.
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Inapplicability of the Solidarity 
Movement. On the Reasons 
behind Rejecting a Project of the 
Political Social Movement 1
1st Thesis: a Political Project for Solidarity Existed
In my study, I have adopted an interpretation widely dominating the social 
literature which views Solidarity as a social movement. I define this notion as 
collective actions directed at a particular goal of carrying out a certain social 
change. They take place within not fully institutionalized and formalized 
boundaries, and in this sense are ‘something in between a group behavior (e.g. 
in crowds) and a professional behavior (e.g. in offices).’ 2 Another important 
input assumption was to limit the time frame of the first period of Solidarity activ-
ity (from the first strikes in July 1980 until the introduction of Martial Law in 
December 1981). This premise stems from the research hypothesis that only by 
exploring this period, when the movement was at its most enthusiastic point 
and functioned on a grand scale, may one capture the positive political vision 
of the social movement. By adapting such a model, it is possible to separate the 
initial project from any further fate of its creators. The third assertion was to 
concentrate on the positive side of the intellectual activity of Solidarity. The litera-
1 The text presents the methodological premises and most important conclusions of a 
doctoral thesis entitled “The political project of the social movement of Solidarity (July 
1980-December 1981).” Jagiellonian University, Kraków, 2011.
2 P. Sztompka, Socjologia (Kraków: Wyd. UJ, 2002), p. 158 and 422.
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ture on the subject tends to interpret all actions taken by the Union, including 
intellectual endeavors, only in terms of ruses carried out in the permanent 
conflict against the representatives of the Polish United Workers’ Party (Polish 
communist party). Thus the analysis of the political thought of those times is 
determined by the perspective imposed by the researchers of the political history 
of the movement. However, there is a different approach, a way of the history of 
ideas, which requires a change in the perspective. For these reasons I analyze 
the political project of Solidarity in terms of its issues, by reconstructing the 
most important ideas, such as dignity, freedom, and lawfulness, one by one.
On the basis of these three broad notions, I have come to the conclusion 
that the policy achievements of Solidarity were for the most part anticipated by 
the dissident circles of 1976-1980 and their ideas, which were absorbed by the 
massive social movement. Combining the intellectual resources of people from 
different political traditions resulted in a political project which surprised by 
its diversity, or even eclecticism. Simultaneously, when describing successive 
ideas fundamental to Solidarity, it is clear to distinguish a general and coherent 
body of beliefs which in time was universally accepted, despite the ideological 
differences dividing the creators.
It is important to emphasize that finding a term, which would encompass 
the character of this program also posed a challenge. Eventually, I decided to use 
the term political project, which is defined by Andrew Heywood as a complex of 
historically, culturally, and socially determined, general ideas creating a broad 
vision of the world, including concepts of a proper social and political order, 
and indicating specific solutions targeted at altering the reality in desired 
ways. By using the term political project, which is not burdened by strong his-
torical connotations, I want to avoid a line of natural associations connected 
to other notions used in the literature of the subject. Thus, Solidarity did not 
create an ideology, as this would assume the possibility of creating a system-
atic and comprehensive political doctrine, which could have been used in all 
207
Inapplicability of the Solidarity Movement. On the Reasons behind Rejecting a Project of the Political Social Movement
circumstances, aimed at restructuring the prevailing social order according 
to rational models. The achievements in policy of Solidarity may not also be 
called a political doctrine, as that would suggest placing them on the map of 
traditional doctrinal disputes. The political project of the Union, which draws 
heavily from various political traditions, did not follow the division developed 
after the French Revolution. Finally, it could not really be treated as a political 
program, which is usually a means for expressing exact aims for political activity 
by political parties.
2nd Thesis: when Examining the Political Thought 
behind Social Movements, it is Necessary to 
Establish a Hierarchy of Source Documents
Before we go into a detailed description of the political project of Solidarity, it is 
worth pointing out the crucial methodological challenges ahead. Without any 
doubt, the biggest trial was establishing the components common to a massive 
social movement, especially when one takes into account a body of convictions 
shared by the majority of its activists. Two topics, which seem to be prevalent 
are the issue of the representative character of certain convictions, and the 
problem of sources for knowing this political vision. The first subject is more 
of a doubt whether an opinion expressed by a circle of union leaders could be 
treated as popularly accepted by all or even most of the activists. The second 
one may be framed as a question: does one analyze only policy documents, or 
also the journalism and artistic movements of the period?
I addressed the first doubt by referring to data proving the subjective feeling 
of unanimity of experiences by the majority of activists. Those which cannot be 
considered as representative are strengthened by sociological analyses indicat-
ing a heavy homogenization of convictions among the members of a movement. 
Finally, another important factor which came into play was the use of efficient 
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channels for transferring information between all levels of the trade union. The 
flow was provided by a highly developed union press, information bulletins, 
and independent opinion polls amongst the Union activists. These three ar-
guments speak in favor of the thesis on the homogeneity of the social movement.
In order to quell doubts concerning the sources needed for learning the 
political project of Solidarity, and the representativeness of certain judgments, 
I have decided to use a certain hierarchy of source documents. At the top of this 
hierarchy I put the Policy Resolution of the 1st National Congress of Delegates of 
the Independent Self-governing Trade Union Solidarity — the most important 
document concerning the Union’s policy, passed in the autumn of 1981 by the 
representatives chosen by the society. The diversity of views presented during 
this congress seems to be representative of the Union, and possibly the whole 
social movement, thus I found it legitimate to recognize the policy resolution 
as the most valuable source of knowledge on the political idea behind Solidar-
ity. I treated other documents signed by the central and regional authorities 
of the Union, such as the Statute of Solidarity, or the records of the Centre for 
Vocational and Social Labour, as secondary. The third level, in my opinion, 
constituted of the journalism of the period. It is worth mentioning Tygodnik 
Solidarność, the biggest union weekly magazine in Poland. This category also 
includes publications of the intellectual and actual leaders of the Union. The 
fourth and last level encompasses sources presenting the wide cultural backdrop 
of the period, showing the ways in which the people of those times thought. 
This is where essay writings, journals, and even poetry from that period can 
be found.
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3rd Thesis: Solidarity was an Existential Revolution
The ideological roots of Solidarity cannot be found in any specific tradition 
of political thinking. There is no use in applying its program to the formats 
known from the works of classics of political philosophy, or in arguing whether 
its overtones are left-winged, liberal, republican, or Christian Democratic. The 
political project of a movement originates straight from the experiences of its 
makers. The wave of strikes in August 1980 were not political at their core, but 
gave opportunity to an authentic outcry, providing the activists with feelings 
of renewed pride and human dignity. In their most basic sense, they were not 
targeted against the authorities but were organized by the workers for them-
selves, driven by the inner need for recognition. Marcin Król is right when he 
says we should talk not about a social or political revolution, but rather, above 
all about a ‘moral revolution’ or even an ‘existential’ one. Rather than seizing 
power or changing the social scene, the movement aimed at proving both to 
itself and to the world that ‘we are still living, we are capable of human kindness: 
doing good, establishing friendships, and respecting the truth.’ 3
The most important element of this experience was rediscovering human 
dignity, which recalls the inalienable value of each human being and their will 
to live according to moral principles, especially the principle of justice. This 
led to uncovering universal and inalienable human rights, which cannot be 
questioned by any political system. Another real need was to create an inner 
integrity that eventually led to a massive rejection of conformism imposed by 
the post-totalitarian authorities, and expression of individual convictions in 
the public space. This transition from inner freedom to public expression of 
one’s reasons automatically included a social element in the experience of the 
strikers — the people who publicly articulate their rights become citizens. The 
3 M. Król, “Inna rewolucja,” in Po sierpniu, ed. M. Król, J. Kurczewski (Warszawa: 
NOWA 2, 1981), p. 3.
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joint aspect of this phenomenon included these two elements in the ‘existential 
revolution.’ The collective character of the experience revealed the solidarity 
existing among people, i.e. a real bond connecting everybody into a community, 
which is mirrored in human nature (‘the human is a social being’), as well as 
in ethics (‘bear ye one another’s burdens’). Finally, it was extremely vital for 
people to discover the public importance of national and religious bonds, which 
placed the strikers in the context of a centuries-old tradition, giving a second 
cornerstone (apart from the social one) to the community.
The strikes of August 1980 allowed the workers to experience these feelings. 
This is when the strikers discovered the basic rules of life in a community. This 
experience did not only touch them personally but became a common, fun-
damentally discursive background for a universal event. And this experience 
became the basic ideological plane for the whole movement. Thus, the existential 
revolution anticipated any considerations about the program of the movement.
4th Thesis: Political Doctrines (Political 
Identifications) Were Replaced by Values 
(Metapolitical Identifications)
The reconstructed political project was not founded on specific political ide-
ologies , as they were replaced by metapolitical identifications rooted in the 
experience of Solidarity’s creators. These identifications, ideological principles, 
determine the ideal of a political community. Ludwik Dorn, one of the members 
of Solidarity, acutely observed that the former blends of doctrines ‘had not 
functioned as live indicators of ideological identity’ in the social movement, 
and their significance had been only aspectual, limited to a certain area of 
issues. Their place were taken by metapolitical identifications stemming from 
recognizing the above-mentioned moral and existential principles. Dorn wrote 
in 1981:
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Currently, we are experiencing in Poland a process of 
creating a political culture of a new type, unprecedent-
ed here before, similar in some fashion to the political 
culture of the USA, where the general recognition of 
ideas determining the shape of public life (the so-called 
fundamentals) are accompanied by non-ideological 
political pragmatism. In Poland, these fundamentals 
were symbols and signs of identity connected to na-
tion and faith linked to the philosophy of the nation, 
society, and public life, which all were far from being 
crystallized. This philosophy was accepted along with 
the direction for transformations of social instruments 
and institutions, such as enterprises, self-governing 
bodies, administration, people’s councils, and the Sejm. 
In such a situation there was no need for ideology, nor 
disputes about what is better: the right wing or the left 
wing, liberalism or socialism. People who care about 
Poland have more important things to settle. 4
This meant that the agreement on the ideological principles, these funda-
mentals, was the core of the policy of the movement. In this way the activists 
rejected the traditional doctrinal solutions, perceiving them as inapplicable 
to the contemporary challenges.
We may enumerate these basic values which were supposed to be the foun-
dations of the political community: (1) respect human dignity understood as 
corporal and spiritual unity of a man, whose humanity is realized in many 
natural communities (family, local societies, society, nation); (2) recognizing 
4 L. Dorn, “Solidarność jako ruch ideowy,” in Niepodległość pracy (Warszawa: Ośrodek 
Badań Społecznych NSZZ Solidarność region Mazowsze, 1981), p. 75.
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universal and inalienable human rights; (3) accepting traditional moral values 
of Christian civilization, such as truth, goodness, justice, equality, and solidarity, 
which should come into effect in politics and the economy; (4) rejecting the 
individual-community dichotomy, and trying to combine these perspectives 
in the spirit of communitarianism, respecting the principle of equality between 
the benefits and the obligations of the citizens; (5) recognizing society as an 
organic community in which members should work together for the greater 
good in the spirit of solidarity (‘bear ye one another’s burdens’); (6) treating 
national bounds defined by culture as the foundations of a political communi-
ty; (7) acknowledging the key role of the state as the guarantor of public order 
while simultaneously maximally limiting its role according to the subsidiarity 
rule (units of a higher order interfere only in these issues which the lower units 
cannot solve for themselves); (8) finally, placing religion as an important part 
of public life due to its sense-creating role in tradition, clearly limiting strictly 
the political activity of the Church. These ideological principles of a political 
community should be recognized by means of general social compromise, and 
entered into the area of everyday political discourse.
5th Thesis: Solidarity was Characterized 
by Anti-dogmatic Thinking
The above-mentioned ideological principles are general rules for composing an 
ideal political community. These principles come directly from the experiences 
of the project creators. At the same time, such values as dignity or solidarity, 
presented clearly during the strikes of August 1980, were universal in their 
character, and may be treated as the basis for a community with members 
who did not necessarily participate in the above-mentioned experience of 
existential revolution. Furthermore, the power of ideological principles lay in 
the fact they were not specified by the Solidarity activists’. As the ideas came 
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from different traditions and different views, people were looking for the parts 
which were common to them, rather than those that set them apart. These ideas 
were treated as the cornerstone for the community, and not as ideological fighting 
grounds. These ethical roots did not lead to creation of a rigid code of detailed 
bans and orders. The solidarity founded in morality was not tempted to be-
come entangled in a permanent political dispute over axiological differences. 
This is why apart from the recognition of ideological principles, the political 
project was characterized by a certain anti-dogmatism of thinking, which 
Dorn called ‘aideological political pragmatism.’ The movement was opposed 
by a heavily centralized communist state which had a huge propaganda and 
pressure machine aimed at maximally marginalizing the Union. When fighting 
such an opponent, Solidarity had to demonstrate a greater degree of flexibility 
concerning its thoughts and actions.
In these terms, we can distinguish between two basic social levels of the 
movement: (a) regulative ideas, i.e. universal rules outlining the ideal of political 
order, and (b) specific demands of the Union, which also become a way to apply 
these regulative ideas to the social and political reality. The transition from the 
ideal pattern to the specific demands including the political reality obviously 
required a certain amount of flexibility in thinking. The aideological political 
pragmatism was based on the strong premise that the same common values 
could be realized in many different ways, and choosing one of them should 
every time belong to the people. This is why Solidarity called for establish-
ing institutional solutions which authentically involve citizens in public life. 
Therefore, the state should be built on the basis of the idea of assistance, where 
low-level institutions with real competences may solve most of the local prob-
lems. Yet again, it was clear that the shape of the political project of Solidarity 
had depended more on the reality of activity in the communist state than in 
consistent reading of classics of the political idea.
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It is worth adding that the most crucial reason behind this reluctance of the 
Union activists towards ‘self-salutary positive models’ was the rejection of the 
Marxist-Leninist ideology. Communism was largely interpreted as a political 
system utterly invented by theoreticians and prophets, which was imposed on 
the society top-down, without any adaptation to reality. Thus, in isolation of 
the ideology from the social life, the Union activists saw the greatest warning 
against creating any rival models a priori. Again, as Baczko pertinently put it, 
due to this rejection, Marxism was completely removed from the discussion 
during the Solidarity period.
Marxism was worn out not due to dogmatic rigidity but, on the contrary, 
through its too lenient flexibility. Its compliance to any excuses for manipulating 
History made it perfect for propaganda. However, it proved totally ineffective 
for getting out of the crisis in the system it helped to create. 5
In view of the deadlock of the communist ideology, old formulas and di-
visions were rejected, as they were not suited for diagnosing the new situation. 
Thus, all ideological baggage was lost, and new terms and ways of expressions 
were sought.
6th Thesis: the Political Project of Solidarity Was Eclectic
The anti-dogmatism of thinking led straight to extensive drawing of inspira-
tion from many different doctrines. This shaped the ideological output into 
an eclectic entirety. The values and ideas from different traditions were freely 
mixed, often disregarding the tensions between them. This resulted from three 
circumstances. The first reason was the absorption of the dissident circles by 
Solidarity from 1976-1980, which were founded on totally different grounds. 
5 B. Baczko, Wyobrażenia społeczne. Szkice o nadziei i pamięci zbiorowej (Warszawa: 
PWN, 1994), p. 242.
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Their cooperation led to a search for inspiration in many traditions, and at the 
same time, sought for similarities rather than differences. The second reason 
was the necessity for flexibility in meeting the realities of the communist state, 
where activists looked for different solutions to increase their chances when 
dealing with the authorities. However, it seems a third reason may be presented, 
one which is far more universal. When examining basic social and political 
issues in terms of theory, one should pay attention to their logical coherence. 
In this way, the analysis of terms which stand diametrically opposed to each 
other (freedom-equality, community-individual, etc.) induces one to be clearly 
in favor of one of these values. Therefore, liberalism will defend freedom and 
the individual, whilst socialism will sympathize with equality and community. 
However, when one sees past the theoretical deliberations, and focuses on 
the existential experience of an individual, these basic dilemmas of political 
philosophy will reveal themselves in a completely new light. Things which are 
easy settled in theory are connected together into a single human experience. 
On an existential level, an individual usually wants to find a creative balance 
between values which are deemed as mutually exclusive by the theoreticians. It 
should not come as a surprise that the unionists, drawing out of their experience, 
associated (contrary to the doctrines) equality with freedom, the individual 
with community, and strong moral values with a certain openness to otherness.
This was interestingly commented on by Václav Havel in his essay The Power 
of the Powerless. Havel pointed out that the Czech dissident movement lacked 
in-depth knowledge about politics. As Havel puts it, ‘it’s also not so bound by 
traditional political thinking and political habits and therefore, paradoxically, 
they are more aware of genuine political reality and more sensitive to what 
can and should be done under the circumstances.’ The point of departure for 
politically uneducated people is not some reality-deprived notion and ‘all the 
traditional political schemata that have been imported into our circumstanc-
es from a world that will never return’ but a specific individual with its basic 
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needs. ‘To shed the burden of traditional political categories and habits and 
open oneself up fully to the world of human existence and then to draw polit-
ical conclusions only after having analyzed it: this is not only politically more 
realistic but at the same time (…) politically more promising as well.’ In order 
to meet the challenges of the contemporary reality, politics had to remove from 
its plans ‘the abstract vision of a self-salutary positive models,’ which usually 
lead to enslavement of a society, and focus on the needs of specific people. 6 
Solidarity abandoned self-salutary positive models and grounded its ideology 
in a single experience.
By combining these three elements — universal values which are the cor-
nerstone of the community, aideological political pragmatism of action, and an 
eclectic way of thinking for designing specific solutions — the political project 
of Solidarity was established. This unique way of thinking in politics was the 
most significant contribution of the movement to political thought.
This briefly described political project proved to be an extremely inconve-
nient heritage. In order to accommodate this understanding, we have to revise 
many contemporary intellectual habits. This is why my thesis is supported by 
three levels of inapplicability of this political project to the modern categories of 
thought: intellectual inapplicability, methodological inapplicability, and political 
inapplicability. The next three theses expand on this idea.
7th Thesis: The Intellectual Inapplicability of Solidarity
The intellectual inapplicability was rooted in our worldview, especially in terms 
of politics and sociology, which was shaped mainly by the Enlightenment, 
which to this day is a vital element of our culture and undoubtedly one of the 
6 V. Havel, The Power of the Powerless trans. by Paul Wilson, at: http://vaclavhavel.cz/
showtrans.php?cat=eseje&val=2_aj_eseje.html&typ=HTML (accessed January 16, 
2012).
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cornerstones of the present day. 7 The intellectual influence of the Enlighten-
ment was especially strengthened in Poland after 1989, as the last 20 years of 
Polish history was about making up for lost time and catching up to the intel-
lectual output of the Western Europe. One of the most important elements 
in this process was the Polish intelligentsia discovering political traditions of 
the Enlightenment. However, such a turn of events has taken us away from 
the possibility of understanding the political project of Solidarity, which by 
rejecting the basic foundations of Marxist and Leninist ideology (both heavily 
influenced by the Enlightenment), automatically distanced itself from many 
axioms characteristic of these traditions. In order to surpass the Enlightenment 
heritage in our culture, the unionist demonstrated a high degree of innovation 
in thinking outside the boundaries, at the same time condemning themselves 
to incomprehension, since their project stood in clear contradiction to the 
line of political thought characteristic of the Polish Third Republic. Let us 
enumerate the most vital features of this Enlightenment vision which were 
rejected by the creators of Solidarity in 1980, and which returned ten years later.
The basic achievement of the Enlightenment is a specific ideal of rationality. 
Stanley Rosen states it was possible to see within this heritage the ‘intentions 
to replace the standards of reason by standards of faith, custom, or tradition.’ 
Reason is comprehended as Cartesian mathesis universalis, a thesis which in 
itself is the generalization of mathematics. This thesis leads us step by step 
to stigmatizing everything which cannot be explained by mathematics as 
rhetoric, i.e. something mindless. In this way, we reject metaphysics, religion, 
and tradition, replacing them with mathematics. 8 The creators of Solidarity 
rejected such a concept of rationality. In their opinion, both religion and tra-
7 Ch. Taylor, Źródła podmiotowości. Narodziny tożsamości nowoczesnej (Warszawa: PWN, 
2001), p. 724. (Polish translationon of Sources of the Self… by Charles Tylor).
8 S. Rosen, “Rozmyślając nad oświeceniem,” in Oświecenie dzisiaj: rozmowy w Castel 
Gandolfo, ed. K. Michalski (K raków: Znak,1999), p. 11-13.
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dition were hugely influential, thus they reached for these values ingrained in 
our culture. Thus, they were in favor of a thesis contrary to the Enlightenment 
philosophy, that one could not actually understand the social reality without 
wider reference to metaphysics.
Together with an ideal of rationality, the Enlightenment promoted a specific 
anthropological vision of human beings with a naturalistic and materialistic 
paradigm. According to this point of view, a human is an extremely complex 
organism without any spiritual element, and may be learned only by means 
of methods taken from natural science. 9 This perspective was connected to 
rejection of transcendence, which meant negation of the thesis that human 
life has some other meaning beyond itself. This was the birth of exclusive hu-
manism, which is based on limiting the human existence to mortal life. 10 The 
activists of Solidarity did not agree with such an understanding of humans, 
seeing them more as a unity between the spiritual and the physical. Through 
in-depth exploration of the concept of human dignity rooted in religion, it 
became obvious they could not agree with a naturalistic approach.
As a result of Enlightenment anthropology, people began to reject traditional 
morality. It was replaced by a conviction that all our purposes, ideals, or values 
are nothing but preferences based on sensations of pain and pleasure. 11 This, 
in turn, gave rise to a tendency to treat ethics contextually, i.e. by evaluating 
good and evil in criteria of usefulness of fulfilling specific goals. However, the 
social movement, called by scholars the ethical civic society, returned to the tra-
ditional moral categories. The activists were for universal and timeless status 
of values by supporting substantialist justice or the sense of the call to ‘bear ye 
9 R. Spaemann, “Wewnętrzna sprzeczność oświecenia,” in Oświecenie dzisiaj: rozmowy w 
Castel Gandolfo, ed. K. Michalski, (K raków: Znak,1999), p. 200-201.
10 Ch. Taylor, “Immanentne kontroświecenie,” Oświecenie dzisiaj: rozmowy w Castel 
Gandolfo, ed. K. Michalski, (K raków: Znak,1999), p. 46.
11 S. Rosen, “Rozmyślając nad oświeceniem,” p. 22.
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one another’s burdens.’ The revolted against reducing morality to preferences 
based on senses or utilitarianism.
Another characteristic feature of the Enlightenment was perceiving religion 
as a relic of the past, which acted as the main perpetrator in trapping people 
in superstitions of the past. Voltaire in Treatise on Tolerance presented a vision 
of the community of people united with a singular vision of rationality. This 
concept sanctioned the model of a modern Enlightenment state where an 
overlord was obliged to fight any religious zealotry, especially Catholic. 12 The 
result of this concept was pushing all Christian traditions onto the margins of 
European society, all in the name of affirmation of pure rationalism. The activists 
of Solidarity thought in a completely different manner. The above-mentioned 
theses were close to the basic Marxist ideology, and in the face of the struggle 
which the Church had to endure in the post-war era, it was no surprise they 
were rejected by the Union. In the context of the Union’s battle with the com-
munist state, the language of the Church was the one showing the ideological 
emptiness of existing propaganda. The social movement did not want a neutral 
point of view of the state, but clamored for a visible presence of religion in the 
public space, and accepted the important institutional role of the Church.
By negating traditional religion and metaphysics, the Enlightenment has 
established its own faith. Its centerpiece was progress, which was meant to be 
accomplished by the human race in terms of exploration, society, ethics, and 
technology by revealing the truths governing our world. The mental image of 
the long-lasting great march of people towards civilization is clearly visible in 
the works of such thinkers as Condorcet. Most of great minds of the Enlight-
enment believed in ‘scientific determinism.’ They proclaimed liberating the 
human race, and stated at the same time that people are basically and irrevo-
12 Voltaire, Traktat o tolerancji: napisany z powodu śmierci Jana Calasa, (Warszawa: PIW 
1956) (Polish translation of Voltaire’s Treatise on Tolerance).
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cably slaves. 13 By analyzing the process of de-ideologization of the communist 
state, we have discovered that the Enlightenment belief in the rationality of 
history, which became the cornerstone of Marxism, was rejected by the Polish 
society. The documents of the period known as ‘the carnival of Solidarity’ are 
therefore free of any unwavering rules of historical development which may be 
discovered through rational analysis. The explosion of freedom characteristic 
of a massive social movement legitimated thinking about the future as a large 
unknown, which would be determined by thousands of particular decisions of 
individual persons. According to scientific determinism, the past was closed, 
and the future determined; due to historical events, Solidarity perceived to-
morrow as uncertain, basing its wisdom on yesterday.
Finally, the Enlightenment was fond of social engineering, as the extension 
of faith in the rational laws of history. The period of Enlightenment popularized 
the conviction that the society is an organized machine in which all elements 
contribute to its functioning.
The Enlightenment philosophy gave people deep faith 
in their own cognitive capabilities but also in the recon-
struction of social and political order, which gave rise 
to theories discovering the mechanisms governing the 
world and human behavior, establishing rules similar 
to these of natural sciences which were ruthless and 
unforgiving. The rules dictated by reason would be 
implemented, only if the reality could be freed from 
the evil surrounding the society; they were the ones 
13 R. Spaemann, “Wewnętrzna sprzeczność oświecenia,” p. 200.
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determining the order to which all social actions and 
behavior were adjusted. 14
This aspect of the Enlightenment was also shown in communist ideology 
which believed in the redemptive power of the state which by nationalizing 
the means of production frees the authentic nature of the people. The failure 
of the communist project made Solidarity extremely distrustful of self-salutary 
positive models. By rejecting all inclinations towards social engineering, the 
activists demanded the rule of assistance, i.e. a model based on strong subjec-
tivity of low-level institutions. In this model, it was society who should solve 
most of the local problems through grassroots activities.
In all these aspects, the political project of Solidarity transgressed the 
specifically understood Enlightenment, trying to correct its basic premises. 
Obviously, nobody at that time defined the main task of the movement di-
rectly in that way, and one can see many statements of the activists which can 
be deemed as taken directly from the Enlightenment. However, undoubted-
ly, the cult of narrowly-understood rationality, interpretation of the human 
through naturalism and materialism, rejection of traditional morality in lieu 
of utilitarianism, acknowledging religion as a thing of the past and the greatest 
enemy of freeing humans from bygone superstitions, belief in universal truths 
which through science govern the development of civilization, and last but 
not least, the affection for social engineering — all these traits were treated 
by the creators of Solidarity as Marxist and Leninist. The activists distanced 
themselves automatically from basic axioms of a major trend in our culture 
by rejecting the communist point of view rooted deeply in the tradition of 
the Enlightenment. Thus, we have every right to call the achievements of the 
movement a post-Enlightenment project.
14 W. Bernacki, “Socjalizm,” in Słownik społeczny, ed. B. Szlachta (Kraków: WAM, 2004), 
p. 1207.
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Of course, the above description is quite one-sided. These six features of 
the Enlightenment philosophy seem to be selected rather partially, as this 
exceptionally rich current produced many other topics which were far from 
extreme scientism or naturalism. Furthermore, the proposed definition of the 
Enlightenment reduced this trend only to the French contributions to this age, 
leaving aside the achievements of the Scottish or Polish Enlightenments, which 
had different approaches to the issues of anthropology. Finally, it is also safe 
to say there were many philosophers who were crucial to the Enlightenment 
period, and yet their anthropology was closer to the concepts of the Solidarity 
activists than the scientific vision (Alexis de Tocqueville or Edmund Burke). 
As well, there were some people in the Union who were greatly inspired by the 
tradition of the Enlightenment (like Leszek Kołakowski and Adam Michnik).
However, it seems most legitimate to treat this concept of the Enlighten-
ment as a certain type of progressive views lending a tone to the political debate 
in Poland after 1989 because it allows us to fully understand the mechanism 
of intellectual inapplicability. According to many researchers, the last 20 years 
in Polish history were characterized by making up for lost time in terms of 
academic outcomes of the West, a period when Poles were discovering the 
political traditions which founded modern liberal democracy and capitalism. 
This heritage came with the ideas of political pluralism and neutrality of the 
state’s outlook; a view that secularization is an inherent features of modern-
ization; a distrust towards strong national and religious identities, which were 
supposed to constitute threats to the modern concept of tolerance; a privatiza-
tion of rules and ethical norms connected to liberalism; a conviction regarding 
the extremely individualistic nature of humans which is carried out only by 
expressing the uniqueness of a lifestyle in opposition to the community; confi-
dence about the superiority of academic reasoning over religious thinking; and 
eventually a belief that history will end as a victory of democracy and capitalism, 
which through its world order, according to the theory of neoliberalism, will 
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provide people with eternal happiness. All these elements of Western political 
thinking, which developed over the course of 200 years, were learned in Po-
land from the angle of the French Enlightenment. Due to the short time span 
available for this adoption, and drastic political and economic changes of the 
period, this process was perforce ‘extremely selective and superficial.’ Mostly, 
we were not ‘aware of any inner dilemmas, or current issues emerging from 
the transformations in liberalism.’ 15 Zdzisław Krasnodębski in Demokracja 
peryferii convincingly demonstrates that the end result was an unquestioning 
acceptance of Western intellectual standards. We have enthusiastically em-
braced the achievements of the Enlightenment, moulding our own intellectual 
habits in its image, and our way of thinking about public affairs was based on 
stiff doctrinal divisions in their 19th century form. At the same time, we have 
condemned ourselves to the incomprehension of the program of Solidarity, 
which was far more modern than the ideas rooted in 19th century, saw the 
current problems connected with the Enlightenment tradition, and tried to 
correct its basic assumptions. It was easier to acknowledge this program as 
an absurd creation of uneducated workers than change our own intellectual 
habits, which were supposed to be synonymous with progress and modernity. 16
15 Z. Krasnodębski, Demokracja peryferii (Gdańsk: słowo/obraz terytoria, 2005), p. 8.
16 In her recollections about the August 1980 negotiations in the Gdańsk Shipyard 
between the strikers and the communist government, Jadwiga Staniszkis writes she 
had to quit the debate as the ‘thinking of experts’ was based too much on current reality, 
which according to her was ‘a type of corruption.’ She believed, the ‘unimaginable’ 
things (such as establishing free trade unions) were only attainable by people who were 
not aware of the impossibility — ‘this should be the workers’ choice alone,’ she adds 
later on. When viewing this observation in the perspective of the following 30 years, we 
may say that this uncritical acceptance of the specific aspects of the Enlightenment was 
a type of corruption which prevented any fair evaluation of the programme of Solidarity. 
See: J. Staniszkis, Ewolucje form robotniczego protestu w Polsce. Socjologiczne refleksje 
wokół wydarzeń w Gdańsku, sierpień 1980 (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo MKZ NSZZ 
„Solidarność”, 1981), p. 12.
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8th Thesis: Methodological Inapplicability
The issue of methodological inapplicability was connected with the positivist 
tendencies in social studies. In the context of Solidarity this issue was firstly 
mentioned by Ireneusz Krzemiński, who wrote that, ‘the academic gear of 
sociology assumes … a particular image of the society and of an individual. 
This image is confirmed by a variety of philosophical grounds which cause the 
analysis to omit or disable the description of worldly dimensions necessary 
to be considered in understanding of the entirety of the social experience.’ 
Without any unnecessary philosophical debates, Krzemiński clearly suggests 
that by closely abiding the recommendations of objective professional sociology, 
created in the spirit of positivism, we cannot fully comprehend the metaphysical 
solutions of the experience of sense which was the basis for Solidarity. Therefore, 
we have to introduce ‘new notional instrumentation’ which will enable us ‘to 
commemorate this exceptional social experience.’ 17
In similar fashion, I was forced to correct the methodological principles, 
especially by revising four rules recognized almost universally in social sciences: 
(1) the principle of a solid division of sciences due to the field of research, which 
means a profound specialization; I have chosen an interdisciplinary method, 
which in a multi-faceted way combines the work of political sciences, philosophy, 
sociology, history, and linguistics; (2) the principle of an individual research 
subject applied in political thinking, which stems from the belief that only 
individuals may be reasonably researched in view of individually practiced 
political philosophy; in order to describe the political project of a massive social 
movement, I had to cast aside this rule, and reconstruct the political thinking 
of collective subjects. (3) the principle dividing the source into specific types 
and categories, which is reluctant to compare sources of different character 
(e.g. legal documents with literature); in order to place the political project of 
17 I. Krzemiński, “Świat zakorzeniony,” Aneks 43 (1986), p. 91-93.
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Solidarity in a wider cultural contexts, I decided to use a proper hierarchy of 
sources (Policy Resolution, official documents signed by the union, journalism, 
cultural works) in order to juxtapose and contrast them for an outline of the 
phenomenon; (4) the principle of rational explanation of phenomena, which 
declares that the only way to reach the essence of social events is by rational 
analyses; I found the political project of Solidarity was founded on values 
directly derived from experiences identified during the strikes by an intuitive 
insight of the activists into the world of values, and implicitly decided that its 
phenomenon cannot be understood by academic analyses. Without revision 
of these four methodological principles, i.e. on a plane of objective academic 
political science, to paraphrase Krzemiński’s words, such a social experience 
could not be commemorated in all its complexity.
9th Thesis: Political Inapplicability of Solidarity
Finally, the issue of political inapplicability, i.e. the impossibility of simply trans-
lating those ideas onto the last 20 years of Polish political struggles, seems to 
be rather obvious, especially in the light of earlier findings. Let us look at this 
problem from the perspective of theoretical disputes between parties invoking 
socialist or liberal traditions, and the argument between the left and the right 
sides of the political stage. The parties which rooted themselves in socialist 
ideas found the thought of Solidarity similar to their ways of treating the so-
ciety as an organic whole, managing a company by workers’ self-management, 
and caring for the disadvantaged and dispossessed. However, at the same time, 
the socialists could not accept Solidarity for its desire to limit the authority of 
the state for low-level bodies, its reluctance towards social engineering, and 
rejection of mechanical perception of equality. Meanwhile, the liberals allud-
ed to the liberation aspect of the social movement, as well as the demand to 
decentralize the state in the spirit of subsidiarity, and enhancing grassroots 
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initiatives in the society. But they viewed the critique of individualism and so-
cial solidarity as relics of past socialist thinking, similar also to any attempts to 
establish moral foundations for capitalism, or the ideas of privatization through 
granting proprietary rights to workers rather than selling the companies. This 
meant that neither socialists nor the liberals of the Polish Third Republic took 
over the principles of the political project of Solidarity.
A similar thing happened after the division of the political scene into the 
left and right wings. The Left saw the heritage of Solidarity in terms of social 
sensitivity towards the poor and the excluded. The most important Polish 
left-wing party after 1989 derived from the communist Polish United Workers’ 
Party, and its voters consisted mainly of people who were reluctant towards 
the union in the 1980s. In the end, the achievements of the social movement 
which contributed to the downfall of communism could not become the ba-
sis for a program of a party which looked back on the communist People’s 
Republic of Poland. The strong religious and axiological aspects of Solidarity 
were also an issue for the new left-wing parties which dissociated themselves 
from the communist era but believed in profound neutralization of the state’s 
oversight. The achievements of the social movement would perhaps be most 
appropriate for a religious, patriotic left-wing party, rooted in the pre-WWII 
heritage of the Polish Socialist Party. However, there are no real influential 
parties on the Polish political landscape right now which refer to these roots. 
Also, surprisingly, Solidarity did not either prove to be an authentic program 
cornerstone for right-wing parties. Obviously, almost all of them took the 
national, Catholic, and anti-communist character of their movement as their 
own, and especially within these features the right claimed to have the Soli-
darity heritage. However, in reality these three key elements of the legacy were 
extremely inconvenient for them: first of all, Solidarity claimed the concept 
of split independence, where the state would be governed both by the commu-
nists and the representatives of social forces, which was an idea very far from 
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the right-wing ethos of uncompromising fight against the communists. The 
agreement of Solidarity to negotiate with the communists during the Round 
Table Talks in 1989 was treated by many as treason of the August ideals of 1980, 
which in itself may be viewed as a paradox. Many people forgot that the trade 
union was established in 1980 through peaceful negotiations with the author-
ities, and the following phases of talks with the communists were from the 
beginning the basis for this peaceful revolution. The second cornerstone of the 
Solidarity legacy, also different from the convictions of the right for the past 
20 years, was the self-limitation of the social movement in axiological matters. 
The union acknowledged its connection to the religious plane but avoided any 
ideological disputes in this matter, and as a result the basic ethical principles 
were not up for constant political debate. The social movement managed to steer 
clear of treating Catholicism as the state religion, and emphasized its ethical 
and spiritual background for the culture; the predominant bonds which were 
supposed to unite the nation were not ethnic but cultural, open wide to other 
political or religious views. Treating axiological matters as pivotal for political 
struggles, which we can now witness both in right- and left-wing parties, was 
absent from the view of Solidarity. Lastly, the right-wing politicians who claim 
their Solidarity heritage usually had a hard time accepting the important role 
of left-wing advisers in the movement, or people from the circles of Catholic 
intellectuals, who had moderate opinions concerning communism. In order 
to reduce this discord, in time, many rightists started to voice their concern 
about the influence of dishonest advisers on the trade union.
All of this means that the program of the social movement established over 
30 years ago could not have been accepted by any influential Polish political 
party after 1989. In this political sense, Solidarity is an orphan – no one today 
may approve of its achievements on the whole without reservations.
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10th Thesis: the Political Project of Solidarity May 
Help to Define the Polish Constitutional Identity
I want to end this paper referring to a contemporary text entitled ‘In quest 
for lost identity’ by Professor Lech Morawski, a constitutionalist from the 
Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń. Morawski puts forward the thesis 
that Poles still do not have a common constitutional identity, as up to this day 
there is no singular universally recognized corpus for the basis of the Polish 
political system. The author states that in order to have a constitutional identity, 
the rules for it must ‘start living in people’s hearts, and drive the interaction 
between the citizens and the authorities.’ The problem is now more urgent than 
ever as the clause on protecting constitutional identity in the Lisbon Treaty is 
going to determine the scope of competence which may be transferred by the 
state to the European Union. This means that in the light of recent changes in 
the EU, constitutional identity is now the frontier of a state’s independence. 18 
The political project of the first Solidarity tried to name the basic values for the 
entirety of the Polish political community, and may be an important voice in 
the contemporary discussions on, for example, Polish constitutional identity. 
However, in order to use that voice properly, it is necessary to cease thinking 
about Solidarity as a political party, and see the doctrine behind its first period 
of activity, with its broader and more universal character.
Translated by Łukasz Moskała
18 L. Morawski, “W poszukiwaniu utraconej tożsamości.” (working paper for the 
participants of the project “Fenomen państwa w wielopoziomowych porządkach 
polityczno-prawnych oraz w integracji europejskiej,” (Centrum Europejskie Natolin, 
Warszawa 2011).
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Solidarity in the Framework of 
Social Movement Theory
The article is a proposal to use categories taken from contemporary theories 
of social movements in order to describe the anticommunist movements in 
Poland in the 1970s and 1980s. The aim of the article is to show that the demo-
cratic opposition, the Solidarity movement and the underground of the 1980s 
could be described as elements of the same movement, which, however, had 
different dynamics at different points in time. These different dynamics spe-
ci fied to what extent the movement functioned as a spontaneous, grass-roots 
movement and to what degree it was controlled by political leaders, well aware 
of the goals that they wanted to achieve.
In order to describe the changing dynamics of the movement, it is best to 
use approaches which in the theory of social movements used to be treated 
as alternative. The history of Polish opposition shows that they are in fact 
complementary, and they describe different aspects of the movement, whose 
meaning depends on the circumstances under which it could develop. 1
Literature Review
Although most researchers seem to agree that Solidarity was a major social 
movement, there are very few analyses of the phenomenon which consider it 
1 This paper was presented by the author during a conference of the Social Sciences 
Department of the University of Gdańsk entitled “ The Culture of Freedom – the 
Culture of Responsibility,” in Gdańsk, May 23-24, 2011, and it has recently been 
published in Polish, see: K. Ciechorska-Kulesza, R. Kossakowski, P. Łuczeczko, ed., 
Kultura Solidarności. Socjologiczno-antropologiczne analizy kulturowego dziedzictwa 
„Solidarności” (Pszczółki: Orbis Exterior, 2011).
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in the context of contemporary social movement theories. This work will aim 
to show that in spite of the fact that theories seen as most popular today are 
based on the experiences of Western democracies, rather than real socialism, 
many – though not all – of the concepts they produced may be used to describe 
the development of the Solidarity movement. The author believes that elements 
of these theories should be treated as complementary, which follows current 
trends in the way one thinks of social movements. 2 In the case of Solidarity, 
modes of thinking based on new theories of social movements and of resource 
mobilization describe particular aspects of the movement, whose meaning 
changed along with changing circumstances and the stages of the movement’s 
development.
Alan Touraine was the most prominent researcher and social movement 
theorist to investigate Solidarity, and he devoted a large research project to 
its phenomenon and wrote a book about the movement. 3 Touraine’s research 
was on the one hand very fruitful from a descriptive point of view, but on the 
other hand, the social movement theory he created and applied did not prove 
useful in clarifying the emergence of the movement. Touraine, whose work 
was deeply rooted in research on ‘new social movements,’ was actually looking 
for a very specific movement: one that was not fighting to achieve particular 
interests and partial goals, but a movement which aimed at an all-embracing 
change of social reality, in order to increase the social subjects’ control over 
their fate (historicity). This very character of the movement was meant to 
be an expression of new conflicts, characteristic of the new, emerging social 
2 B. Klandermans and S. Tarrow, “Mobilization into Social Movements: Synthesizing 
European and American Approaches,” International Social Movement Research 1 (1988), 
p. 1-38.
3 A. Touraine, Solidarność. Analiza ruchu społecznego 1980-1981 (Warszawa: Europa, 
1989). The French original was published in 1982 under the title: Solidarité: Analyse d’un 
mouvement social (Pologne 1980-1981).
231
Solidarity in the Framework of Social Movement Theory
order: a post-industrial society. 4 This notion was deeply rooted in issues char-
acteristic of Western democracies, and treated as a universal stage of develop-
ment. Social movements investigated within this notion were to show ‘new’ or 
‘post-industrial’ social aspirations and contradictions, which slipped out of the 
conceptual framework of previously dominant theories which saw conflict in 
the class context, as a part of their Marxist heritage.
Seeing Solidarity as one of such movements was an important act of ac-
knowledging the universality of demands that Poles put forward, but it was 
not an effective analytic tool for the analysis of Solidarity, which was deeply 
immersed in local conditions. As Marek Latoszek argued 5 Solidarity cannot 
be treated as a reaction to phenomena typical of post-industrial societies. The 
conditions under which cultural grass-roots movements of Western Europe 
emerged were in fact so different, that the roots of Solidarity cannot be traced 
in analogical evolutionary processes taking place in Polish society. This may 
have been the reason why Touraine’s theory did not find followers here, de-
spite the direct involvement of Touraine’s team in research in Poland and 
establishing many contacts among researchers. It has to be said that Alain 
Touraine himself did not include his description of Solidarity in the body of his 
theoretical considerations, although he often emphasized how important his 
Polish experience was. His book Solidarity. An analysis of the social movement: 
Poland 1980-81, written in haste and without the participation of any Polish 
researchers, who were prevented from cooperating with Touraine’s team by 
the state of Martial Law in Poland, remains a valuable descriptive piece of work, 
4 P. Kuczyński, M. Frybes, W poszukiwaniu ruchu społecznego. Wokół socjologii Alaina 
Touraine’a (Warszawa: Oficyna Naukowa, 1994).
5 M. Latoszek, “Solidarność: ruch społeczny, rewolucja, czy powstanie,” in Solidarność 
w imieniu narodu i obywateli, ed. M. Latoszek (Kraków: ARCANA, 2005); M. Latoszek, 
“Solidarity – A Contribution to Social Movement Theory,” Polish Sociological Review 1 
(2006), p. 39-53.
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empirically documenting the inner dynamics of the Solidarity trade union, but 
it does not form a theoretical approach to which other researchers could refer.
David S. Mason gives more arguments for using the new theories of social 
movements to describe Solidarity in his article 6 He is fully aware of the dif-
ferences in circumstances under which Solidarity and Western movements 
emerged, but points out many similarities between the former and ‘new’ social 
movements as described by Western sociologists. One of such similarities 
is the fact that Solidarity was not a class movement, but rather a reaction to 
alienation of people in a world dominated by institutions which intervened in 
and destroyed traditional systems of interpersonal relations, and its aim was 
not to gain material benefits, but to defend values like equality, participatory 
democracy, the right to self-fulfillment and human rights. He affirms that in 
fact, Solidarity was defending the same post-materialistic values as those which 
grew stronger in Western societies. Mason emphasizes such similarities as 
being rooted in Christian values, preaching non-violence and being oriented 
towards self-government. He also directs attention to an aspect that I shall 
return to later in the article: the continuous conflict between the top-down 
and bottom-up dynamics of the movement.
Elisabeth Crighton 7 tried to apply resources mobilization theory to Sol-
idarity, and in her article she views the movement as a coalition of particu-
lar organizations of social movements, operating in diverse and cooperating 
environments. The theory that she applies seems to apply to the analysis of 
Solidarity, and she rightly emphasizes the local and regional levels of the move-
ment, observing the autonomy and differences between its particular elements. 
6 D. S. Mason, “Solidarity as a New Social Movement,” Political Science Quarterly, 
Volume 104, No. 1 (1989).
7 E. Crighton, “Resource Mobilization and Solidarity: Comparing Social Movements 
across Regimes,” in Poland after Solidarity. The Social Movement versus the State, ed. 
B. Misztal (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1985), p. 113-132.
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Unfortunately, Crighton’s work is not based on a deep understanding of Polish 
reality. First of all, she seems to overestimate the importance of the non-mate-
rial resources owned by the organizations she identifies, especially those that 
operated before August 1980. Although she is right in claiming that Solidarity 
was indebted to ‘social support infrastructure’ created by the Catholic Church 
and the democratic opposition, it is difficult to see elements of this network as 
organizations of social movement able to play a subjective role in the enormous 
social mobilization which was then taking place. As I am going to show later 
in this work, during the formative phase of the movement the resources of the 
already existing organizations did not play a key role, because they were only 
going to form in the course of an uncontrollable outbreak of social energy. 
Undoubtedly, the activists taking part in creating Solidarity were people of 
diverse values, interests and needs, but I strongly believe that forming these 
partial identities as well as forming the collective identity was destined to 
begin later, in the process of creation of the movement.
Another work falling into the category of resource mobilization theory 
is Solidarity & Contention. Networks of Polish Opposition by Maryjane Osa. 
Osa places a lot of emphasis on network analysis, and I believe that the main 
advantage of her work is giving a historical perspective to network analysis – 
that is, broadening the scope of interest outside the period directly before the 
creation of Solidarity, and tracking the ways in which oppositional traditions 
had been formed throughout the decades of the existence of the Peoples’ Re-
public of Poland. To a large extent she continues the outstanding work of Jan 
Kubik, 8 who shows how oppositional attitudes of Poles were rooted in culture 
and emphasizes the role that national traditions and institutions, mainly the 
Catholic Church, played in their formation.
8 J. Kubik, The Power of Symbols against the Symbols of Power. The rise of Solidarity and the 
Fall of State Socialism in Poland (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University 
Press, 1994).
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Osa justly assumes that a social movement is distinguished from isolat-
ed protest events or organizations, because a movement generates a cultural 
framework that cognitively connects discrete episodes of contention and inte-
grates organizations and actions into a single coherent narrative of collective 
identity and purpose.’ 9 Then she meticulously traces how this cultural framing 
emerged and what it looked like in subsequent protests that shook the country. 
She rightly assumes that the state of social discontent was permanent, and 
that a potential for mobilization was present during the whole existence of the 
People’s Republic. She also shows that the mobilizing frames of protests and 
dissident activities were diverse and depended on the political opportunity 
structure and subjects playing the main roles in them.
Osa (as well as Jan Kubik) points out the central role of the Catholic Church, 
and especially the Church of Primate Wyszyński, in creating a discourse al-
ternative to the official one. She shows that it has been the most important 
institution when it comes to activating the masses in Poland. Although this 
phenomenon did not have a clearly political character, its discourse was defi-
nitely oppositional, as it rose against the ideological principle of atheization 
and encouraged believers to oppose such politics of the state. Osa recognizes 
the important role of the religious program of the Great Novena which pre-
ceded (in the years 1957-1966) the celebration of the thousand-year jubilee 
of Poland’s baptism, which, in her eyes, provided the type of encompassing 
themes that made a master frame of dissent movements. On the one hand, it 
created a clear us-versus-them frame, in which us stood for the devout nation, 
and they were the Soviet-installed governing apparatus, which brought with 
itself a major threat to the country: atheization. On the other hand, it clearly 
broke from prevailing forms of opposition against the authorities rooted in 
9 M. Osa, Solidarity and Contention. Networks of Polish Opposition (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2003), p. 3.
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earlier Polish tradition, uprisings and military action often taken up regardless 
of any chances of success, by the virtue of which it contributed to the future 
opposition becoming a non-violent movement. 10
Osa also notices the emergence and growth of other diverse islands of 
opposition, like the independent Catholic periodicals Znak, Więź, and Ty-
godnik Powszechny, and later many other non-religious organizations, such 
as: Komandosi, Taternicy, KOR (Workers’ Defence Commmittee), ROPCiO 
(Movement for Defence of Human and Civic Rights) and KPN (Confeder-
ation of Independent Poland). She attributes special importance to the fact 
that these groups were becoming more and more interconnected and finally 
started cooperating. Here Osa follows in the footsteps of other researchers 
investigating the history of Solidarity, although her research in this matter is 
far more systematic and scrupulous. She also emphasizes the importance of 
creating a common interpretative framework of the opposition, based on the 
contrast between us and them, and their openness to particular variants of 
activation frameworks, specific to diverse dissident groups.
She conducts quantitative analyses that point out the multiplication of such 
enterprises and organizations, the number of which peaked at the end of the 
1970s. She also considers the changing political opportunity structure resulting 
from the situation in the governing circles. Other important factors allowing 
understanding of the changing dynamics and diverse effects of subsequent dis-
sident outbursts taking place during those times are the severity of repressions, 
divisions in the governing elite and people’s access to information. To sum up, 
Osa’s work is an excellent study, which takes into account a large array of factors. 
However, the conclusion of the study is somewhat puzzling, because in the 
conclusion she finds the explanation for the outbreak of Solidarity in the size 
and density of opposition and quasi-opposition networks, which were mainly 
10 J. Kubik, The Power of Symbols, p. 77-78.
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associated with intelligentsia. She does not point out a comprehensible mech-
anism which would transform these networks into a nation-wide movement 
based on massive activity in workplaces. Her argumentation seems convincing 
when she writes about local events, for example, when she answers the ques-
tion why it was during a wave of strikes on the Polish coast and not in Lublin 
that postulates regarding general matters were formulated and defended. She 
brings to light regional differences regarding accessibility of information and 
contact with opposition organizations, local conflicts and economic conditions, 
the degree to which local authorities were loyal to the central government, 
and attitudes towards clergy (who in some places tried to moderate conflicts, 
and in others supported the striking workers). While maintaining the view 
that a social movement is a phenomenon created in one way or another by pre-
viously existing ‘organizations of social movement,’ Osa is not able to explain 
the gigantic quantitative gap between numerous but isolated opposing groups 
trying to ‘do something’ and a massive, nation-wide movement.
Connecting Two Perspectives
Undoubtedly, most of Osa’s observations are perfectly valid, but they need to 
be supplemented, and this supplement can be found in an approach in com-
petition with the one adopted by Osa, namely, in the ‘new social movements 
theories.’ Regardless of the above-mentioned criticism by Latoszek 11 regarding 
analogies that can be observed between Solidarity and ‘new’ social movements 
in the West, it has to be admitted that many aspects of this approach seem 
appropriate, especially when considering the very functioning of the move-
11 M. Latoszek, “„Solidarność”: ruch społeczny, rewolucja, czy powstanie,” p. 240-282; 
M. Latoszek, “Solidarity - A Contribution,” p. 39-53.
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ment and motivation and identity of individuals involved in it, which are very 
significant in this perspective.
The advantage of the above-mentioned approach, especially in the version 
proposed by Alberto Melucci 12 is its serious treatment of grass-roots origins of 
the movement, as well as directing the analysis onto the level of an individual. 
Melucci – although he is seen as a representative of the movement – clearly 
states that ‘new’ movements are exactly the same as ‘old’ ones, because the 
mechanisms that created them remain identical. At the same time Melucci 
makes a statement that is very significant from our perspective, that social 
movements are internally heterogeneous. The starting point of his description 
is the observation that first of all there are many diverse protest activities, which, 
with time and under certain circumstances may become a social movement. 
Thus Melucci breaks with a homogeneous perspective on social movement 
(used by Touraine), which is the expression of one particular conflict central 
to its times. He observes that although homogeneity of a movement may be 
an aspect that is presented outside, it is in fact a product of constant negoti-
ations and compromise between its particular parts, and these negotiations 
do not always succeed. In consequence, one may see social movements not 
from the point of view of their political aims, but their cultural self-expres-
sion. Collective activities connected with movements are not perceived as 
created by some social-movement managers, who are aware of the goal that 
they striving to attain, but rather as a form in which dreams and expectations 
of the involved individuals express themselves. These motives are obviously 
socially constructed, but they are not imposed as a form of a political message. 
Rather they are created on the basis of the participants’ own perceptions of 
their own identities. Such reflections are consistent with what can clearly be 
12 A. Melucci, The Nomads of the Present. Social Movements and Individual Needs in 
Contemporary Society (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989).
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observed in the case of Solidarity – the fact that the movement had in fact no 
political agenda. 13
Although some authors 14 hold the opinion that the development of the 
opposition in Poland in the late 1970s and the emergence of free trade unions 
were in fact an implementation of a political project of ‘reinstating civic so-
ciety,’ created by KOR (Workers’ Defence Commmittee) and its associates, 
the sophisticated concept of anti-politics presented in their writings cannot 
be treated as a program common for the whole of Solidarity, or even less so 
as a tool to activate the masses. The authors mentioned above show a certain 
inability to explain the transformation from a theoretical project into a mass 
movement. This mass movement, when it had already become Solidarity, was 
described by Ost 15 himself as an entity which was not subordinate to the ideas 
of any politicians. On the contrary, during a significant part of its legal existence, 
Solidarity was striving to overcome the impossibility of a realistic scenario of 
operation. Negotiations concerning which political stance the union should 
assume lasted until the end of its legal existence, and they involved activists 
of diverse status in the organization. 16
The synthetic approach that I am suggesting would be based on taking 
into account the grass-roots and cultural character of the movement and the 
influence that different organizations with their own politics exerted upon it. 
13 E. Matynia, “The Lost Treasure of Solidarity,” Social Research 4 (2001), p. 917-936.
14 D. Ost, Solidarity and the Politics of Anti-Politics (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 
1990); M. H. Bernhard, The Origins of Democratization in Poland: Workers, Intellectuals, 
and Oppositional Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).
15 D. Ost, Solidarity and the Politics, p. 187.
16 J. Staniszkis, Samoograniczająca się rewolucja (Gdańsk: Europejskie Centrum 
Solidarności, 2010) – English version: Poland’s Self-Limiting Revolution, 1984; 
A. Touraine, Solidarność. ; S. Kowalski, Krytyka solidarnościowego rozumu. Studium z 
socjologii myślenia potocznego (Warszawa: PEN, 1990).
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I believe, as does Osa, 17 that the culture of protest characteristic of the dawn 
of the Gierek era was to a large extent shaped by organizations that existed 
earlier, that is mainly the Catholic Church, and to a lesser degree by opposi-
tion organizations that were then emerging. These formative activities came 
upon a favorable ground of the existing cultural resources transmitted spon-
taneously, either within the family or in models existing in literature, and also 
in those canonical works included in school readings. Seeing the growth of 
Solidarity in the first months of its existence as inconsistent with the limited 
resources available to the opposition (together with the ambiguous attitude of 
the Church), I am of the opinion that the importance of these resources should 
not be overestimated. Of course, there were areas in which the influence of 
these resources was considerable, but the very formation of Solidarity should 
be seen as a phenomenon determined mainly by the levels of cumulated social 
discontent, in the context of economic breakdown as well as hitherto empha-
sized cultural considerations.
A Crack in the System
As Kubik rightly points out 18 repressions and humiliation of the nation in the 
times of real socialism were of diverse character: cultural, political and eco-
nomic. I believe that all these aspects had an influence on the sudden outburst 
of Solidarity and the readiness of the masses to engage in a movement that 
was seen as opposing the Party. At the end of the 1970s more symptoms of the 
economic crisis and incapacity of the state emerged, and it was these symptoms, 
and not the organizational capabilities of the opposition, that had a significant 
17 M. Osa, Solidarity and Contention.
18 J. Kubik, The Power of Symbols.; J. Kubik, “Czyje to dzieło: robotników, intelektualistów 
czy kogoś innego? Kontrowersje wokół pochodzenia i składu społecznego 
Solidarności,” Kultura i Społeczeństwo 1 (1994), p. 175-188.
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influence upon the growing pessimism regarding the situation in the country, 
clearly visible in results of opinion polls, which were growing more and more 
negative. 19 What detonated these tensions was – as had happened before in 
the Peoples’ Republic of Poland – an increase in the prices of meat, which 
led to a wave of strikes. The majority of these strikes never formulated any 
political aims. Against this background the events in the Gdańsk Shipyard 
and the political process which led to negotiating the accords were highly 
unusual phenomena. Undoubtedly, self-aware political activists and intellec-
tuals along with equally self-aware politicians of the Party played the key roles 
here. Formulating strike demands, including the demand to create free trade 
unions, establishing and maintaining the intercollegiate strike committee, and 
finally, signing the accords were the result of specific circumstances and people 
involved in the process and it was not determined by the dynamics of a social 
process, nor was it an outcome of some strategic plan.
Although the idea of free trade unions was one of many promoted by the 
democratic opposition, it was neither a finite nor the key postulate. It was a re-
sult of the experiences of workers from the Baltic Coast in 1970, 20 and it was 
taken up by members of opposition intellectuals, who wanted to reach the 
minds of workers. Intellectuals and leaders of the opposition in the 1980s did 
not think the postulate was realistic, and they found it rather intimidating, 
as they foresaw its potential revolutionary consequences. 21 In many respects, 
however, it was not a well-considered postulate, and, by the same token, many 
19 M. Zaremba, “Zimno, ciepło, gorąco… Nastroje Polaków od zimy stulecia do lata 
1980,” in „Solidarność” od wewnątrz 1980-1981, ed. A. Friszke, K. Persak, P. Sowiński 
(Warszawa: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2013); see also English version of Zaremba’s 
article in this volume.
20 R. Laba, The Roots of Solidarity. A Political Sociology of Poland’s Working-Class 
Democratization (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991).
21 J. Staniszkis, Samoograniczająca się rewolucja.; J. Holzer, „Solidarność” 1980-81. Geneza i 
historia (Warszawa: Krąg, 1983).
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key organizational decisions – like the one making the movement operate 
on a regional, rather than professional basis – were not at all taken for granted. 22 
Then, the fact that the August Accords promised legalization of independent 
trade unions was not a part of anyone’s conscious strategy of ‘reinstating civic 
society.’ Nobody expected that a trade union would become such an effective 
tool of social activity.
Although the decision was by no means well-considered, adopting the 
formula of a trade union was of absolutely vital importance for the further 
development of the movement. Agreeing to do so, the authorities allowed 
for a crack in the system, which directed accumulated social energy in one par-
ticular direction. The strength of this formula was its wide availability – which 
was certainly relative, because the negotiations to create similar structures 
for students, farmers or other professions lasted well into 1981. A trade union 
is a structure whose natural purpose is to solve problems connected with work 
relations on the level of each production unit. In the corrupted and misman-
aged economy of the People’s Republic these were truly pressing problems for 
practically all employees.
The fact that the trade union formula was ideologically neutral and 
had a pro-social character which was in accordance with the official ideology 
made the operations of the union relatively safe: masses could become involved, 
without anyone being given the risky label of dissident. This neutrality had one 
more important aspect from the perspective of the birthplace of a wide social 
movement: the trade union formula prescribed distance to ideology, and thus 
it created no barriers to prospective members in this sphere. Although in its 
particular spheres diverse ideologies bloomed and unified local communities, 
22 A. Rębowska, “Wybrane aspekty ruchu obywatelskiego Solidarność z perspektywy 
ćwierćwiecza,” in „Solidarność” w imieniu narodu i obywateli, ed. M. Latoszek (Kraków: 
Arcana, 2005), p. 86-98.
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as a whole the formula followed a good path of intentional self-control – it aimed 
at representing employees, which also opened the door to mass participation.
Because such is the nature of a trade union, and perhaps in opposition to 
Lenin’s formula of a central council of trade unions, Solidarity was a demo-
cratic organization and it built its structures from the bottom up, starting with 
individual workplaces. In consequence, although there was no socially root-
ed democratic culture and in spite of adverse political conditions, it became 
possible to create an organization fuelled from the bottom, and remaining 
under significant control of social forces. Undoubtedly, this democracy was 
far from perfect, 23 but for many of those involved it was the first experience of 
democracy in their lives.
A Nation-wide Movement
So, in fact it was not the ideas of the democratic opposition, but the formula 
of a trade union spontaneously filled with content that defined the character 
of Solidarity. The movement, once initiated, spread throughout the country 
and started representing all Poles. With all due respect to all those who went 
on strike in Gdańsk, Szczecin and Jastrzębie, the analysis of the phenomenon 
of Solidarity is much more than just strikes leading to an agreement with the 
government. There would have been no independent trade unions, no Solidarity, 
if a huge wave of social activism taking place in workplaces all over the country 
had not followed the strikes. This wave presented the government with a fait 
accompli: that independent trade unions existed in all corners of Poland.
One has to take into consideration the fact that the authorities were first 
of the opinion that these new trade unions could only be established in work-
23 J. Staniszkis, Samoograniczająca się rewolucja; S. Kowalski, Krytyka solidarnościowego 
rozumu. Studium z socjologii myślenia potocznego  
(Warszawa: PEN, 1990).
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places that had signed the August Accords, and state services did all they could 
to make establishing new cells of trade unions as difficult as possible by in-
timidating activists and multiplying formal obstacles. 24 Although signing 
the Gdansk Accords did make a crack in the system, a genuine change took 
place only when what was merely a political possibility was filled with social 
content, and – especially important from our point of view – started to live 
an independent life.
Although it has just been said that adopting the formula of trade unions 
was relatively safe to its potential participants, still at the beginning it de-
manded courage and tenacity. The main force at play in work relations in the 
Peoples’ Republic was doubtlessly fear, which is well shown in the Polacy 80’ 
research, 25 and overcoming this fear in working communities was by no means 
easy. Krzemiński (see footnote 25) in particular pays attention to the role played 
by those ‘displeased and disobedient’ – people who had stood out by voicing 
critical opinions before and who were ready to lead the rest of the staff. These 
were often people who had had contacts – albeit often superficial – with dem-
ocratic opposition. Their presence made it much easier to generate common 
demands and made manipulations on the part of management of the workplace 
much more difficult.
The review of historical sources concerning the creation of local cells of the 
Unions in August and September 1980 shows that a special role was played by 
people who had had contacts with oppositional circles. Independent printing 
presses and the leaflets that they produced, reaching many workplaces all 
24 A. Dudek, “Dzieje dziesięciomilionowej Solidarności (1980-1981),” in Droga do 
niepodległości. Solidarność 1980 -2005, ed. A. Borowski  
(Warszawa: Volumen, 2005), p. 19-63.
25 M. Marody z zespołem, Polacy 80. Wizje rzeczywistości dnia (nie)codziennego 
(Warszawa: WFiS UW, 2004); I. Krzemiński, “Proces formowania się 
NSZZ Solidarność,” in Polacy – Jesień’ 80, ed. I. Krzemiński z zespołem (Warszawa: 
WFiS UW), p. 61-183.
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over the country, were a very important aspect of these contacts. What seems 
most significant, though, was the existence of networks of people with mature 
opposition attitudes, who were also highly respected in their environments 
and ready to establish new cells of the Union locally. In this respect Maryjane 
Osa 26 is perfectly right when she speaks about the key role of oppositional 
networks in the establishment of Solidarity. The network of potential activists 
and potential information channels able to reach them (using leaflets or by 
means of, for example, Radio Free Europe) made it easier to organize struc-
tures locally. But this was only a catalyst, and the force that pushed Solidarity 
was the pre-existing social tension, and the idea: this organizational solution, 
which seemed to be a new way worth trying when attempting to solve problems 
previously insoluble.
Diversity
This work avoids specifying the aims of emerging trade union organizations, 
because these were simply different in different environments. The idea of 
trade unions is treated as a practical legal formula, and not ideology. For that 
reason the participants in the Polacy 80’ research – conducted to investigate 
work relations in several workplaces in Masovia in the summer and autumn of 
1980 – had different diagnoses of the situation and different aims. Differences 
between the interpretations of Marody 27 and Krzemiński 28 may, in the opin-
ion of the author of this work, be attributed to the fact that the research was 
26 M. Osa, Solidarity and Contention.; M. Osa, “Sieci opozycji w PRL,” in Dynamika życia 
społecznego. Współczesne koncepcje ruchów społecznych, ed. K. Gorlach, P.H. Mooney 
(Warszawa: Scholar, 2008), p. 214-246.
27 M. Marody z zespołem, Polacy 80.
28 I. Krzemiński, “Proces formowania się NSZZ Solidarność,” in Polacy – Jesień’ 80, ed. 
I. Krzemiński z zespołem, Polacy – Jesień’ 80.
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conducted in the early phase of the formation of Solidarity, and the researchers 
were able to grasp particular discourses of its participants before they became 
relatively unified. In qualitative research the above-mentioned researchers 
heard diverse narratives, and treating any of them as dominant was by no means 
obvious, but was a result of the researcher’s individual interests: in the case of 
Mirosława Marody, workers imprisoned in the language of official propagan-
da, and in the case of Ireneusz Krzemiński, ordinary activists involved in the 
movement. There were many more variations, resulting from age, education, 
regional differences or branches of industry, but everyone could feel at home in 
the neutral formula of trade unions, and negotiations concerning the common 
identity of the movement were to last endlessly.
The social movement of Solidarity connected many of its participants with 
strong emotional ties, and it happened because each person to some extent 
could have their own Solidarity, form their own goals in its name and believe 
that they were shared by other members of the movement. The observation 
that most of authors researching Solidarity made was accurate: that the main 
factor building the identity of the movement was the binary opposition of 
us-versus-them, with the latter being the morally compromised authorities. 
There has never been a unified program shared by all members or a single idea 
which could be codified, because, even if we recognize the importance of the 
resolutions of the First Convention of the Union, these were only documents, 
and not records of a collective state of mind. The political history of the move-
ment was rather turbulent, and the questions that its participants had to face 
were changing quickly, which was well recorded in the report of Touraine’s 
research 29 and which other authors also acknowledge. 30
29 A. Touraine, Solidarność.
30 J. Staniszkis, Samoograniczająca się rewolucja.; D. Ost, Solidarity and the Politics of Anti-
Politics.; S. Kowalski, Krytyka solidarnościowego rozumu.
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This experience was described by authors who mainly dealt with activists of 
the basic rank 31 but also in later interpretations, which see Solidarity as a com-
munity devoid of a political program, which created such strong binds between 
its members as communities of first Christians 32 as well as of republicans. 33 
The unions seem to be an ethical community based on internal transformation, 
which Poles experienced after the August Accords – of people overcoming fear 
and taking responsibility for building a common good, regardless of adverse 
circumstances. Significantly, the Union was perceived as an autotelic value, 
and the right arena for realizing the good which it carried. It was not a tool to 
aid (the impossible) systemic transformation of the state, or a card in some 
kind of a political game, but it was this specific achievement, won by rebellious 
workers, inside which and throughout which its participants were to regain 
freedom and dignity. 34
This way of thinking about Solidarity remains in opposition to those anal-
yses which begin with the question about political perspectives of the move-
31 I. Krzemiński, “Proces formowania się NSZZ Solidarność,” and in Polacy – Jesień’ 
80, ed. I. Krzemiński z zespołem.; G. Bakuniak, “My Solidarność – nowy związek 
we własnych oczach,” in Polacy – jesień 80, ed. I. Krzemiński z zespołem, p. 185-212; 
A. Touraine, Solidarność.
32 D. Karłowicz, “Solidarność jako Kościół” in Lekcja Sierpnia. Dziedzictwo „Solidarności” 
po dwudziestu latach, ed. Dariusz Gawin (Warszawa: IFiS PAN, 2002), p. 39-61; 
Z. Stawrowski, “Doświadczenie Solidarności jako wspólnoty etycznej,” in Lekcja 
Sierpnia. Dziedzictwo „Solidarności” po dwudziestu latach, ed. D. Gawin (Warszawa: 
IFiS PAN 2002), p. 103-122.
33 P. Śpiewak, “Alexis de Tocqueville i Hannah Arendt o Solidarności,” Res Publica 
5 (1987), p. 83-88; D. Gawin, “Solidarność – republikańska rewolucja Polaków” in 
Lekcja Sierpnia. Dziedzictwo „Solidarności” po dwudziestu latach, ed. Dariusz Gawin 
(Warszawa: IFiS PAN, 2002), p. 161-188; E. Ciżewska, Filozofia publiczna Solidarności. 
Solidarność 1980-1981 z perspektywy republikańskiej tradycji politycznej (Warszawa: 
Narodowe Centrum Kultury, 2010).
34 A. Mielczarek, “Solidarność jako ojczyzna,” Res Publica 2 (1989), p. 7-12; I. Krzemiński, 
Solidarność. Projekt polskiej demokracji (Warszawa: Oficyna Naukowa, 1997); 
E. Matynia, “The Lost Treasure of Solidarity.”
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ment, 35 where the union and the movement are not treated as a value in itself, 
but as a means of exerting pressure on the government and a tool of political 
negotiations. In the quoted writings the most beneficial outcome, which was 
indicated as the goal of a potential agreement with the Party, was a corporat-
ist solution where the leaders of Solidarity could become partners with the 
Government as representatives of some group of interest – most probably, of 
workers – in exchange for the Party gaining control over the movement and 
limiting its demands.
Ost, 36 who analyzed such a possibility in most detail, admitted that it had 
never become an official project of the leadership of the Union, but he identi-
fied a ‘pragmatic’ wing of its leaders and advisers as a subject which could and 
should force such a stance and who came close to such a solution. At the same 
time he realized that such a solution would be very difficult to defend in front 
of ordinary members and that it contradicted the core ideas that were a frame-
work unifying the whole of the movement. Regardless of political connotations 
connected with two outlined ways of thinking, it is worth noticing that they 
overlap with the perspectives of social movements discussed at the beginning 
of this work. One of them speaks about a grass-roots movement, which is an 
arena of self-expression and a field of self-fulfillment of its participants, while 
the other sees the movement from the perspective of its managers, for whom 
activating the participants to act is a tool in reaching goals unconnected with 
the movement itself. Each of these perspectives touches upon important aspects 
of Solidarity, which had to coexist and at different points in time played a key 
role in the shaping of the movement.
35 D. Ost, Solidarity and the Politics of Anti-Politics.; Z. Pełczyński, Polska droga od 
komunizmu. Refleksje nad historią i polityką 1956-2006 (Warszawa: Scholar, 2007).
36 D. Ost, Solidarity and the Politics.
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The top-down aspect of the movement connected with this second perspec-
tive was also visible in the Solidarity of the period 1980-1981, and its importance 
grew because the importance of nation-level structures and centralization of 
decisions regarding the Union’s policies grew. The structure of conflict with the 
Party-state caused the Union authorities to often force regional cells to settle 
conflicts and limit their demands, regardless of their legitimacy in the name 
of their own politics. 37 According to Staniszkis, the breakthrough date for the 
development of Solidarity was the Warsaw settlement on March 23, 1981, which 
was a symbolic turning point from the phase of ‘cultural revolution,’ during 
which Solidarity – a movement of workers – was a tool which disrupted the 
hierarchy, to the point where expressive functions of the movement were again 
entirely regained by – as she calls it – the middle class. This caused a lasting 
demobilization of the movement in workplaces. From a temporal perspec-
tive one may assume that one of consequences of this fact was the inability 
of Solidarity to respond to the state of Martial Law. Undoubtedly then, with 
the increase in its political role, the importance to the central authorities of 
the Union as a social movement organization grew, as the authorities were 
controlling how and where its resources were allocated. The dynamics of po-
litical control over the movement remained in conflict with the dynamics of 
grass-roots articulation of social aspirations.
The State of Martial Law
The imposition of Martial Law was a very spectacular act of terminating a certain 
political opportunity external to the movement, which was a result of previous 
weaknesses, divisions and indecisiveness among Polish communists – ruling 
37 J. Staniszkis, Samoograniczająca się rewolucja.; D. Ost, Solidarity and the Politics of Anti-
Politics.
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Polish United Workers’ Party. Turning back to state terror, the authorities rein-
stated fear as a tool for effective control over citizens and eliminated the most 
important tools and fields where the movement had functioned with relative 
freedom for the past sixteen months. While within this period of time the 
formula of trade unions was a certain way of articulation of social discontent 
under the conditions of real socialism, on the day of December 13, 1981 this 
way was declared invalid, and the system was again sealed.
This act did not remove the existing social tension, because it did not solve 
any of the problems that caused this tension. Neither was it able to destroy all 
the capital of social relations and activities that were initiated during the legal 
operation of Solidarity. In spite of all that, the opposition did not find a new 
way of dealing with the system when it openly resorted to violence. It used 
tools which were prescribed by the national tradition, which were, of course, 
modified to some extent under the influence of the experiences of being the 
opposition in the Peoples’ Republic, such as the ritual of national mourning 
and conspiracy.
This conspiracy was not connected with any realistic political ideas. Al-
though some opposition leaders did with time become theoreticians of con-
spiracy, their works were not necessary for the formation of the movement; 
grass-roots activities took place independently of the exhortations of leaders, 
and often preceded them. Again, the formation of underground Solidarity did 
not need external motivation. Even though over 5 000 leaders of the opposi-
tion were interned in the first days under Martial Law, 38 there were enough 
second-level activists to immediately begin creating clandestine structures 
under the banners of Solidarity all over the country. Regional and local illegal 
union councils, underground printing presses, cultural events, diverse parties 
38 G. Majchrzak, Obóz władzy w stanie wojennym, in Droga do niepodległości. Solidarność 
1980-2005, ed. A. Borowski (Warszawa: Volumen, 2005), p. 107-135.
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and organizations and protest groups existing in all major cities, and often in 
minor ones, as well as in workplaces or schools were again mainly based on 
grass-roots activities. They were a way of expressing the determination and 
despair of many, for whom Solidarity was the embodiment of hope for change.
Just like before the formula of a trade union, now the formula of conspiracy, 
deeply rooted in cultural tradition, shaped further operation of the movement. 
This obviously limited its reach: in the conditions of open terror, there were few 
who opted for direct involvement. There were enough of them, however, and 
the moral support they received was enough for the movement to maintain its 
nationwide character. The movement, though, underwent a transformation 
to a loose coalition of independent structures, brought together by symbols 
and a clearly defined enemy. These structures could not maintain regular contact 
and the possibility to negotiate their common identity. However, the national 
and Solidarity symbols which unified the opposition also masked the differ-
ences resulting from the diversity of circles involved and political programs 
that remained theoretical. Together with the symbols of Solidarity, prominent 
leaders of the movement maintained their authority, often regardless of whether 
they engaged in political activity after December 1981.
The movement again entered a phase of domination of grass-roots ac ti vi-
ty, which reflects what has already been said: it was difficult to name its true 
political aims and strategy. What came to the front was again the autotelic 
dimension – the survival of the movement seen as a domain independent of 
the state and a place to express social discontent. The underground Solidarity 
maintained some central institutions, which were very important for cultivat-
ing a common identity. These were both political centers of the movement like 
the Temporary Coordination Committee, as well as media, including widely 
available underground printed materials and national branches of foreign 
radio stations, mainly Radio Free Europe. All of the above made investments 
in maintain this unifying tradition of Solidarity and its symbols, rightly seeing 
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it as the crucial capital of opposition. In spite of this capital, the role of central 
institutions in the movement remained figurative, as the politicians of the op-
position were not able to suggest any innovative formula of operation, which 
would be a new way to overcome the limits set by the system. If such formulas 
did appear, they had local and grass-roots character, like the Orange Alternative 
(Pomarańczowa Alternatywa), Peace and Freedom (Wolność i pokój), and the 
movement of economic enterprises. 39 In general, in a situation where political 
possibilities had dried up, all ideas concerning activity were the result of the 
invention of activists that were directly involved in them. These local initiatives 
operating on their own, although they invoked common symbols, created on 
the local level diverse interpretative frameworks of their activities. They did 
follow the us-versus-them pattern, but these frameworks were hardly a subject 
of negotiations and settlements among different trends connected with the 
tradition of Solidarity.
In spite of obvious weaknesses, over a period of seven years from the im-
position of Martial Law the opposition managed to maintain considerable 
mobilization potential throughout the country. The culture and political dis-
course of the opposition clearly remained more attractive than those of the 
authorities, and it was maintained by a network of activists that were more 
numerous, more experienced and better rooted in local communities than at 
the beginning of the decade. Thanks to this fact, on the threshold of the new 
political possibilities of the 1980s, the opposition possessed a lot of resourc-
es which the pre-August 1980 opposition lacked. It was well-rooted in local 
communities all over the country, relatively well-structured, and it had a clear 
and recognizable identity and an array of well-known leaders on the national 
level. At the same time, it reminded deeply apolitical and non-ideological. Its 
39 P. Kenney, Rewolucyjny karnawał. Europa środkowa 1989 (Wrocław: Kolegium Europy 
Wschodniej, 2005) – Polish translation of A Carnival of Revolution. Central Europe 1989, 
2002.
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activists recreated certain cultural patterns, and were concerned about the 
survival of the oppositional community, but the movement had neither clear 
political aims nor specified leaders. The existing resources were waiting to be 
managed by leaders able to propose a new and effective formula of operation.
The Breakthrough of the Round Table
The breakthrough that changed the political situation was the emergence of an 
offer to negotiate a merger of the opposition and the institutional system of the 
communist Poland. This offer, directed by the authorities to the political elite 
of the movement, naturally animated the movement’s dynamics. The shape 
of the political opportunity structure prejudged that at this decisive moment 
the resources of low and mid-range activists lost their importance for the sake 
of the resources of political leaders, which weighed more on the future of the 
movement. These resources were on the one hand the ability to negotiate with 
the authorities and on the other, the trust of all those sympathizing with the 
movement and the ability to control their actions.
It is worth noticing that it was far from obvious who should be established 
as the management of the movement. Politicians aspiring to be political lead-
ers still had to persuade their supporters. Ordinary activists of the movement, 
whether they wanted it or not, were faced with a choice – to accept political 
negotiations as a potential way to change the system and support the dealings 
of the Round Table or to lie in wait, to see whether the proposal was a trap set by 
the authorities or a sign of their weakness. 40 The majority was won over by those 
who wanted to accept this challenge. Research conducted among opposition 
activists showed that in 1989 80 per cent of them supported the settlements of 
the Round Table. Curiously, even the activists that were ideologically against 
40 A. Dudek, Pierwsze lata III Rzeczypospolitej 1989-2001 (Kraków: Arkana, 2004).
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those settlements seemed to support them in practice, and worked at preparing 
the June elections just like everyone else. 41
The outburst of faith in the possibility of a systemic change caused the 
cells of the movement, which were thus far autonomous and built from the 
bottom up, to be transformed into tools for realizing tasks set by politicians. 
At this time the structure of the underground movement, loose, informal and 
ideology-free, also proved to be flexible and universal. Activists who had been 
engaged in its diverse structures loyally obeyed a new political idea. All the 
resources which had been generated for years were now given to the common 
cause – the organization of an election campaign and winning the half-free 
elections whose possibility was negotiated at the Round Table.
This new way was certainly tightly connected to a certain formula specified 
by a form of organization – in the loosest sense of the word – under which the 
activists were now to operate. This formula included both the possibilities and 
limitations of its future growth. In the year 1980 this was a formula of trade 
unions, which was responsible for its many historically significant aspects, and 
contributed to maintaining harmony between its bottom-up and top-down 
dynamics. Under Martial Law it was a formula of conspiracy, which mainly 
concentrated on printing activities and was based on grass-roots actions. In 
1989 it was a formula of election committees, organized on grass-roots levels 
as well, but at the same time strictly subordinate to political leadership.
This new solution was supported by a firm and attractive prognostic frame – 
granting the opposition (including the independent trade union Solidarity) a le-
gal status, and even incorporating its representation into the Parliament. With 
time this frame became even more attractive, as creating a government by the 
former opposition and conducting a system change became a real possibili-
41 A. Mielczarek, Śpiący rycerze. Szeregowi działacze warszawskiego podziemia 
wydawniczego lat osiemdziesiątych (Warszawa: Stowarzyszenie Wolnego Słowa, 2006), 
also confirmed by yet unpublished data from my research in Siedlce and Rzeszów.
254
Adam Mielczarek
ty. This possibility legitimized the new formula of operation as well as new 
leadership bodies of the movement. Leaders, who had significant resources 
of public trust and being given a real chance to seize political power, quickly 
started using them to implement their own idea of reforms, which suddenly 
materialized. This idea of reforms was in need of social discussion, but the 
leaders did not intend to undertake such a process.
Just as after the Bydgoszcz crisis in 1981, again the expressive functions of 
the movement were taken over by – to use the term of Staniszkis 42 – the middle 
class, or even by a very clearly defined political option presented by a group of 
politicians of the opposition, who sat at the Round Table during an unprece-
dented centralization of the movement under entirely new conditions. Unlike 
in 1981, the present formula, involving access to state media and press networks, 
gave the political winners a huge advantage over the competition and to a large 
extent put all the movement cells in a fully dependent position. When the 
possibility of a huge political change on a central level dawned, the pressure 
exerted on all locally-voiced demands to be silenced was much stronger than 
in 1981. The movement now lacked efficient institutional tools to undertake 
local activities on its own. The Civic Committee of Lech Wałęsa, or rather its 
informal political leadership, on an almost day-to-day basis, seized the previ-
ously non-existent function of the central social movement organization, which 
was able to formulate new interpretative frames of the movement.
The elites which emerged during the Round Table seized the control over 
the movement’s resources and formulated its political goals, without seeing 
the need to negotiate them with other movements, which they now saw as 
competitors. These elites, who set political goals for themselves, largely ig-
nored Solidarity’s cultural functions of overcoming institutional obstacles 
and self-expression. Solidarity, in its aspect described by the theory of new 
42 J. Staniszkis, Samoograniczająca się rewolucja.
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social movements, was a movement opposing the world of controlling state 
institutions and the alienation that this phenomenon wrought upon the indi-
vidual. But at its moment of triumph its new leaders put all their efforts into 
maintaining this control and retaining many of the old institutional ways. 
Moreover, the non-negotiable economic solutions adopted were to deepen 
this alienation, fossilizing economic inequalities. The leaders of transforma-
tion, who originated from Solidarity, did not understand the cultural needs of 
their own background and thought of them as unimportant, or saw their open 
expression as a potential threat.
The tragedy of Solidarity during the breakthrough period, which became 
the reason for a permanent dissolution of the movement, was that the shape 
of the political reality at that time did not force the leaders to compromise. No 
longer in need of any assistance from their background activists, they were 
in favor of a gradual disintegration of this background. The hegemony that 
the elites gained was not only structural, or resulting from their privileged 
access to media or material assets, but it was a direct result of the weakness of 
their opponents from the movement, who were not able to propose any other 
convincing ideas. Although very violent conflicts appeared within the move-
ment, none of the sides could offer a formula which would carry the cultural 
and freedom-oriented dimension of Solidarity. All in all, in spite of a political 
victory, the tradition of Solidarity suffered a cultural loss, as it was not able to 
fulfill its destiny.
Theory of Social Movements and Solidarity
Maryjane Osa, quoted at the beginning of this article, observes that a social 
movement cannot be seen as a simple sum of events, speeches or protests. A 
social movement creates a culture which unifies very diverse social subjects, 
brought together by a community of interpretative frames. This framework 
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is a result of interaction between leaders who try to direct the activities of the 
movement and very diverse groups of individuals ready to participate. Alberto 
Melucci 43 points out that this framework is far from stable, and it is based on 
constant negotiations between all the subjects involved. The example of Soli-
darity shows that this culture may be a lasting one, and that a common identity 
may unite people in changing external conditions, and the very movement 
may be changing its form, range and modes of functioning at the same time.
The author of this article believes that today, when it can definitely be said 
that the movement of Solidarity has long ago disintegrated, the traditions that 
it created keep influencing the shape of political culture and the social life 
of this country. It is enough to say that over twenty years after the systemic 
change, the relation to the heritage of Solidarity still marks political divisions 
and remains an element of election campaigns.
It seems that the theoretical framework, which is needed today to describe 
Solidarity, must enable us to speak about its former unity and later decay. It 
should envisage the inner changeability of the movement and the factors that 
influenced it. It appears that this paper’s interpretation of internal changes 
in the movement shows that it can be done with the apparatus of theory of 
contemporary social movements. It also serves as proof that the approaches 
assumed here do not need to be seen as competing. On the contrary, they ex-
plain two parallel aspects of social movements, two opposing dynamics, which, 
depending on circumstances, may play a lesser or greater role in managing the 
activities of the movement.
Translated by Anna Sekułowicz
43 A. Melucci, The Nomads of the Present.
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Free from The Soviet Regime: Self-
subsistent Society in Soviet Lithuania 1
More than twenty years after the collapse of the communist regime, the nature 
of Soviet and socialist societies remains puzzling. On the one hand, they are 
characterized by atomization, individualistic opportunism, and a fear of social 
ties and/or instrumental sociability formed from above. 2 On the other hand, 
these societies were celebrated for their extraordinary solidarity and civic 
activism in the late 1980s. After the glorious victory of civil society against 
the regime, however, the current post-communist societies suffer from social, 
political and economic maladies, such as corruption, distrust, and the per-
sistence of nomenclature ties, all of which can be traced back to the nature of 
communist society. Therefore, to uncover the principles of the functioning of 
the regime and society in the Soviet system is not a task for historians only. It 
is also a task for sociologists, anthropologists, and political scientists, in trying 
to grasp the principles of functioning of the current society and to investigate 
unwritten social norms shaping social behavior.
In Lithuanian public and academic debates, an empirical question about the 
functioning of society in Soviet times is usually transformed into a normative 
question about collaboration and resistance. Who opposed the totalitarian 
regime, and who deserves the name of collaborators? How does one define 
1 This research was funded by the European Social Fund under the Global Grant 
measure, project “Invisible society of Soviet-era Lithuania: the revision of distinction 
between systemic and non-systemic social networks,” no. VP1-3.1-ŠMM-07-K-02-053.
2 H. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt Brace and Company, 
1979); B. Volker and H. Flap, “Weak Ties as a Liability. The Case of East Germany,” 
Rationality and Society 13(4) (2001), p. 397-428.
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opposition to the totalitarian regime? Where is the dividing line between 
resistance and conformism, between conformism and collaboration? These 
questions inspire continuous intense disputes among Lithuanian scholars 
representing different ideological positions and different theoretical inter-
pretations of the Soviet past. The debates, however, fail to give answers to 
simple questions, such as how were different stances towards the Soviet regime 
translated into political action and where was the seedbed of mass political 
mobilization against the regime in 1988?
The rigorous divide between resistance and collaboration made by Kęstutis 
Girnius and others offers clear guidelines for those seeking normative criteria 
of moral evaluation of individual positions towards the regime. 3 According 
to this stance, only an explicit anti-system position combined with public 
action (acting against the regime and/or open support for this kind of action) 
can be regarded as resistance. 4 While this approach is very sound, it cannot 
explain the puzzle of the mass revolution in 1988. The extent of overt resistance 
in Lithuania was very small; moreover, the contentious mass movement was, 
surprisingly, not borne within the circle of dissidents.
Another line of argument extends the concept of resistance to ‘invisible,’ 
‘silent,’ or ‘passive’ forms of opposition to the regime. Different versions of 
this approach describe different strategies enabling actors to inhibit the func-
tioning of the communist regime without making critical sacrifices of one’s 
life, freedom or career. These conformist strategies could range from Aeso-
3 K. Girnius, “Pasipriešinimas, prisitaikymas, kolaboravimas,” Naujasis židinys 5 (1996), 
p. 268-279.
4 K. Girnius, “Pasipriešinimas,”; N. Putinaitė, Nenutrūkusi styga: prisitaikymas ir 
pasipriešinimas Sovietų Lietuvoje (Vilnius: Aidai, 2007); A. Streikus, “Lietuvos 
katalikų pilietinio aktyvumo pavyzdžiai ir ribos XX amžiuje,” Naujasis Židinys, 1 
(2014); M. Jurkutė and N. Šepetys, ed., Democracy in Lithuania: Civil Spirit versus 
Totalitarianism at the Defining Moments of the Twentieth Century (Vilnius: Naujasis 
Židinys–Aidai, 2011).
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pian language used by artists to the strategies of nomenclature of extracting 
resources from Moscow for local investments. 5 They resulted in forming a 
‘double consciousness’ of individuals widely documented in memoirs of in-
tellectuals of the Soviet era and strikingly described in a prominent book by 
Alexey Yurchak. 6 While this approach provides a realistic view of sovietized 
societies, it obliterates the line between pro-system and anti-system actions 
and cannot explain how this so called ‘double consciousness’ could encourage 
political action against the system.
In fact, the revolution of 1988-1989 in Central and Eastern Europe and in 
the three Baltic States continues to bewilder researchers in the West as well as 
in post-communist countries themselves, as it is not compatible with dominant 
understandings of socialist societies. While some accounts demonstrated the 
possibility of the collapse of the communist system, none of the three dominant 
paradigms of sovietology – totalitarianism, revisionism and post-revisionism – 
is able to explain the extraordinary mobilizing power of these societies in 1988.
This article presents an alternative approach to the society of Soviet Lithua-
nia, applied in the recent attempt to explain the roots of Sąjūdis (the Lithuanian 
civic movement of 1988-1989) 7 and in the ongoing research of informal social 
5 E. Klivis, “Ardomasis prisitaikymas: cenzūra ir pasipriešinimo jai būdai sovietinio 
laikotarpio Lietuvos teatre,” Menotyra vol. 17 no. 2 (2010); E. Baliutytė, “Tyliosios 
rezistencijos metafora ir prisitaikymo strategijos sovietmečio literatūros kritikoje,” 
Colloquia 19 (2007), p. 58-79; V. Klumbys, “Lietuvos kultūrinio elito elgsenos modeliai 
sovietmečiu.” (PhD diss., Vilnius University 2009).
6 A. Yurchak, “Soviet Hegemony of Form: Everything Was Forever, until It Was 
No More,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 45(3) (2003).
7 The results of the research were published in: J. Kavaliauskaitė and A. Ramonaitė, ed. 
Sąjūdžio ištakų beieškant: nepaklusniųjų tinklaveikos galia (Vilnius: Baltos lankos, 2011), 
p. 439.
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networks in late Soviet Lithuania. 8 The research uses the sociological approach 
to collective action applying the social network perspective, which enables 
one to explain the causal mechanisms of social processes. This perspective 
allowed us to shift the focus from the question of the moral stance of an indi-
vidual to the social mechanisms of building alternative social structure able to 
withstand the power of the regime. This resulted in the theoretical concept of 
self-subsistent (in Lithuanian savaimi) society, compatible and comparable with 
the concepts of the political thought of anti-communist activists in Poland and 
other countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
This article presents the concept of self-subsistent society and explores its 
use in the analysis of Lithuanian society in the Soviet era. In the first part of 
the chapter, the concept is defined and situated in the similar conceptual de-
bates in Central and Eastern European countries. The second part provides 
an overview of empirical manifestations of the self-subsistent society in Soviet 
Lithuania. Finally, the third part discusses the advantages of this approach in 
the context of three main paradigms of sovietology: totalitarianism, revision-
ism and post-revisionism.
The Concept of Self-subsistent Society
The debates in Lithuanian public and intellectual spheres on resistance and 
collaboration generating new and increasingly more complicated classifica-
tions, surprisingly enough, completely ignore the political thought born in 
Poland, the former Czechoslovakia, and Hungary during the socialist era. 
This political thought addresses a similar issue of resistance to a totalitarian 
regime but offers slightly different highlights. Here a major criterion of eval-
8 Reseach grant for the project “Invisible society of Soviet-era Lithuania: the revision of 
distinction between systemic and non-systemic social networks.” (Nr. VP1-3.1-ŠMM-
07-K-02-053).
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uation is not the degree of personal, individual resistance to the system, but 
the potential and ability of the community to establish a viable alternative to 
the totalitarian order.
The idea of self-organization of society as a means of destroying the (post)
totalitarian regime was indeed common for the political thought of opposition 
in socialist Central and Eastern Europe. Theoreticians of opposition in Poland 
(Adam Michnik, Jacek Kuroń, Leszek Kołakowski) indicated the development 
of an autonomous, independent society as the goal of resistance, rather than 
the destruction of the system itself. Totalitarianism is a system that under-
mines any form of autonomous social life and absorbs all social relations into 
the state; 9 therefore, self-organized society as an opposition to the state order 
became the ultimate goal of the Polish opposition. They purposefully reject-
ed the strategy of violent revolutionary action and the interest in state power, 
recognizing the futility of replacing one absolute state power with another. 
Instead they advocated the separation of spheres between state and society. 10 
A normative vision of Solidarity was to establish a democratically organized 
self-governing society, confining state structures to military, police and for-
eign policy functions and relegating the Communist party to an insignificant 
position. 11 The notion of civil society embodied this vision well to become the 
axis of the political theorizing of the Polish opposition. 12
9 J. L. Cohen and A. Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory  
(Boston: The MIT Press, 1994).
10 G. Baker, Civil Society and Democratic Theory: Alternative Voices  
(London: Routledge, 2002), p. 18.
11 G. Skilling, Samizdat and Independent Society in Central and Eastern Europe 
(Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1989), p. 159.
12 M. Osa, “Networks in Opposition: Linking Organisations Through Activists in the 
Polish Peoples‘s Republic,” in Social Movements and Networks: Relational Approaches to 
Collective Action ed. M. Diani and D. McAdam (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2003).
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A similar discussion on the goals and means of resistance to communist 
regimes was taking place among the intellectual leaders of Czechoslovakia and 
Hungary. However, having fewer chances to create a real political alternative, 
the leaders of the opposition there focused instead on moral and cultural op-
position to the regime. As Václav Havel claims is his famous essay The Power 
of the Powerless, ‘the original and most important sphere of activity, one that 
predetermines all the others, is simply an attempt to create and support the 
independent life of society as an articulated expression of living within the 
truth.’  13 According to Ivan M. Jirous, a member of the psychedelic rock band 
‘The Plastic People of the Universe’ and one of leaders of the Czechoslovakian 
underground during the socialist era, these self-managed spaces of ‘living 
in truth’ may not lead open political combat against the regime. Their very 
existence, vitality and inner complexity, however, consciously or not, erodes 
the monolith of (post)totalitarian order. 14 As Milan Šimečka claims, ‘all in-
dependent activity, without necessarily publicly manifesting it or even being 
aware of it, is attempting to create a kind of substitute plurality.’ 15
In Czechoslovakia, at the beginning such state-independent activities 
were called ‘independent initiatives of citizens,’ later on, however, the notions 
of a ‘parallel society,’ an ‘alternative society’ or the ‘second culture’ entered 
into use and were applied interchangeably. Members of Charter 77 actively 
reacted to the idea of a ‘parallel polis,’ proposed by Czech dissident Václav 
13 V. Havel, The Power of the Powerless, available online at: <http://vaclavhavel.cz/
showtrans.php?cat=clanky&val=72_aj_clanky.html&typ=HTML>
14 V. Benda et al., “Parallel Polis, or An Independent Society in Central and Eastern 
Europe: An Inquiry,” Social Research, 55 no. 1-2 (1988), p. 225.
15 M. Šimečka in: V. Benda et al., “Parallel Polis, or An Independent Society in Central 
and Eastern Europe,” p. 225.
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Benda in 1978. 16 His idea highlighted the need for the institutionalization of 
independent societal initiatives. Benda called for the establishment of economic 
institutions, a cultural and educational system as well as a public sphere, par-
allel to the official system, and thus to create a genuine alternative society or a 
‘parallel polis.’ Similar though more elaborate ideas came from the Hungarian 
theoretician Elemer Hankiss, who generated a model of the ‘second society,’ an 
alternative social system with the following core sectors – the second economy, 
the second public sphere, the second culture, the second social consciousness 
and the second arena of socio-political interactions. 17
In Lithuania, the oppositional political thought was not as developed as 
in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. It is most likely that activists of the 
Lithuanian underground did not know the concepts developed by the dissi-
dents of Central Eastern Europe, and did not use those concepts to reflect their 
own state of existence (this fact should not come as a surprise because, in the 
words of Vilma Visiliauskaitė, Lithuanian underground publishers were not 
familiar with the samizdat periodicals of Central Eastern Europe 18). However, 
their experiences and methods of resistance were very alike. KGB archival 
documentation proves that Lithuania, similarly to other communist states, 
had grassroots initiatives, youth subcultures, informal gatherings of artists and 
scholars, arising ‘from below’ and not subjected to governmental control. Lith-
uanian publications of samizdat contain arguments echoing the ideas of Havel 
and Jirous. For example, the underground publication Pastogė offers a simple 
answer to the question of how artists can defeat their own unconscious inner 
16 V. Benda et al., “Parallel Polis, or An Independent Society in Central and Eastern 
Europe.”
17 E. Hankiss, “The ‘Second Society’: Is There an Alternative Social Model Emerging in 
Contemporary Hungary?” Social Research t. 55, nr. 1-2 (1988), p. 13-42.
18 V. Vasiliauskaitė, Lietuvos ir Vidurio Rytų Europos šalių periodinė savilaida (1972-1989) 
(Vilnius: LGGRTC, 2006), p. 14.
264
Ainė Ramonaitė and Jūratė Kavaliauskaitė
censor. It suggests listening to one’s personal conscience and publishing one’s 
own works in the free samizdat press. 19 In other words, the publication calls 
for the establishment of a parallel public sphere based on different principles 
and dedicated to individuals ‘living in truth.’
The idea that the establishment of a state-independent communality equals 
the resistance to the totalitarian ambition of the regime, is nicely grasped by 
Nerija Putinaitė some twenty years after the collapse of the Soviet order: ‘The 
resistance meant taking part in some alternative social structure, even if it 
did not enter an eyeball to eyeball confrontation with the structures of social 
life.’ 20 In her words, only by the development of alternative forms of ‘different’ 
sociability, subcommunities, and subcultures, can one overcome the ambiva-
lence of life, moulding ‘islands of normal communication in the Soviet totality.’ 
However, this idea remains underdeveloped in her works, and the ‘forms of 
different sociability’ are neither defined nor listed.
What Lithuanian notion could be used to embody and conceptualize the 
aforementioned idea? Can we follow the tradition of the Polish oppositional 
thought and give the phenomenon of independent society the title of civil society? 
On the one hand, the political thought of the Polish Solidarity that galvanized 
the return of a notion of civil society into the modern discourse of Western phi-
losophy, along with the present usage of the term in works of political science 
in the West (e.g., Robert Putnam 21) seem to make such a match possible and 
19 A. Patackas, Pastogės Lietuva: Pogrindžio, Sąjūdžio ir Laisvės Kronika (Vilnius: Aidai, 
2011), p. 383.
20 N. Putinaitė, Nenutrūkusi styga, p. 276.
21 R. Putnam, Kad demkratija veiktų (Vilnius: Margi raštai, 2001) – Lithuanian 
translation of R. Putnam’s Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy; 
R. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community  
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000).
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reasonable. On the other hand, the notion of civil society, defined in this way, 
clashes with the dominant meaning of the concept in the Lithuanian discourse.
In Lithuania, twenty years were not enough for the concept of civil society 
to gain a clear, defined and stable meaning either in the political life or intellec-
tual discourse. In principle this is a result not only of maladies or weaknesses 
of political practice or of civil society but of other objective reasons. First, 
the relationship between state and society, between civil society and politics, 
is a relatively old and complicated issue of normative political theory with 
no simple solution. Second, over the decades the concept of civil society has 
gained a multitude of new meanings and connotations, thus doubts have arisen 
regarding its potential to describe the political transformation in Central and 
Eastern Europe at the end of the twentieth century. 22 Moreover, there is no 
clear-cut distinction between civil society and so-called civic-ness (pilietiškumas) 
in the Lithuanian language. Finally, modern discourses on civil society and 
democratization are intertwined and based on a close mutual relationship. 23 
Therefore any attempt to talk about civil society under the Soviet (undemo-
cratic) regime may appear to lack a conceptual validity.
In order to name some phenomenon of societal self-organization under the 
communist regime as the manifestation of civil society, that phenomenon must 
have been independent vis-à-vis the communist state – established without 
the interference of state forces and devoid of ideological goals of the regime 
but also aimed at the continuous common life in its own political community 
and the defense of its interests against the official political power. A number 
of societal communalities (religious and spiritual movements, hippies, punks, 
the rock scene, practitioners of Eastern martial arts, etc.) not tolerated by the 
22 K. Kumar, “Civil Society: An Inquiry into the Usefulness of an Historical Term,”  
The British Journal of Sociology 44, 3 (1993), p. 375-395.
23 E. Gellner, Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals  
(London: Hamish Hamilton, 1994).
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Soviet regime and held malicious or even dangerous, are, however, rarely men-
tioned in intellectual debates on civil society. These informal societal spaces 
were not political indeed in terms of the aforementioned definition because 
they neither nurtured a comprehensive vision of common life, nor were they 
aimed at political self-government (e.g. alternative hobby clubs), or because 
their vision of a common lifeworld stretched beyond the limits of a modern 
nation state or any other political constellation (e.g. a spiritual cosmopolitan 
hippie community).
For a variety of societal formations that misfited and opposed the (post)
totalitarian Soviet regime, a name was coined in Lithuanian that has no direct 
equivalents in other languages. Savaimi visuomenė can be approximately trans-
lated as a ‘self-subsistent society,’ although at the same time the old Lithuanian 
adjective savaimus means ‘free,’ ‘non-coercive.’ 24 This notion encompasses forms 
of alternative societal self-organization and management, mushrooming from 
below and embodying an endeavor to live on one’s own, in one’s own manner 
and according to one’s own will (savaip), in spite of the pressure and demands 
of the ideological institutionalized state system. Savaimi also has connotations 
of ‘self-(re)produced’ or ‘self-born’ because such an alternative society exists 
distancing itself from the (totalitarian) state. Self-organization is the mani-
festation and the result of the inner vitality of the alternative society that may 
not necessarily translate into a political project. This is not a civil society in 
the traditional sense because it bears no compulsory binding relationship with 
the state and merely seeks to distance itself from state prohibitions and lead 
its own life according to its own will and vision in cultural and social milieus.
The concept of the self-subsistent society offers a different approach to 
resistance, conformity and collaboration in the Soviet era, if compared to 
well-established and dominant approaches in today’s scholarly debates of Lith-
24 Lietuvių kalbos žodynas (t. I-XX, 1941-2002), electronic version, I issue, 2005, www.lkz.lt
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uanian historians and philosophers. It oversteps the inefficient opposition of 
individual resistance vs. collaboration and shifts attention to social ‘islands of 
freedom’ generating alternative discourses and alternative social values, and, 
thus, breaking ground for the emergence of the Sąjūdis movement in 1988.
‘Islands of Freedom’ in Soviet Lithuania: 
the Realms of Self-subsistent Society
Acknowledging the importance of autonomous life under the Soviet regime, 
where should we look for its manifestations in Lithuania? Sparse investigations 
of alternative sociability in communist states so far reveal that independent 
activities in (post)totalitarian regimes might appear in different and often 
unsuspected settings. In Czechoslovakia oppositional networks flourished 
in the cultural sphere, such as in theatre groups or underground music. 25 In 
Estonia the anti-system mood was cultivated in choral groups, folk ensembles, 
ethnographic study groups, Friends of Book Societies, English-language circles, 
beekeeping societies and horticultural groups. 26 The Catholic Church was an 
especially important ‘space of freedom’ in Poland, as was the Lutheran Church 
in the East Germany. 27
25 M. Skilling, Samizdat and Independent Society.
26 H. Johnston and C. Mueller, “Unobtrusive Practices of Contention in Leninist 
Regimes,” Sociological Perspectives 44 (3) (2001).
27 See e. g. Johnston and Mueller, “Unobtrusive Practices,”; H. Jonston, “Towards an 
explanation of Church Opposition to Authoritarian Regimes: Religio-Oppositional 
Subcultures in Poland and Catalonia,” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 
28(4) (1989), p. 193-508; M. Osa, Solidarity and Contention.; A. Smolar, “Towards Self 
-Limiting Revolution: Poland, 1970-89,” in Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The 
Experience of Non-violent Action from Gandhi to the Present ed. A. Roberts and T. Garton 
Ash (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2009).
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Our exploration of the Lithuanian society in Soviet times reveals numer-
ous manifestations of the alternative society, varying by the degree of their 
societal autonomy from the (post)totalitarian state as well as the nature of 
their self-sustained activities and values. To illuminate the inner heterogeneity 
of the self-subsistent society, we use here the classification of four realms: an 
overt oppositional realm, a conspiratorial underground realm, an informal 
non-systemic realm and a legal non-systemic realm. A short overview of in-
dependent activities in these four realms should shed light on the character 
and complexity of the self-subsistent society and enable placing Lithuania into 
comparative contexts with other Soviet and socialist states. 28
One should start with dissidents’ organizations and the Catholic Church, 
commonly recognized as the main opponents of the Soviet regime in Lithu-
ania. They belong to the realm of overt opposition, distinct from underground 
resistance in terms of their public and uncompromising actions to discredit 
the communist regime. According to Arūnas Streikus, who analyzed the re-
ligious policy of Soviet Lithuania in detail, the Catholic Church, which ‘used 
to have a dense network of religious and secular organizations […] was seen 
as a potentially powerful opponent of the regime, and the regime’s institutions 
were forced to devote much effort in order to decrease its influence.’ 29 While 
the efforts to curtail the activities of the Church were partially successful, the 
regime was compelled to accept an organization maintaining submission to 
the Holy See rather than the Central Committee of the Communist Party, and 
to grant it some freedom of action.
In comparison with the Church, dissident organizations in Lithuania (e.g. 
the Lithuanian Helsinki Group, the Committee for the Defence of the Rights 
28 An in-depth account is presented in: J. Kavaliauskaitė and A. Ramonaitė, ed., Sąjūdžio 
ištakų beieškant, chapers 1-8.
29 A. Streikus, Sovietų valdžios antibažnytinė politika Lietuvoje (1944–1990) (Vilnius: 
LGGRTC, 2008), p. 8.
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of Believers, the Lithuanian League of Freedom) did not build a solid structure 
but remained rather informal networks of like-minded individuals and their 
groupings which would pool their efforts in peculiar political initiatives, such 
as public protest declarations and allegations addressed at state power or in-
ternational institutions. 30 For example, the leader of the best-known dissident 
organization in Lithuania, the Lithuanian League of Freedom (Lietuvos Laisvės 
Lyga), Antanas Terleckas, cannot himself tell how many members the League 
had because the membership in the organization was only symbolic. 31 Due 
to an overt anti-communist opposition, members of dissident organizations 
were persecuted, imprisoned, forced to leave the Soviet Union or retreat to an 
underground resistance.
The underground realm in Lithuania was composed of political organizations, 
non-political organizations and networks of samizdat. Political organizations 
are characterized by an openly anti-systemic stance, as well as complex orga-
nization and a high degree of secrecy that prevents the assessment of the size 
and full network of these organizations. Small groupings were often short-lived 
due to the intensive surveillance and exposure by the KGB. The primary goals 
of such organizations were definitely political, aimed at disseminating various 
proclamations campaigning against the communist rule and imperialist power 
of the Soviet Union.
A good example of a non-political underground organization is the move-
ment of the Friends of the Eucharist. 32 While its aims were religious rather than 
30 I. Puzaitė, “Pogrindinis komitetas tikinčiųjų teisėms ginti,“ Lietuvių katalikų mokslo 
akademijos metraštis 24 (2004); Ž. Račkauskaitė, “Pasipriešinimas sovietiniam režimui 
Lietuvoje aštuntame dešimtmetyje,“ Genocidas ir rezistencija 2(4) (1998).
31 Interview with Antanas Terleckas taken on April 13, 2011.
32 A. Ramonaitė, “Paralelinė visuomenės užuomazgos sovietinėje Lietuvoje: 
katalikiškojo pogrindžio ir etnokultūrinio sąjūdžio simbiozė,” in Sąjūdžio ištakų 
beieškant, p. 33-58.
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political, participation in its activities were no less risky, so it had to use similar 
secretive tactics. Although severely persecuted, the movement prominently 
overshadowed the political organizations in the extent and endurance of its 
activities. An underground Priest Seminary is another manifestation of an 
underground organization related to the Catholic Church. It was launched 
in the early 1970s to countervail the efforts of the Soviet regime to curtail the 
activity of Kaunas Priest Seminary, the only legal priest seminary in Lithuania 
at the time. 33
Another interesting example of an underground organization is the Uni-
versity of Antanas Strazdelis, active from 1976 to 1982. It is an embodiment of a 
‘flying university’ similar to that in Poland and other socialist states of Central 
and Eastern Europe. Its members studied prohibited authors’ works, had lec-
tures and tasks for personal home study, shared books of private libraries and 
practiced a humanist way of life. 34 While the university had around 30 students, 
only two of them finished the whole course of study and received diplomas, 
as participation in the activities of the university soon became too perilous. 35
Finally, publishing networks and circulation of samizdat might be distin-
guished as a special type of underground network. 36 Sometimes periodical 
samizdat publications were published by dissident organizations (e.g. Vytis was 
the journal of the Lithuanian League of Freedom), but usually the publishers and 
33 J. Boruta and A. Katilius, ed., Pogrindžio kunigų seminarija: XX a. aštuntojo ir devintojo 
dešimtmečio Lietuvos antisovietinio pogrindžio dokumentai (Vilnius: Lietuvių katalikų 
mokslų akademija, 2002).
34 Interview with Vytenis Povilas Andriukaitis on December 1, 2010.
35 Interview of Arvydas Juozaitis with the Rector of the University Viktoras Kutorga, in: 
A. Juozaitis, Tarp žmonių, (Vilnius: Diena, 1993), p. 14-15.
36 For the analysis of samizdat networks in Lithaunia see: A. Ramonaitė, V. Klumbys 
and R. Kukulskytė, “Exploring vindicated clandestine networks: the functioning of 
samizdat in Soviet Lithuania.“ Paper presented at the 7th ECPR General Conference, 
Bordeaux, September 4-7, 2013.
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contributors of the publications did not belong to any organization but formed 
an invisible community linked by strong ties of trust (e.g. Lietuvos Katalikų 
Bažnyčios kronika, 37 Rūpintojėlis, Perspektyvos, etc.). In addition to samizdat 
periodicals, the underground presses publishing books of prohibited authors 
should be mentioned, such as those of Gediminas Jakubčionis and Alfonsas 
Vinclovas and the secret printing house ‘ab’ near Kaunas which printed books 
of patriotic and religious content. 38
The informal non-systemic realm of independent society includes first of 
all hippies, punks, rock and metal music fans, as well as the other so-called 
‘informal’ youth of the Soviet decades. 39 These (sub)cultural groupings and 
networks lacked defined organizations and were based on a vanguard of young 
people striving for personal freedom, self-expression and safe environments 
for open and meaningful communication, in contrast to official ideological 
organizations of Komsomol. These cultural tastes and life-styles, contravening 
the image of decent ‘Soviet youth,’ were suppressed by the regime as undesirable. 
There were also those pioneers of jazz, big beat, and rock culture who were not 
allowed to perform in public and remained in private spaces on the fringes of 
the official life of youth (e.g. informal student festivities).
The ethno-cultural movement in Lithuania – folklorists, hikers (žygeiviai), 
ethnographers (ramuviečiai) – belongs to the informal non-systemic realm as 
well, due to the fact that communal activities in private environments – gath-
erings to sing in dormitories or at someone’s place, informal get-togethers 
37 The Chronicle of the Catholic church in Lithuania, Englis 
translation, see: http://lkbkronika.lt/en/index.php?option=com_
content&view=article&id=347&Itemid=232
38 See a documentary Printer from Underground by Algis Kuzmickas on the printing 
house ‘ab’ at <http://vimeo.com/23605057>
39 J. Kavaliauskaitė, Ž. Mikailienė, “Vakarų palytėtųjų autonomija sovietmečiu: nuo 
hipių iki Roko maršų per Lietuvą,” in Sąjūdžio ištakų beieškant, p. 59-97.
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for ritual events (e.g. Midsummer celebrations of Rasos in Kernavė), hiking 
in private groups – were widely practiced and sustained the vitality of the 
movement. The shared identity, moral norms (rules of sobriety, respect for 
the environment, etc.) and cultural symbols, rather than formal membership 
or institutions, united the insiders of the movement. 40
The informal non-systemic realm of alternative society in Lithuania also 
encompasses the semi-private ‘tea clubs’ of local intelligentsia. Living quar-
ters of famous intellectuals and members of the cultural elite served as ‘free 
spaces’ 41 to exchange information, discuss art, culture, and politics, as well as 
share illegal and rare literature of pre-war Lithuanian, emigrant and foreign 
authors. According to Marcelijus Martinaitis, a poet and a host of such a sa-
lon, participants in these exclusive circles were certain ‘academic dissidents’ 
whose intellectual endeavors trespassed officially allowed limits of reasoning, 
discussion and knowledge. 42
One of the most prominent of such salons was the house of Vladas 
Vildžiūnas and his wife Marija Vildžiūnienė in Vilnius. Vladas Vildžiūnas 
was a talented sculptor unloved by the regime’s institutions for his uncom-
promising attitudes. Marija Vildžiūnienė was a daughter of the general of pre-
war Lithuania Kazys Ladiga. After Stefanija Ladigienė, the widow of Kazys 
Ladiga, returned from deportation in Siberia the house of Vildžiūnai became 
an important meeting place of old pre-war intelligentsia and young artists and 
40 A. Ramonaitė, “Paralelinė visuomenės užuomazgos sovietinėje Lietuvoje: 
katalikiškojo pogrindžio ir etnokultūrinio sąjūdžio simbiozė,” p. 33-58.
41 F. Poletta, “Free Spaces in Collective Action,” Theory and Society 28 (1999), p. 1-38.
42 M. Martinaitis, “Iki Sąjūdžio ir po jo. Atsakymai į Aurimo Šukio klausimus,” in Sąjūdis 
ateina iš toli (Vilnius: Margi raštai, 2008), p. 478.
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other intellectuals of non-systemic attitudes, including Vytautas Landsbergis, 
the would-be leader of Sąjūdis. 43
Another example of informal academic circles was the circle of devotees 
of Vincas Mykolaitis Putinas, a famous Lithuanian poet (1893-1967). Founded 
by former Putinas’ scholars Meilė Lukšienė (a would-be member of Sąjūdis 
Initiative group), Irena Kostkevičiūtė and others in the 1950s while Putinas 
was still alive, the informal circle was an important network of Lithuanists and 
writers until the late 1980s. Meeting at least two times a year at Irena Kost-
kevičiūtė’s house on Putinas’ birthday and on the anniversary of his death the 
circle fostered an oppositional identity and served as a social capital for some 
protest actions, including a successful one in 1977 opposing plans to build 
garages for nomenklatura in a culturally important site of Vilnius’ old town. 44
Still one more type of informal alternative space was the legendary Café 
Neringa in Vilnius. This was a public but informal meeting space for writers, 
scientists, musicians and other artists. Neringa started hosting jazz evenings 
in 1969. A famous GTC jazz trio (Ganelin, Čekasin and Tarasov) used to play 
there, and later it was an important stage for the young generation of Lithu-
anian jazz performers. At the ‘professors’ table’ many prominent Lithuanian 
intellectuals used to discuss different topics quite openly, even though the 
discussions were apparently monitored by the KGB. Among famous visitors 
to the café were not only such Lithuanian poets as Putinas or the would-be 
dissident Tomas Venclova, but also such people as Josif Brodskij, Vladimir 
43 Interview with Vladas and Marija Vildžiūnas on February 16, 2011; interview with 
Vytautas Landsbergis on February 23, 2011, Interview with Marcelijus Martinaitis on 
December 10, 2010.
44 V. Ivanauskas, “Tinklaveika mokslininkų aplinkoje: tarp oficialiųjų sovietmečio 
procesų ir alternatyvių pažiūrų,” in Sąjūdžio ištakų beieškant, p. 132-160; S. Kulevičius, 
“Per praeities palikimą į ateitį: visuomeninio paveldosaugos judėjimo virsmai Sąjūdžio 
išvakarėse,” in Sąjūdžio ištakų beieškant, p. 185-213.
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Vysockyj, Bulat Okudzhava and other guests from Russia, other Soviet republics 
and even Western countries. 45
Finally, the legal non-systemic realm includes a variety of legally recognized 
and institutionalized organizations of non-systemic spirit – various associations, 
societies, clubs, and other agencies under the auspices of establishment bodies. 
Often oppositional circles would find shelter in the amateur and professional art 
groups and societies. For example, the pantomime troupe of Modris Tenisons, 
Hana Šumilaitė’s amateur theatre in Kaunas, many folk groups, youth bands 
of big beat and later rock, metal and other alternative music, progressive disc 
jockeys (officially registered under auspices of universities, culture houses, legal 
leisure clubs or even factories but promoting ideologically ‘improper’ tastes), 
as well as the wave of new clubs of youth, music or rock e.g. Kauno roko klubas 
(Kaunas Rock Club), Šiaulių roko klubas (Šiauliai Rock Club), etc., initiated 
by vanguard youth and established in Lithuania during the perestroika period, 
all have characteristics of agencies of self-subsistent society.
The legal non-systemic realm also encompasses some hobby clubs, estab-
lished from below and overstepping the boundaries of activities suitable for 
a ‘Soviet citizen.’ The Martyno Mažvydo bibliofilų klubas (Martynas Mažvy-
das Bibliophile Club), launched in 1970, represents an interesting example of 
such a club. It was formally a subdivision of the USSR’s Voluntary Fellowship 
of Friends of Books, although it hosted meetings with regime-persecuted dissi-
dents, former political prisoners and persons returned from forced exile. 46 Many 
legally established organizations for ethno-cultural movements (e.g. Ramuva 
45 L. Lavaste, L. Valonytė, “Legendinėje kavinėje skambėjo ir laisvės idėjos, ir meilės 
žodžiai,” www.lrytas.lt, 2009 m. lapkričio 7 d; A. Baranauskaitė, Čia priėjo Gorbulskis… 
(Vilnius: Versus aureus, 2010); Z. Mačionis, Profesorius Kazys Daukšas (Vilnius: Pradai, 
2000).
46 J. Stašaitis et al., Mažvydo klubas. Vilniaus knygos bičiuliai. 1970-2010 (Vilnius: Krantų 
redakcija, 2010).
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and Alkas in Vilnius, Tėviškė club in Kaunas, the student hikers’ club Ąžuolas, 
the Vilnius University Tourist Club, etc.) can also fall into this category. 47
A number of legal academic clubs and associations under the auspices of 
the Lithuanian Academy of Science, state universities and other institutions of 
education, such as the discussion club headed by prof. Paulius Slavėnas at the 
establishment-set Žinija in 1965-1968, the club of young scientists Po Zodiaku 
(Under the Zodiac), and the philosopher’s discussion club Kultūra ir istorija 
(Culture and History) launched in 1987. They functioned as ‘free spaces’ for 
unconventional discussions, provocative intellectual exchanges and nurtured 
visions of future social and political life. The Open Air Museum in Rumšiškės 
hosted a seminar of the Lithuanian Cultural Research Society which attracted 
oppositionally minded people from Vilnius, Kaunas and Klaipėda, 48 while 
Nida in the Curonian Spit was the venue for Thomas Mann seminars.
The number of such initiatives increased in the late 1980s. Gorbachev’s re-
forms reduced restrictions on voluntary societal self-organization in 1986 and 
1987and presented an opportunity to act, 49 at once seized upon by new clubs 
of preservation of cultural heritage: Talka, Jaunųjų paminklosaugininkų klubas 
(Club of Young Monument Preservers) in Vilnius in 1987, among others, and 
environmentalists (Atgaja in 1987 in Kaunas, Žemyna in Vilnius and Aukuras 
in Šiauliai in 1988). The level of their autonomy, active engagement in revision 
of public life, and the initiation of mass protest mobilization distinguished 
them from the official longstanding institutions of the cultural establishment 
(e.g. the Union of Writers or the Union of Composers) which revealed certain 
47 See: A. Ramonaitė, “Creating One’s Own Reality as Resistance: The Shape of ‘Parallel 
Society’ in Soviet Lithuania,” Lithuanian Historical Studies, 15 (2010), p. 79-106.
48 Interview with Vytautas Umbrasas on May 27, 2010.
49 M. Garcelon, Revolutionary Passage: from Soviet to post-Soviet Russia, 1985-2000 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2005).
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alternative voices on the eve of Sąjūdis but nonetheless remained an integral 
part of the Soviet state apparatus to implement cultural policies.
Where is the proof that the self-subsistent society formed the footing for 
mass anti-communist mobilization in 1988? Our analysis demonstrated that 
since the mid-1960s, the network of the alternative society in Lithuania was 
continuously expanding and flourishing, despite the repressions of the regime 
in 1972 and after, even if setbacks are visible in some sectors in some periods. 50 
The crucial outbreak in quantitative and qualitative terms, however, occurred 
in 1987, when entrenched networks of ethno-cultural movements, the Catholic 
underground, academic and cultural circles and rock culture were supplemented 
by emerging academic discussion clubs and youthful and rebellious clubs for 
preservation of cultural heritage and ecology. The absolute number of formal 
or informal organizations that could be assigned to the self-subsistent society 
turned out to be much larger than could be expected from previous research. 
Moreover, network analysis reveals that on the eve of the Singing Revolution, 
the oppositional social groups forming ‘free spaces’ in Soviet Lithuania were 
closely interconnected into a dense and solid fabric of alternative society. 51
A detailed analysis of the story of the founding of Sąjūdis demonstrat-
ed that the initiative for consolidation of anti-system and non-system forces 
into a single movement emerged in the densest part of the network, mainly 
in the academic circles and clubs for preservation of the environment and 
cultural heritage. Quantitative analysis of actor centrality in the network of 
the autonomous society revealed that key members of the organizational team 
of Sąjūdis were in fact among the most central persons in the entire network 
50 J. Kavaliauskaitė and A. Ramonaitė, Sąjūdžio ištakų beieškant.
51 J.Kavaliauskaitė and A. Ramonaitė, Sąjūdžio ištakų beieškant.
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of opposition-minded autonomous society. 52 It explains the extraordinary 
success and power of mass mobilization, which is often regarded as a ‘miracle’ 
in Lithuanian historiography.
The Conception of Self-subsistent Society 
and Paradigms of Sovietology
What is the relationship between our approach and the main paradigms of 
sovietology studies? In what terms is this approach new? The application of the 
concept of self-subsistent society and methodology of social network analysis 
reveal issues and actors left on the margins or even beyond the limits of existing 
discussions or misinterpreted in the academic research. It denounces the dom-
inant premise of the classical paradigm of totalitarianism according to which 
the viable alternative society is merely a result of the weakening totalitarian 
control and the declining power of the institutional system of the Soviet state. 
We argue that the Soviet control in Lithuania did not reach its totality, and, 
therefore, it is vitally important to understand who succeeded in withstanding 
the control and oppression, and how. We find that the Lithuanian society of 
the late Soviet period was not merely an aggregate of atomized, passive and 
victimized individuals held together by fear and coercion. This is the reason 
why the mass movement Sąjūdis could arise without dissidents and other forc-
es of active resistance being the main drivers of the Singing Revolution. The 
movement emerged due to the existence of the self-subsistent society based 
on viable grassroots social networks of collective action that did not serve 
ideological goals of the regime, and remained disfavored and oppressed (but 
not entirely suppressed) by the Soviet state before its collapse.
52 A. Ramonaitė and J. Kavaliauskaitė, “Explaining the emergence of social movement 
in an undemocratic setting using social network analysis.” Paper prepared for the 6th 
ECPR General Conference, Reykjavik, August 25-27, 2011.
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The revisionist paradigm of sovietology challenges major premises of 
totalitarianism and denounces the concept of the total power of the Soviet 
regime. This approach highlights the inner erosion of the (post)totalitarian 
regime during the late Soviet era, defined by looser ideological control, the 
priority of formalism and informal rules in place of the earlier dogmatism 
as well as a growing plurality of power. However, revisionism in Lithuania, 
similarly to the paradigm it opposes, focuses on the highest Soviet political 
elites, ideological structures of power and explores whether nomenklatura and 
other official elites were loyal or disloyal to the Soviet system. The advocates 
of the latter approach seek to reveal whether and to what extent members of 
national nomenklatura departed from the official dogma of the regime, if they 
deviated from the ideological framework, practiced partial conformism or even 
resistance that in the end could become an important source of the systemic 
failure of the Soviet regime and help to facilitate the radical transformation.
Our research shows that, in contrast to revisionist arguments, the origins 
of the Sąjūdis movement stem not from nomenklatura, but from societal forces 
which neither occupied important and high official power posts, nor enjoyed 
the wide state recognition available to Soviet cultural elites. Moreover, in our 
approach the membership in an self-subsistent society depends not upon a prin-
ciple of ‘silent resistance’ (covert personal moral convictions of ordinary citizens 
or overt ‘work on behalf of the motherland’ of political elites, etc.) 53 but upon 
the individual’s participation in state-independent, autonomous, non-Soviet 
spaces of collective action (clubs, gatherings, communities, etc.) beyond one’s 
official posts or work positions. Surprisingly enough, the majority of the cul-
tural elite and intelligentsia taking part in the birth of the Sąjūdis movement 
were already members of such spaces of freedom. Finally, revisionists agree 
53 A. Štromas, Laisvės horizontai (Vilnius: Baltos lankos, 2001); A. Brazauskas, Ir tuomet 
dirbome Lietuvai: faktai, atsiminimai, komentarai (Vilnius: Knygiai, 2007); T. Venclova, 
“Aš buvau išimtis,” Literatūra ir menas, 10 (1991), p. 10.
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that the sovietisation of masses (and elites) in Lithuania was not total, yet they 
cannot indicate the sources and exact mechanisms of change because their 
definition of resistance is too wide. Here ‘resistance’ encompasses a huge variety 
of phenomena – from an inner moral stance of the individual to conformism 
on behalf of virtuous goals. The conception of self-subsistent society based on 
the social network analysis provides analytical instruments to identify such 
sources of social and political change. The latter approach also challenges 
another dominant view that the decline of the repressive regime set free the 
mystical ‘spirit of the Lithuanian nation’ which was alive although imprisoned 
during the long decades of Soviet occupation.
In contrast to totalitarianism and revisionism focusing on formal struc-
tures of the Soviet system, post-revisionism turns to the ordinary life of society, 
traces of official ideology in everyday environments and popular mentalities 
of the Soviet era. In the spirit of Foucauldian philosophy, this paradigm of So-
vietology argues that the ideology functioned not merely as an overt coercive 
instrument of the state but as a discursive order overwhelming the state and 
the lifeworld of ordinary people. Therefore post-revisionists denounce the 
possibility of autonomous ‘non-Soviet’ reality because nothing and nobody 
could escape the prison of the reigning discourse. ‘In opinion of post-revision-
ists, citizens of the USSR did not belong to the group of selfmade individuals 
with system-free thinking.’ 54
Even though the impact of sovietisation could not always and entirely 
be reflected and realized by the popular masses in Lithuania, our research 
reveals that there are no reasons to hold the power of dominant discourse to-
tal and absolute. Networks of self-subsistent societies formed in spite of risks 
and prohibitions, and their members felt an acute conflict between their free 
54 D. Marcinkevičienė, “Sovietmečio istoriografija: užsienio autorių tyrinėjimai ir 
interpretacijos,” Lietuvos istorijos metraštis 2 (2003), p. 91-106.
280
Ainė Ramonaitė and Jūratė Kavaliauskaitė
aspirations and the coercive reality. Perhaps an individual in isolation cannot 
create his/her own ‘other’ identity, but spaces of collective action fed by the 
living memory of interwar Independent Lithuania and experiences of the 
free West could become a source of discourses and identities different from 
and unfavorable to the ideal of a new Soviet personhood. According to the 
post-revisionist logic, the spiritual degradation of society – disillusionment, 
disappointment, apathy – ruined the Soviet Union. However, it appears that 
networks of self-subsistent society became not only a shelter to protect oneself 
from such degradation but also a space to create constructive new visions of 
the future and mobilize on their behalf when the window of opportunities 
became wide open.
Conclusions
According to researchers of communist societies, mass terror and the atmo-
sphere of intimidation in totalitarian states resulted in a rupture of pre-existing 
social networks. 55 The mass revolutions of 1988-1989, however, challenge this 
view. Analyzing the roots of the Solidarity movement in Poland, Maryane Osa 
demonstrates that Solidarity was born out of dense networks of semi-clandes-
tine oppositional civic organizations, such as the Workers’ Defence Committee 
(Komitet Obrony Robotników, KOR), free trade unions, the Students’ Solidarity 
Committee (Studencki Komitet Solidarności), the Movement for Defence of 
Human and Civic Rights (Ruch Obrony Praw Człowieka i Obywatela, ROP-
CiO) , the Society of Scientific Courses (Towarzystwo Kursów Naukowych, 
TKN) and many other liberal, Catholic, nationalist, secular leftist, youth, and 
55 H. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism.; J. L. Gibson, “Social Networks, Civil society, 
and the Prospects of Consolidating Russia‘s Democratic Transition,” American Journal 
of Political Science 45 (1) (2001), p. 51-68.
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farmers’ organizations. 56 These organizations indeed might be attributed to 
civil society as they were ‘social influence associations’ engaged in public social 
action and independent from the Communist party.
In the Soviet Union and some other socialist countries, including the rigid 
regimes of Czechoslovakia and East Germany, however, oppositional organi-
zations were less numerous and less powerful than in Poland. According to 
Anders Uhlin, a researcher of politics and society of the Baltic States, dissidents’ 
ranks were as weak and fragmented in Soviet Lithuania as in the rest of the 
Soviet Union, and one cannot really speak of the existence of a civil society 
there until 1988. 57 Even if Uhlin underestimates the influence of underground 
networks in Lithuania (e.g. the Lithuanian samizdat publication The Chronicle 
of the Catholic Church in Lithuania published from 1972 to 1988 was one of the 
most successful samizdat publications in the Soviet bloc), it is true that an 
overt political opposition in Lithuania was scarce and far from resembling the 
developed networks of the ‘civil society’ in Poland.
The weakness of dissident movements in Lithuania and other communist 
states, however, does not mean that all manifestations of autonomous social life 
there were suppressed and controlled by the state. The concept of self-subsistent 
society suggests that the analysis of forms of resistance to communist regimes 
should look for independent activities in such non-political arenas as religious 
communities, the musical underground, ethno-cultural movements and the 
entire realm of alternative culture not dependent on the official channels of 
communication and culture.
The analysis proves that Sąjūdis indeed was born in the network of the 
self-subsistent society at a time when the network reached its most complex 
56 M. Osa, Solidarity and Contention.
57 A. Uhlin, Post-Soviet Civil Society. Democratization in Russia and the Baltic States 
(London: Routledge Press, 2006).
282
Ainė Ramonaitė and Jūratė Kavaliauskaitė
structure, and Sąjūdis emerged at the very centre of the network. Surprisingly 
enough, the development of the protest mobilization in Lithuania reiterates 
that of Poland, even if the nature of the political regimes and of the movements’ 
organizations themselves were vastly different (Solidarity was a trade union 
while Sąjūdis was established in an academic milieu).
If grassroots-based and ideology-resistant self-subsistent society in Lith-
uania was so important for the mobilization of Sąjūdis, why has its role not 
been recognized in previous studies of the Lithuanian national rebirth in the 
late 1980s? We may argue that this happened due to several objective reasons. 
Firstly, Lithuanian Sovietology studies were dominated by the paradigm of 
totalitarianism for a long period of time, and other two paradigms have just 
started to gain a voice in the intellectual arena. However, in their debates on 
definitions of resistance and control, none of these paradigms anticipates an 
organizational and moral autonomy of collective action, similar to that pro-
posed in our approach. Secondly, the structuralist explanation, arguing that 
perestroika policy and the erosion of the Soviet regime opened a window of 
opportunities, enough for Sąjūdis to break through, retains a stronghold in 
intellectual debates, and this allows an underestimation of the role of grass-
roots-based activism. When either an abstract national spirit or official elites 
are seen as major drivers of change in Lithuania, (other) sources of collective 
disobedience and opposition remain not only invisible but also unimportant. 
Thirdly, there are some primary efforts to go beyond dominant approaches 
and to explore the informal life of intelligentsia evolving beyond the official 
Soviet public sphere. 58 However, up to this moment the latter studies have 
revealed only fragments of this sphere, as they have not found satisfactory 
methodological instruments for such an endeavor. Our approach is based 
58 V. Klumbys, “Lietuvos kultūrinis elitas sovietmečiu: tarp pasipriešinimo ir 
prisitaikymo,” Lietuvos etnologija 8(17) (2008), p. 139-161.
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on the developed instruments of social network analysis that allow not only 
the purposeful systemic collection of relevant data but also the quantitative 
analysis of the data with quantitative results, as well as a holistic visual picture 
of the self-subsistent society, its structure and traits.
There is also one more reason why the Soviet-era arenas of self-subsistent 
society in Lithuania have remained unnoticed and devoid of recognition. If 
we pose a simple question – what social forces are the most salient for the 
history of the Sąjūdis movement – we may expect a single answer: these are 
forces which openly resisted the occupants and were aimed at restoration of the 
independent Lithuania. 59 Although Sąjūdis was borne neither in the milieus 
of a political underground of dissidents nor in sites of open resistance, the 
agency of self-subsistent society is rarely mentioned because it does not meet 
the criteria of the dominant reasoning. Up to this day, the history of Sąjūdis in 
Lithuania is written as a history of restoration of national independence, the 
fight against the Eastern Empire, and not as a history of anti-totalitarianism. In 
contrast, intellectuals of oppositional movements in Central Eastern Europe 
first of all aimed at the destruction the totalitarian order and based their logic 
on the strict separation between state and society, where a viable society was 
to become the major force, able to bring down the state (the Soviet regime) 
‘from below’ and to restore human dignity and national sovereignty. Here not 
only self-organization of societal forces aimed at national sovereignty are recog-
nized and valued; any active social agency which withstood a totalitarian spirit, 
defended and practiced freedoms of thought, conscience, self-expression and 
free collective action is no less important. Similarly to this argument, in Lith-
uania a variety of societal forces who acutely perceived and refused to follow 
the imperatives of Soviet order searched for the ways to distance themselves 
59 K. Girnius, “Pasipriešinimas,“ p. 268-279; A. Nikžentaitis, “Lietuvių prisitaikymo 
kronika,” Atgimimas 8, 2005 m. vasario 25-kovo 3 d., p. 14.
from the coercive state and brew into a self-subsistent society with a different 
collective reality and the hope of a different life that in the end gave birth to 
the vanguard of Sąjūdis.
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Samizdat – the Art of Polish 
Publishing Resistance 1
For years now, I have been under a spell of the subtle charm of the Polish pub-
lication underground of the 1980s. However, it occurred to me recently that 
the history of this movement and its opposition are treated rather narrowly, in 
order not to relate the greatness of this resistance with the constraints of the 
system and the obedience towards them. After reading some of our works, a less 
informed reader may even come to the conclusion that the entire lives of the 
opposition in those times took place out of the control of the authorities. It is 
also hard not to notice where we have invested our affinities. Such a convention 
is also favorable for a historian. It promotes separating opposition as a group and 
constructing a logical argument. Otherwise, the whole story starts becoming 
blurry social-wise to a state where all divisions are ambiguous and no longer 
clear-cut, which may lead to a conclusion that the entire society was in one 
way or another in opposition. 2
The main thing is that the Polish opposition was a heterogeneous group 
of several thousand people. Such a large number had to split their lives, run 
away from the official world, and sometimes return to it. Their existence was 
both secret and overt, which is best seen in the 1980s. Hence, it is necessary to 
accept a more free-form approach which could show their choices against the 
1 The following article is an extension to one of my essays: Zakazana książka. Uczestnicy 
drugiego obiegu 1977-1989 (Warszawa 2011). I would also like to thank the attendees 
of the seminar: Solidarity — a new approach to the social movement organized by 
Collegium Civitas, Warsaw, www.solidarnosc.collegium.pl
2 “Opozycja i opór społeczny w Polsce po 1956 roku — stan badań i nowe perspektywy. 
Dyskusja,” in Opozycja i opór społeczny w Polsce po 1956 roku, ed. Tomasz Kozłowski, Jan 
Olaszek (Warszawa 2011), p. 11-23.
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complex backdrop of the social life and relations to the system. This history 
— as well as reality in general — may be treated as slightly blurred, disturbed, 
and not devoid of complications. The opposition had no choice but cooperate 
with the communist Polish People’s Republic (PRL) in hundreds of everyday 
situations, and in turn, the authorities remained relatively flexible towards the 
‘exiles.’ The official and unofficial realm sometimes overlap.
After moments of grandeur, the reality kicks in — which more often than 
not is grey and mundane. When one becomes the opposition of one’s days, 
it is necessary also to learn how to live in such a period. You cannot really 
escape reality, as you grow in it, and acquire certain cultural life abilities un-
intentionally. ‘This war was not as bloody, the tensions were not as clear. We 
have all been exposed to the same language, culture, customs’ – recalls one 
of the most dedicated Solidarity activists. 3 These problems and theories are 
probably widely well-known, however, they have not been put into use in the 
historiography concerning the Polish opposition. We are always enshrouded 
in this intellectual climate of the era, which behaves quite like atmospheric 
pressure, which is invisible but forming. The samizdat publications may have 
lived in people, not only due to the fact they were prohibited or suppressed but 
also that books were treated differently than they are now or even beforehand, 
as the culture of official and unofficial publication was only partially different, 
but partially remained unchanged. 4
Dictators contribute towards enhances the educational level of a society, 
and in turn the society overthrows the dictator — a thesis which was tested in 
3 K. Zalewska, Będzie strajk (Warszawa 2012), p. 167 (statement by Maciej Zalewski).
4 W. Narojek, Jednostka wobec systemu. Antropologia trwania i zmiany (Warszawa 1996).
287
Samizdat – the Art of Polish Publishing Resistance
history many times. 5 Poland , with all its drawbacks and faults, may be treated 
as a type of a European welfare state. 6 The government cared for e.g. develop-
ment in readership due to its potential as an instrument for remaining its power. 
This was seen in the attitude towards education, but also in general polices such 
as creating libraries (even in holiday houses), organizing book fairs, holding 
national patronage of literature, and above all in the industrialization process 
which encouraged people to move to the cities, creating a new type of book 
consumers. The number of readers grew, the level of readership increased, as 
well as general knowledge about the world. Also, people started to appreciate 
mass communication, which went beyond just chatting with your neighbors, 
and focused on reading, listening, and watching the emerging mass media. 
The perspective of witnesses of these times, especially these in the opposition, 
was naturally different.
According to the Statistical Yearbook of the Central Statistical Office, in 
1959 there were 161 000 students in Poland; in 1980 this number increased 
to 453 000. This educational leap had to influence the emergence of social 
framework for the samizdat, mainly due to the fact its core was established by 
intelligentsia. Furthermore, the development in secondary education (and 
to a less extent also in the vocational education) may also correlate to the 
later popularity of subversive bulletins in workers’ circles. Another important 
element was women participation, who were partially left out by the pre-war 
education system. However, in the communist era as much as one third of 
them started graduating, becoming relevant to our field of interest. Women 
5 R. Chartier, The Cultural Origins of the French Revolution (Duke 1991), p. 69-72 and 189-
192. ‘During the educational process, the political awareness of people, importance 
of social interest groups, as well as organizational skills increase’ — says Andrew 
Heywood, a British political scientists (Politics, Basingstoke 1997).
6 G. Therborn, European Modernity and Beyond : The Trajectory of European Societies, 
1945-2000 (London 1995); T. Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945 (London 2005).
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infiltrated the public sphere by taking up jobs and choosing careers. More and 
more females became editors, librarians, teachers, academics — vital members 
of the press culture.
Such an approach may relativize the phenomenon of the opposition but 
this could be useful, if we do not want to write about something in total isola-
tion from the rest of the historical landscape. While building the foundations 
of a new civilization, you draw on the experience of the old order, even if the 
Ancien Régime is considered hostile. Often these types of cases were described 
in the past, however, usually people need more time to maintain detachment 
from such delicate matters. Two Romans, Lucius and Claudius, invented by 
Witold Kula in his Gusła, theorizing about the fall of the Roman Empire and 
the birth of the new order: ‘They build their temples according to plans of our 
basilicas; in painting they follow lost Pompeian frescoes, known to us only 
from legends. Sometimes it amuses me, sometimes it makes me angry,’ writes 
Claudius. ‘But cannot you see the greatness in this?’ Lucius responses: ‘There 
is a new synthesis in the making.’ Thus, heritage may be a result of complex 
transformations and mutual influence of different traditions. 7
Let us take a look at the official publishing market of Poland. Since the 
1960s many valuable books were published, as cultural life was only partly 
indoctrinated by the authorities. The government was not able to provide the 
Polish people with decent living, and this made them look for other sources 
for stabilization in history, literature, and book reality. It is no wonder that the 
milieu of the Polish Writers’ Union (at least its Warsaw office) became the arena 
for defiance of the communist system. As a matter of fact, the dissidents of the 
7 W. Kula, “Gusła,” in Wokół historii (Warszawa 1988), p. 385, 388. The text of Witold Kula, 
printed back in the 1950s, is also an example of encrypted meanings, playing cat-and-
mouse with the censorship, and circumventing the regulations. Reading on Gusła in: 
Adam Michnik, “Lukrecjusz i Gusła,” in Z dziejów honoru w Polsce by Adam Michnik 
(Warszawa 1985), p. 3-31.
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later years have recognized some of the publications available on the market 
as important for the development of opposition behavior. Proper reading was 
also what fuelled the dissident movement, and such writers who sought their 
own means of expression in official culture, distancing themselves from the 
government policy, were treated with respect by the opposition, or at the very 
least became a buffer between the authorities and the dissidents, which con-
tributed to the status allowing for a better intellectual criticism of the system. 8
It is true that the official culture with its limitation and sometimes re-
ally aggressive censorship by the authorities was not the richest soil for the 
movement. The Stalinist supervision of the early 1950s was characterized by 
‘heavily politicized and ideologized books,’ ruthless manipulations of artistic 
work, and destruction of publications which did not fit into the new vision of 
Poland. 9 Stronger impulses were generated probably by family traditions, and 
later by organized opposition with its way of thinking and its physical presence 
alone. However, without any doubt the beginnings of the opposition may be 
traced to the official culture, urban space, university circles, students’ clubs, 
cabarets, theatres, poetry vanguard, and liberalization of culture life according 
to Joanna Wawrzyniak and Piotr Filipkowski, who depicted the grand scale 
of the opposition in Poznań of the 1970s. 10
But it continued to be like that later on. The two realities never really split 
ways. Joanna Krakowska in her biography of Halina Mikołajska shown the 
8 K. Rokicki, Literaci. Relacje między literatami a władzami PRL w latach 1956-1970 
(Warszawa 2011), T. Ruzikowski, ”Kultura niezależna,” in NSZZ Solidarność 1980-1989 
(Warszawa 2010), vol. 2, p. 316-323.
9 A. S. Kondek, Papierowa rewolucja. Oficjalny obieg książek w Polsce w latach 1948-1955 
(Warszawa 1999).
10 Polscy opozycjoniści. Biograficzne studium pewnego (poznańskiego) przypadku, a 
typescript handed over for print in the The Institute of National Remembrance 
publication house (after 1956). I would like to thank Joanna Wawrzyniak for making a 
working version available for me.
290
Paweł Sowiński
situation in mature alternative theatres. ‘The situation needs to be seen in the 
context of the two spheres, the official and unofficial one, permeating each 
other,’ she wrote. Usually the works presented there were published by official 
channels, shown on a mass scale. Unofficial was the audience, sometimes ac-
tors, and the atmosphere, aura, emotions of people who came to see the plays. 11 
However, it is worth noticing that the official culture also had centers of creative 
unrest, allusive references, and murmurs of discontent. Some examples that 
almost immediately come to mind are the Polish cinema of moral anxiety of 
the 1970s, some historical books on the Polish resistance movement in World 
War II German-occupied Poland (called Home Army), The Emperor: Down-
fall of an Autocrat by Ryszard Kapuściński who was treated as dissident, the 
poetry of Zbigniew Herbert, an essay by Bohdan Cywiński entitled Rodowody 
niepokornych (The Origins of the Rebellious), or a sociological book by Aldona 
Jawłowska Drogi kontrkultury 12 (The Paths of Counterculture).
The most renowned example are the works of Zbigniew Herbert, published 
both official and unofficially, but interpreted in the 1980s as antiauthoritar-
ian. Such a reception was strengthened by their musical interpretation by 
Przemysław Gintrowski, who performed in schools and churches, and whose 
concerts were recorded on tape by the youth and distributed outside of any 
official means of distribution. 13 Let us revisit the theatre in this context. Salon 
11 J. Krakowska, Mikołajska: teatr i PRL (Warszawa 2011).
12 M. Fik, Kultura polska po Jałcie. Kronika lat 1944-1981 (London 1989). See also the 
polemics between Andrzej Paczkowski and Stanisław Barańczak in: A. Paczkowski, Pół 
wieku dziejów Polski 1939-1989 (Warszawa 1995), p. 449-455; B. Toruńczyk, Żywe cienie 
(Warszawa 2012), p. 12.
13 Recently this topic was raised by Wojciech Staszewski, “Ścichł szczęk i śpiew,” Gazeta 
Wyborcza”, 27th-28th October 2012, p. 18-19.
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Niezależnych, a cabaret closed by the authorities after some time, 14 and Teatr 
Ósmego Dnia, a struggling theatre which was funded by the state until 1984 may 
be located in between the two realities. 15 It is interesting to watch the whole 
cat-and-mouse play with the censorship: actors’ interpretations, moments 
when the audience cheer, as it was in the case of the famous adaptation of Adam 
Mickiewicz’s Forefathers’ Eve (Dziady) directed by Kazimierz Dejmek, which 
took place right before the student and intellectual protest action against the 
government of March 1968. Mickiewicz, the most prominent poet and figure 
in Polish Romanticism, again became current, and similarly to first half of the 
19th century, anti-governmental. 16
In January 1983, the catholic and subjected to the state censorship magazine 
Znak published an essay by Bronisław Geremek, the main expert of the Solidar-
ity movement, written during the Martial Law of 1981 in the internment camp, 
where Geremek was staying that period. 17 Before 1980 Tygodnik Powszechny 
weekly was home to such personae as Stanisław Barańczak, a famous Polish 
poet, literary critic, and translator, or Jacek Kuroń, the godfather of the Polish 
14 ‘We have squeezed the liberalization given to us in the 1970s to its limits,’ said one of 
the leaders of the Salon Niezależnych: Jacek Kleyff, Rozmowa (Warszawa 2012). The 
cabaret members included also Janusz Weiss and Michał Tarkowski. The authorities 
prevented further performances from happening in the second half of the 1970s.
15 This perspective is most interestingly portrayed in the interview with Lech Raczak, 
the Art Director of Teatr Ósmego Dnia, an outstanding director, a supporter of the 
opposition, and at the same time member of Socjalistyczny Związek Studentów Polski 
(eng. Socialist Polish Students’ Association): ‘I presumptuously went to the important 
meetings of the Association in Warsaw, got into a fight or discussed amicably with 
Aleksander Kwaśniewski, then a highly placed official of the organization, just to go 
right after that to Adam Michnik’s place to be booked by the militia at the entrance to 
his house,’ A. Grupińska, J. Wawrzyniak, Buntownicy, polskie lata 70. i 80. (Warszawa 
2011), p. 105.
16 W. Śliwowska, Historyczne peregrynacje. Szkice z dziejów Polaków i Rosjan w XIX wieku 
(Warszawa 2012), p. 210-216.
17 B. Geremek “Człowiek i grzech. Trzy książki o kulturze średniowiecznej,” Znak 1 (1983).
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opposition, who wrote there under aliases. After the introduction of Martial 
Law on December 13, 1981, the editorial team was joined by Piotr Wierzbicki and 
Andrzej Drawicz, who were released from the internment camps. The magazine 
included other journalists dismissed from the official media: Stefan Bratkowski, 
Ernest Skalski, Wanda Falkowska, Ewa Berberyusz, Ewa Szumańska. 18 Catholic 
publishers have even tried, sometimes with success, to print texts of Leszek 
Kołakowski (in Znak) and Gustaw Herling-Grudziński (in W drodze). 19 We 
have even placed the profile of Jerzy Turowicz, the editor-in-chief of Tygodnik 
Powszechny on the list of Polish Anticommunist Opposition activists, 20 even 
though he was not banned by the authorities.
Two Worlds
The fact that so much publications came out only due to social will is amaz-
ing in itself. They were engraved in the collective memory of the society, and 
survived all the years in the oppressive environment of communist Poland. 
There is a whole separate branch of historiography which investigates the role 
of an individual in the course of history and dissociates itself form the police 
records, disregarding the investigation of power structures and its authority 
over societies. This perspective does not care much whether the experiences 
18 W. Bereś, K. Burnetko, J. Podsadecka, Krąg Turowicza. Tygodnik, czasy, ludzie. 1945-1999 
(Kraków 2012).
19 ”Bóg rezonerów,” Znak, July-August (1985), p. 64-68; “Święty Smok,” W drodze, 
October (1985), p. 6-10; Shift in Polish Policy Towards Emigres (8th August 1986),  
Open Society Archives in Budapest, HU OSA 300-50-1, Records of RFE/RL Research 
Institute [Fonds 300], Polish Unit [subfonds 50], Old Code Subject Files [series 1], 
container no. 502. However, it needs to be said that these particular publications did 
not have a huge political significance, and did not make it to a wider audience due to 
restricted circulation of Catholic magazines.
20 Opozycja w PRL. Słownik biograficzny 1956-89 (Warszawa 200).
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of central characters were registered by the administrative system in its nu-
merous files, both the ones which were destroyed and the ones that were left. 
The most important are the people of the opposition itself, their story; and the 
inspectors behind the desks, filing papers into dossiers are only treated here as 
the backdrop. The main aspect which is underlined is the private dimension of 
the commitment, not dominated by ‘operational research,’ and other similar 
tricks of captains and majors. This also brings about the well-known problem of 
valence in studies, both positive and negative evaluation of central characters, 
and various interpretation experiences.
We will sort the sources in a different way but as historians we need to be 
deeply and constantly aware of imperfection. We never have the full extent 
of knowledge, and our analyses may naturally contain some flaws. Similarly, 
the above civilization perspective, which levels and justifies all, and brings the 
narration above the individuals to the level of powerful social trends, needs to 
interchangeable with a perspective of a single human being. Macro historical 
studies need to be mixed with a micro perspective. It is crucial. It makes us see 
the civilization surroundings in a different light. Perhaps, we may even come 
to a conclusion that an individual stands a chance in a clash with history (and 
historians). The individual perspective will show us how the living conditions, 
police ‘keeping,’ have separated the opposition from the realm of ordinary 
people, and how they endangered the lives of the dissidents. The things which 
for global history enthusiasts are considered as trifle, minute, and non-sig-
nificant, will grow to the level of great struggles, fascinating events, and the 
utmost dramatic experiences.
‘Though Pałka’s in distress, nothing’s gonna stop the press’ was a seemingly 
humorous rhyme designed by Jan Walc, an independent printed and literary 
critic, who ran it in Biuletyn Informacyjny, a well-known weekly samizdat. Ze-
non Pałka was a member of the printing community of the Workers’ Defence 
Committee (KOR). Years later, he explains the rhyme thus: ‘I was beaten at 
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the militia headquarters in Wrocław in 1979. Two sturdy officers have pulled 
out thick sticks, which look like giant socks filled with sand. They battered me 
so badly I was lying in bed all week with my kidneys injured to a point I was 
literally pissing blood.’ 21 He then gives an account of his reasons for leaving 
Poland in 1983: ‘My mother was “removed” from her work unexpectedly, right 
after December 13. She was really affected by this event. My father was forced 
to take early retirement due to my “lack of affection for the military,” which 
barely was sufficient for raising my two younger brothers.’ 22
Such a complicated situation on one hand needs empathy for such witnesses, 
on the other, we need to step beyond the circle of personal experiences. The 
voice of the people who were imprisoned, dragged around from one militia 
headquarter to the next, and even tortured needs to be heard wide and loud. 23 
However, many other life stories of these times were not as bleak. This may call 
for citing obvious truths, such as: you live only once, and if you live in a state 
21 Zenon Pałka of Wrocław, printer at NOWA, the editor of illegal magazines in Lower 
Silesia. Information about the battery in the Annoncement of the Workers’ Defence 
Committee from September 11, 1978, in Dokumenty Komitetu Obrony Robotników i 
Komitetu Samoobrony Społecznej „KOR”, ed. A. Jastrzębski (Warszawa 1994), p. 287.
22 An interview with Zenon Pałka (July 2012) in the author’s collection. In 1971 Pałka 
was enlisted to the army for obligatory military service. He refused to eat meat, and 
declared himself vegetarian and enthusiast of the Indian culture. He was recognized 
as unfit for military service. His father, a regular officer, was forced to take early 
retirement after this incident. See also: “Nic nie wstrzyma ruchu wałka, z Zenonem 
Pałką rozmawia Beata Maciejewska,” Gazeta Wyborcza [Wrocław], 29th September 
2006, p. 4. More about subjecting members of the Workers’ Defence Committee to 
harassment in: Jan Skórzyński, Siła bezsilnych. Historia Komitetu Obrony Robotników 
(Warszawa 2012).
23 The case of interrogation of Krzysztof Lachowski, a student of Warsaw University of 
Technology, from an amateur printshop of the Workers’ Defence Committee situated 
in the Mikrus student hostel. A transcript of a program of Radio Free Europe entitled 
“Fakty i Opinie,” March 2, 1980, Open Society Archives in Budapest, OSA 300-50-1, 
RFE/RL Research Institute, Polish Unit, Box 159, Wolność słowa w Polsce 1980-1981. 
See also Jan Józef Lipski, KOR: a History of the Workers’ Defence Committee in Poland, 
1976-1981 (Oakland, California 1985).
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like Polish People’s Republic, this is your whole life — and it consists not only 
of moments of outrage. 24 This meant, e.g. that stamp collectors interested in 
underground stamps, were also collecting official postage stamps. Many read-
ers have read the official press, and then turn to the opposition newspapers, 
or sometimes they even compared them to each other. Many people, not only 
in the police, had to function with a split sense of loyalty, as I have already 
mentioned earlier. Many lives and situations will blur heavily our view, and 
knock over once established theses. 25
The receiver’s perspective does not really need to correspond to the sender’s 
one. While books from two circulation may have met on a home bookshelf, the 
national and clandestine publishers probably were different from each other. 
When one reads the documentation of state publishers from the Central Ar-
chives of Modern Records, it seems quite clear that their reality was completely 
different from the underground one. In the first case, these were bureaucratic 
institutions dominated by offices with secretaries and council minutes; the 
second world was the realm of the resistance with hiding in basements, attics, 
kitchens from the persecutors with the looming threat of prison and losing 
one’s chance in life. When comparing the state presidents with independent 
editors, it is again easy to discern the division of Poland in these times into 
two factions. The people from the opposing barricades not only did not like 
each other, they rarely saw each other, and sometimes they even were afraid 
of themselves, even if their books were read by the same people.
24 S. Wolle, Die heile Welt der Diktatur : Alltag und Herrschaft in der DDR 1971-1989 
(Berlin 1998); M. Zaremba, Im nationalen Gewande. Strategien kommunistischer 
Herrschaftslegitimation in Polen 1944-1980 (Osnabruck 2011).
25 An interview with Silke Plate, a specialist in Polish underground post, from the 
Research Centre for East European Studies in Bremen. If Poland did not have such a 
strong official philatelists’ movement, it would have been harder for the opposition to 
carry out their ‘postal operation.’
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The authorities had large resources, vast printing houses, and the state 
apparatus. The opposition had next to nothing. They had to steer clear of po-
lice patrols, hide their actions, and be careful of every move. Their successes 
may change into failures at any given time, resulting in confiscation of appli-
ances and editions, which meant the end of the fight. However, the power of 
the authorities sometimes felt feigned, the base sometimes illusory, and the 
advantage only partial. In state factories, surrounded by barbed-wired fences, 
guarded by watchmen, infiltrated by secret agents, a second life was under way 
consisting of secret prints and distribution of forbidden press. 26 The items and 
spaces surrounding our characters may look official but were ‘intercepted’ by 
the dissidence, and used for their own purposes. For example, the telephone 
lines, which were controlled by the authorities but not fully. It all depended 
on who was calling. Similarly, road lines were used to benefit both parties. 27
The state controlled the sea, ships, and ports. It trained sailors, extended 
the seashore, built dockyards, and provided custom offices. Many ships from 
all over the world call at Polish ports, bringing such exclusive items as oranges, 
which were available in Poland only during Christmas. However, these sea 
routes established for the good of the Polish People’s Republic were used by 
quite a surprising character called ‘Brother Christopher.’ He was a sailor who 
became an officer and later a captain. He have sailed under the Polish flag since 
the 1960s, and when the opportunity occurred smuggled Kultura (a leading 
26 Ewa Choromańska, the leading member of the underground Solidarity structure 
for Warsaw work places, in her account pictures the railway hospital in Międzylesie, 
where she worked as a surgeon, as a heavily opposing place even after December 13, 
1981. The nurses at that time distributed independent newsletters, organized store 
rooms for press, all people paid fees for Solidarity, the patients were usually only from 
the opposition, and the General Secretary of the Communist Party remained totally 
passive. See: K. Zalewska, Będzie strajk (Warszawa 2012), p. 136.
27 Another story written by Mateusz Fałkowski printed by CDN publishing tells about 
using the power grid for purposes not connected to supplying electricity or guidelines 
from the authorities (Gdańsk 2011, p. 107).
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Polish-émigré literary-political magazine published in Paris) into Szczecin; 
it is estimated that he had managed to bring ca. 1,5 metric tonnes until 1989. 
Most of his crew joined the process (however, admittedly some of them were 
smugglers in the first place). His wife was a librarian in Szczecin, who used the 
public network of libraries for distribution of the magazines. This is how the 
illegal practices were continued cruise after cruise, for several dozen of years. 
It is a wonder that the Security Service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in 
Szczecin missed such fraud. 28 Henri-Jean Martin would say it was a tradition-
al example of helplessness on behalf of the administrative authorities when 
coming into contract with dissemination of new ideas. 29
Let us look for a while now at the development of the opposition from the 
angle of inconsistent repressions towards these circles, and essentially the fall 
of one political community and the emergence of another one. All instruments 
of repression were there but were not used to the extent of the Stalinist era. 30 
When Anka Kowalska joined the Workers’ Defence Committee, she was con-
vinced she would be removed from the opposition soon. During this period 
she worked full time in the PAX Publishing House as editor, and at the same 
28 ‘Brother Christopher’ was in fact captain Józef Gawłowicz. He was a contact for Jerzy 
Giedroyc, a well-know Polish writer, political activist, and the editor of Kultura who 
lived most of his life in Paris. See: M. Paziewski, “Sylwetki. Józef Gawłowicz,” Wolność 
i Solidarność 4 (2012), p. 185-190; J. Gawłowicz, Byłem kurierem Giedroycia (Szczecin 
1998).
29 L. Febvre and H.-J. Martin, The Coming of the Book. The Impact of Printing, 1450-1800 
(London 2010), p. 244.
30 October 22, 1976 which marked the date a political and police meeting took place 
hosted by Stanisław Kania, First Secretary of the Polish communist party, after the 
establishing the Workers’ Defence Committee, is considered now as the starting 
moment for the policy of ‘reduced repression.’ “Zawężona represja. Co robić z 
Komitetem Obrony Robotników? Narada u Stanisława Kani 22 października 1976,” 
ed. Andrzej Paczkowski and Marcin Zaremba, Więź 8 (2001). See also: A. Friszke, 
M. Zaremba, ed., Rozmowy na Zawracie. Taktyka walki z opozycją demokratyczną 
(Warszawa 2008), p. 54-59.
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time she was a member of the underground press. When in February 1977 she 
was summoned to the director’s office, she was almost sure she was going to 
be given notice. Despite the fact the meeting was not particularly pleasant, to 
her surprise the only punishment was sending her to work from home. She 
was to come to the publishing office only once a week in order not to ‘corrupt’ 
the other staff members. ‘In this way Bolesław Piasecki, the Director of PAX, 
delegated me to the Workers’ Defence Committee as I simply had more time 
to commit fully to the opposition cause,’ she recollects half-jokingly. 31
Throughout the 1970s, also Stefan Kisielewski, an editor of Tygodnik 
Powszechny, the front figure of opposition literature, the author of many books 
published by Giedroyc and later in samizdat circulation, was given ‘preferential’ 
treatment by the authorities. In spite of publishing his works under the pen 
name Tomasz Staliński, he was known to the security apparatus at least since 
1974. He also gave numerous interviews abroad under his own name which were 
critical of the political system in Poland. However, the state apparatus treated 
him quite leniently. Of course, there is no doubt, his columns were brutally 
censored, and Kisielewski himself was isolated from a wider range of readers 
in many other way. In 1976 even a trial against him was under consideration. 32 
No action was taken after all. Kisielewski was a public figure, a guest in many 
Western embassies, a writer valued by opinion-forming communities abroad, 
31 A. Kowalska, Folklor tamtych lat (Warszawa 2011), p. 73-74. One may treat the 
whole case of Kowalska as unique, as well as the whole situation connected with 
PAX. Bolesław Piasecki opposed the pressure from the Security Service, and perhaps 
even the Party. The heads of other state bodies did not have the power, nor the courage 
to do something like that.
32 Case code name “Cezar” against Stefan Kisielewski, Archives of The Institute of 
National Remembrance in Warsaw, IPN BU 0712/27, ch. 7 and 18.
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which meant he posed a political threat to the Security Service. 33 Despite some 
difficulties, Kisielewski continued to work and go abroad.
Zdzisław Najder, a well-known expert on Joseph Conrad’s life and work, 
and a member of the Polish Writers’ Union, had some unfinished business with 
the authorities. After he ended his collaboration with the Security Service in 
1965, the government tried to take his passport but after an intervention at the 
Ministry by Jarosław Iwaszkiewicz, another Polish essayist and writer, they 
conceded. 10 years later, Najder, who joined the opposition, was caught at the 
Warsaw Airport with a copy with samizdat literature. A prosecution was on 
the way, however, it was closed. Afterwards, Najder was closely kept under 
surveillance by the police which was no small measure. His acts provided 
information about his contacts with the Kultura, suspicions about collabo-
ration with Western agencies, and even his participation in the opposition 
organization – Polskie Porozumienie Niepodległościowe. But the authorities did 
not take his passport, perhaps also due to his marriage to a British citizen. 34
The passport policy against the protesters is indeed a great topic for research. 
The government divided the dissidents into two groups: these with the privilege 
of travelling abroad, and these without it. This policy was twofold; on the one 
hand, it showed the liberal side of the Polish communist regime, on the other, 
it was supposed to scare off any potential followers from following the path of 
the opposition. There were also some situations when the same person fulfilled 
33 For example, the Security Service was also unable to scuttle the action of transporting 
the typescript of the book Kościół, lewica, dialog by Adam Michnik to the Western 
countries. Kisielewski entrusted this unusual task to his friend, a Danish diplomat, 
whom the Security Service had not venture to strip search at the border, despite the fact 
the communists had known exactly when the book would be smuggled.
34 Case code name “Caroll” against Zdzisław Najder, PN BU 248/135 Vol. 1-2.
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both roles. 35 Jerzy Holzer, an oppositionist historian, employed at that time at 
the Warsaw University, recalls:
after publishing my history of Solidarity in 1983, in the 
second circulation, the authorities denied me the trip 
to West Germany but I was supposed to accompany 
Professor Jan Szczepański, a sociologist who was at 
that time a close associate of the government. It would 
have been quite an inappropriate situation for him, as 
the organizers would have undoubtedly asked him 
about the reasons for my absence and his presence. 
Szczepański personally intervened on my behalf in the 
Foreign Ministry, and they called me to let me know 
that in spite of the earlier decision I can get a passport. 36
A large group of the opposition had their passports on temporal basis, de-
pending on the mind-set of the authorities, the knowledge and policy of the 
Security Service, and also their personal social status. The authorities usually 
were less keen on repressing or withdrawn from harassing people who were 
known in public, had some international support, or were just popular in Church 
or opposition circles. The government tried to isolate the most unruly indi-
viduals, and the whole political arena was full of power abuse, however, most 
of the actions proved less efficient in reality than in their principles. In the 
declining years of communism in Poland, the opposition was still too weak to 
pose a serious threat to the system, but the authorities were not able to destroy 
the dissidents completely. This was the political deadlock of the 1980s, visible 
35 D. Stola, Kraj bez wyjścia? Migracje z Polski 1949-1989 (Warszawa 2010), p. 315. Klemens 
Szaniawski was declined his passport rights for the entire 1980s, also Marek Edelman 
had problems with traveling abroad.
36 An account by Jerzy Holzer (February 19, 2008), typescript owned by the author.
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not only in Poland but also in other communist states. Ferenc Kőszeg, a Hun-
garian oppositionist, who analyzed the symptoms of the disintegration of 
the political system in Hungary during the reign of János Kádár, wrote ‘when 
disobedience is common, there is no longer a division between oppositional 
and normal attitudes — the repression would have to touch so many people 
that the means of punishment no longer are useful.’ 37 Such situations force 
the authorities to go into more socially complex politics.
Barbara Falk, the author of a great book on the literary output of the Cen-
tral and Eastern European samizdat says ‘the boundaries between what was 
permitted and what was not clear. This was the effect of the samizdat.’ 38 A re-
cent interview with Jacek Bocheński, the co-creator of the Polish independent 
publishing, recalled that his book was published officially during the Martial 
Law. 39 This poses a paradox — on the one hand, you have internees, such as 
Wiktor Woroszylski, the leader of the opposition, who was locked away for al-
most a year; on the other hand, the censors release to official print, after holding 
on to it for 10 years, without any apparent reason. The whole period was still 
full of secret surveillance and aggressive press attacks on this barely tolerated 
output. However, the authorities did not expect at that time any servile hom-
ages in return for privileges of print, and such experienced dissident writers 
37 A. Bozóki, “Opozycja demokratyczna na Węgrzech: dyskusje programowe,” Wolność i 
Solidarność 3 (2012), p. 133.
38 B. J. Falk, The Dilemmas of Dissidence in East-Central Europe. Citizen Intellectuals and 
Philosopher Kings (Budapest 2003), p. 135.
39 A conversation at a discussion about my sketches on literary underground in PRL at the 
Polish Academy of Sciences History Institute (May 12, 2012). See also: Wtedy. Rozmowy 
z Jackiem Bocheńskim (Warszawa 2011).
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as Woroszylski and Bocheński knew they could not afford to reject proposals 
for publications, even during the period of the Martial Law. 40
‘You go fishing to get away from the real world,’ says Hanna Krall in her 
column entitled meaningfully ‘Smutek ryb’ (sadness of the fish) in fishermen’s 
magazine Wiadomości wędkarskie 41 felt they were militant members of the 
opposition. Apart from the declared activists, there were also dissidents who 
wanted to be in between, and did not side with anybody permanently. ‘All in 
all, I had three books published and three books retained,’ said Krall in her 
interview in 1987. She was a courageous author publishing her texts mainly 
in the underground but not only there. She is deemed one of the finest Polish 
reporters but obviously also a person who neither wanted to swim with the tide, 
nor go against it. She wanted to remain apolitical which ended in her writing 
columns in Wiadomości wędkarskie where she conducted interviews with ‘big 
fish’ of science and culture. 42
Cultural Strategies
From the 1960s Polish opposition grew, challenging more and more taboos 
in its activities, and discovering new horizons of thought. At first these were 
minor counter-cultural behaviors, such as sending parallel petition letters; 
afterwards, the civil protest intensified and was more institutionalized with 
40 ‘His wife brought him to this visitation a book of poetry of Don Kichote, and a book 
entitled Kto zabił Puszkina,’ recalls Anna Bikont and Joanna Szczęsna in: Lawina i 
kamienie (Warszawa 2006), p. 477.
41 Wiadomości wędkarskie 10 (1984), p. 24. Krall wrote for this column from October 1984 
to January 1986.
42 “Każdy ma swoją odpowiedź. Z Hanną Krall o Hannie Krall rozmawiała Ewa 
Szemplińska,” Most 16/17 (1987), p. 133-138; “Mój normalny głos. Z Hanną Krall 
rozmawia Ewa Polak,” Arka 15 (1986), p. 41-45; Reporterka. Rozmowy z Hanną Krall, ed. 
J. Antczak (Warszawa 1997).
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the establishment of such organizations as the Workers’ Defence Committee, 
or the Movement for Defence of Human and Civic Rights (Ruch Obrony Praw 
Człowieka i Obywatela, ROPCiO). The next step was organizing underground 
publishing, open workshops for the youth, integration of workers and farmers 
into the movement. Lastly, the emergence of Solidarity which followed an 
explosion of social dissatisfaction and increase in the amount of samizdat up 
to December 13, 1981 and the introduction of the Martial Law showing the 
deepening division of the Polish society. 43 In a nutshell, this was the evolution 
of the Polish dissident movement.
The culminating moment was the introduction of the Martial Law, which 
pushed people into more desperate measures. Małgorzata Drynio recalls the 
initiation into ‘Solidarni’ Resistance Group:
[Waldemar] Różycki gathered us in the woods, and 
without any lights on ordered us to stand to atten-
tion. He had an electric torch lighting a piece of paper 
with an oath on it. I cannot remember its words, but 
I am sure it ended with the following words: ‘You are 
the soldiers of Underground Poland.’ After Różyc-
ki finished reading the oath, we have all said on his 
command: ‘We swear.’ Later, together with [Elżbieta] 
Rozesłaniec we tried to ask Różycki about any details 
about the organization we have just signed in. He just 
said that it has the same aims as Solidarity. However 
one may call it, this was an escape from the authorities 
but even these most radical oppositionist had to come 
43 A. Friszke, Czas KOR-u. Jacek Kuroń a geneza „Solidarności” (Warszawa 2011).
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back home, and turn the official television, just to, for 
example, watch a movie. 44
Similar trends are visible in the richly documented study of Tadeusz Ruzi-
kowski. After a huge drop in audience numbers and the actors’ boycott during 
the Martial Law, official culture have started again to grow — as shown by 
the statistics, in 1983 people returned to cinemas and theatres. 45 Similarly, 
any historical or literary publications plainly vanished from the bookshops. 
Book fairs were sometimes a scene to some real battles over good books. 46 
People looked for them in second-hand bookshops, markets, and bought them 
under the counter. This was a clear sign there was a high demand for books, 
regardless of their origin. In the 1980s, the most popular titles were available 
only by subscription, and the authorities prosecuted second-hand bookseller 
(called ‘book profiteers’), as well as samizdat publishers. Books were treated 
as quality products, exchange objects, and real treasures. Book lovers spent 
44 J. Ramotowski, Sto razy głową w mur (Warszawa 2013).
45 T. Ruzikowski, Stan wojenny w Warszawie i województwie stołecznym 1981-1983 
(Warszawa 2009), p. 474. This aim is also brought to us by the book entitled Czasopisma 
społeczno-kulturalne w okresie PRL, ed. U. Jakubowska (Warszawa 2012), as well as 
the study of A. Krajewski, Między współpracą a oporem. Twórcy kultury wobec systemu 
politycznego PRL (1975-1980) (Warszawa 2004).
46 A radio interview of Jerzy Sosnowski with Wiesław Uchański, a president of Iskry 
Publishing House on reading in PRL from the series “Time Machine of the 3rd 
Programme.” A brief synopsis at www.polskieradio.pl; L. Żuliński, Foksal 17. 
Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy (Warszawa 2006).
305
Samizdat – the Art of Polish Publishing Resistance
hours roaming large cities, going from a one bookstore to another, searching 
for interesting titles. 47
No group in history was ever alienated from a wider stream of everyday 
life. 48 These experiences from bookshops, libraries, and second-hand book-
shops shed new light onto the underground book scene. On the hand, it shows 
the reading market was already developed, and additional publications would 
have found their audience. More and more readers demanded books, and the 
number of official publications declined due to the economic crisis of the 
1980s. 49 There were of course also some titles, which were pure propaganda, or 
for any other reasons did not become popular with the readers, and filled the 
shelves in warehouses and shops for entire years. On the other hand, it is clear 
(judging from the queues outside of bookshops at that time) that samizdat 
could not have satisfied the demand for books alone. Mostly official literature 
won the minds and hearts of Polish people. 50 This is at least the perspective 
of wide-scoped social research, not limited to the circles within opposition.
47 M. Baczyński, M. Cichy, “Książka na wolności,” Gazeta Wyborcza, 12th September 1997. 
Likewise is the case with some of the periodicals: ‘400 000 copies of our newspaper 
is sold every day. Street pedlars sold it in Warszawa at profiteer’s prices, from 400 to 
1 000 zloty per copy,’ wrote Polityka about its sales (the price of the paper in official 
distribution was 70 zloty). Perhaps the statement was a bit self-advertising, but without 
any doubt there were queues in front of newspaper stands, and the best titles were sold 
almost immediately. “Polityka pod ziemią,” 43, 22nd October 1988, p. 15.
48 W. Kula, Wokół historii (Warszawa 1988), p. 190.
49 Ruch wydawniczy w liczbach (Warszawa 1987), p. 90. See also the typescript about the 
situation of writers in 1984, private archives of Wiktor Kulerski, in the collection of 
Stowarzyszenie Archiwum Solidarności; D. Jarosz, Dzieje książki w Polsce 1944-1989. 
Wybór źródeł (Warszawa 2010), p. 26.
50 The matters of official publications were also important to the Culture Department 
of Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party See also: Archiwum Akt 
Nowych, KC PZPR, LVI-1455, LVI-1452, LVI-1450, LVI-1499, LVI-1658. You will find 
many materials on the subject there.
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However, this reasoning may be weakened. In history, not always the mighty 
ones win. The authorities might have of course had their share of publication 
accomplishments, although, it is doubtful that long queues for books may 
be treated as one of them. The opposition’s success was based on something 
different and modern. Its strength lied somewhere else, as described perfectly 
by Václav Havel in his essay The Power of the Powerless, and lately by Jeffrey 
Goldfarb in The Politics of Small Things. The beginnings are usually quite hum-
ble but the fact they are there at all, proves decisive in the end. Without them, 
the outcome might have been totally different. Forbidden literature, which in 
terms of statistics were hardly visible, proved to be a sensitive gauge of changes. 
Samizdat contributed to a new quality of life. By means of baby steps it brought 
us closer to freedom. In 1980s the authorities were no longer in power the way 
they were before, and no statistics, even the most favorable ones, could prevent 
them from leaving the political stage. 51
All in all, the identity and uniqueness of the opposition was not determined 
by culture or economy (the area probably with the most similarities to the 
communist reality in Poland: different flows, mergers, and connections to the 
deficits — the same economic conditions) but by policy. The dissidents consist-
ed mainly of intellectuals, thinkers, visionaries capable of creating a political 
alternative to the official government, people such as activists like Jacek Kuroń 
or Adam Michnik, and creators of intellectual foundations of the movement 
in the persons of Antoni Macierewicz or Leszek Moczulski. These people, as 
well as their friends and advisers, were the closest correspondent to the term 
‘opposition’ we know and use today. Their body of texts, which nowadays can 
be distinguished and analyzed, proves their political intentions. The political 
history of those times is the best advocate of the definition of opposition, as it 
51 Timothy Garton Ash also hinted at that problem in his brilliant essays on Central 
Europe, The Uses of Adversity: Essays on the Fate of Central Europe (New York 1989).
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separates it convincingly from the rest of the social life, and facilitates repre-
sentation of the issue in sources. 52
Yet even these older leaders of anti-communist opposition were nothing 
like the politicians of today, who lack the intellectual commitment of that pe-
riod, but are professionals in governance, members of a democratic parliament, 
elected and supported by the constituency. After the Martial Law was intro-
duced, and the downfall of Solidarity as a massive movement, the opposition 
become less of a policy-driven force, and more of a culture, full of educational 
events and symbolic gestures, bringing heritage to the future generations. 
When there was no possibility to discuss anything with government, or even 
hope of any change for changes in the political system, workers’ strikes could 
not be enforced, and the only protest took form of street manifestations, the 
opposition movement had to withdraw. Publishing again became the means 
of actions, similarly to the times of the Workers’ Defence Committee in the 
late 1970s, and sometimes even larger in its scale. This means cultural history 
was complemented by the political scenario, however, remaining sometimes 
in odds with it.
It is a perspective of memories, interviews, rather than bureaucratic docu-
mentation. These thoughts may have an extremely wide range, anthropologi-
cally speaking, not limited to the history of art, music, writers, and poets. It is 
interesting to see how the protest or distance to it formed in families, passed 
52 The most merited author in this field is Andrzej Friszke, who recently finished a 
monumental biography of Jacek Kuroń. Kuroń shaped the oppositionist political scene 
of the communist era. Friszke’s first book on the subject entitled Historia polityczna 
opozycji 1945-1980 (London 1994), is already considered a historiographic classic. Some 
other publications written in the same vein are: “Solidaritat”: die Geschichte einer freien 
Gewerkschaft in Polen by Jerzy Holzer, the first monography on Solidarity, as well as 
Rewolucja Okrągłego Stołu by Jan Skórzyński. However, his newest piece about the 
Workers’ Defence Committee shifts in a more culture-oriented direction. See also: 
K. Łabędź, Spory wokół zagadnień programowych w publikacjach opozycji politycznej w 
Polsce w latach 1981-1989 (Kraków 1997).
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on from parents to their children. How these behaviors translated into social 
groups, neighbor circles, and home situations. The source of resistance were 
sometimes youth, the desire to impress your peers, foolhardiness, and vitality, 
which sadly leaves people at a certain age. But also elderly people, especially 
the ones who survived World War II, and remembered the Polish underground 
of 1939-1945. It is also worth noticing the relations between men and women 
at those times. Cultural symbols, costumes, and emotions, which assisted 
them in their everyday experiences. According to the anthropologists, these 
relations are basic for every human being, which means are crucial also for 
understanding the political bond, creating a higher level of commitment. This 
level, however, is not that important to everyone. 53
The shape of the history of our opposition depends on our outlook on the 
characters and situations of those times. When I get closer to the characters 
involved, I need to balance the picture and seek other contexts. From time 
to time it is worth investigating experience of people who never published 
any banned publications. All in all, one will arrive at a conclusion there are 
no real symmetries in historical research. You cannot create a perfect picture 
out of sources. It will always have faults. It is quite clear as long as a problem 
is tackled from different perspectives. This imponderability, homogenization 
is and will be a central problem. Further investigations are needed deep into 
53 The starting point for considerations on the anthropology of communism are 
the numerous treatises of Andrzej Mencwel. See also: Z. Grębecka, “O potrzebie 
antropologii komunizmu,” in Sploty kultury, ed. N. Dołowy-Rybińska et al.  
(Warszawa 2010). More empirical works on this matter include: M. Kurkowska-Budzan, 
Antykomunistyczne podziemie na Białostocczyźnie: analiza współczesnej symbolizacji 
przeszłości (Kraków 2009), A. Grupińska, J. Wawrzyniak, Buntownicy. Polskie lata 70. 
i 80. (Warszawa 2011), K. Dunin, Zadyma (Kraków 2007); E. Kondratowicz, Szminka 
na sztandarze. Kobiety „Solidarności” 1980-1989: rozmowy (Warszawa 2011); S. Penn, 
Solidarity Secret: the Women who Defeated Communism in Poland (Ann Arbor 2005),  
K. S. Long, We All Fought for Freedom. Women in Poland’s Solidarity Movement  
(New York 1996).
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the field, and perhaps even some that will widen the scope of research. One 
might say — a look of a multidimensional character. Then, and only then, we 
shall find why some have chosen the official circulation, some samizdat, and 
other were present in both currents. More conservative perspectives, which 
put a bold line between the two realities of those times, should be carefully 
supplemented.
At least this is my view, a derivative idea introduced by Professor Marcin 
Kula in his seminars, and repeated over the years in the interdisciplinary circles 
of the Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences, espe-
cially in the historical laboratory managed by Professor Andrzej Paczkowski 
and Professor Andrzej Friszke. Partially, such beliefs are against the current 
trends of what people want to relive as history. However, as the time goes by, 
the views will change, whether we like it or not. As we distance ourselves from 
the period we are so passionate about, its nuances are less and less visible, clear 
divisions do not matter that much anymore, and unfortunately, the witnesses of 
these times pass away. But as the time gap becomes larger, we also get a better 
glimpse of the big picture. This mix will also bring about further reinterpreta-
tions which are inevitable for historical research.
Translated by Łukasz Moskała
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Playing Politics or Play as Politics? 
A Study of a Portrait of Young 
Opposition of the 1980s 1
Introduction
The last decade of the Polish People’s Republic – PRL (1980-1989) was charac-
terized by such rapid social and political changes that within these ten years 
one can observe at least three distinct periods of different social, economic 
and political circumstances: 1980-1981, when the Independent Self-governing 
Trade Union Solidarity operated; the period of Martial Law (1981-1983); and 
the period when the communist system in Poland was in the process of decay 
(1984-1989). The most active part of the young generation was very quick to react 
to these changes, and often took part in them. They were especially supportive 
of the peaceful revolution of Solidarity, and assumed its notions as their own.
Because of this, the 1980s were marked by activities of independent orga-
nizations, movements and youth groups. Some of them concentrated on the 
struggle to change the political system of the Peoples’ Republic, taking part 
in the anti-communist political opposition which was well developed at the 
time. From 1980-1981 the Ministry of Internal Affairs detected 77 underground 
youth groups and organizations. At the same time, more than 30 student orga-
1 This article was prepared on the basis of Chapter 19 of my book: Ostatni bunt. 
Młodzieżowa opozycja polityczna u schyłku PRL 1980-1990. Fakty, konteksty, interpretacje 
(Lublin 2013).
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nizations functioned openly, although not always legally. 2 From 1982-1985 the 
security services detected almost 300 underground youth movements, groups 
and organizations. In the last years of the communist Poland at least 20 youth 
political opposition groups were functioning. 3
What they all had in common was giving priority to strictly political activ-
ity with the objective of a profound change to the political system in Poland. 
Interestingly, this emphasis did not come from institutions and organizations 
within the system; rather, it had a non-systemic character. These organizations 
most often consisted of people aged from 15 to 25, although that was not always 
the case.
One of the most important organizations of this line of opposition was the 
Independent Students’ Union (ISU), which aspired to defend the interests of 
Polish students and to play the role of a political force assisting Solidarity in 
the field of civil liberties and limiting the monopoly of the communist party 
(Polish United Workers’ Party). 4 On September 12, 1981 in Gdańsk the Federa-
2 See: “Nielegalne organizacje i grupy młodzieży szkolnej w Polsce w latach 1980-
1982 (opracowanie Instytutu Kryminalistyki i Kryminologii Akademii Spraw 
Wewnętrznych przygotowane na zlecenie Wydziału Nauki i Oświaty KC PZPR), 
Warszawa 1985,” in „Jesteście naszą wielką szansą”. Młodzież na rozstajach komunizmu 
1944-1989, ed. P. Ceranka, S. Stępień (Warszawa 2009), p. 387-390 and “Informacja dot.
[ycząca] sytuacji w środowisku młodzieży,” in „Jesteście naszą wielką szansą”. Młodzież 
na rozstajach, p. 437.
3 See: D. Cecuda, Leksykon opozycji politycznej w latach 1976-1989 (Toruń 1990).
4 The Independent Students’ Union (Niezależne Zrzeszenie Studentów - NSZ) was a 
student organization established at the height of the revolution of Solidarity. It was 
dissolved under Martial Law, then reappeared at universities spontaneously and as an 
underground grass-roots organization in 1986 as the so-called II NZS. It was dissolved 
again on September 22, 1989, and then it removed itself from strictly political activity.
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tion of School Youth (FSY) was established. 5 It was a national structure which 
consolidated diverse circles, organizations and committees run by secondary 
school students. Its work was symbolically continued by the Federation of 
Fighting Youth (FFY), established in 1984. 6 In 1983 the Movement for Alter-
native Society (MAS) appeared, 7 promoting anarchist notions, and in 1985 the 
Freedom and Peace Movement (FAP) emerged at a time of disillusionment 
with the weakness of underground organizations. 8 More significant opposi-
tional organizations such as the Confederation for Independent Poland 9 and 
Fighting Solidarity 10 had their youth wings. There were also many youth groups 
and organizations on local levels.
The youth wing of the opposition shared their political views with its older 
circles, but they retained the feeling of uniqueness of their own generation. It was 
5 The Federation of School Youth (Federacja Młodzieży Szkolnej - FMS) was a national 
youth organization with the aim of representing the interests of school students. It had 
the same program and the same ideals as Solidarity of 1980-1981. Under Martial Law it 
was forced to cease activity.
6 The Federation of Fighting Youth (Federacja Młodzieży Walczącej - FMW) was a 
nationwide radical anticommunist youth organization, which existed in 1984-1990.
7 The Movement for Alternative Society (Ruch Społeczeństwa Alternatywnego) was 
established in 1983, and in 1988 it mutated into the Anarchist Federation (Intercity 
Anarchist Federation). The movement refused to acknowledge either a communist or 
capitalist state, and believed that the necessary condition to creating an independent 
alternative society was regaining independence.
8 The Freedom and Peace Movement (Ruch ‘Wolność i Pokój’ - WiP) emerged in 1985. It 
wanted to act in a non-violent way and was inspired by pacifism and ecology.
9 The Confederation of Independent Poland (Konfederacja Polski Niepodległej - KPN) 
was an opposition political party, established by Leszek Moczulski in 1979. Its goals 
were to overthrow the communist regime and regain Poland’s independence of the 
USSR .
10 Fighting Solidarity was an oppositional organization whose origin was similar to that 
of Solidarity, established by Kornel Morawiecki in Wrocław in 1982. It was created to 
express discontent with the passive and conciliatory attitude – as Morawiecki saw 
it – of the management of the underground Solidarity. MS was determined to fight the 
communist system until Poland regained independence.
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justified by its specific features, such as radical aims and methods of operation, 
an uncompromising desire to overturn the regime and regain independence, 
and a keen interest in Western youth counter-culture values, inspired by the 
ideals of the student rebellion of 1968. Young opposition activists enriched the 
programme of the political opposition with new areas of interest like ecology 
and pacifism while emphasizing the need to solve problems of local commu-
nities and struggle for issues important to the whole generation. They also 
introduced new forms and methods of operation, like political happenings 
(popularized by a counterculture movement under the name of Orange Al-
ternative 11), holding sit-ins 12 or ruszting. 13 It also advocated mutual activity 
of different factions of young wings of political opposition, who wanted to 
tackle issues that they found particularly important. Such issues included the 
struggle to abolish compulsory military preparation classes at universities, to 
stop the construction of an atomic power plant in Żarnowiec, and to legalize 
the ISU again in 1989.
The first wave of young opposition which involved the participants of the 
events of 1980-1983 borrowed its main ideological framework from Solidarity. 
This framework included such notions as: human dignity understood in the 
11 The Orange Alternative (Pomarańczowa Alternatywa) was a counter-culture social 
and cultural movement, which in the last decade of the PRL organized political 
happenings mocking the authorities. These happenings were political demonstrations, 
street theatre shows and simple entertainment all at once. For example, one of their 
slogans was ‘All proletarians be beautiful!’ Pomarańczowa Alternatywa w dokumentach 
aparatu represji PRL (1987-1989), ed. J. Dardzińska, K. Dolata (Wrocław 2011).
12 Sit-ins were a form of a political demonstration borrowed from student movements 
of the 1960s. The idea was to protest by sitting in public places – in streets, in squares, 
on stairs – which both grabbed the attention of the public and made it difficult for the 
security services to react.
13 Ruszting was a form of protest which consisted in scattering leaflets, hanging banners 
or giving speeches from the top of scaffolding or from rooftops of buildings. In order to 
grab more attention, rusztings were usually organized in city centers.
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context of Christian personalism, truth understood as refraining from lying 
in the public domain, solidarity between people, social justice, responsibility 
for common well-being, reinstating the rule of law, freedom, and civic activi-
ty. It also borrowed the language of moral and political demands used by the 
Church and the opposition to demand that the authorities observe human 
and civic rights and formulate a proposal to reform the socio-political system. 
This language was elevated by Pope John Paul II during his first pilgrimage to 
Poland. These moral and civic values were connected with national ones, such 
as independence of the nation and the state, its full sovereignty, and develop-
ment and respect for national culture with all its elements: history, literature, 
science, art and tradition. 14
The next generation of young opposition (1986-1990) not only treated these 
values as a part of a moral and patriotic heritage handed down by Solidarity, 
but also added some values of their own, especially those from the realm of the 
alternative culture. The most important ones were the concentration on private 
life, individualism, love, a sense of community, friendship, independence and 
subjectivity, concerning both the authorities and the world of adults. 15
Young oppositionists were first of all anti-communists, and they saw 
fighting the regime as the main aim of their own actions, as well as those of 
their organizations. To a greater or lesser degree they based their identity on 
Christianity, even if the ideology and programme of their organization were 
14 I. Krzemiński, “Solidarność – organizacja polskich nadziei,” in Solidarność – 
wydarzenie, konsekwencje, pamięć, ed. A. Sułek (Warszawa 2006), p. 16; 
M. Michalewska-Pawlak, Obywatelskość demokratyczna jako idea normatywna w 
koncepcjach polityczno-programowych polskiej opozycji w latach 1980-1989 (Gdańsk 2010), 
p. 267-285.
15 J. Wertenstein-Żuławski, Między nadzieją a rozpaczą: rock, młodzież, społeczeństwo 
(Warszawa 1993), p. 65; Grizzly. Pismo studentów i absolwentów 2, November-December 
(1987), p. 3. See also: MIŚ. Międzyuczelniany Informator Środowiskowy [Niezależnego 
Zrzeszenia Studentów] (Warszawa 1985-1989).
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of a leftist character. They were people searching for their own identity and tried 
to add meaning to their lives by conducting political activity. At the same time 
they were going through the first important experiences of their youth. 16 Thus, 
to a large extent, the character of young political opposition was based on ethos.
In spite of a wide range of ideological diversity, the young opposition had 
many qualities in common. First of all, they belonged to an elite, mainly because 
there were relatively few of them. It is estimated that in the years 1988-1989 
about 25-30 thousand people participated in the young oppositional circles, 
as opposed to about 8 million Poles aged 14-29 and 6 million aged 14-25. 17 The 
young generation of the 1980s, outside of the period of the legality of Solidarity 
when young people showed interest in social and political issues, were generally 
uninterested in politics, directing their energy to private life. Against this back-
ground, members of independent organizations were unique in their interest 
in spiritual values and social and political issues, a heightened national and 
political awareness, knowledge of recent Polish history, and surely exceptional 
courage and activism as well. They were exceptionally sensitive to tensions and 
contradictions in the social structure of communist Poland, and thus deeply 
felt the material deprivation blocking their aspirations for a higher standard 
of living, the contrast between the publicly voiced values and the difficulties 
in putting them into practice, as well as their exclusion from participation in 
political decision-making. 18 This unusual social and political awareness was 
both a blessing – they saw and knew much more than their peers – as well 
16 P. Pleskot, R. Spałek, Pokolenie 82-89. Niezależne Zrzeszenie Studentów na Uniwersytecie 
Warszawskim we wspomnieniach (1982-1989) (Warszawa 2011); materials from the FFY 
website: http://www.fmw.org.pl .
17 Archiwum Akt Nowych, IBPM, sign. 1043, Warunki startu zawodowego młodzieży, ed. 
by prof. L. Ostrowski, Warszawa 1989, p. 6; J. Wertenstein-Żuławski, Między nadzieją i 
rozpaczą, p. 6 and the author’s own estimations.
18 M. Śliwa, Ruch Wolność i Pokój 1985-1989. (M.A. thesis, Jagiellonian University,  
Kraków 1992), p. 70.
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as a curse: they were not able to lead normal lives according to generally ac-
cepted rules of conduct. 19
The distinctiveness of the young political opposition was also clearly marked 
during the period of transformation of 1988-1990, when it headed a move-
ment aimed at changing the political system without compromising with the 
communist government. As a result, radical youth factions of the opposition 
entered into a conflict with the moderates led by Lech Wałęsa who decided to 
negotiate with the authorities at the Round Table of February 6-April 5, 1989. 
The battle was won by the moderate wing, and its adversaries, who were at the 
peak of their creative abilities and already had considerable experience, were 
suddenly cast out to the margins of the new political scene.
This article answers questions concerning the identity of the most active 
young opposition activists from the end of the 1980s, who lost their influence 
upon the direction of transformation at the beginning of a new political era. 
Which qualities enabled them to fight the communist regime so effectively, 
and which made them lose under the new socio-political conditions? Which 
qualities made them different from the rest of the society, especially its young 
people? How did they see the world?
19 K. Kosiński, “Młodzież lat osiemdziesiątych w świetle badań CBOS oraz wybranych 
analiz IBPM, MAW i KC PZPR,” Dzieje Najnowsze 2 (2009), p. 117-136. See: T. Junes, 
Generations of Change. Student Movements and Student Politics in Communist Poland 
(Leuven 2012). On the politics of the elites, see: J. Szumski, Elity, ich miejsce i rola w 
społeczeństwie (Katowice 2007).
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In the Arms of History
The testimonies of the oppositional activists could serve as a ground for sketching 
their collective, social, mental and spiritual portrait. 20 The first quality of the 
young opposition was the fact that they looked back to the past. The co-founder 
of the Federation of Fighting Youth, Jacek Górski, said ‘history formed our 
ideological roots.’ 21 It was not an exception, considering the entire backdrop 
of all opposition movements, and the number of illegal publications from 1976-
1989 collected by the National Library could be seen as proof of this interest 
in history. Among the books in the National Library, 1 697 are dedicated to 
history, and by comparison 736 to politics and 137 to economics. 22
The emphasis on the importance of history was a result of the discord 
between the official, falsified vision of the past given in school books and pro-
paganda, and the version discussed in families or churches. Many Poles inde-
pendently looked for the truth about the past. What should be emphasized is 
the importance of traditions of oral transmission of history from generation 
to generation, as well as foreign Polish-language radio stations like Radio 
Free Europe. 23 Finally, opposition activists also experienced history directly 
in their own lives. Many cities in Poland had their own history of more or less 
violent demonstrations of discontent, many of which, like the massacre of 
workers in December 1970, reverberated throughout the whole country. The 
20 I believe it is worth undertaking such an attempt, in spite of the risk of generalizing and 
oversimplifying the description of attitudes of the oppositional young wing. In order 
to minimize this risk, I will concentrate only on the most visible common aspects of 
young opposition activists.
21 B. Noszczak, “Federacja Młodzieży Walczącej w Warszawie (1984-1989),” Pamięć i 
Sprawiedliwość 1(19) (2012), p. 378.
22 P. Sowiński, Zakazana książka. Uczestnicy „drugiego obiegu” 1977-1989 (Warszawa 2011), 
p. 262-263.
23 See: P. Machcewicz, „Monachijska menażeria”. Walka z Radiem Wolna Europa 1950-1989 
(Warszawa 2007).
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most important historical event turned out to be the establishment and legal 
operation of Solidarity and the explosion of freedom that came with it, which 
was later crushed during the period of Martial Law. 24
One could also point to the historical notions and images that served as 
motivation to undertake opposition activity in the final decade of the Polish 
People’s Republic, the most important of which was the myth of a 19th century 
conspiracy, fuelled by the participation of youth. 25 The myths of the Polish 
Underground State, the Home Army and the Warsaw Uprising were also very 
popular. These experiences were seen as the matrix for underground and inde-
pendent struggle. Since the Pope’s first visit to Poland, the myth of St. Stanislaus 
the Martyr, who as tradition has it was murdered by king Bolesław the Bold 
for criticising the king’s conduct, was gaining popularity. 26 However, the most 
potent myth was the legend of Solidarity, which was seen as the embodiment 
of dreams of freedom, the peaceful fight for human and civic rights as well 
as the improvement of everyday life and future prospects. The legend of the 
Independent Students’ Union was also very important, as it mobilized subse-
quent groups of students to voice concern for both social and environmental 
matters. The oppositionists also appreciated the already mythologized role of 
the student rebellion of 1968, both in Poland and in the West. 27
24 See also materials on the website of the Federation of Fighting Youth:  
http://www.fmw.org.pl
25 H. Samsonowicz, “Mity w świadomości historycznej Polaków,” in Oblicza polskości, 
ed. A. Kłoskowska, (Warszawa 1990), p. 158; P. Pleskot, R. Spałek, Pokolenie’82/89. 
Niezależne Zrzeszenie Studentów na Uniwersytecie Warszawskim we wspomnieniach 
(1982-1990) (Warszawa 2011), p. 130-133, 323; K. Kosiński, Nastolatki’81. Świadomość 
młodzieży w epoce „Solidarności” (1980-1981) (Warszawa 2002).
26 J. Kubik, The Power of Symbols against the Symbols of Power. The Rise of Solidarity and the 
Fall of State Socialism in Poland (University Park, PA 1994), p. 145-150.
27 See: ‘Talking ‘bout my generation’. Conflicts of Generation Building and Europe’s 1968, ed. 
A. von der Golz (Gottingen 2011).
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On the other hand, the young opposition showed a great deal of diversity. 
For example, the members of such movements as The Movement for Alterna-
tive Society or the Freedom and Peace Movement often rejected traditional 
patriotism based on history and religion. As one of them recalled: ‘Most peo-
ple /…/ thought along the pattern God – Honour – Homeland, but we wanted 
something different. They thought that the state was something good, for us 
it was a ridiculous cliché. At that time we were listening to Dezerter.’ 28 Still, 
historical references were not entirely unknown to such groups, which can 
be seen in the popularity of the person and views of the creator of the Polish 
version of anarchism, Edward Abramowski. 29
Between Legality and Illegality
When I speak about young people, I mean those who shared their time be-
tween two main duties: studying (or working, but less frequently) and political 
activity. The latter could be of overt character (like in 1980-81), but not neces-
sarily legal (like The Federation of School Youth in 1981 or The Independent 
Students’ Union in 1988.) Many of them could not maintain balance between 
these spheres of life: often political activity was so involving that there was no 
time left for education. Sometimes attending classes was impossible because 
someone was in hiding or in prison. Political activity encouraged people to 
28 Dezerter – a popular punk rock band of the 1980s. Quotation from: E. Krasucki, 
“Alternatywne ruchy młodzieżowe wobec zmian społeczno-politycznych końca lat 
80. XX wieku,” in Narodziny III Rzeczypospolitej. Pomorze Zachodnie w latach 1988-
1989, ed. M. Machałek, J. Macholak (Szczecin 2006), p. 183. See also: M. Śliwa, „Ruch 
Wolność i Pokój”, p. 14; J. P. Waluszko, “Czy anarchista w Polsce winien walczyć o jej 
niepodległość,” in Gorączka czasu przełomu. Dokumenty ugrupowań radykalnych, ed. 
P. Frączak (Warszawa 1994), p. 70-72.
29 Józef Edward Abramowski (1868-1918), philosopher, sociologist and psychologist. The 
author of the notion of the ‘stateless socialism.’
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pay less and less attention to education, which resulted in repeating years 
in schools and prolonging studies at university. In those times, nobody was 
surprised that some people spent seven or eight years at university, and not 
necessarily for political reasons. 30
In the latter 1980s the opposition youth activists usually treated their activity 
as a hobby, but for many it was also a source of income. They participated in 
street actions like painting slogans on walls, distributing leaflets, taking part 
in sit-ins and kadrówkas, 31 and writing programmes, statutes, appeals and 
articles. There were also more mundane but necessary things to be done such 
as obtaining printing ink, paper, and matrixes, and organizing printing and 
distribution. In the early 1980s many of them earned additional money in stu-
dent cooperatives. At the end of the decade, printing became professionalized 
and some printing presses offered decent money for printing or distribution. 
Printing was also profitable because of the high social demand for independent 
literature. Andrzej Szozda, of the second Independent Students’ Union, recalls:
I mainly dealt underground books, together with 
Krzysztof Czuma. Sometimes we would even sell a cou-
ple of thousand books per month. We had, in fact, a big 
company. I had a small Fiat car back then. We crossed 
the city far and wide and delivered books. People from 
universities in different part of Poland visited us in 
Warsaw. They received backpacks full of illegal mate-
rials, which we got from different circles: the NOWa 
Publishing House, some UPR printing presses. We 
30 P. Pleskot, R. Spałek, Pokolenie, p. 189.
31 Kadrówkas were a form of street protests, conducted without informing the public 
opinion, with the help of several insider activists and sympathisers of the opposition. 
Operating in such a way, they could count on the element of surprise, and any 
repressions on the part of authorities would be ineffective.
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also distributed the materials by the underground 
press Świt. 32
It was ‘a black market of ideas,’ as Paweł Sowiński justly described it, adding 
that one must not see trading illegal publications only in a business context, 
because this kind of occupation was risky and temporary. First of all, it involved 
constant danger from authorities, and secondly, there was a chance of losing all 
stock without getting paid, for example as a result of dishonest business partners.
In order to understand the specific character of this market – just like the 
character of the whole communism in Poland – one should bear in mind that 
selling illegal publications and getting money for printing them required a lot 
of effort and a network of informal connections. These connections were often 
acquaintances in state-owned printing houses, shop assistants and drivers 
who facilitated illegal purchases. Often the goods were paid for with a bottle 
of vodka or homemade alcohol. At times, the printing was done after hours by 
employees of state-owned printing presses looking to make some additional 
money. 33
This ‘life of pretence’ had had a long tradition in Poland, but at the end of 
the Polish People’s Republic its presence became overwhelming. It resided in 
the notorious gap between theory and practice, disregarding regulations and 
decrees of the authorities, mixing private and state-owned property as well as 
the official and private spheres, only pretending to be doing things, or doing 
them in differently from the intention of those who initiated them. 34 Young 
opposition activists operated on the borderline between the legal and the 
illegal, as well as that between the official and private worlds. In the period 
32 P. Pleskot. R. Spałek, Pokolenie, p. 189.
33 P. Sowiński, Zakazana książka, p. 174-182.
34 See: M. Kula, “W PRL: życie na niby?,” in Buntownicy. Polskie lata 70 i 80, ed. 
A. Grupińska, J. Wawrzyniak, (Warszawa 2011), p. 491-496; J. Kochanowski, Tylnymi 
drzwiami. Czarny rynek w Polsce 1944-1989 (Warszawa 2010).
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when Solidarity was allowed to operate, they were granted the luxury of the 
right to speak their minds and reach their goals. Martial Law forced them into 
the political underground, in which they had to conspire to hide the character 
and the scale of their activities. In the late 1980s this gap became even wider. 
The last years of communism in Poland were characterised by a lower level of 
repression towards the actions of the opposition, but there was little hope for 
significant political change. All these issues presented the conspirators with 
the choice between staying underground or exposing themselves and waiting 
for the collapse of communism, which seemed distant at the time.
The answer to the question whether to conspire or not was not simple. The 
environment of the Freedom and Peace Movement chose confronting the sys-
tem openly, and believed that it was an assumption that formed the identity of 
the movement. However, most of the organizations decided to remain in the 
underground – in a sense, against reality. The reality was that since September 
1986 when amnesty for political prisoners was announced, more organizations 
of the ‘older’ opposition decided to act openly. But the largest young opposition 
groups displayed rather opposite tendencies. In the Federation of Fighting Youth 
it was normal to use pseudonyms, codes, code words, double-checks and other 
conspirational elements. Even during the proceedings of the Round Table, the 
Gdańsk branch of the Federation organized a training camp in the Bieszczady 
mountains with the main goal of teaching the principles of clandestine activity 
to its members. Many of them started to publicly reveal their true names and 
telephone numbers only in the autumn of that year. 35
Although on the one hand the members tried to maintain an air of conspira-
cy, in many cases they were unable to do so effectively; for example, they shared 
confidential information at social meetings where outsiders were included. At 
35 See the account of Aleksandra Bakiera on the Federation of the Fighting Youth website. 
http://www.fmw.org.pl
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universities, many students knew full well that their some of their peers were 
underground activists. Of course, it gave the impression of being a prestigious 
affiliation, but only up to a point.
When amnesty was announced, it turned out that they were very old-fash-
ioned or even grotesque when compared with the old opposition. For many 
the necessity to give up clandestine activity after a year or two was a dramatic 
decision, because they expected to stay underground until full victory was 
achieved. Suddenly they had to accept the changing reality of public and op-
positional lives. In the following years, they started to enter the ‘grey zone’ of 
politics, engaging in activities that were still illegal, but overt. In 1988, The 
Independent Students’ Union had even rooms at the Warsaw University in 
which its activists worked. In the university courtyard illegal materials were 
sold openly. 36
Customs and Communication
In the everyday life of the rebels, social and clandestine lives were intertwined. 
This was no surprise, because the activists spent a lot of time together. 37 Their 
older oppositional colleagues still operated in a different way, based on circles 
of friends. Common activities brought young activists closer to each other 
because they thought of underground as a passion that only could be shared 
with those of a similar ilk. Common experiences were a source of strong con-
nections which grew into life-long friendships. The process also worked in 
the opposite direction, as close friends decided to undertake underground 
political activities together.
36 P. Pleskot, R. Spałek, Pokolenie, p. 315.
37 J. Górski, Moje PRL-owskie dzieciństwo, (memories on the FFY website); the account of 
Robert Kwiatek on the FFY website. http://www.fmw.org.pl
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It was no accident, then, that the questions: ‘How would you describe your 
social life as a Freedom and Peace Movement activist?’ and, ‘Did you stay in the 
close group of activists, or did you take part in the social lives of other groups?’ 
were answered by 78 Freedom and Peace Movement activists in the following 
way: 18 people said that they ‘exclusively socialised’ with other activists, 28 
said ‘mainly,’ 24 indicated ‘partially,’ and 6 responded with ‘hardly.’ Śliwa’s 
opinion that the activists created a kind of a ‘ghetto’ which satisfied their social 
needs, among others, seems to be accurate. 38 In other groups and circles the 
situation must have been similar. The activists spent their time together and 
organized birthday parties and cultural and sporting events. ‘At that time 
private lives, school, parties and opposition were all closely interconnected,’ 
Jarosław Hołownia recalls. 39
Parties and social meetings were organized on many occasions, or for no 
particular reason at all, and they usually involved heavy drinking. ‘This brought 
people closer, and was necessary, because, as everyone knows, each action 
was very stressful, and after a few such actions or other activities it was only 
natural to relax and have a party,’ one of the Freedom and Peace Movement 
activists recalls.
The more stress, the more need to relax. As Wojciech ‘Jacob’ Jankowski 
recalls, in December 1987, after the end of a hunger strike in defence of Sławomir 
Dutkiewicz and others who refused to do military service, 40 he and other FAP 
38 M. Śliwa, „Ruch Wolność i Pokój,” p. 69.
39 K. Stachurska, “Żeby nie być szarym. Federacja Młodzieży Walczącej (1984-1989) w 
świetle relacji, prasy podziemnej i zbiorów Archiwum Ośrodka KARTA.” (MA thesis, 
Warsaw University, Warszawa, June 2009), p. 20.
40 See: B. Hrybacz, “Pamiętnik z głodówki,” in Wielka Gra, młodzieżowe pismo oświaty 
niezależnej 9 (April 1988), p. 1, 8-10.
326
Marek Wierzbicki
activists organized a party which they called ‘The Grande Bouffe.’ 41 During 
the hunger strike the participating activists had fantasized about the dishes 
that they would like to eat during the party. Everyone had to bring a dish for 
21 people. Then, the whole group in fancy dress had a thunderous party for the 
next three days, during which moral limitations were forgotten. As Jankowski 
said, when Adam Michnik dropped in, he was shocked at first, but then said 
that he had enjoyed the party and indeed, the Freedom and Peace Movement 
was unique in its unconventional attitude to life. 42
In other circles of young opposition wild parties were also a frequent pas-
time. Joanna Kluzik-Rostkowska recalls a New Year’s Eve Party organized in 
1988 in the flat of Polish Socialist Party (Polska Partia Socjalistyczna - PPS) 
activist Piotr Ikonowicz, with the participation of Independent Students’ Union 
activists. The party marked the end of a week-long hunger strike in defence of 
imprisoned Czechoslovakian students. The ISU representatives had to wait 
until midnight, when the protest officially ended, until they ate anything. A 
remarkable situation took place: several men went on hunger strike in Ikono-
wicz’s tiny apartment, in which his wife and newborn daughter also lived. Also, 
after Tomasz Ziemiński was chosen the president of ISU in early 1989, it was 
celebrated with a party in the apartment of Joanna Kluzik-Rostkowska. 43
It was also characteristic for the young opposition of that period to organize 
camps, rallies and common holidays. Their aim was to integrate representa-
tives of different organizations. Sometimes the goals were more ambitious, 
as in the case of the Gdańsk Movement for Alternative Society (MAS) who 
wanted ‘politicians’ to get together with counterculture performers, musicians, 
41 ‘The Grande Bouffe’ is a well-known French-Italian production from 1973, directed by 
Marco Ferreri, which was perceived to be a satire of consumerist society. In its final 
scene the protagonists die after a long orgy of food and sex.
42 W. Jankowski, „Stan bezwładzy,” Karta 6 (1991), p. 66.
43 P. Pleskot, R. Spałek, Pokolenie, p. 117-136.
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painters and writers. During the so-called ‘Hyde Parks,’ first organized in 1985, 
members of MAS, FAP, FFY and ISU met with representatives of subcultures, 
especially punks and skinheads. As the leader of MAS, J.P. Waluszko recalls 
that the number of participants at such events in 1989 ranged from 200 to 
over a thousand. Political events were mixed with happenings, concerts and 
dance parties. So much alcohol was consumed that at times the events became 
drunken parties more than political events. 44
During a summer camp organized by the Movement of Independent 
Youth – The Interschool Committee from Wrocław the participants – about 
sixty people – for two weeks refused to take part in discussions, lectures, or 
printing camp newsletters and instead lay on the beach, bathed in the lake, 
sang songs by the bonfire and consumed beer. In the third week the leaders of 
the organization appeared and forced them to participate in classes. The camp 
ended with an all-night bonfire party, where everyone enjoyed themselves. In 
spite of many shortcomings, especially passivity and lack of responsibility on 
the part of participants and bad organization, people had nostalgic memories 
of the summer camp, mainly because of its social aspects. 45
Yet another interesting issue is the internal and external communication 
among the opposition. At first, ‘grown-up’ language was used, which was serious, 
full of pathos and reflected the way in which older oppositionists saw the world. 
But soon the young wing began using slang, which was rather incomprehensible 
for older people. In this way young opposition established a rapport with its 
social background, young people who did not belong to any organizations. The 
language of mass youth culture played the role of a code used by young people 
to communicate with each other. The use of neologisms, borrowings from En-
44 M. Śliwa, „Ruch Wolność i Pokój,” p. 9.
45 B. Sokołowska-Pabjan, M. Drozd, W. Kras, ed., Międzyszkolny Komitet Oporu 
(Warszawa 2010), p. 62-63.
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glish, fragments of lyrics of popular songs and unconventional grammar and 
syntax made it hermetic and inaccessible to other people. The language also 
strengthened the identity and the feeling of uniqueness among young people. 46
The rejection of hierarchy among opposition activists promoted the es-
tablishment of contacts, and helped to build rapport and understanding with 
other people. For movements such as FAP or MAS this principle was elevated 
to dogma, which constituted the identity of the milieu, its functioning and 
attitude to individual and collective life. Other opposition groups displayed 
similar tendencies, which reflected the customs and habits observable among 
the whole youth wing. The atmosphere of ISU at Warsaw University is recalled 
by Jan Szczerba, one of its activists:
It was cool, because ISU was at the same time a big 
force in terms of opposition as well as social life. There 
was not much hierarchy – although we had manage-
ment, nobody could feel any hierarchy. There were 
many people among us who were very popular so-
cially. 47
No young activist was surprised by how easily one could obtain food, shelter 
and material support in practically any oppositional circle. The atmosphere 
of democracy, egalitarianism and openness to others was a feature of their 
identity practically throughout the whole period of the decay of the Polish 
People’s Republic (1980-1989). An issue connected with the above was a relaxed 
attitude towards time. As Remigiusz Kasprzycki noticed, time was perceived 
46 K. Kosiński, Oficjalne i prywatne życie młodzieży w PRL (Warszawa 2006), p. 337-343.
47 P. Pleskot, R. Spałek, Pokolenie, p. 237.
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as something relative, just as money was at that time. 48 Andrzej Stasiuk, a FAP 
activist then, wrote the following words about his youth:
The mid-1980s was simply a wonderland. Time did not 
exist, it seemed. Or at least, it existed only in small frac-
tions. It lasted from one event to another, stopped, and 
it had to start again. Possibly it was going somewhere, 
but we had the feeling that we would always make it, 
that if something happened, we weren’t going to miss 
it. Everything was close. Nobody was in a hurry. You 
dropped in at someone’s place, and stayed until the 
morning. Try doing something like this today. Yes. 
We were the last happy generation. 49
Partying and having fun also became a way of generational communication, 
as it was seen as a means of expressing aspirations, needs and opinions. Its im-
portance was clearly visible at the end of the 1980s, which could be explained 
by the influence of counterculture movements (as in the case of the Orange 
Alternative) as well as by the mentality of the young opposition. Entering the 
world of politics from 1986-1989, most of them were teenagers, which could 
be a hypothetical explanation of their interest in enjoying themselves. Using 
fun in political activity changed its character, leading to a connection between 
48 R. Kasprzycki, Opozycja polityczna w Krakowie w latach 1988-1989 (Kraków 2003), p. 151; 
see also: P. Kenney, Rewolucyjny karnawał. Europa Środkowa 1989 (Wrocław 2005), 
p. 206-210 (Polish translation of A Carnival of Revolution. Central Europe 1989, 2001); 
P. Pleskot, R. Spałek, Pokolenie, p. 165-174.
49 A. Stasiuk, Jak zostałem pisarzem (próba autobiografii intelektualnej) (Czarne 1998), 
p. 105-106; R. Kasprzycki, Opozycja polityczna, p. 151.
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homo politicus with homo ludens. 50 If entertainment and fun became a signifi-
cant if not the dominant current of mass culture of the 20th century, its transfer 
into the sphere of politics, especially by young people, shaped by mass and 
electronic media, should be seen as a natural process. New forms of political 
activity, like happenings, were a kind of play, also present in ruszting, which 
connected the kinds of acrobatic tricks associated with the shows of street 
acrobats in the Middle Ages and the Modern Era with political messages. A 
competition between members of FAP in 1988 to get fined as often as possible 
(with no intention of paying the fines, of course) was also a form of play. Some 
treated being chased by ZOMO (the anti-riot armed militia) throughout the 
courtyards of Gdańsk as fun, and others stole tramway number plates in order 
to put them back with anti-system messages. Some editors of underground 
papers also saw their work as entertainment. 51
One of the most important ways in which opposition communicated with 
their non-involved peers were underground materials. Until 1985 they were 
similar to those printed by the older opposition and were dominated by histor-
ical, political or international issues tackled in long articles, with absolutely no 
visual appeal. From 1986 onwards the situation underwent a dramatic change. 
A large number of student periodicals started to appear, issued by both high 
school and university (ISU) students. Most of them were of local character, 
circulating only in one school, district, town, university or even department. 
The content also changed as editors started to devote more time to issues likely 
to interest a young readership. Less was written about ‘serious politics,’ and more 
50 See. J. Huizinga, Homo ludens. Zabawa jako źródło kultury (Warszawa 2011) – Polish 
translation of Huizinga’s Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play-Element in Culture (1971). 
Huizinga points to play/games as an important element of culture connecting 
entertainment with competition, and being a source of many cultural phenomena like 
war, poetry, art or celebrations.
51 P. Kenney, Rewolucyjny karnawał, p. 210-211.
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about the everyday life of the young generation, often defending its interests. 
These papers started to entertain the audience, featuring articles on cultural 
events, holidays, free time and romantic issues, often treated in a satirical way. 
The visuals improved greatly, as more space was devoted to photos, comic car-
toons or drawings than to the written word. Some underground magazines (like 
these of FFY) did not satisfy young readers, who complained of their sloppy 
editing, spelling mistakes, poor printing or boring content. 52
A good case in point of this evolution was the periodical Szkoła (School), 
called Szkoła Podziemna (Underground School) until 1986. Dropping the ad-
jective was not only a formal solution, but it meant a change of profile and style 
of the periodical. It was taken over by students who did not remember the time 
of Martial Law. Editors tried to establish a dialogue with readers, for example 
by conducting opinion polls in which the readers could express their views 
on the magazine. It also cooperated with school councils, sometimes adding 
new impact to what they did. This was beneficial to both sides: Szkoła tackled 
issues connected with the lives of students and schools, and readers undertook 
action against the fossilized school system, for example by boycotting working 
Saturdays or the International Workers’ Day (the 1st of May) celebrations in 
1987. It was thus not only a political periodical, but also one targeted at young 
people, like the official weekly Na Przełaj. Other periodicals like those print-
ed by ISU of Warsaw University also wanted to maintain relations with the 
audience, for example by placing messages for organizations, groups, or even 
individual people. This explains their popularity: in Warsaw alone 18 ISU pe-
52 P. Kenney, Rewolucyjny karnawał, p. 206-211; K. Stachurska, “Żeby nie być szarym. 
Federacja,” p. 31-34.
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riodicals appeared, and throughout Poland there were about 200. FFY printed 
about 200 periodicals, mainly school ones. 53
Conclusions
Young opposition and their organizations played an important role in the 
political and social life in Poland of the 1980s, a role which has not yet been 
properly acknowledged. Its importance lay in the fact that it continued the 
struggle for independence both in the individual and collective dimension. The 
activity of young opposition was the last wave of political young oppositional 
movements which appeared on the arena in the 19th century to appeal for the 
right of Poles to be independent. This activity showed cultural continuity with 
its predecessors.
On the other hand, the activity had all features of modern horizontal net-
work structures, which emphasised the negative attitude to traditional hierarchy 
and patterns of dissent that had become fossilized in the previous decades. 
Young opposition played an important culture-forming role by propagating 
new ideas, patterns of activity and social resistance. Moreover, thanks to them, 
organizations of the young segment of the opposition became the most import-
ant grassroots form of modernizing Poland. They propagated new patterns of 
behaviour by popularizing elements of mass youth culture like slang, fashion 
and music. Young people of those days, especially those involved in social and 
political matters, set the trends for the development of the state and society. For 
example, they promoted Western political system patterns of parliamentary 
democracy, political pluralism and a market economy. In a surprising way they 
connected the striving for radical social and political change with opting for 
53 P. Kenney, Rewolucyjny karnawał, p. 206-210; P. Pleskot, R. Spałek, Pokolenie, p. 165-
174. See: Międzyszkolny Komitet Oporu…, a CD with issues of the Szkoła periodical 
electronic version.
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the preservation of traditional moral, religious and national values. In this, it 
had a markedly conservative strain. Young opposition not only tried to realize 
its political goals, but also took on the role of youth trade unions and struggled 
for the rights and interests of its generation together with other social, cultural 
and identity movements. The elements of alternative culture (counterculture) 
perceivable in the way the young opposition operated were a clear cultural 
code, a sign of a generational link and community which turned out to be more 
powerful than connections with adults.
Political activists among young people had qualities which on the one 
hand gave them strength for a long struggle to realize the ideals of freedom, 
subjectivity, justice, democracy and independence. These qualities were above 
all outstanding political and social awareness, courage, energy, belief in ideals, 
activity, and radicalism. On the other hand, these qualities did not allow them 
to take a cool and rational view of the political game going on between the 
authorities and the opposition, or on the geo-political conditions which they 
were unable to evaluate, not necessarily in the context of struggle for realiz-
ing national imponderables, but in the context of compromise necessary for 
achieving the scope of freedom available at the time. Idealistic perception of 
political life did not allow young activists to observe the necessity to regain 
independence through gradual, evolutionary changes, which – at least at the 
beginning of the transformation period of 1988-1989 – assumed that compro-
mise with the authorities would be necessary. The failure to observe this logic 
of events caused the defeat of the young political opposition as a political entity, 
and its final elimination from public life.
Translated by Anna Sekułowicz
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The International Legal Status 
of Lithuania and its Resistance 
to the Soviet Union
The aim of this article is to examine, from the standpoint of international law, 
the status of Lithuania and its Resistance to the Soviet Union in the period of 
1940-1990. Certainly there is sufficient uniformity of views on this issue, as well 
as in general, on the illegality of the 1940 annexation and the legal continuity 
of the Baltic States. 1 However, these issues are not always sufficiently clarified, 
in particular for the public, when they come to the more concrete details or 
events, such as how to treat the former Lithuanian SSR and its ‘national’ au-
thorities; or what the status of the members of the Lithuanian Resistance was, 
in particular those who participated in the underground political organisations 
1 E.g., a comprehensive bibliography consisting of more than 100 positions on matters 
related to Baltic statehood is provided by D. A. Loeber in: D. A. Loeber, “Legal 
Consequences of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact for the Baltic States: On the Obligation 
‘to Overcome the Problems Inherited from the Past,’” Baltic Yearbook of International 
Law 1 (2001), p. 153-166. In addition, see the relevant articles of L. Mälksoo, R. 
Satkauskas, I. Ziemele, and D. Žalimas in 1 and 3 Baltic Yearbook of International Law 
(2001, 2003) and, e.g., the following publications: R. Kherad, “La Réconnaisance 
Internationale des Etats Baltes,” in The Baltic Path to Independence, ed. A. Sprudzs (New 
York: William S. Hein & Co., 1994), p. 293-322; R. Yakemtchouk, “Les republiques 
baltes en droit international: Echec d’une annexation operee en violation du droit des 
gens,” in The Baltic Path to Independence, ed. A. Sprudzs (New York: William S. Hein 
& Co., 1994), p. 261-291; I. Ziemele, State Continuity and Nationality: the Baltic States 
and Russia (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005), p. 21-43; L. Malksoo, Illegal 
Annexation and State Continuity: the Case of the Incorporation of the Baltic States by 
the USSR (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2003), p. 45-77; D. Žalimas, Lietuvos 
Respublikos nepriklausomybės atkūrimo 1990 m. kovo 11 d. tarptautiniai teisiniai pagrindai 
ir pasekmės (Vilnius: Demokratinės politikos institutas, 2005), p. 257-261.
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after the suppression of the armed Resistance; or how to assess the events of 
January 1991 in Vilnius (i.e., as an act of aggression or an attempted coup d’état). 
In the wider Central and Eastern European context questions arise about the 
differences in the international legal status of Lithuania and the other two 
Baltic States, on the one hand, and the former Soviet republics, like Belarus 
or Ukraine, on the other, or about the differences between the Baltic States, 
which had been incorporated into the USSR, and the Central European States 
(e.g., Poland, the former Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Romania), which were 
formally independent in the Soviet-led socialist camp (soclagerj) but also had 
Soviet troops deployed on their soil.
It is unlikely that all of these issues can be addressed in one article, but 
they all have a common core, that is, the international legal status of Lithuania 
from 1940; in turn, the key issue here is the international legal assessment of the 
Soviet acts against Lithuania undertaken in June 1940. Recalling an answer to 
that key issue is the first reason for this article: if one knows the legally sound 
answer to the question of what happened in Lithuania in 1940, then it will not be 
hard to resolve all other questions related to Lithuania’s history from 1940-1990.
One more reason to recall the international legal assessment of the events 
of 1940, and in general Lithuania from 1940-1990, is that sometimes in political, 
historical or even legal discourse one can notice a certain reluctance to call 
things by their true names, avoiding, for example, such terms as ‘aggression’ 
or ‘occupation’ and to use instead more neutral terms, such as ‘annexation’ or 
‘incorporation.’ This is an expression of ‘political correctness,’ due to which we 
sometimes tend to forget that there were actually two aggressors responsible 
for the beginning of WWII: it was the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of August 
23, 1939 which opened the way for Nazi Germany to launch aggression against 
Poland, soon followed by the Soviet Union and the division of Poland by these 
two states; it then also gave a free hand to the Soviet Union to start war against 
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Finland, to commit aggression against Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and to 
seize a part of Romania.
Apart from political correctness, one can also notice open attempts to 
deny the Soviet crimes, in particular from the side of the Russian Federation, 
which claims to continue the international legal personality of the USSR. One 
of the most striking examples is that, disregarding the provisions of the 1991 
Treaty with Lithuania on the Fundamentals of Interstate Relations, 2 since 
approximately 2000 Russia has taken a line on justification of the 1940 Soviet 
seizure of the Baltic States 3 and has even made the glorification of the Soviet 
2 In the preamble of this Treaty Russia expressed its conviction that the USSR had 
to remove the consequences of the 1940 annexation of Lithuania. However, most 
importantly, by virtue of Article 1 of the Treaty, Russia recognised the Republic of 
Lithuania as a fully-fledged subject of international law and a sovereign State under 
its State status defined in the fundamental acts of 11 March 1990. This means that Russia 
has recognised all the principles declared by those acts and the March 11, 1990 Act 
on the Restoration of Independence of the Republic of Lithuania, including the fact 
of the 1940 aggression against Lithuania, the illegality of the subsequent occupation 
and annexation of Lithuania, and the legal continuity and identity of the Republic of 
Lithuania inherent in the acts of March 11, 1990; i.e., in general Russia has accepted the 
concept of the State of Lithuania which was founded in 1918 and liberated on 11 March 
1990 from Soviet occupation which began in 1940. See: the July 29, 1991 Treaty on 
the Fundamentals of Interstate Relations between the Republic of Lithuania and the 
Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic, Lietuvos aidas, 30 July 1991; English text of 
the Treaty in: Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review 1 (1998), <http://www.lfpr.lt/uploads/
File/1998-1/Treaty.pdf> (accessed on 1 November 2013).
3 The most characteristic here is the June 9, 2000 Statement No. 342 of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation concerning the beginning to consider 
by the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania the draft Law on Compensation of the 
Damage Resulting from the Soviet Occupation, in which material claims to Russia 
are raised, see the full English text in: D. Žalimas, “Commentary to the Law of the 
Republic of Lithuania on Compensation of Damage Resulting from the Occupation of 
the USSR,” Baltic Yearbook of International Law 3 (2003), p. 120-121 (footnote 56). Inter 
alia this Statement declared that ‘the USSR troops were introduced (into Lithuania) 
in 1940 with the consent of the highest leadership of that State, which had been 
received in the framework of international law of that time. During the Soviet period 
there (in Lithuania) the power functions had been exercised by national authorities. 
The 3 August 1940 Resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on Lithuania’s 
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past (including Stalin’s period) a part of its official ideology. 4 Thus, it is also 
worth investigating whether the denial of Soviet crimes could have any ground 
in international law.
Before assessing the 1940 Soviet acts taken with respect to Lithuania in 
the light of international law, it is reasonable to recall the broader international 
context of that time: the 1939 secret agreements of the Molotov-Ribbentrop 
Pact between the German Reich and the USSR, which was the starting point 
of a number of forceful acts committed by those two states against others, in-
cluding the incorporation of Lithuania and the two other Baltic States into the 
Soviet Union. Therefore the first part of this article deals with the international 
legal evaluation of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, in order to demonstrate 
whether the Soviet acts of 1940 could have any legal grounds arising out of 
the pact. Though, certainly, the conclusion of the pact and the subsequent 
Soviet actions against Lithuania can be seen as separate historical events that 
admission to the Soviet Union was preceded by the corresponding appeals of the 
highest representative organs of the Baltic States’ and concluded that ‘it is wrong to 
qualify Lithuania’s entry into the USSR as the result of unilateral actions of the latter. 
Statements about Lithuania’s “occupation” and “annexation” by the Soviet Union, as 
well as related claims of any nature ignore political, historical and juridical realities and, 
consequently, are groundless.’
4 E.g., on November 8, 2012, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 
released a statement on the judicial prosecution by Lithuania of the former Soviet 
security official M. Tabakaev, in which it condemned the conviction of the said person 
for the deportation of the Lithuanian population from the territory of the occupied 
Lithuania to the Soviet Union; the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs also stated 
that this kind of conviction was grounded on an allegedly false concept of the Soviet 
occupation, and promised all the material and moral support for the convicted person 
and other Soviet veterans allegedly persecuted for political reasons. See: the November 
8, 2012 Response of the Official Representative of the MFA of the Russian Federation 
A. K. Lukashevich to the Question of Mass Media Regarding the Judicial Prosecution 
of the Veteran of the USSR Law-Enforcement Organs M. Tabakaev, <http://www.mid.
ru /brp_4.nsf/newsline/ F48062F0D44BE58044257AB000586E32> (accessed on 26 
February 2013).
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can be assessed separately, 5 i.e. the legal qualification of the events of 1940 
would nevertheless be the same, with or without taking into account the legal 
assessment of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.
The second and most important part of this article is designed namely for 
the international legal assessment of the 1940 Soviet acts taken in and with 
respect to Lithuania. Logically, the subsequent parts are devoted to the out-
come of that assessment: the third part examines the international legal status 
of Lithuania from 1940 to 1990, including the status of the Lithuanian SSR, 
the key issue being whether Lithuania has ever been a legitimate part of the 
former USSR, while the fourth and final part is focused on the legal status of 
the Resistance against Soviet rule in Lithuania.
It is assumed that the reader is familiar enough with the historical back-
ground of the events that fall within the scope of this article. Therefore only 
the main historical facts and their most significant details, as far as they are 
necessary for the international legal analysis, are provided in this article.
5 N. Šepetys, Molotovo – Ribbentropo paktas ir Lietuva (Vilnius: Aidai, 2006), p. 75-76.
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International Legal Assessment of 
the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact
It is well known that on August 23 and September 28, 1939 the German Re-
ich and the USSR signed two secret protocols on the division of the spheres 
of interests in Europe, including the fate of Lithuania (those two protocols 
together with the third, 6 dated January 10, 1941 are usually referred to as the 
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact 7). The Republic of Lithuania, whose independence 
had been officially recognised by the international community, including both 
signatories of those protocols, was finally assigned to the Soviet zone of interests, 
and ‘the special measures’ to be taken by the Soviet government to protect its 
interests on Lithuania’s territory were already foreseen in the second protocol. 
Those special measures in practice brought about the occupation and annex-
ation of Lithuania in 1940. 8 As the true content of political agreements can be 
seen from mutual relations and intentions of the parties to those agreements, 9 
one can state that without any doubt the true intentions of the parties to the 
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact were aggressive. 10 In essence the German Reich 
6 According to this protocol, in exchange for monetary compensation from the Soviet 
Union the German Reich waived its claim to a part of Lithuania’s territory that 
had been assigned to Germany pursuant to the second secret protocol of September 
28, 1939, as this part of Lithuania’s territory from June 15, 1940 had already 
been seized by the Soviets.
7 Texts of all three protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact can be found, e.g., in: Eesti 
Teaduste Akadeemia Toimetised 39(2) (1990), p. 208-233; СССР – Германия, 1939-1941, 
vol. 1 (Vilnius: Mokslas, 1989), p. 62-64, 109-110; СССР – Германия, 1939-1941, vol. 2 
(Mokslas, Vilnius, 1989), p. 141.
8 This is also one of the conclusions reached in 1989 by the Commission of the Supreme 
Council of the Lithuanian SSR for the Examination of the German-
Soviet Agreements of 1939 and their Consequences. See the August 21, 1989 
Conclusions of the Commission in: Tiesa, 22 August 1989.
9 И. И. Лукашук, Международное право: общая часть (Москва: БЕК, 1996), p. 32-33.
10 L. Hannikainen, “The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and Imperative 
Norms of International Law,” Eesti Teaduste Akadeemia Toimetised 39(2) (1990), p. 136.
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and the USSR agreed on a territorial division between themselves not only of 
Poland, but also of Lithuania (as a part of Lithuania’s territory was assigned to 
Germany), as well as to harmonise their aggressive plans (territorial seizures) 
against the other states.
From the standpoint of international law, the secret protocols of the Mo-
lotov-Ribbentrop Pact have to be regarded as null and void, ‘invalid from the 
very moment of their signing (ex nunc).’ 11 They were declared null and void by 
both signatories in 1989. 12 In particular, the Soviet Union declared that by the 
December 24, 1989 Resolution of the Congress of People’s Deputies of the USSR 
on the Political and Juridical Appraisal of the Soviet-German Non-aggression 
Treaty of 1939, 13 whereby the Congress of People’s Deputies of the USSR, then 
being the supreme authority of the Soviet Union, also stated that ‘territorial 
divisions into Soviet and German “spheres of influence” […] from the standpoint 
of international law were in conflict with the sovereignty and independence of 
several third countries’ (here the Congress was referring to Latvia, Lithuania, 
Estonia, Poland and Finland) and that, although the secret protocols of the 
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact had not formed a new basis for relationships of the 
USSR with those third countries, they were used ‘for ultimatums and pressure 
by force on (those) other States in breach of legal obligations assumed (by the 
11 H. Lindpere, “Evaluation of the Soviet-German Pacts of August 23 and September 28, 
1939, from the Standpoint of International Law,” Eesti Teaduste Akadeemia Toimetised 
39(2) (1990), p. 106.
12 D. A. Loeber referred to the September 1, 1989 special Declaration on this 
issue made by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany on 
the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the outbreak of World War II. See: D. A. 
Loeber, “Consequences of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact for Lithuania of Today: 
International Law Aspects,” Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review 4 (1999), p. 104; 
D. A. Loeber, “Legal Consequences of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact for the 
Baltic States: On the Obligation ‘to Overcome the Problems Inherited from the Past,’” 
Baltic Yearbook of International Law 1 (2001), p. 131.
13 English text see in: Eesti Teaduste Akadeemia Toimetised 39(2) (1990), p. 198-199.
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USSR) towards those States’ (the Congress also specifically noted that the 
relationships of the USSR with Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia had been based 
on the 1920 peace treaties and the 1926-1933 non-aggression treaties).
Several legal grounds for nullifying the secret protocols of the Molotov-Rib-
bentrop Pact might be mentioned. First of all, their conclusion and realisation 
contravened the main principles of international law that were already in force 
in 1939, 14 such as first and foremost the prohibition of aggression (this prin-
ciple followed from Art. I of the Briand-Kellogg Pact 15 which had already be-
come a part of customary international law 16) and the respect to sovereignty of 
other states (the obligation to respect and preserve against external aggression 
the territorial integrity and political independence of states was stipulated in 
Art. 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations 17). According to the well-
known Stimson Doctrine that emerged in international law in 1932, it is a duty 
of all states not to recognise any situation, treaty or agreement which may be 
brought about by means contrary to the Covenant of the League of Nations or 
14 The August 21, 1989 Conclusions of the Commission of the Supreme Council of the 
Lithuanian SSR for the Examination of the German-Soviet Agreements of 1939 
and their Consequences, supra note 8.
15 That is the unofficial name of the August 27, 1928 General Treaty 
for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy. See: League of Nations, 
Treaty Series, vol. 94, p. 57 (No. 2137): http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/
UNTS/LON/Volume%2094/v94.pdf (accessed on 15 November 2013). 
Under Art. I of this Treaty, the High Contracting Parties condemned 
recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounced it as an 
instrument of national policy.
16 C. D. Wallace, “Kellogg-Briand Pact,” Encyclopaedia of Public International Law 3 (1982), 
p. 238.
17 The 28 April 1919 Covenant of the League of Nations. See the UNHCR webpage: http://
www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?docid=3dd8b9854 pdf (accessed on 15 
November 2013).
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the Briand-Kellogg Pact. 18 Secondly, from the standpoint of modern interna-
tional law the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact were in conflict 
with a peremptory norm jus cogens prohibiting aggression: according to Art. 
53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 19 a treaty is void if 
it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law. Thirdly, the 
secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact effaced the very raison d’être 
of the earlier treaties dealing with political status of territory, 20 i.e. the conclu-
sion of such protocols was prohibited by the earlier bilateral and multilateral 
treaties. 21 Fourthly, the secret protocols breached ‘the universally recognised 
principle of law of treaties pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt – a treaty does 
not grant rights in regard to the third party nor does it create obligations to 
it.’ 22 And, finally, the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact had 
18 See: W. J. H. Hough III, “The Annexation of the Baltic States and Its 
Effect on the Development of Law Prohibiting Forcible Seizure of Territory,” New York 
Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law 6:2 (1985), p. 327-329.
19 See: United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155, p. 331: http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/
instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf (last accessed on 15 November 2013).
20 V. Vadapalas, V. Žalys, “Secret Protocols to the Soviet-German Treaties of 1939 and the 
Problem of Prescription in International Law,” Eesti Teaduste Akadeemia Toimetised 
39(2) (1990), p. 130.
21 Apart from the mentioned multilateral treaties (the Briand-Kellogg Pact and the 
Covenant of the League of Nations), one can also recall in this regard bilateral 
treaties of the USSR and the Republic of Lithuania: e.g., by concluding the secret 
protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the Soviet Union breached its obligations 
under Art. I of the 1920 Peace Treaty with Lithuania, according to which the 
then Soviet Russia unreservedly recognised the independence of Lithuania and 
renounced forever all sovereign rights over the Lithuanian people and 
territory, and under Art. 2 of the 1926 Non-aggression Treaty with Lithuania 
that placed both parties under the obligation ‘to respect in all circumstances the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of each other.’ See D. Žalimas, “Legal Issues on the 
Continuity of the Republic of Lithuania,” Baltic Yearbook of International Law 1 (2001), 
p. 3.
22 R. Müllerson, “Soviet-German Agreements of 1939 in the Light of International Law,” 
Eesti Teaduste Akadeemia Toimetised 39(2) (1990), p. 116.
344
Dainius Žalimas
never had any legitimate object, as their object was the territory of third states 
that had not belonged either of the signatories; therefore it is only logical that, 
as a treaty without an object, the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop 
Pact could never come into force.
As a consequence, those protocols could not produce any rights for the 
USSR towards Lithuania, nor could they serve as any legal basis or justification 
for the Soviet acts against and in Lithuania.
The nullity of the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact is re-
garded as a well-established historical and legal fact, on which there is a gen-
eral consensus by the European Court of Human Rights. 23 For instance, the 
Grand Chamber of the Court in the Ždanoka v. Latvia case 24 noted that the 
Baltic States lost their independence ‘in 1940 in the aftermath of the partition 
of Central and Eastern Europe agreed upon by Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s 
Soviet Union by way of secret protocol to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, an 
agreement contrary to the generally recognised principles of international law.’ 25
23 In its case-law the European Court of Justice accepts well-known historical truths and 
the facts established in international law as well as relies on the general consensus on 
those issues. See: V. Milašiūtė, “History of the Communist Regime in the European 
Court of Human Rights Cases,” Baltic Yearbook of International Law 9 (2009), p. 51-53, 
67.
24 Ždanoka v. Latvia, 16 March 2006, ECHR [GC], no. 58278/00: http://hudoc.echr.coe.
int/sites/eng/Pages/search. aspx#{%22fulltext%22:[%22%C5%BDdanoka%22],%22doc
umentcollectionid2%22:[%22GRANDCHAMBER%22,%22CHAMBER%22],%22item
id%22:[%22001-72794%22]} (accessed on 15 November 2013).
25 Similarly, in the case of Kuolelis, Bartoševičius and Burokevičius v. Lithuania (19 
February 2008, ECHR, nos. 74357/01, 26764/02 and 27434/02: http://hudoc.echr.
coe.int/sites/eng/Pages/search.aspx # {%22fulltext%22:[%22Kuolelis%22],%22docu
mentcollectionid2%22:[%22 GRANDCHAMBER %22,%22CHAMBER%22],%22ite
mid%22:[%22 001-85152%22]} ( accessed on 15 November 2013) the European Court 
of Human Rights noted that ‘on 23 August 1939 Stalin’s Soviet Union signed a non-
aggression treaty with Hitler’s Germany (the ‘Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact’). According 
to a secret additional protocol approved by the parties on 23 August and amended on 
28 September 1939, the Baltic States had been attributed to the sphere of interest of the 
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International Legal Assessment of the 
1940 Soviet Acts against Lithuania
As regards the 1940 events in the Baltic States, the European Court of Human 
Rights also perceives the Soviet armed invasion into these countries and their 
subsequent forceful incorporation into the Soviet Union as a well-established 
fact. For instance, in the Ždanoka v. Latvia case 26 the Court stated that in June 
1940 ‘the Soviet army invaded’ the Baltic States, the legitimate governments 
were removed, new (‘people’s’) governments were formed under the direction 
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and ‘the ensuing annexation of 
Latvia by the Soviet Union was orchestrated and conducted under the authority 
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.’ Again, similarly in the case of 
Kuolelis, Bartoševičius and Burokevičius v. Lithuania, 27 the Court stated that 
‘following an ultimatum to allow an unlimited number of Soviet troops to be 
stationed in the Baltic countries, on June 15, 1940 the Soviet Army invaded 
Lithuania. 28 The Government of Lithuania was removed from office, and a new 
government was formed under the direction of the Communist Party of the 
USSR in the event of a future territorial and political rearrangement of the territories 
of these then independent countries.’ The fact of the partition of Eastern Europe, in 
particular Poland, by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was also mentioned in the case of 
Janowiec and Others v. Russia (16 April 2012), ECHR, 21 October 2013, ECHR [GC], 
nos. 55508/07 and 29520/09: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/Pages/search.aspx-
#{%22fulltext%22:[%22Janowiec%22],%22documentcollectionid2%22:[%22GRANDC
HAMBER%22,%22CHAMBER%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-110513%22]} and http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/Pages/search.aspx #{%22fulltext%22:[%22Janowiec%22]
,%22documentcollectionid2%22:[%22GRANDCHAMBER%22,%22CHAMBER%22],
%22itemid%22:[%22001-127684%22]} (accessed on 16 November 2013).
26 Supra note 24.
27 Supra note 25.
28 To compare, in the case of Janowiec and Others v. Russia (supra note 25) the European 
Court of Human Rights in identical and similar terms characterised the 1939 Nazi and 
Soviet acts against Poland: ‘on 1 September 1939 Germany invaded Poland,’ and ‘on 17 
September 1939 the Soviet Red Army marched into Polish territory.’
346
Dainius Žalimas
Soviet Union, the USSR’s only party.’ The Court went on to note that ‘on August 
3, 1940 the Soviet Union completed the annexation of Lithuania by adopting an 
act incorporating the country into the USSR, with Lithuania being called the 
“Soviet Socialist Republic of Lithuania”’ (hereinafter – the Lithuanian SSR); 
the Court also acknowledged that the government of the Lithuanian SSR was 
appointed and controlled by the Communist Party of Lithuania, a regional 
branch of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
In the course of implementation of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, on Oc-
tober 10, 1939 Lithuania was compelled by the Soviet Union to allow the estab-
lishment of Soviet military bases, while on June 14, 1940 the USSR presented 
an ultimatum to Lithuania demanding the immediate prosecution of two 
Lithuanian officials (the minister of the interior and the head of the state secu-
rity service), an immediate change of government, and immediate permission 
for additional Soviet military units to enter and occupy the most important 
centres of Lithuania. 29 The last two demands were the most important, as they 
actually put pressure on Lithuania to agree to the Soviet occupation of the country, 
as the Soviet Union had expressly sought to control the territory of Lithuania 
by means of deployment of armed forces and substitution of the Lithuanian 
government. Here it is also worth recalling that the element of effective control 
and authority is decisive for military occupation: as on several occasions it was 
stated by the International Court of Justice that, 30 ‘under customary interna-
29 The June 14, 1940 Statement of the Soviet Government to the Lithuanian Government, 
СССР и Литва в годы Второй мировой войны: сборник документов, vol. 1 (Vilnius: 
LII leidykla, 2006), p. 597-599.
30 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 9 
July 2004, ICJ, Advisory Opinion, para. 78, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 136: http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/131/1671.pdf (accessed on 26 November 2013); Armed Activities on 
the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), 19 December 
2005, ICJ, Judgment, Merits, paras. 172-173, I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 168: http://www.icj-cij.
org/docket/files/116/10455.pdf (accessed on 26 November 2013).
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tional law, as reflected in Art. 42 of the Hague Regulations 31 of 1907, territory 
is considered to be occupied when it is actually placed under the authority 
of a hostile army, and the occupation extends only to the territory where such 
authority has been established and can be exercised.’
Having presented the ultimatum to Lithuania, Soviet Prime Minister and 
Foreign Minister Molotov made clear that, irrespective of the answer, Soviet 
troops would enter Lithuanian territory on the next day. 32 Indeed, by June 15, 
1940 the Soviet Union had already finished all the military and logistics prepa-
rations for a large scale invasion of Lithuania, hostilities on and occupation of 
Lithuanian territory, and the movement of the Soviet troops in and within the 
Lithuanian territory was typical of military occupation. 33 This can be confirmed 
by a number of the Soviet combat orders of June 7-15, 1940: instructions and 
reports on the preparation of military hospitals, the evacuation of eventual 
prisoners of war and the preparation of special camps for them, combat prepa-
ration and equipment of military units, schemes of movement and stationing 
of troops, as well as occupation of key points, including the temporary capital 
31 See the text of Art. 42 of the 1907 Regulations Respecting the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land (Annex to the IV Hague Convention Respecting 
the Laws and Customs of War on Land) in the website of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross: http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.
xsp?documentId=4D47F92DF3966A7EC12563CD002D6788&action=openDocument 
(accessed on 26 November 2013).
32 J. Urbšys, Lietuva lemtingaisiais 1939-1940 metais (Vilnius: Mintis, 1988), p. 50; From the 
Diary of V. M. Molotov: 11.50 pm of June 14, 1940, meeting with the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania J. Urbšys, СССР и Литва в годы Второй мировой 
войны: сборник документов, vol. 1 (Vilnius: LII leidykla, 2006), p. 595-597.
33 Н. С. Лебедева, “Вводная статья,” in СССР и Литва в годы Второй мировой 
войны: сборник документов, vol. 1 (Vilnius: LII leidykla, 2006), p. 51-52; S. 
Katuoka, J. Žilinskas, “Lietuva ir tarptautinė teisė: 1940-1991 m. SSRS okupacijos 
neigimo teisiniame diskurse nepagrįstumas,” in Regnum est. 1990 m. Kovo 11-osios 
Nepriklausomybės Aktui – 20: Liber Amicorum Vytautui Landsbergiui (Vilnius: Mykolo 
Romerio universiteto Leidybos centras, 2010), p. 277-278.
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Kaunas, Vilnius and other cities, main roads, bridges and airports. 34 Moreover, 
the Soviet military invasion was started by a number of armed attacks against 
the Lithuanian border police stations prior 35 to the expiry of the terms of the 
ultimatum (June 15, 1940, 10 am). 36
In such a situation, after some hesitation, the Government of Lithuania 
decided not to resist and accepted the Soviet ultimatum. On June 15, 1940 
additional Soviet troops crossed the border and, together with the already 
stationed units, marched to the ordered points of their destination, and began 
to occupy and control the whole country.
Against this background, it is only logical to presume that the June 15, 1940 
Soviet armed invasion into Lithuania has to be treated as an act of aggression 
34 See the corresponding documents in: СССР и Литва в годы Второй мировой войны: 
сборник документов, vol. 1 (Vilnius: LII leidykla, 2006), p. 566-571, 578-579, 586-589, 
600-601, 605-609.
35 See about at least two attacks on the night of June 15, 1940: СССР и Литва в годы 
Второй мировой войны: сборник документов, vol. 1 (Vilnius: LII leidykla, 2006), 
p. 610-612.
36 On April 29, 2010 the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania adopted the Resolution on 
the 70th Anniversary of the Murder of the Border Police Officer A. Barauskas and the 
Beginning of the Aggression of the Soviet Union against the Republic of Lithuania, 
Valstybės žinios 52-2551 (2010). The Russian text of the Resolution is available at the 
official website of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania: http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/
inter3/dokpaieska.showdoc_l?p_id=376025 (accessed on 10 December 2013). In the 
Resolution the Seimas stated that in the early morning of June 15, 1940, prior to the 
expiration of the term of the Soviet ultimatum, a squad of the Soviet armed forces 
invaded the territory of the Republic of Lithuania, attacked the Lithuanian Ūta border 
police station and savagely murdered the unarmed chief guard Aleksandras Barauskas. 
The Seimas emphasised further that ‘in such a manner the USSR started the aggression 
against the Republic of Lithuania seeking to intimidate anyone who would dare to 
resist. The armed attack against the Ūta border station and the murder of its chief guard 
Aleksandras Barauskas is one of the facts that deny the Soviet fabrications that the 
armed force has not been used against Lithuania and that Lithuania itself has admitted 
the USSR armed forces.’
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(aggressive war) 37 that was ipso facto a manifestly grave breach of Arts. I and 
II of the Briand-Kellogg Pact, i.e. of the international legal obligations not to 
resort to war and to settle all disputes solely by peaceful means. 38 Indeed, the 
Soviet armed invasion fully met the definition of the term ‘act of aggression’ as 
defined in para. 2 of Art. II of the Convention for the Definition of Aggression 
between Lithuania and the USSR, 39 which was signed on July 5, 1933 in London: 
it was an exactly ‘invasion by armed forces, with or without a declaration of 
war, of the territory of another State.’ 40
It should be emphasised that, according to its content, this bilateral Con-
vention was identical to two multilateral conventions for the definition of 
aggression, which were also signed in London shortly before: the first, most 
often referred to as the London Convention for the Definition of Aggression, 
was signed on July 3, 1933 by the USSR and its seven neighbouring States, 41 
including Estonia, Latvia and Poland (Finland acceded to this Convention 
later in 1934); the second one was signed on July 4, 1933 between the USSR and 
37 As Lauri Hannikainen pointed out, ‘the Soviet Union’s occupations and annexation of 
the Baltic States after a successful threat of an armed attack was equivalent to a war of 
aggression.’ See: supra note 10, p. 136.
38 In addition to that, there were a number of other breaches by the 
USSR of its international obligations, including those provided by the 
abovementioned treaties: Art. 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, Art. I of the 
1920 Peace Treaty with Lithuania, Arts. 1-3 and 5 of the 1926 Non-aggression Treaty 
with Lithuania. See: the August 21, 1989 Conclusions of the Commission of the 
Supreme Council of the Lithuanian SSR for the Examination of the German-
Soviet Agreements of 1939 and their Consequences, supra note 8.
39 Supra note 20, p. 131.
40 Convention between Lithuania and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the 
Definition of Aggression. See: League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 148, p. 79 (No. 
3405): http://www.worldlii.org/int/other/treaties/LNTSer/1934/95.html (accessed on 
15 December 2013).
41 Convention for the Definition of Aggression. See: League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 
147, p. 67 (No. 3391): http://www.worldlii.org/int/other/treaties/LNTSer/1934/75.
html (accessed on 15 December 2013).
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its four neighbouring states 42 (apart from the Soviet Union, both conventions 
were signed also by Romania and Turkey). Thus all three London conventions 
bound the USSR and 11 of its neighbours in different combinations, including 
Lithuania. 43 The most important is that all three conventions shared the same 
purpose – to clarify the meaning of aggression as already prohibited by the 
Briand-Kellogg Pact and in such a way to specify more precisely the obligations 
arising from that pact. 44 This was clear from the preambles of the conventions, 
whereby Briand-Kellogg was referred to as the basis that ‘prohibits all aggres-
sion’ and it was declared necessary ‘in the interests of the general security, to 
define aggression as specifically as possible.’
It is also important that in all three conventions an invasion by armed forces 
of the territory of another state and an attack by armed forces on the territory 
of another state (as well, ‘with or without a declaration of war’) were named as 
different acts of aggression (they were stipulated in different paragraphs of the 
same Art. II). That leads to the conclusion that an invasion was not necessarily 
covered by an attack, but also had to include so-called ‘peaceful invasions,’ 
those not meeting any resistance from the invaded country or conducted with 
the forced consent of the latter. This is exactly the situation of the June 15, 1940 
armed Soviet invasion of Lithuania.
42 Convention for the Definition of Aggression between Romania, the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, Czechoslovakia, Turkey and Yugoslavia. See: League of Nations, 
Treaty Series, vol. 148, p. 211 (No. 3414): http://www.worldlii.org/int/other/treaties/
LNTSer/1934/102.html (accessed on 15 December 2013).
43 The bilateral Lithuanian-Soviet convention was concluded on Lithuania’s 
initiative, as due to the unsettled Vilnius issue at that time Lithuania was not 
willing to sign the same multilateral convention with Poland.
44 See: I. Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1963), p. 75-76, 103; P. Kūris, Atsakomybės tarptautinėje teisėje problemos 
(Vilnius: Vilniaus valstybinis V. Kapsuko universitetas, 1970), p. 43.
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How then does one assess the abovementioned argument regarding the 
consent of Lithuania as a factor legitimising the Soviet invasion? 45 Could 
this argument disprove the said presumption of aggression? From the very 
beginning it is apparent that this argument is not original; the same argument 
was raised to justify aggressive acts of the German Reich against other states 
(including Austria, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Belgium, and Luxembourg) 
before the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal by the accused Nazi 
leaders. For example, there is a striking similarity between the Russian argument 
regarding the consent of Lithuania over its invasion and annexation and the 
Nazis’ argument about the consent or even desire of Austria to unite with the 
German Reich. As regards the latter, the Nuremberg Tribunal firmly rejected 
this kind of argument: the 1938 Anschluss was treated as an act of aggression 
(aggressive war), since Austria’s alleged consent was regarded by the Tribunal 
as ‘really immaterial, for the facts plainly prove that the methods employed 
to achieve the object were those of an aggressor. The ultimate factor was the 
armed might of Germany ready to be used if any resistance was encountered.’ 46 
The rule here is more than clear: the consent of a victim (in particular, when 
given under coercion) to an act of aggression cannot be considered as legally 
valid and decisive in assessing legitimacy of that act, 47 and such a consent has 
45 See supra note 3.
46 Extract from the September 30-October 1, 1946 Judgement of the International 
Military Tribunal for the Trial of Major German War Criminals. See the 
website of the Avalon Project at Yale Law School: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/
judaus.asp (accessed on 17 December 2013); Нюрнбергский процесс над главными 
немецкими военными преступниками, vol. 7 (Москва: Госюриздат, 1961), p. 336.
47 Taking into account the Nuremberg Tribunal’s assessment of the Austrian 
Anschluss, this rule has been confirmed by the International Law Commission in Arts. 
20 and 26 of the 2001 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts. See para. 4 (footnote 321) of the Commission’s commentary to Art. 
20 of those Draft Articles, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts: commentaries, Official Records of the UN General Assembly, Fifty-sixth session, 
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to be regarded as null and void. 48 There is no legal ground to assess the 1940 
Lithuanian case differently from the Austrian Anschluss, as otherwise inter-
national law would lose its objective legal character. It should be added here 
that the universality of the Nuremberg principles has been generally recognised. 
Serving as excellent examples of proof are several cases heard by the European 
Court of Human Rights: in its almost identical decisions on admissibility in 
the cases of Kolk and Kislyiy v. Estonia 49 and Penart v. Estonia 50 the Court 
declared that ‘responsibility for crimes against humanity cannot be limited 
only to the nationals of certain countries and solely to acts committed within 
the specific time frame of the Second World War,’ and that the Nuremberg 
principles and their universal validity were perfectly known to the Soviet Union, 
which was the founder of the Nuremberg Tribunal and a founding member of 
the United Nations. Similar reasoning was applied by the court in the cases 
Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), chp. IV.E.2: http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/
english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf (accessed on 17 December 2013); J. Crawford, 
The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text 
and Commentaries (Cambridge: University Press, 2002), p. 163-164 (footnote 341).
48 Indeed, if any legal weight was given to the consent of a victim 
(in particular, given under coercion), then the prohibition of aggression would 
have become meaningless, as the (potential) aggressors would always have been 
given the prospect to easily avoid any responsibility for their actions, in particular in 
cases when resistance would have been hopeless. Such a prospect would also have 
been in conflict with the general aim of the Briand-Kellogg Pact to perpetuate 
peaceful and friendly relations between states (see supra note 15).
49 Kolk and Kislyiy v Estonia, 17 January 2006, ECHR, nos. 23052/04 and 24018/04: 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/Pages/search.aspx #{%22fulltext%22:[%22kolk%2
2],%22documentcollectionid2%22:[%22GRANDCHAMBER%22,%22CHAMBER%22
,%22DECISIONS%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-72404%22]} (accessed on 17 December 
2013).
50 Penart v Estonia, 24 January 2006, ECHR, no. 14685/04: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
sites/eng/Pages/search.aspx #{%22fulltext%22:[%22penart%22],%22documentcollecti
onid2%22:[%22GRANDCHAMBER%22,%22CHAMBER%22,%22DECISIONS%22],
%22itemid%22:[%22001-72685%22]} (accessed 17 December 2013).
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of Kononov v. Latvia 51 and Janowiec and Others v. Russia, 52 whereby it relied 
inter alia on the Nuremberg principles, thus impliedly rejecting the Russian 
argument that those principles could not be applied to the acts committed by 
the Soviet Union and the members of its armed forces. Thus, the Nuremberg 
rule of invalidity of consent with aggression can and should be applied to the 
1940 Soviet invasion of Lithuania and the other two Baltic States.
Moreover, before the invasion into Lithuania, in 1938 the Soviet Union 
itself in the strongest possible terms condemned that kind of invasion by pro-
claiming in the League of Nations that neither the direct seizures and annex-
ations of other peoples’ territory, nor ‘those cases where such annexations are 
camouflaged by the setting-up of puppet “national” governments, allegedly 
independent, but in reality serving merely as a screen for, and an agency of, 
the foreign invader,’ could ever be recognised as legal. 53 One of the best ex-
amples of the latter case is precisely the 1940 Soviet invasion, occupation and 
annexation of Lithuania. It is also worth recalling that, by the December 24, 
1989 Resolution of the Congress of People’s Deputies of the USSR on the Po-
litical and Juridical Appraisal of the Soviet-German Non-aggression Treaty of 
1939, 54 the Soviet Union acknowledged breaches of the 1920 Peace Treaty and 
the 1926 Non-aggression Treaty with Lithuania. Bearing that in mind, one is 
simply compelled to draw the conclusion that in such a way the USSR itself 
had recognised the 1940 aggression against Lithuania, because that is the only 
logical way to explain the acknowledgment of those breaches, i.e. it is obvious 
51 Kononov v. Latvia, 17 May 2010, ECHR [GC], no. 36376/04: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
sites/eng/Pages/search.aspx #{%22fulltext%22:[%22kononov%22],%22documentcollec
tionid2%22:[%22GRANDCHAMBER%22,%22CHAMBER%22,%22DECISIONS%22]
,%22itemid%22:[%22001-98669%22]} (accessed on 17 December 2013).
52 Supra note 25.
53 Supra note 18, p. 390.
54 Supra note 13.
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that to violate both a peace treaty and a non-aggression pact one must commit 
an act of aggression. To prove the contrary would be a sophistic exercise.
To sum up, there is no alternative under international law than to treat 
the June 15, 1940 Soviet invasion into Lithuania as an act of aggression that was 
followed by other acts continuing the aggression – an illegal occupation and 
annexation. It is not accidental that Art. 3(a) of the 1974 Definition of Aggression 
by the UN General Assembly Resolution No. 3314 (XXIX), 55 in comparison 
with the 1933 conventions on the definition of aggression, 56 formally and log-
ically expanded the previous exemplary list of the acts of aggression so as to 
include not only an invasion or attack by armed forces, but also the possible 
consequences of such an invasion or attack: military occupation and annexation.
International Legal Status of Lithuania 1940-1990
Thus it is well established that in 1940 Lithuania fell victim to Soviet aggres-
sion. Then the next issue is the international legal status of Lithuania from 
June 15, 1940 (the first day of the Soviet invasion and occupation) to March 11, 
1990 (the restoration of the independence of the Republic of Lithuania). The 
key to the answer lies in the general principle of law: ex injuria non oritur jus, 
according to which no legal benefit can be derived from an illegal act, or, to 
55 Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly during its Twenty-ninth Session, 17 
September-18 December 1974, Official Records of the UN General Assembly, Twenty-
ninth Session, Supplement No. 31 (A/9619) (United Nations, New York, 1975) 
p. 142-144: http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/
RES/3314%28XXIX%29&Lang=E&Area=RESOLUTION (accessed on 17 December 
2013).
56 The 1974 Definition of Aggression had been prepared on the basis of the 
1933 definition; however, it developed and supplemented the latter with new 
provisions reflecting the evolution of international law. See: И. И. Лукашук, Д. Мэрфи, 
“Преступления против мира,” in Нюрнбергский процесс: право против войны и 
фашизма (Москва: Институт государства и права РАН, 1996), p. 128.
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be more concrete for the purposes of the present analysis, an internationally 
wrongful act cannot be a source of legal rights for the perpetrator of that act.
The first conclusion to be made from the application of the principle ex 
injuria non oritur jus in case of the Soviet aggression against Lithuania is that 
the USSR did not have any sovereign rights (or a legal title) over Lithuania’s 
territory. Therefore, in accordance with international law, Lithuania has never 
been a legitimate part of the USSR; from the standpoint of international law, 
Lithuania could never be treated as a (former) Soviet republic. Consequently, 
in 1990 Lithuania did not secede from the Soviet Union, it rather restored its 
injured rights (independence) by liberating itself from the Soviet occupation. 57 
The Soviet Union could not acquire any rights to Lithuania’s territory due 
to a long period (almost five decades) of actual possession (effective authority) 
of that territory. 58 International law does not recognise any general term of 
prescription. 59 Moreover, there cannot be any prescription at all for an aggres-
sion that is of the most serious breaches of international law. 60
Thus, a logical consequence of the application of the principle ex injuria 
non oritur jus is that the Soviet annexation of Lithuania’s territory was null 
and void, therefore it could not alter the legal title to, or the legal status of, that 
57 See more about the international legal status and the 1990 
restoration of the independence of the Republic of Lithuania in: supra note 21, 
p. 8-21; D. Žalimas, “The Soviet Aggression against Lithuania in January 1991: 
International legal Aspects,” Baltic Yearbook of International Law 6 (2006), p. 297-300, 
321-327.
58 L. Mälksoo, Illegal Annexation and State Continuity: the Case of the Incorporation of the 
Baltic States by the USSR (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2003), p. 164-165.
59 Supra note 20, p. 132.
60 One can recall here that in its judgment the Nuremberg 
Tribunal characterised an aggression as ‘the supreme international crime 
differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated 
evil of the whole,’ Supra note 46, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/judnazi.asp#common 
(accessed on 17 December 2013), p. 327.
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territory. This can also be supported by analogy with the case of the Legal 
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territo-
ry. 61 Here the International Court of Justice noted that neither the annexation 
of a part of the occupied Palestinian territory, nor alleged partial autonomy 
of the occupied territory, nor any other legislative or administrative actions 
taken by the occupying state (Israel) could change the legal status of that 
occupied territory. In the case of Lithuania, there is no reason to come to 
different conclusions: neither the creation of the Lithuanian SSR in the ter-
ritory of Lithuania, nor the alleged partial national autonomy of that entity, 
nor any other Soviet administrative measures in Lithuania could ever change 
the legal status of the territory of the Republic of Lithuania and the Republic 
of Lithuania itself. Similarly to the case of Palestine, regardless of the Soviet 
annexation the Republic of Lithuania and its territory from 1940 to 1990 has 
to be treated as an occupied State and territory. In line with that reasoning, the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe referred to the Baltic States 
as ‘the (formerly) occupied States.’ 62
Indeed, it is only logical that there is no other alternative under interna-
tional law but to treat all the period of 1940-1990 in Lithuania’s history as that 
of the Soviet occupation (with the exception of the period of the Nazi occu-
pation in 1941-1944). As already proved, 63 on June 15, 1940 the Soviet Union 
61 Supra note 30, paras. 75-78.
62 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, On Russia’s request for 
membership of the Council of Europe, Opinion no. 193 (1996), 25 January 1996, http://
assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/AdoptedText/
TA96/Eopi193.htm (last accessed on 26 November 2013), para. 7.xii; Council of Europe, 
Parliamentary Assembly, Honouring of obligations and commitments by the Russian 
Federation, Resolution No. 1455(2005), 22 June 2005, http://assembly.coe.int/Main.
asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta05/ERES1455.htm (accessed on 26 November 
2013), para. 14.iv.
63 See part 2 of this article.
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launched a successful armed invasion that, according to international law, was 
an act of aggression. A logical consequence of that invasion was the full control 
of the territory of Lithuania by the Soviet armed forces and the introduction of 
Soviet rule. According to terms of Art. 42 of the Hague Regulations of 1907, 64 
it was a military occupation of the entire territory of Lithuania, even if it was 
achieved in 1940 without an outbreak of hostilities. Incidentally, even the ab-
sence of Lithuania’s armed resistance to the Soviet occupation can be questioned: 
keeping in mind the re-occupation by the Soviet Union of Lithuania’s territory 
in 1944-1945, one can recall the undisputed fact that then the Soviet armed 
forces met a fierce armed resistance that lasted around 10 years. 65 However, 
if to turn back to June 15, 1940, it would be hard to disagree with the position 
that the Soviet armed forces had not become less hostile to Lithuania merely 
because the latter had been forced to agree with the invasion. 66 In addition, the 
decisive factor for the existence of a military occupation is the military might 
of the occupying power and its de facto rather than de jure authority. 67 It is clear 
from the circumstances that from June 15, 1940 the Soviet military presence 
played a decisive role in managing Lithuania’s affairs and due to that military 
presence the Soviet officials had full de facto authority in Lithuania, although 
64 ‘Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the 
hostile army,’ supra note 31.
65 The organised armed resistance against the second Soviet occupation lasted until 
1953 when the leader (underground president) of the Resistance Jonas Žemaitis was 
captured, while the last active Resistance fighter fell in 1965. See more about Lithuania’s 
armed Resistance to the Soviet occupation and its legal status in: D. Žalimas, 
“Legal Status of Lithuania’s Armed Resistance to the Soviet Occupation in the 
Context of State Continuity,” Baltic Yearbook of International Law 11 (2011), p. 67-112.
66 S. Katuoka, J. Žilinskas, supra note 33, p. 278.
67 S. Katuoka, J. Žilinskas, supra note 33, p. 281; M. Bothe, “Occupatio Belligerent,” 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law 4 (1982), p. 65.
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de jure authority until the formal end of the annexation on August 3, 1940 had 
been in hands of the so-called people’s government of Lithuania.
Moreover, even if to assume that the Soviet occupation of Lithuania can be 
qualified as pacific rather than belligerent (i.e., accomplished with the consent 
and without resistance of the occupied state), that would not change the legal 
regime applicable to that occupation: pacific occupation should be treated in 
the same way as the use of force and the same norms of international law should 
be applied as in the case of classic military occupation. 68 Indeed, in the context 
of WWII the rule regarding applicability of the 1907 Hague Regulations regime 
of belligerent occupation to all the forcible pacific occupations has already 
emerged. 69 The legal grounds for that rule was ‘Marten’s Clause’ inserted into 
the preamble of the IV Hague Convention of 1907 Respecting the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land. 70 according to that clause, ‘the inhabitants and the 
belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of the 
law of nations, as they result from usages established among civilised peoples, 
from laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience.’ Therefore, 
it follows that no grey zone could ever be left for unorthodox (pacific) occu-
pations, as in that case the inhabitants of the ‘peacefully’ occupied territory 
would be denied the protection of international law and would be left at the 
mercy of the occupying power; moreover, if to make the applicability of the 
legal regime of occupation dependent on the resistance of the occupied state, 
then that regime would almost always be inapplicable, in particular if the 
much weaker state, whose resistance would be hopeless, is subjected to the 
68 M. Bothe, “Occupation, Pacific,” Encyclopedia of Public International Law 4 (1982),  
p. 67-69.
69 Supra note 58, p. 174-177, 189-191; J. Žilinskas, “Status of Members of Anti-Soviet Armed 
Resistance (Partisans’ War) of 1944-1953 in Lithuania under International Law,” 
Baltic Yearbook of International Law 11 (2011), p. 41-44.
70 Supra note 31.
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occupation. In other words, the law and administration of justice would be left 
in the hands of the criminal (aggressor). The same would also happen in cases 
where the applicability of the law of occupation was dependent solely on the 
discretion of the occupying power (e.g., the decision to terminate the regime 
of occupation after the suppression of resistance). That obviously would be 
inconsistent with the Hague regime.
That development of international law, according to which the same inter-
national legal regime has to cover all kinds of foreign occupations, is expressly 
reflected in the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War (IV Geneva Convention), 71 which includes the rules 
applicable to occupied territories: Art. 2 states that the Convention is applicable 
inter alia in cases when a state of war is not recognized by one of the parties, 
and to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory, even if the said 
occupation meets with no armed resistance.
Thus, once more it can be confirmed that, once it is established that in 
1940 the Soviet Union occupied Lithuania’s territory and the subsequent an-
nexation of that territory was null and void, the only possible international 
legal status of Lithuania’s territory in 1940-1990 was that of occupied territory, 
even if the Soviet Union did not acknowledge that status and did not apply 
the law of occupation. 72 However, that brings into question the status of the 
71 See the text in the website of the International Committee of 
the Red Cross: http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.
xsp?documentId=AE2D398352C5B028C12563CD002D6B5C&action=openDocument 
(accessed on 26 November 2013).
72 The refusal to apply the international legal rules on occupation led to the commission 
of numerous international crimes by the Soviet occupation regime, including the 
following crimes against humanity and war crimes: mass killings and torture of the 
population and the members of the Resistance, denying the latter category guarantees 
provided for combatants and prisoners of war by international law, mass deportations 
of the civilian population, mass arrests, deprivation of liberty and other persecutions 
on political grounds, forced mobilisation and recruitment to the occupation armed 
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Lithuanian SSR – the entity established by the Soviet Union in the occupied 
territory of Lithuania. Again it is only logical that, as well as its predecessors 
also established under the dictate of the Soviet officials: ‘Lithuanian people’s 
government’ and ‘Lithuanian people’s Seimas,’ the Lithuanian SSR had been 
nothing more than a puppet Soviet entity, 73 i.e. it was a mere blind tool of the 
Soviet Union, which had to disguise the aggression rather than to be an auton-
omous national authority. 74 Therefore, from the standpoint of international law, 
the Lithuanian SSR was an artificial pseudo-state entity of the Soviet Union 
rather than any form of the statehood of Lithuania. With respect to the State 
of Lithuania, the Lithuanian SSR was always a part of the state machinery of 
the foreign state, which had been established illegally on the territory of the 
State of Lithuania. Thus, the Lithuanian SSR could never be regarded as a state 
and a subject of international law; the term ‘Lithuanian SSR’ rather reflected 
the following means of administration of the occupied territory of the Republic 
of Lithuania: to administer that territory, the USSR established its subordinate 
and controlled administration and granted it a national name (the ‘Lithuanian’ 
SSR) to demonstrate the alleged national and representative character of that 
forces. The Soviet occupation directly affected around one-third of the Lithuanian 
population and one-fifth of the population was lost. For example, during the first 
Soviet occupation in 1940-1941, approximately 30 000 people became victims of the 
Soviet terror. Out of this number, over one thousand were killed in Lithuania and 
nearly 20 000 were deported to the gulag camps. At the beginning of the second Soviet 
occupation, in 1944-1956, around 120 000 people were deported from Lithuania, more 
than 20 000 members of the Resistance and a similar number of the civilian population 
were killed, around 180 000 people were imprisoned, more than 100 000 had been 
recruited to the Soviet armed forces, and nearly 450 000 people had left the country 
before the second Soviet occupation. Figures from: Crimes of the Soviet Totalitarian 
Regime in Lithuania (Vilnius: Solidarity, 2008).
73 K. Marek, Identity and Continuity of States in Public International Law 
(Geneve: Librairie E. Droz, 1954), p. 396.
74 M. Rėmeris, Lietuvos sovietizacija, 1940-1941 (Vilnius: Lituanus, 1989), p. 38.
361
The International Legal Status of Lithuania and its Resistance to the Soviet Union
administration. 75 Obviously no legal ties could ever exist between the Repub-
lic of Lithuania (as a state and a separate subject of international law) and the 
Lithuanian SSR (as a part of the state machinery of the other state); the latter 
could not have any legal powers to govern the affairs of the former.
The Resolution February 7, 1990 on the 1939 German-Soviet Treaties and 
the Liquidation of their Consequences for Lithuania 76 was adopted by the last 
Supreme Council of the Lithuanian SSR shortly before the restoration of the 
independence of the Republic of Lithuania. After condemning the aggression 
against Lithuania and its occupation and annexation as international crimes 
committed by the USSR, the Supreme Council of the Lithuanian SSR made 
the following decisions: 1) to declare unlawful and invalid the July 21, 1940 
Declaration of the puppet ‘People’s Seimas’ of Lithuania regarding Lithuania’s 
entry into the USSR; 2) to state that the August 3, 1940 Soviet Law on the 
Admission of Lithuania into the USSR was both unlawful and non-binding 
upon Lithuania. That Resolution of the Supreme Council of the Lithuanian 
SSR was unique, as even the Lithuanian SSR itself acknowledged the illegality 
of its nature and establishment in 1940.
The final outcome of the application of the principle ex injuria non oritur 
jus is the continuity of the Republic of Lithuania: the Soviet aggression could 
not abolish the State of Lithuania as a subject of international law, i.e. the 
Republic of Lithuania continued to exist as a state and an international legal 
person, despite the Soviet occupation of the whole of its territory and almost 
the complete destruction of state institutions (only the Lithuanian diplomatic 
service abroad had continued its activities representing the last Government 
of the Republic of Lithuania, dissolved on June 15, 1940). Therefore, during 
75 V. Sinkevičius, Lietuvos Respublikos pilietybė 1918-2001 metais  
(Vilnius: TIC, 2002), p. 122.
76 Lietuvos TSR AT ir Vyriausybės žinios, 8-182 (1990).
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the whole period of 1940-1990, the Republic of Lithuania and the USSR had 
always been two different States and subjects of international law, although the 
former had been illegally occupied by the latter.
Both pillars of the continuity of the State of Lithuania, the will of the state 
to exist and international recognition of the continuity, 77 have been present. As 
regards the latter pillar, the recognition of the legal continuity of the Republic 
of Lithuania logically followed the non-recognition of the illegal annexation 
of the Baltic States. 78 As regards the former pillar, the continuous resistance to 
the Soviet occupation with the aim to restore the independence of the country 
played a key role. That was demonstrated first and foremost by the strong armed 
resistance to the second Soviet occupation; after its suppression on the first 
occasion the resistance came from the underground together with the Lith-
77 Those pillars of state continuity are pointed out by Ineta Ziemele. See: I. Ziemele, 
State Continuity and Nationality: the Baltic States and Russia (Past, Present 
and Future as Defined by International Law) (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2005), p. 126.
78 See for comprehensive review of state practice concerning non-recognition of the 
annexation of the Baltic States and the continued recognition of their legal existence: 
supra note 18. See also the relevant resolutions of the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe and the European Parliament: Council of Europe, Parliamentary 
Assembly, On the Situation in the Baltic States on the Twentieth Anniversary of Their 
Forcible Incorporation into the Soviet Union, Resolution No. 189 (1960), 29 September 
1960, http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta60/
ERES189.htm (accessed on 26 November 2013); Council of Europe, Parliamentary 
Assembly, On the Situation of the Baltic Peoples, Resolution No. 872(1987), 28 January 
1987, http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta87/
ERES872.htm (accessed on 26 November 2013); European Parliament, Resolution, 13 
January 1983, supra note 18, p. 439. In all these resolutions it was stated that the Soviet 
annexation had not gained recognition and, as a corollary, a great majority of the 
democratic states continued to recognise the independent existence of the Baltic States. 
The 1975 Helsinki Final Act of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 
which provided for the principle of the inviolability of borders, had not changed the 
policy of the non-recognition of the annexation of the Baltic States, as pursued by 
the majority of the then-existing democratic states: there was also the provision of 
the Helsinki Final Act which obliged states not to recognise any occupation or other 
territorial acquisition contrary to international law.
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uanian Freedom League and the Sąjūdis in 1987-1988, and that ultimately led 
to the restoration of the independence of the Republic of Lithuania in 1990. 79
Legal Status of the Resistance to the Soviet Occupation
To determine the legal status of the Resistance to the Soviet occupation, one 
first has to find out what the civic status of the members of the Resistance was, 
i.e. whose nationals they were under international law. It is logical to assert 
that from the continuity of statehood follows the continuity of nationality, 80 
as nationality is dependent upon statehood. 81 Therefore, if the continuity of 
an occupied state is preserved under international law, the continuity of na-
tionality of that state has to be safeguarded as well.
As regards the continuity of nationality of the Republic of Lithuania in the 
light of the imposition of the Soviet nationality on Lithuanian nationals in 1940, 
two points have to be noted. First of all, any imposition on nationals of the oc-
79 In its 22 February 2013 Ruling (English text available at the official website of 
the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania: http://www.lrkt.lt/
dokumentai/2013/r130222.htm – accessed on 1 December 2013) the Constitutional 
Court of the Republic of Lithuania inter alia noted that ‘the restoration of the 
independence of the State of Lithuania was grounded on the continuity of the State of 
Lithuania, which means that the aggression that the USSR began against the Republic 
of Lithuania on June 15, 1940 (inter alia the occupation and annexation of the territory 
of the Republic of Lithuania) did not abolish the State of Lithuania as a subject of 
international law and its sovereign powers; due to the occupation of the territory of 
Lithuania and demolition of its state institutions, the implementation of the sovereign 
powers of the State of Lithuania, inter alia its international rights and obligations, were 
suspended; the annexation of the territory of the Republic of Lithuania perpetrated 
by the USSR on August 3, 1940, as a continuation of the aggression, was an act null and 
void, thus, from the viewpoint of the international law, the territory of the Republic of 
Lithuania was occupied by another state and it was never a legal part of the USSR.’
80 Supra note 77, p. 12, 388, 391.
81 J. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law  
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), p. 52.
364
Dainius Žalimas
cupied State of the nationality of the occupying State, as a consequence of the 
aggression, is illegal, null and void due to the operation of the above mentioned 
principle ex injuria jus non oritur. 82 Secondly, there is a specific guarantee for 
the continuity of nationality of an occupied State: namely, an occupying power 
has a specific duty not to impose its nationality on a national of an occupied 
territory. 83 Therefore, under international law nationals of the Republic of 
Lithuania retained their nationality regardless of the imposition on them of 
Soviet nationality: that is why all the persons who had been nationals of the 
Republic of Lithuania on the day of the Soviet occupation (June 15, 1940) and 
their descendants had to be presumed as automatically continuing nationality 
of the Republic of Lithuania, while the Soviet nationality imposed on them 
had to be regarded as null and void. 84
82 Imposition of nationality of an occupying power on nationals of an occupied 
state is regarded as one of the most serious breaches of international law. See: 
supra note 73, p. 83.
83 Under Art. 45 of the 1907 Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land (supra note 31), ‘it is forbidden to compel the inhabitants of occupied territory 
to swear allegiance to the hostile power,’ that clearly includes prohibition to impose 
nationality of an occupying power on nationals of an occupied state. Meanwhile, 
according to Art. 51 of the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War (supra note 71), ‘an occupying power may not compel 
protected persons to serve in its armed or auxiliary forces,’ that kind of restriction 
can be explained only by the continuity of nationality of an occupied state and, as its 
corollary, the prohibition to change that nationality.
84 As the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania noted in its 22 February 
2013 Ruling (supra note 79), ‘from the continuity of the State of Lithuania there stems 
a continuity of citizenship of the Republic of Lithuania which inter alia implies 
that, from the viewpoint of international and Lithuanian constitutional law, 
the imposition of USSR citizenship upon citizens of the Republic of Lithuania in 1940, as a 
consequence of the aggression of the USSR, was an act null and void; thus, this act was not 
a legal ground to lose citizenship of the Republic of Lithuania. Consequently, during 
the years of the Soviet occupation, citizens of the Republic of Lithuania (the persons 
who held citizenship of the Republic of Lithuania on 15 June 1940 and their 
children) were also not bound by the obligations related to USSR citizenship, 
inter alia the general military obligation of the USSR introduced on the 
365
The International Legal Status of Lithuania and its Resistance to the Soviet Union
Thus, in general all the members of the Resistance (both of the armed units 
and of the other underground organisations) were nationals of the Republic 
of Lithuania who could not have any commitments and obligations of loyalty 
towards the Soviet State. 85 (e.g., they were not obliged to comply with con-
scription to the Soviet armed forces). Moreover, as nationals of the illegally 
occupied state, they had a legitimate right to resist the occupation and to form 
any organisations and authorities for that purpose. Their Resistance to the 
occupation was legal and, as far as the armed Resistance is concerned, could be 
regarded as a manifestation of self-defence pursued on behalf of their State. 86 
The corollary of that is the presumption of innocence of all those Lithuanian 
nationals who have been repressed by the Soviet authorities for their Resistance, 
irrespective of whether they have been repressed in an extrajudicial (summary) 
occupied territory of the Republic of Lithuania, which had been imposed upon 
them unlawfully.’ The Court also referred to its previous Ruling of November 
13, 2006 (English text available at the official website of the Constitutional 
Court of the Republic of Lithuania: http://www.lrkt.lt/dokumentai/2006/r061113.htm 
- accessed on 1 December 2013), repeating that the ‘citizenship of the USSR’ and the 
‘citizenship of the Lithuanian SSR’ both ‘were imposed by force, were and are null 
and void; even though the citizens of the Republic of Lithuania temporarily used the 
passports of citizens of the USSR, they could not be treated as citizens of the USSR, 
i.e. as citizens of the state which had declared them as its citizens against their own will.’
85 That was also confirmed by the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania 
(see supra note 84).
86 That appraisal is also given by the Lithuanian legislation. E.g., it follows 
from the preamble of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the 16 February 
1949 Declaration of the Council of the Lithuanian Freedom Fight Movement 
(English text is available in: supra note 65, p. 105-110, Annex 1), that the 
armed Resistance of 1944-1953 is treated as self-defence of the State of Lithuania 
against the Soviet occupation. The armed fight of 1944-1953 by the forces of nationals of 
the Republic of Lithuania (volunteer soldiers) against the second Soviet occupation was 
assessed as self-defence of the Republic of Lithuania against the USSR aggression 
also by March 12, 2009 Declaration of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania on 
Recognition of Jonas Žemaitis as the Head of the State of Lithuania (English text is available 
in: supra note 65, p. 111-112, Annex 2).
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way or sentenced in accordance with judicial procedure for crimes against the 
Soviet State and its totalitarian regime.
Due to the continuity of the State of Lithuania and its nationality, the Re-
sistance in Lithuania has to be differentiated from classical national liberation 
movements striving for self-determination by establishing an independent State. 
The Resistance was acting on behalf of the already existing State of Lithuania 
and sought to defend that state against the foreign occupation and restore its 
independence. Therefore the partisan war against the Soviet occupation had 
to be regarded as an international armed conflict, a war between two states 
(the Soviet Union, as an occupying power, and the Republic of Lithuania, as 
an occupied State represented by the Resistance). 87
Two more conclusions regarding the status of the armed Resistance can 
be drawn, taking into account the continuity of the Republic of Lithuania. 88 
First, it logically follows that the armed forces of the Resistance had to be 
regarded as belligerent forces of the Republic of Lithuania (the armed forces 
of a State rather than insurgents or rebels). Service in these forces is considered 
to have been service to the State of Lithuania. 89 Under international law, the 
members of these forces had to be entitled to the status of combatants and, 
87 B. Gailius, “The Guerrilla War of 1944-1953 in the Historical, Political and Legal 
Culture of Contemporary Lithuania: Summary of Doctoral Dissertation.” 
(Vilnius University, 2009), p. 23-24.
88 See in more detail: supra note 65, p. 87-104.
89 As it follows from the February 22, 2013 Ruling of the Constitutional 
Court of the Republic of Lithuania (supra note 79), prior to the restoration of the 
independence the service to the Republic of Lithuania was possible only in the survived 
institutions of the State of Lithuania – the diplomatic missions and consular posts 
abroad (the diplomatic service of the Republic of Lithuania) – and in the structures 
(inter alia in the Lithuanian Freedom Fight Movement) of the organised armed 
Resistance against the occupation, which took place for a certain time on the 
occupied territory of the Republic of Lithuania.
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in case of captivity, prisoners of war. 90 Indeed, the partisans complied with 
the criteria of combatants – soldiers of volunteer armed forces – provided by 
international law of that time 91 (e.g., with the criteria laid down in Art. 1 of 
the 1907 Hague Regulations, 92 according to which a volunteer soldier has to 
be considered a combatant if he is commanded by a person responsible for 
his subordinates, has a fixed distinctive emblem recognisable at a distance, 
carries arms openly and conducts operations in accordance with the laws and 
customs of war).
Secondly, the leadership of the centralised armed Resistance to the second 
Soviet occupation, i.e. the Council of the Lithuanian Freedom Fight Movement 
(the LFFM Council) established in February 1949, is considered to have been 
the legitimate government of the Republic of Lithuania, 93 while the head of the 
Resistance (the Chairman of the LFFM Council Presidium Jonas Žemaitis) 
is regarded as the then acting head of the State of Lithuania (as was proclaimed 
90 At least the 1907 Hague Regulations and the 1929 Geneva conventions for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in armies in the Field 
and on the Treatment of Prisoners of War could be applicable to both parties to the 
conflict (the partisan forces of the Republic of Lithuania and the USSR armed forces). 
See: J. Žilinskas, supra note 69, p. 38-41.
91 Supra note 87, p. 15-16; B. Gailius, Partizanai tada ir šiandien (Vilnius: Versus aureus, 
2006), p. 31-40; J. Žilinskas, “Lietuvos laisvės kovotojų statuso pagal tarptautinę 
teisę klausimai ir MGB agentų – smogikų bylos,” Genocidas ir rezistencija 2:16 (2004), 
p. 96-102.
92 Supra note 31.
93 That is reflected in Art. 2(2) Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the 16 February 
1949 Declaration of the Council of the Lithuanian Freedom Fight Movement 
(supra note 86), which states that LFFM Council ‘constituted the supreme political 
and military structure leading this fight and was the sole legitimate authority within the 
territory of the occupied Lithuania.’ This provision of the Law relies on para. 1 of the 16 
February 1949 Declaration of the LFFM Council Movement (English text is available 
in: supra note 65, p. 107-109, Annex 1), whereby the LFFM Council declared itself to be 
‘the supreme political body of the Nation, in charge of the political and military fight for 
the liberation of the Nation.’
368
Dainius Žalimas
by March 12, 2009 Declaration of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania on 
Recognition of Jonas Žemaitis as the Head of the State of Lithuania). 94
The LFFM Council lacked constitutional continuity with the pre-occupation 
government. However, constitutional continuity does not constitute a nec-
essary prerequisite even for a government-in-exile 95 that does not exercise 
any authority in the occupied state. In general the term ‘government’ may be 
characterised by two aspects: the actual exercise of authority and the right or 
title to exercise that authority. 96 Against this background the LFFM Council 
can be seen as sufficiently effective under the circumstances of the foreign 
occupation: contrary to any government-in-exile, it exercised a certain effec-
tive authority in the occupied country; however, it is more important that the 
LFFM Council at that time (1949-1953) was the only authority (the belligerent 
government) having the right and title to act on behalf of the occupied state 
in administering its affairs. The source of the powers of the LFFM Council to 
represent the occupied country was the sovereign will of the Lithuanian people 
(the corpus of nationals of Lithuania). It is clear that under the Soviet occupation 
there was no possibility for the Lithuanian people to form their government in 
accordance with the procedures provided by the last valid Constitution of the 
Republic of Lithuania. The only available way to establish this kind of authority 
was by utilising the structures of the Resistance. It is generally recognised that 
emergency circumstances can render imperative the creation of emergency 
laws: ‘when a state of emergency exists […] the constitution does not apply 
94 Supra note 86. In this Declaration it was proclaimed inter alia that from 
the adoption of the 16 February 1949 Declaration of the LFFM Council to his death on 
26 November 1954 the Chairman of the LFFM Council Presidium Jonas Žemaitis had 
been the Head of the State of Lithuania fighting against the occupation. See also 
the commentary of the 12 March 2009 Declaration of the Seimas in: supra note 65, 
p. 99-102.
95 Supra note 73, p. 97-99; supra note 81, p. 688.
96 Supra note 81, p. 57.
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first and foremost, but the vital interests of State and people.’ 97 Therefore, from 
the standpoint of constitutional law of the Republic of Lithuania, the LFFM 
Council has to be regarded as the supreme representative authority of the State 
of Lithuania vested with powers to express the sovereign will of its people. 98
Concluding Remarks
There are many similarities as well as some differences in the history and the 
legal status of the Baltic States and the rest of the Central and Eastern European 
countries from WWII until the end of the Cold War. First of all, the destiny of 
almost all of these nations, including Lithuania and Poland, was predetermined 
by the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Both Lithuania and 
Poland territories were divided between the two aggressors, the German Reich 
and the USSR, although the ‘German part’ of Lithuania’s territory was later 
bought by the Soviet Union.
There is a general understanding, and it has been accepted as a well-estab-
lished historical and legal fact by the European Court of Human Rights, that 
the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact are to be treated as null 
and void, since they first and foremost were in conflict with the most import-
ant principles of international law, such as the prohibition of aggression and 
the respect of sovereignty of other states; as well, those protocols had never 
had a legitimate object, therefore one could even question whether, in terms 
of international law, they could be regarded as treaties at all.
97 Citation from: supra note 73, p. 98.
98 V. Sinkevičius, “Lietuvos Laisvės Kovos Sąjūdžio Tarybos 1949 
m. vasario 16 d. deklaracija Lietuvos teisės sistemoje,” in Regnum est: 1990 m. Kovo 
11-osios Nepriklausomybės Aktui – 20. Liber Amicorum Vytautui Landsbergiui 
(Vilnius: Mykolo Romerio universiteto Leidybos centras, 2010), p. 56.
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There is also a sufficient uniformity of views that, like Poland, Lithuania 
fell victim to aggression. Indeed, it is clear enough from both the factual and 
legal circumstances (and also taken as a well-established fact by the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights), that on June 15, 1940 the Soviet armed forces 
invaded Lithuania and accomplished their task to control the whole territory 
of the country. This act was an aggression, already outlawed by international 
law: in particular, it fully met the definition of the term ‘act of aggression’ as 
defined in para. 2 of Art. II of the July 5, 1933 Convention for the Definition of 
Aggression between Lithuania and the USSR: an ‘invasion by armed forces, 
with or without a declaration of war, of the territory of another State.’ A logical 
consequence of that invasion was the military occupation of Lithuania.
As regards the attempts to justify the Soviet invasion and occupation of 
Lithuania by grounding its alleged legality on Lithuania’s consent with the 
occupation, they can be regarded as an outlying position rather than a se-
rious legal argument. It is established in international law that the consent 
of a victim state given under the threat of force cannot be taken into account, 
i.e. it in principle cannot preclude the wrongfulness of such a serious breach 
of international law as aggression. Otherwise the prohibition of aggression 
would be simply meaningless, in particular it would fail to protect the weakest 
states (in terms of military might) whose resistance against the more powerful 
neighbours would not have a chance of success. As the rule on nullity of the 
consent to aggression was cited by the Nuremberg Tribunal in response to the 
Nazis’ argument to justify of their acts, one can only regret that that the Nazis 
argument has been recently revived by Russia.
Contrary to the more general issues of the secret protocols of the Molo-
tov-Ribbentrop Pact and the 1940 Soviet aggression against Lithuania, there 
is probably less agreement on how to define some consequences of that aggres-
sion, including the issue of occupation and the legal status of the Resistance 
in Lithuania. However, at least international law can provide definite answers 
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to these questions, which logically follows from the application of the general 
principle of law ex injuria jus non oritur.
First and foremost, it is in accordance with that principle to conclude 
that the annexation of Lithuania had been null and void (Lithuania has never 
been a legitimate part of the USSR); therefore there is no alternative under 
international law as to treat the regime in Lithuania from 1940 to 1990 as that 
of a foreign occupation. It should be noted that this legal qualification is ap-
plicable irrespective of the absence of Lithuania’s military resistance in 1940 
and is applicable to the entire period of 1940-1990, including that after the 
suppression of the organised armed Resistance in 1953. Otherwise we would 
acknowledge the existence of grey zones that would be incompatible with the 
nature and purposes of international humanitarian law (including the Hague 
and Geneva regimes) to provide the maximum protection for the inhabitants 
of the occupied territories, not to leave them solely at the mercy of the occu-
pying power. In other words, if to make the applicability of the legal regime 
of occupation dependent on the resistance of the occupied state or on the 
discretion of the occupying power, then that protective regime would become 
meaningless, as the law and administration of justice would often be left solely 
in the hands of the aggressor.
Thus, it is natural to treat the so-called ‘people’s authorities’ in Lithuania, 
including the Lithuanian SSR with its ‘national’ administration, as nothing 
more than a puppet entity established to disguise the Soviet aggression, in 
particular to create a certain visibility of ‘voluntary accession’ of Lithuania to 
the Soviet Union. The Lithuanian SSR was always a part of the state machin-
ery of the Soviet Union, which had been established illegally in the occupied 
territory of the State of Lithuania as a means of administration of that territory. 
As the administrative entity of a foreign State, the Lithuanian SSR was never 
any form of Lithuanian statehood and could never have had any legal ties with 
the Republic of Lithuania.
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There were a few differences between Lithuania (and the other two Baltic 
States) and Poland (and the majority of the other Central European countries). 
The occupation of Poland (at least formally) ended with the re-establishment 
of the Polish State in 1945 within its new borders under the Potsdam accords 
between the Allied Powers; thus, the rest of the period of presence of the Soviet 
Union (from 1991, the Russian Federation) armed forces was that of independent 
statehood with the ‘national’ communist regime supported by the foreign troops. 
Unlike the Lithuanian SSR, the regime of the ‘people’s republic’ of Poland, 
though also being to a certain degree of a puppet nature, was not a part of the 
Soviet State and was internationally recognised as a legitimate government of 
Poland. Therefore, as regards the legal personality of the Polish State, there is 
continuity and identity between the pre-war Republic of Poland, the ‘people’s 
republic’ of Poland and the current Republic of Poland. That is why, unlike 
the case of Lithuania, the crimes committed by the totalitarian communist 
regime in Poland could not be attributable solely to the foreign occupation 
regime (i.e. to another state); they were rather the crimes of the Polish, though 
certainly enforced, regime.
The last important outcome of the application of the principle ex injuria jus 
non oritur in case of the Soviet aggression against Lithuania is the safeguarded 
de jure continuity of the Republic of Lithuania regardless of the foreign occupa-
tion of all of its territory and the almost complete destruction of its institutions. 
Here one can find the answers to the remaining questions about the status 
of the Resistance to the Soviet occupation. The continuity of the Republic 
of Lithuania has brought about the continuity of its nationality; therefore, in 
accordance with international law, nationals of the Republic of Lithuania have 
retained their nationality and, as nationals of the illegally occupied state, they 
in principle had a legitimate right to resist the occupation as well as to form any 
organisations and authorities for that purpose. As far as the armed Resistance 
to the Soviet occupation is concerned, in the context of the state continuity it 
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has to be logically seen as legitimate self-defence of the Republic of Lithuania 
against the Soviet Union, i.e. as an international armed conflict between the 
two states. Again it is only logical to treat the Resistance forces as the armed 
forces of the Republic of Lithuania; meanwhile, against the background of 
state continuity, the supreme Resistance authority (the LFFM Council) has 
to be regarded as the legitimate government and the supreme representative 
authority of the occupied Republic of Lithuania at that time, and the head of that 
authority has to be recognised as the then acting head of the State of Lithuania.
Certainly one can argue that these conclusions and answers might seem 
too straightforward, as international law of that time was probably or allegedly 
not so clear and unambiguous, at least as far as the issues of so-called pacific 
occupations and the legal status of partisans are concerned. However, I think 
one should seek clear and unambiguous answers to the difficult questions as 
much as possible, including the challenges posed by the history to a lawyer. To 
my mind, the conclusions and answers provided in this article have a strong 
legal logic and more than any other possible legal evaluation correspond to 
the ideas of justice and rule of law. Meanwhile, uncertainty and ambiguity 
may sometimes be useful to those who seek, whatever their reasons, to erase 
the dividing line between an aggressor and a victim. That line is vital for the 
existence of modern international law.
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Cold, Hot, Boiling. Attitudes of 
Poles from the ‘Winter of the 
Century’ until the Summer of 1980
Thus far throughout history, nobody has been able to see a revolution coming. 1 
If Lenin could not do so, it was even more doubtful that Edward Gierek would 
be able to. The Revolution of Solidarity was neither an accident nor the result 
of a conspiracy, as Edward Gierek claimed in his Przerwana Dekada (Inter-
rupted Decade). It had its own genesis. 2 It was preceded by an aggravating 
revolutionary situation – increasing public discontent, tiredness and irrita-
tion stemming from the deepening economic crisis and failed hopes awoken 
by a short period of relative prosperity, often called ‘stewed-cabbage socialism.’ 3 
But the Polish revolution would not have broken out if not for the simultaneous 
emergence of revolutionary consciousness, which on the one hand included 
the need for change, felt by an increasing number of social groups, and on 
the other a growing feeling of national community and social subjectiveness 
1 The first, shortened version of the text without annotations was published in: 
Polityka Pomocnik Historyczny, 14 (2010). 
2 There are plenty of books on the subject. Mentioning only most important ones 
would take too much space, so let me just name five sources which describe the issue 
to the largest extent: M. Marody, ed., Polacy ‘80 (Warszawa, 1981); J. Koralewicz, ed., 
Społeczeństwo polskie przed kryzysem w świetle badań socjologicznych z lat 1977-1979 
(Warszawa, 1987); K. Ziemer, Polens Weg in die Kriese. Eine politische Soziologie der „Ära 
Gierek” (Frankfurt am Main, 1987); R. Laba, The Roots of Solidarity. A Political Sociology 
of Poland’s Working-Class Democratization (Princeton, 1991); A. Friszke, Czas KOR-u. 
Jacek Kuroń a geneza Solidarności (Kraków, 2011).
3 M. Zaremba, “Bigosowy socjalizm. Dekada Gierka” in Polacy wobec PRL – 
strategie przystosowawcze, ed. G. Miernik (Kielce, 2003), p. 183-200.
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among Poles. The mechanisms of spontaneous change in society started even 
before August 1980, as well as the process of waking up from conformist sleep, 
and shaping thinking in the context of ‘we, the nation’ in opposition to the 
authorities, perceived simply as ‘them.’
After the August Accords were signed, these processes gained momentum 
and new dynamics. However, looking for the sources of the revolution, we have 
to look back at several months before the event, during which crucial events 
happened, for example, ‘the Winter of the Century,’ Pope’s John Paul II visit to 
Poland, Katyń commemorations organized by the democratic opposition, the 
8th Convention of the Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR, Polish communist 
party), the last Sejm elections of their kind and the first wave of strikes in July 
1980. All these factors influenced social moods, opinions and attitudes, the 
description of which is the main goal of this essay.
It is worth taking a step aside. One does not need special insights to ob-
serve that the Solidarity revolution is not only a subject of research, but also 
of mythologisation. An apologetic approach to this phenomenon may lead 
to assuming a simplified perception of the two main actors of those times: 
the authorities and the society. It can also lead to the fallacy of historicism: 
choosing only those facts and sources that allegedly prove the necessity of the 
outbreak of public discontent in July and August 1980. The revolution of Soli-
darity did not break out by accident, but this does not mean that it necessarily 
had to happen. The human inclination towards giving causal explanations to 
events may easily lead us to the path taken previously by Marx and Engels as 
well as thousands of Marxists, convinced of ‘historical necessity.’ The fallacy 
pointed out by Karl R. Popper is even more dangerous because the very sourc-
es that we have access to seem to suggest causality. Information provided by 
the Organizational Department of the Central Committee of the communist 
party, various reports, and letters to the Central Committee and to a lesser 
degree the OBOP (Centre for Monitoring Public Opinion) mainly reported 
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grim messages for the authorities. So, if one just based an argument on those, 
it would be easy to paint an exclusively negative picture of the last months of 
Gierek’s term of office.
Not only should this fact be borne in mind, but it is also indispensable to 
confront diverse sources and point out different phenomena, which could be 
described, using a weather metaphor, as large albeit gradually melting layers 
of conformism and support for the regime. On the other hand, the signs of the 
coming storm to come were clearly visible.
The Cold
The Russian Revolution broke out after the defeats that the country suffered 
during World War I. These weakened the authority of the royal house, but they 
mainly brought economic complications, an increase in the price of bread and 
hunger in the cities, which obviously had a negative influence on the public 
mood. The French revolution was preceded by the unusually bad harvest of 1788 
followed by an exceptionally tough winter, which aggravated the lives of the 
poor. ‘The sudden increase in the price of bread, stagnation and unemployment 
in industry, irritation and anxiety of people,’ is how Jan Baszkiewicz describes 
the mood of the French 4 in the spring of 1789. The ‘Winter of the Century’ 
brought similar consequences for the origin of the Revolution of Solidarity.
Though, to repeat, although the outbreak of the Revolution of Solidarity 
was not an accident, chance did play an important role in it. Plainly speaking, 
Gierek and his associates had extremely bad luck when it came to the weather. 
This factor had an unprecedented influence on the 1970s. First of all, there were 
rainy summers with bad harvests, which gradually decreased pork production 
from year to year, and then a blizzard beginning on New Year’s Day of 1978, 
4 J. Baszkiewicz, Ludwik XVI (Wrocław, 1983), p. 210.
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which paralysed the country for almost two months. During the first days of 
the New Year many towns and villages were cut off from the rest of the world. 
The same even happened to some districts of cities, like Ursynów, quite remote 
from the centre of Warsaw, which became impossible to reach or even con-
tact by phone, as the phone lines were down. The few available phone boxes 
had to suffice to provide all contact with the external world. In early January, 
only 25 per cent of the roads were passable in the Siedlce Region, and in other 
regions the situation was no better. The regions of Gdańsk, Legnica, Poznań 
and Toruń announced states of emergency due to natural disaster. One had 
the impression that everything stopped, and not only because of snowdrifts, 
but mainly because of failures of equipment and organization. 5
Snowploughs failed to start, as oil froze in the sub-zero temperatures. Re-
gional and local bus connections came to a halt as well. For a few days the towns 
and cities of Poland became ghost-towns. Villages were in a better position, 
as they had horses. The transportation system of the state turned out to be 
completely unprepared for a severe winter. For the Polish Railways these days 
proved to be the worst since the war and post-war migrations. Rail switches 
froze. In Legnica 80 per cent of rolling stock went dead, and in the Bydgoszcz 
region 60 electric and gas locomotives stopped. In some regions, like in Gdańsk 
area, train service was entirely suspended. The fuel for locomotives was scarce. 
Passengers crowded on platforms as delays of over 24 hours were recorded. 6
The situation was truly reminiscent of a war, and the messages from the front 
were rather unfavourable for the ‘builders of socialism.’ The Organizational 
Department of the Central Committee of the Party reported in its special 
bulletin reserved only for the highest Party authorities:
5 More on ‘The Winter of the Century’ can be found in M. Zaremba, “Wywrotowa zima,” 
Polityka, 17 I 2009.
6 M. Wesołowska, “Próba zimna,” Polityka, 6 I 1979.
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 – Opole, January 4. The length of periods without access to energy de-
creased, but as a result of previous limitations in the service a couple 
of hundred pigs died, as did over 150 thousand broilers and chickens. 
Some greenhouse crops froze.
 – Białystok, January 31: Serious breakdowns of power networks. Over 
1 700 transformer stations out of 4 000 have been damaged. The heating 
system of Czarna Białostocka stopped functioning altogether. There 
are difficulties with transporting products from factories.
 – Piła: On the night of February 14 three passenger trains stalled in 
snowdrifts. The passengers on the Wałcz-Krzyż train were rescued 
from the train by the army in the small hours of the morning. In other 
cases passengers are being evacuated by helicopters.
 – Olsztyn, February 17, no cargo trains with coal reached the region 
through the trunk line. In the area of Kozłów, on the line between 
Olsztyn and Działdowo a passenger train bound for Warszawa stalled 
in snowdrifts. 7
Casualties were reported. A feature article by Marta Wesołowska entitled 
‘A Trial by Cold,’ published in Polityka magazine on January 6, 1979 reads, ‘Do 
you really need to know now what is happening here? – An on-duty female 
emergency doctor asked with a voice so hoarse that it sounded like a man’s 
voice. It was her twelfth hour of duty that day.’ 8
In the capital, ambulances got stuck in snow almost immediately after 
they left hospitals. By January 2, 1979, fourteen cases of death by exposure had 
been reported, and in Bydgoszcz alone five people died. All the victims of the 
7 AAN, KC PZPR 3563 (working catalogue number), Information no III/9/79, III/58/79, 
III/84/79, III/94/79.
8 M. Wesołowska, “Próba zimna.”
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winter have never been counted. What should be taken into account are all the 
casualties resulting from the failure of emergency services to reach patients in 
time, re-scheduling operations, diseases spreading among children, the elderly 
failing to heat their houses properly, carbon-monoxide poisonings, and railway 
accidents. Six people lost their lives as a result of carbon monoxide poisoning 
in a train carriage bound for Moscow, and auto accidents were common as 
well, as winter tyres were a luxury unheard of in those days. So, it may well 
be estimated that the Winter of the Century caused more casualties than any 
other natural disaster in the history of the Peoples’ Republic. 9
The entire country was subject to regular power cuts. Piła experienced 
them from 6.30 till 7.00, from 11.00 till 15.10 and from 15.00 till 18.40. 10 Łódź 
received only 20 per cent of its daily energy demand. Briefly put, it was a disaser. 
This fact was later admitted by Jan Szydlak, Gierek’s right hand, in front of the 
Grabski Committee: ‘We were truly on the brink of disaster. The power system 
in Poland was beginning to fall apart.’ 11
People froze, but not only due to low temperatures, but also because build-
ings were neither properly heated nor insulated. Big housing estates, symbolising 
the housing boom of the Gierek era, turned out to be completely unprepared for 
an ordinary winter, not to mention the Winter of the Century. In the district 
of Ursynów, such houses saw temperatures of 7 degrees Celcius inside the 
buildings, and similar recordings were taken in apartments in Gdańsk. Pipes 
broke. The centralised city heating systems based on kilometres-long pipe net-
works fuelled by one or two heating plants turned out to be, just like the whole 
centrally organized economy, dysfunctional and expensive, as well as truly 
9 AAN, KC PZPR 3563 (working catalogue number), Information no. III/6/79, 2 I 1979, 
b.p.
10 AAN, KC PZPR 3563 (working catalogue number), Information no. III/6/79, 2 I 1979, 
b.p…
11 Z. Błażyński, Towarzysze zeznają (Warszawa, 1990), p. 183.
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deadly during such a winter. Small boiler houses also failed, as in Włocławek, 
where 23 estate boiler houses could not provide any heat. The reason for this 
state of affairs were the power cuts, which made it impossible to pump hot 
water to buildings. As a result of this kind of a vicious circle – power cuts, boiler 
houses unable to function, radiators which froze and burst – people froze in 
their apartments in the Kiełczów housing estate in Wrocław, and in Strzelin, 
Oława and Wołów in Lower Silesia. Water poured from broken radiators, and 
in Ciechanów, Płońsk, Pułtusk and Mława this phenomenon lowered the 
temperature inside buildings to nine degrees. In Olsztyn the heating system 
failed almost entirely. In Włocławek, there was a shortage of home radiators, 
estimated to be at two thousand. The Political Bureau of the Party, which 
gathered on January 3, decided to increase the production of radiators, but 
there was also a shortage of oxygen and acetylene necessary for welding works. 12
In January most schools, culture centres, cinemas, theatres and sport halls 
were closed. Street lightning was turned off. In Olsztyn forty grocery stores 
were closed, all of the stores in the city at the time. Health services suffered 
enormous difficulties, both small health centres which lacked coal for heating as 
well as big hospitals. A Party report concerning the situation in Warsaw reads:
Because of low temperatures the situation in hospitals is very difficult, and 
requires intensifying care of patients. In university clinics, for example, students 
were asked to perform such duties. It was necessary to limit operations only 
to these which were absolutely indispensable. It is also necessary to evacuate 
patients from the university maternity clinic to other hospitals. 13
The entire country experienced a lack of candles, and just like during the 
Cuban crisis, people stormed shops to buy flour, preserved meat and warm 
12 AAN, KC PZPR, 1809, Protokół nr 124 posiedzenia Biura Politycznego 3 I 1979., k. 2.
13 AAN, CK PZPR, 3563 (working catalogue number), Information no III/5/79, 2 I 1979, 
b.p.
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clothes. Bread disappeared off the shelves within minutes. Some towns in-
troduced food rationing. The black market price for a car battery exceeded 
2000 zlotys. In many regions fuel was rationed as well. For example, in Szcze-
cin, a person could buy only 10 litres of gas per car at one time. On January 13 
prices on liquid fuels were increased without previous notice. 14
Stores, already almost empty, started lacking basic food products. Constant 
power cuts, delivery delays, absences at work resulting from communication 
breakdowns and employees having to combat winter instead of performing 
their usual duties caused enormous economic losses. From the beginning 
of the year, practically every branch of production suffered losses, and these 
amounting to 80 per cent were practically impossible to make up. In January 
Pollena Lechia factory did not produce any soap, and was unable to deliver 200 
000 tubes of toothpaste. Pollena Uroda was unable to produce deodorants and 
hand creams. Shops lacked shoe polish, trousers and skirts, and the situation 
was tragic in the pharmaceutical industry. In 1979 deliveries of 418 medications 
and dressing materials were either limited or completely halted. The shortages 
included antibiotics, such as penicillin or streptomycin, vitamins C and B6, 
anti-asthmatic medicine, calcium supplements, antihistamine, and sleep and 
psychotropic drugs. 15 As powdered milk was lacking as well, rationing was in-
troduced. Baby-care items were also in shortage, as parents were unable to buy 
baby soap, oil shampoo, powder, washing powder, feeding bottles, clothes, etc. 16
Agriculture suffered particularly badly. In unheated farm buildings, hatch-
eries and poultry farms animals died by the thousands. Greenhouse produc-
14 AAN, CK PZPR, 3563 (working catalogue number), Information no. III/6/79, 3 I 1979, 
b.p.
15 AAN, KC PZPR, 3564 (working catalogue number), Information no II/109/79, 22 II 
1979 r., b.p.
16 AAN, KC PZPR, XI/161, The list of medication shortages 7 III 1979 
r. in Lindley Hospital in Warsaw, k. 28-29.
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tion also suffered huge losses. Cows gave less milk, which was reflected in the 
dropping supply of butter, cream and cheese. Pork production fell dramatically. 
In 1979, for the first time since the war, the country’s GDP fell, by 2,3 per cent 
from the previous year according to official statistics. 17 All these factors were 
of course reflected in the social mood.
The Effects of Winter
‘Party authorities receive many phone calls asking about the reasons for this 
situation,’ reads a Party report from the first days of January. Many of these 
messages are aggressive, and put the blame on the Party, often criticising its 
‘risky economic policies,’ ‘working without necessary resources’ and logistical 
inabilities. Critics often point out that announcing a state of natural disaster 
was aimed at masking the ‘messy economy’ and taking the blame off those 
responsible. 18
In the middle of January the Centre for Monitoring Public Opinion and 
Programme Studies conducted an opinion poll regarding the winter. It turned 
out that 55 per cent of respondents believed that the difficulties they were 
experiencing were a result of ‘logistical inabilities’ and 34 per cent pointed 
to ‘difficult weather conditions.’ Opinions on this issue differed depending 
on the area where respondents lived, their education and class affinity. In 
general, city dwellers (62 per cent), those with higher education such as pro-
fessionals (73 per cent), and qualified white-collar workers (56 per cent) often 
attributed the difficulties to logistical inabilities. 19 Research from April 1979 
17 Rocznik statystyczny 1982 (Warszawa, 1982), p. 69.
18 AAN, KC PZPR, 3563 (working catalogue number), Information no III/6/79, 3 I 1979, 
b.p.
19 Skutki ataku zimy w opinii społecznej, OBOP, luty 1979.
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showed a slight decrease (1-2 per cent) in public trust in the authorities, which 
at that time amounted to 37 per cent. This tiny shift could be explained by the 
fact that in 1978 the authorities had already lost the trust of about 20 per cent 
of the respondents. Simply put, there was no room for public opinion to fall 
any further for the time being. 20
The OBOP regularly investigated the levels of public optimism by asking 
the question about predictions concerning changes in peoples’ prosperity and 
life conditions. In comparison to the results of polls from the last quarter of 
1978, a slight decrease was noted, from 40 to 38 per cent. ‘In comparison to re-
sults from previous years (starting from 1973), similarly low levels of optimism 
have only been noted in the second half of 1976.’ 21
The Party could see the worsening social mood in the letters that they received. 
One of the authors wrote: ‘My colleagues, neighbours and I all see this situation 
as extreme mayhem as well as the ultimate expression of the lack of responsibility 
of the economic managers of the country for the well-being of citizens and the 
fate of the country.’ ‘A Varsovian’ expressed his views in the following words: 
‘After we examine matters a bit closer, it turns out that many people do not have 
skills necessary to run a local store, not to mention a ministry.’ Piotr Nowicki 
from Poznań pointed out the consequences of the harsh winter for the econo-
my and he predicted that the effect of these ‘far-sighted’ politics would be even 
more market problems. ‘Lines in stores will be getting longer, and in those lines 
people will be cursing the times that they live in.’ He concluded: ‘It is high time 
to eliminate inappropriate people from responsible posts.’ 22
Curiously, people did not grow any less upset as the snow thawed. On 
February 15, an explosion destroyed the PKO bank building in Warsaw, and 49 
20 Nastroje społeczeństwa w kwietniu 1979 roku, OBOP, maj 1979.
21 Nastroje społeczeństwa w kwietniu 1979 roku, OBOP, maj 1979.
22 AAN, KC PZPR, XXVII-43, Selection of letters no. 43, k. 34, 35.
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people died. The explosion was caused by a gas leak, which was probably a con-
sequence of freeze-damaged gas pipes. The accident was on everybody’s lips. 
Security Services noted rumours that the accident was in fact a terrorist attack, 
conducted by ‘those displeased with the present situation in the country.’ In 
some institutions in the capital people panicked for fear of similar explosions. 23 
The following week China invaded Vietnam, which for a while became the 
main subject of conversation. March saw the visit of a healer Clive Harris, 
who met the sick in churches. Church services organized the meetings very 
well, which proved to be a dress rehearsal before the Pope’s visit. In Szczecin 
Harris saw 35 000 people in two days, in Wrocław, 30 000, and the meetings 
were similarly popular in Warsaw. This popularity could be seen as a result 
of the public state of mind at that time, or a belief in a magical dimension of 
religion, but also problems with health services. 24
The Winter of the Century also had its positive sides. Cold radiators, power 
cuts and other difficulties encouraged people to act together and express sol-
idarity, in spite of and apart from the authorities. In the course of meetings in 
apartment block corridors and unexpected visits to borrow a candle or a torch 
battery people met, got to know each other, exchanged views and complained 
about the ‘host of the country,’ the Party. In Radom and Giżycko the Security 
Services reported the following demands: ‘Freedom and meat,’ ‘We want light 
and heat.’ 25
23 AIPN, 0296/269, t. 4, Information regarding the state of internal 
security of the country in February 1979, k. 21.
24 AAN, KC PZPR 3564 (working catalogue number), Information no II/134/79, 
nr II/144/79, 7, 12 III 1979, b.p.
25 The most symptomatic attitude which the winter evoked in people was doubtlessly 
the willingness to help others. The media reported this attitude, and everyday 
life confirmed it, even though this view seemed idealistic. (P. Moszyński, 
“Przed odwilżą,” Polityka, 10 II 1979). AIPN, 0296/269, t. 4, Information regarding 
the state of internal security of the country in January 1979, k. 5.
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Heat
Winter turned out to be one of main catalysts of rebellion. By aggravating life 
conditions, it enabled criticism and the possibility to define reality as unbearable 
and needing amending. In October 1978 Cardinal Karol Wojtyła was elected 
Pope, and came to visit his homeland in June 1978, which gave rise to still more 
reflections and conclusions. The conclave’s decision to elect a Pole to be the 
head of the Catholic Church caused shock, joy and pride among people, but 
outside of Krakow these emotions were not manifested in the streets, which 
may be a proof of widespread conformism, a lack of patterns for collective 
expression and a fear of going out into the streets, which were not ‘ours.’ The 
media of the time did not make things easier. Some time had to pass before 
people realized the importance and potential consequences of the conclave’s 
choice. The public eagerly awaited the events to come.
On Sunday, October 22, the pontificate was officially inaugurated in Rome. 
The authorities agreed to a three-hour transmission of this event on public 
TV, which was highly unusual. Practically the entire country sat in front of 
TV screens not just to see the mass, but to take part in it. The audience figures 
reached an incredible and unprecedented 92 per cent of the adult population 
of the country. Undoubtedly, it was the most important media coverage in 
the history of the communist Poland. For millions of Poles it turned out to 
be a breakthrough religious and patriotic experience, giving hope, pride and 
freedom.
The results of OBOP-conducted polls show that 99 per cent of respondents 
were pleased to see such a transmission on TV. 91 per cent knew the name of 
the new Pope, while only 78 per cent knew who the first Polish man in space 
was, and the latter was the subject of the biggest propaganda campaign of the 
communist Poland. Most people felt enormous joy and national pride caused 
by one of their own being elected Pope. An improvement in State-Church 
relations was predicted, as well as an increase in religiosity. Fewer respondents 
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predicted ‘an increase in social morality’ and an improvement of the economic 
situation of the country (that is, better access to loans). Relatively, the least 
frequent choice was the possibility of liberalization of ‘internal relations.’ 26
In private conversation opinions were formulated in a bolder way. People 
speculated on the consequences of the choice, and some suggested that a Pole 
in the Vatican could mean the end of communism in its present shape. The 
fatalistic belief in the invincibility of the communist system, reinforced by 
the Hungarian experience of 1956 and the events in Czechoslovakia in 1968, 
started to lose its power thanks to the conclave’s choice. Revolutions break 
out not only when people see their circumstances as unbearable, but just as 
important is the hope that such a change is possible. In this religiously orthodox 
environment the conviction that Poles are especially close to God and that 
the Virgin Mary protects the nation was growing stronger. Faith in divine 
affirmation, just like a belief in the historical right of the people or self-accep-
tance, had the same psychological effect: the feeling of one’s own – national 
or class – worth, without which it is difficult to maintain non-conformism or 
independent thinking. In other words, for a revolution to break out, it is not 
only necessary to believe that change is possible, but also the faith that the 
people are able to induce it.
Let us remember, however, that such opinions and beliefs were not a widely 
known truth, but privately held views, formulated only in narrow circles and 
groups. At any rate, the harsh winter and its consequences, like the floods, quick-
ly diverted people’s thinking from the Papal visit, whose date was announced on 
March 2, 1979. 27 In order not to heat up the atmosphere, the authorities limited 
26 Opinia społeczna o wyborze nowego papieża i prezentacji tego wydarzenia w 
telewizji, OBOP, październik 1978.
27 More on the negotiations, preparations and the visit itself can be found in: Wizyta 
Jana Pawła II w Polsce 1979. Dokumenty KC PZPR i MSW, ed. A. Friszke, M. Zaremba, 
(Warszawa, 2005).
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media attention only to information that was absolutely indispensable. The 
number of censorship incidents grew. If someone wanted to form their own 
opinion, they had to listen to Western radio stations. Public opinion was also 
shaped by priests, who often mentioned the preparations for the Pope’s visit in 
their sermons. In fact, in a relatively short time a church event security force 
was created. Thanks to the fact that the Civic Militia (MO) were ordered to 
secure the passage routes of the Pope and to stay away from sectors for pilgrims 
during masses, for a few days these members of church staff wearing yellow caps 
became the only representatives of authority. The skills and discipline of these 
people, as well as that of scouts, medical services and other pilgrims, and the 
absence of official militia forces turned it into more than a religious event, but 
also a civic and national experience. Suddenly it tuned out that ‘they’ are not 
necessary, and ‘we’ are a community, in spite of all the partitions and barriers. 28
After the conclave’s decision the church in Poland gained momentum. ‘It 
has been observed that the choice of the new Pope and his decisions shape 
the bishops,’ priests’ and laypeople’s expectations of changes in the politics 
of the Church and state-church relations’ – Security Services (SB) officers 
pointed out. Month by month, new chapels and churches were built. The bish-
op of Częstochowa Franciszek Musiel initiated the petition to reactivate the 
Catholic weekly Niedziela. Such ideas, though still local in character, boosted 
collective activity. 29
Before Easter people were displeased again because of a lack of food in 
shops. It was not only meat that was lacking – Poles seemed to have grown 
accustomed to this – but also quite basic foods like butter, cheese, powdered 
milk, flour, tea and pasta. The longest lines in front of shops counted over 500 
28 And even more: M. Zaremba, “Ojciec cięty,” Polityka, 25 X 2008.
29 AIPN, 0365/5 t. 8, Information regarding the state of internal 
security of the country in November 1978, k. 125.
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people. In May rumours spread that the food shortages were a result of accu-
mulating food reserves for the Pope’s visit. It was also rumoured that prices 
would increase. 30
After the nervous Easter preparations had finished, peoples’ minds again 
centred on the upcoming Papal visit. According to OBOP research, 98 per 
cent of respondents were aware of the fact. 12 per cent, an estimated 3 million 
people, declared that they wanted to see the Pope. 31 It quickly turned out that 
these numbers were much higher than the number of entrance cards that had 
been prepared in parishes. Priests were neither able nor willing to limit the 
number of people attending. Transport problems started to appear. A priest in 
the parish of Koczała in the Słupsk region threatened to start a hunger strike 
if he did not get the bus he had ordered. One fact is certain: the preparations, 
especially those taking place in towns that the Pope was to visit, activated local 
communities and deepened their bond with the Church. 32 In this atmosphere of 
religious elation miraculous divine revelations took place. In May an inhabitant 
of Słończewo in the region of Ciechanów spread a rumour of a miracle, drawing 
crowds even from other regions. The authorities reported up to 2 000 pilgrims 
per day. A miracle in Jeżowo, in the region of Skierniewice, where a figure of 
the Virgin Mary was allegedly moving, also attracted thousands of pilgrims. 33
The Papal visit, which started on June 2, 1979, had both a religious and a social 
dimension, and the latter brought truly revolutionary consequences. With-
in a few months the Pope became a national authority and the centre of na-
30 AAN, KC PZPR 3564 (working catalogue number), Information no I/25/79, 23 III and 
6 IV 1979, b.p.
31 O wizycie papieża w Polsce. Komunikat z badań, OBOP, maj 1979.
32 AIPN, 0296/269, t. 4, Information regarding the state of internal 
security of the country in May 1979, k. 70
33 AIPN, 0296/269 t. 4, Information regarding the state of internal 
security of the country in May 1979, k.73.
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tional identity. These feelings were revealed during his visit, as the places he 
visited were not only decorated with flags and banners, but were also centres 
of non-regime life: songs, collective prayers and outbursts of enthusiasm. Ev-
erything seemed extraordinary and unusual, such as the Pope’s speeches and 
his kneeling on the ground of the airport. When he met Edward Gierek at 
Belvedere, he attracted everyone’s attention. He was cheerful, but also focused 
and dignified. The Pope talked about important issues: the history of Poland, 
the meaning of the word ‘homeland’ and the common fates of the nation and 
the Catholic Church. Pointing out the right of Poles to live in a free state, he 
returned sense to the notions of freedom, homeland and truth. Everyone could 
sense that it had been a very long time since anyone had spoken this way. Many 
people cried in front of their televisions.
In this company the speech of the First Secretary of the Central Commit-
tee was trivial and unremarkable. Even Józef Tejchma, who was a member of 
the Political Bureau, remembers it as something similar to ‘propaganda notes.’ 
Gierek was admired and respected by a large number of Poles, but when he 
stood by the side of John Paul II and spoke, he suddenly lost all his charm. This 
was an important event in the process of the delegitimization of authorities, 
which precedes every revolution. 34
Later the Pope conducted mass on Zwycięstwa Square in Warsaw, which 
was the only event to be transmitted on TV in its entirety. The words that 
were spoken during this mass have been quoted hundreds of times, so I am 
not going to dwell on them in this work. What has not received attention is the 
collective experience of the mass, shared by those present and those in front of 
34 J. Tejchma, W kręgu nadziei i rozczarowań. Notatki dzienne z lat 1978-1982 (Warszawa, 
2002), p. 61.
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their televisions. When the pilgrims sang the religious hymm ‘We Want God’ 
(My chcemy Boga), the viewers could feel a sense of national unity. 35
Although each Papal mass this June was different from the others, the feel-
ings of elevation and joy, the solidarity of the faithful, the millions of banners 
and the cheering crowds remained exactly the same. The Pope’s meetings with 
young people had a particularly special character, as they were direct, sponta-
neous and extremely popular. The mass at Jasna Góra gathered over 100 000 
young people, as the local Regional Committee reported. In some schools in 
Częstochowa as many as 80 per cent of pupils were absent from class on that day.
The communists started to fear:
Activists and members often hold the opinion that 
the Pope’s visit created an unfavourable situation for 
the Party. It has also been pointed out that the Pope 
publicly advocates notions which are completely op-
posite to the political and programme foundations 
of the Party, that he wants to turn the faithful into 
religious fanatics and encourage the clergy to confront 
the socialist state. 36
The Pope Effect
The Papal visit changed Poles. It initiated the process of awakening a society 
stuck in the conformism of the Gierek era. The visit was on everybody’s lips: 87 
per cent of respondents, according to OBOP, declared a high degree of interest 
in the visit after it ended. It awoke enormous hopes. 71 per cent of respondents 
35 For more, see: Wizyta Jana Pawła II, ed. Friszke and Zaremba.
36 AAN, KC PZPR, 3565 (working catalogue number), Information no II/241/79, 7 IV 
1979, b.p.
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predicted an improvement in state-church relations. Most of the respondents 
specified that this improvement would above all mean concessions of the state 
for the sake of the Church, such as increased tolerance for the Church and its 
followers; an increase of the importance of the Church in Poland; state help 
with building and renovating churches; and the hope – though expressed by 
few – of introducing religious education in schools, and making media avail-
able for transmitting religious information and masses. In fact, these were the 
expectations of a complete reconstruction of the state, including abandoning 
its Marxist ideology. These could be seen as actions dismantling the ideologi-
cal basis of the socialist state in Poland. The Pope’s visit awoke hopes that the 
authorities had no intention of fulfilling. History has seen huge revolutionary 
motivations set free in similar circumstances. 37
The hopes that were awakened were not the only effects of John Paul II’s 
visit to Poland. An array of changes in the sphere of social attitudes, moods 
and mental reactions could be called ‘the Pope effect.’ The crucial factor for the 
later emergence of Solidarity turned out to be a decrease in the collective fear. 
The Pope ‘took the fear away,’ a respondent to the poll conducted by Tygodnik 
Powszechny wrote. The fear of violence used to be one of the most important 
stabilizing factors for the regime. The memory of mass repressions of 1944-1956, 
and the pacification of demonstrations in Poznan in 1956 and the Baltic Coast 
in 1970 had inclined people to obey and had created a mood of hopelessness 
and total dependence on the whims of the authorities. 38
The French aristocrat Alexis de Tocqueville once remarked that the regime 
that is overturned by a revolution is always better than the one that came di-
rectly before it. It is hard to deny that Gierek’s decade was the best of all those 
37 Wizyta papieża w Polsce i jej odbicie w telewizji w opinii społecznej. Komunikat z 
badań, OBOP, lipiec 1979.
38 AAN, XIA/930, Informacja Głównego Urzędu Kontroli Prasy, Publikacji i 
Widowisk nr 8 o ingerencjach dokonanych w sierpniu 1979, b.p.
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following the war. Not only were goods more available, but also people stopped 
feeling paralyzing fear. However, as the research of Mirosława Maroda shows, 
the older generation remembered the fear, which weakened the inclination to 
behave in a non-conformist way. The striking shipyard workers in August 1980 
had reason to be afraid of repression, but there was no threat of torture, show 
trials, or early morning executions. This made the decision to rebel somewhat 
easier. The words spoken by the Pope on St. Peter’s Square – ‘Fear not!’ – also 
played their role, as well as the awareness that ‘our man’ in Rome will defend 
us, if the need arises. After the Warsaw uprising and the Yalta Conference Poles 
felt abandoned by the world. Now they knew that they were not alone. We all 
remember the Pope’s photo on the gates of the striking shipyard in Gdansk – it 
functioned as a talisman which was meant to drive the fear away. 39
Serious changes also took place in the religious sphere, although they were 
qualitative rather than quantitative. Since 1973, OBOP had systematically 
investigated the levels of religious belief among people, based on declarations 
concerning relations to faith and religious practice. The results showed a very 
high level of religious belief, close to 90 per cent of the overall number of people, 
as well as little change of attitudes in this respect after the Pope’s visit.
39 For more on fear in the seventies see Polacy ’80, p. 117-136.
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Chart no. 1 Declared religious attitudes in the years 1975-1980 (per cent).
Declared religious attitudes April 1975 April 1978 April 1980
believers participating in religious practices
(to a greater or lesser degree) 77 76 79
believers not participating in religious 
practices 15 12 10
non-believers or undecided 8 12 11
The authors of the research pointed out that, ‘perhaps there is a tendency for 
the attitudes of the group of believers not participating in religious practices to 
polarize either in the direction of becoming religiously active or indifferent to 
religion.’ In other words, some of those who moved away from the Church be-
fore, now started returning. This was mainly true of the intelligentsia. Regional 
committees of the Party reported a growing number of people participating 
in masses even before the Papal visit. Shrines and sanctuaries also filled with 
people. 40
Some groups became increasingly orthodox. On August 1979 a crowd of 
about 200 people singing religious songs gathered in front of the city hall in 
Czaplinek (Koszalin region). Most of them were elderly women, but there 
were also young people and workers present. Led by three priests, they en-
tered a misdemeanour courtroom, where they wanted to protest against the 
40 Brak zmian w stopniu religijności społeczeństwa polskiego. Komunikat z badań, OBOP, 
lipiec 1980.
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trial of a priest for putting up a roadside cross without permission. 41 A process 
against priests: Adam Michalski and Tadeusz Radochoński, charged with 
illegally building a church on a housing estate in Przemyśl brought about 
similar protests. On October 11, 1979, the city was flooded by leaflets signed 
by the Przemyśl Committee of the Devout. One of them read: ‘We, believers, 
will be courageous and show that we are many, we are not afraid and we will 
not let you harm the priest.’ Solidarity with the defendants was called for. On 
the next day a group of about a hundred believers, consisting mainly of elderly 
women, went to court together with the priest, singing religious hymns. 42
On the anniversary of the day Karol Wojtyła was chosen Pope, on Novem-
ber 16, 1979, on the spot where the June mass was held, a group of believers 
arranged a cross of flowers and put up a Vatican flag with a photo of John Paul 
II. Again, religious songs were sung. In Krakow, after a mass conducted by 
the Cardinal Franciszek Macharski, over a thousand people gathered near 
the Adam Mickiewicz statue on the Main Market Square. They were holding 
Papal and national flags, and one of the flags had a crowned eagle on it. 43 The 
authorities noted the increase in the number of pilgrims and summer religious 
camps. 44 The Pope effect was also visible in the symbolic and ritual sphere, 
that is, adorning gates of striking factories with flowers in August 1980 and 
during later protests in the years 1980-1981. It was quite similar to the custom 
of adorning church altars on the day of Corpus Christi. Since 1956 striking 
41 AAN, KC PZPR, 3565 (working catalogue number), Information no I/75/79, 11 VIII 
1979, b.p.
42 AAN, KC PZPR, 3566 (working catalogue number), Information no II/330/79, 12 X 
1979, b.p.
43 AAN, KC PZPR, 3559 (working catalogue number), Information no I/110/79, 17 X 1979, 
b.p.
44 AAN, KC PZPR, 3565 (working catalogue number), Information no III/297/79, 10 VIII 
1979, b.p.
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workers had rarely manifested their religious belief. This changed after the 
visit of John Paul II.
Marx and Engels assumed it was certain that the secularization of societies 
is an unavoidable consequence of progress. Communists in Poland also be-
lieved in this assumption, but decided to help secularization a little. The society, 
however, remained highly active in the religious sphere and it continued to have 
strong religious identity, even though it was completely absent from political 
life. All the great revolutions, starting from the French to those in Russia and 
Mexico had an antifeudal and anti-Church character. The exceptions were 
the revolutions in Poland and Iran, because in both of them a significant role 
in mobilizing the society was played by the clergy. In both of them a strong 
religious identity (just like awoken class awareness in other revolutions) con-
structed a place for dispute and made it easier to identify its actors: the religious 
society and ‘them’ – the secular, or even atheist authorities. In Iran the Muslim 
clergy and Khomeini became the leaders of the revolution.
In Poland, tightening relations between the opposition and the Church 
had its own history, whose important chapters were the meetings of Leszek 
Kołakowski, and later Jacek Kuroń with Primate Wyszyński. 45 In 1977 the 
Literary Institute in Paris published a book by Adam Michnik Kościół, lewica, 
dialog (The Church, the Left and Dialogue) proposing a dialog between the 
left and the Catholic Church. Among the founding fathers of the Workers’ 
Defence Committee (KOR – Komitet Obrony Robotników) there was a well-
known religious leader, Rev. Jan Zieja, and among the founding fathers of the 
Committee for the Protection of Human and Civil Rights there were three 
priests. In May 1977 in St. Martin’s church in Warsaw opposition activists 
45 Two meetings of Adam Michnik with Stefan Wyszyński in Warszawa – together with 
Jacek Kuroń – and Rome in 1976 were also important. For more, see J. Skórzyński, 
Siła bezsilnych. Historia Komitetu Obrony Robotników (Warszawa 2012), p. 182-183, 186-
187.
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undertook a hunger strike. The Papal visit reinforced this mechanism, which, 
from the perspective of the lay West, seemed to be a particularly ‘Polish’ phe-
nomenon. For ten years the Church became a haven for people involved in 
anti-system activity. All independent events, celebrations or feasts started 
with or ended with a mass, during which those present could manifest their 
faith, unity and patriotism. Another hunger strike was undertaken in 1979 by 
fifteen opposition leaders in the St. Cross church in Warsaw – including An-
drzej Czuma, Antoni Macierewicz, Adam Michnik, Halina Mikołajska, Anka 
Kowalska, Jacek Kuroń and Mariusz Wilk. After the introduction of Martial 
Law the communist authorities abolished all the administrative difficulties 
which once hindered the construction of churches and other sacral buildings. 
The purpose of this action was to weaken the ties between the Church and the 
opposition as well as to avoid accusations that the state was making things 
difficult for the Church. 46
But it was not only strong religious motivation that caused the revolution 
of Solidarity. National motivations, 47 connected with religious ones, were 
also important, and one can also see ‘the Pope effect’ at work here. John Paul 
II’s words spoken in Auschwitz, concerning the way in which the system of 
repression functions, the necessity to defend human rights, as well as totalitarian 
systems and the need to fight for freedom were understood by the audience to 
be an allusion to the current conditions in Poland, as we read in the information 
of the Organizational Department of the Central Committee. 48 In June 1979 
in Radziejów someone scattered leaflets which said ‘Death to communists.’ In 
Legnica, graffiti appeared reading, ‘No more imperialism of the USSR,’ ‘No to 
46 J. Skórzyński, “Głodówka u św. Marcina” in Od Piłsudskiego do Wałęsy. Studia z 
dziejów Polski w XX wieku, ed. K. Persak et. al. (Warszawa 2008), p. 441-458.
47 AAN, KC PZPR, 3565, Information no. II/246/79, 8 VI 1979, b.p.
48 M. Kula, Narodowe i rewolucyjne (Londyn 1991).
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the USSR,’ and ‘No more Polish-Soviet friendship!’ If this was not a beginning 
of the march on the Bastille, some circles certainly began to see its walls. 49
In May and June 1980 the anti-Russian mood was on the increase, as the 
Summer Olympics in Moscow approached. The unavailability of building 
materials and food (ham, for example) was widely blamed on the fact that they 
had been exported to the USSR. These moods found a symbolic expression, 
for example in the joy of the Polish audience after Władysław Kozakiewicz 
won the Olympic pole vault competition, beating his Russian opponent, and 
made a famous gesture to the unfriendly Russian audience. It was July 30, 1980.
The First Battle for Remembrance
The reawakening of patriotic feelings was visible in the return to historical 
thinking, and history has always been very important to Poles. A good case in 
point here is Kielce, where on February 12, 1979 a tumult took place. A crowd 
of five hundred people forced their way into a bookshop, where they demand-
ed that the book Poczet królów i książąt polskich (The Kings and Princes of 
Poland) be sold. 50 Historical debates became a substitute for serious political 
debate. The debates from the beginning of the decade over the book Rodowody 
Niepokornych by Bohdan Cywiński or the person of Aleksander Wielopolski 
replaced conversations about current politics and relations with Russia. The 
movie based on a historical novel by Henryk Sienkiewicz Potop (The Deluge) 
brought millions of viewers into cinemas. The intelligentsia were especially 
influenced by the picture Człowiek z marmuru (Man of Marble) directed by 
Andrzej Wajda. It is estimated that over 80 thousand visitors saw the exhibition 
49 AIPN, 0296/269, t. 4, Information regarding the state of internal 
security of the country in June 1979, k. 85
50 AAN, KC PZPR, 3564, Information no.II/78/79, 14 II 1979 r., no page numbers.
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Polaków portret własny (Poles in their own eyes), which opened on November 
8, 1979 at the National Museum in Krakow. All these factors had an influence 
on the national identity of Poles and their rebellious feelings. But there were 
also quite opposite trends: the memories of World War II were fading, and 
national memory was weakened by a turn to consumption from the beginning 
of a decade. Gierek and his men rarely invoked national history to form their 
right to govern the country on its basis. 51 Neither did the opposition use history 
to undermine this right. Instead they decided to stress the lack of respect for 
human rights on the side of the authorities. Papal homilies full of historiosophic 
reflection made the historical past seem very important again.
Party authorities were informed that, in comparison with the previous year, 
the interest of youth in the modern history of Poland was growing regarding, for 
example, issues like the reasons for the Polish loss in September 1939, fighting 
the occupants, rebuilding the country and establishing socialist rule. 52 In works 
devoted to overcoming the negative effects of the Papal visit on the socialist 
regime, it was pointed out that ‘history has recently become a sphere where 
particularly aggressive anti-socialist propaganda operated.’ 53 The necessity 
of historical education was emphasized, which was meant to make people 
identify with socialism.
A war for historical memory broke out between the authorities and the 
opposition, who tried to undermine the position of the former. To be precise, 
this war had already started in November 1978, when Edward Gierek spoke 
at the celebratory session of the Sejm. Workers’ Defence Committee pub-
51 M. Zaremba, Komunizm, legitymizacja, nacjonalizm. Nacjonalistyczna 
legitymizacja władzy komunistycznej w Polsce (Warszawa 2001), p. 363.
52 AAN, KC PZPR, 3565 (working catalogue number), Information no III/297/79, 10 VIII 
1979, b.p.
53 See the project of counteracting the negative effects of the Papal visit in: Wizyta 
Jana Pawła II w Polsce 1979, p. 306.
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lished a statement and Movement for Defence of Human and Citizen’s Rights 
organized the first independent demonstration at the Tomb of the Unknown 
Soldier in Warsaw since 1976. The next year saw more intensive activities in 
this sphere. The authorities tried to take over the remembrance of the Warsaw 
Uprising and gain some advantage in this way. On August 1 and 2, 1979 public 
TV produced a series of broadcasts which included, for example, a demonstra-
tion at the Memorial of Heroes of the Warsaw Uprising. Not since 1945 had 
the celebrations of the anniversary of the Uprising had such media coverage 
and grandiosity. 54
The opposition, on the other hand, organized a demonstration on the for-
tieth anniversary of the outbreak of World War II on September 1, 1979. In 
Warsaw a relatively large demonstration took place: after a mass in the cathe-
dral, about a thousand participants marched down Krakowskie Przedmieście 
Boulevard singing religious and patriotic songs and arrived at the Tomb of the 
Unknown Soldier. There, flowers were laid and the participants sang the national 
anthem. They also publicly announced the establishment of the Confederation 
of Independent Poland. Later many wondered why the communist authorities 
did not disperse these demonstrations. The answer was simple: in doing so the 
authorities would have put themselves in the position of being critics of the 
national remembrance of the war. And the authorities saw themselves as the 
main conductor of the celebrations, which were the most grandiose since the 
1960s. The whole country saw meetings with veterans, flowers were laid on war 
memorials, obelisks and monuments were unveiled, and school celebrations 
were organized. Gierek also gave speeches.
The next cards were played by the opposition during the celebrations of the 
anniversaries of September 17, as well as that of the Baltic Coast pacifications 
in 1970. However, the most influential initiative of the democratic opposition 
54 A. Friszke, Czas KOR-u, p. 458.
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was the commemoration of the Katyń Massacre. All over the country inten-
tion masses for the murdered ones were conducted. On Sunday, April 27, 1980 
alone, over forty such intention masses took place all over the country, as the 
SB calculated. Graffiti saying ‘We’ll avenge Katyń’ appeared on walls, and 
leaflets were distributed. 55 Posters prepared by the opposition appeared in 
Warsaw, Krakow and other cities. 56 This war for historical memory, although 
won by the opposition, took place in the perimeters of the spheres which were 
most important for Poles.
The Evaluation of the Year
The second half of the year 1979 was spent in darkness and using faulty goods. 
The Krakow region saw power cuts almost every day. The inhabitants of the 
Katowice region suffered limits in the supply of energy for 218 days out of ten 
months. In October, only one day was free from power cuts. In other regions 
of the country, the situation was similar. 57
The inhabitants of Warsaw were luckier as the power cuts in the capital were 
much less frequent. However, on October 24 half of the city suffered a power 
cut that lasted almost two days. People were furious, but they started to grow 
accustomed to the fact that ‘they’ could cut the power supply any time they 
wished. This fury was restrained for some time, because power cuts had a neg-
ative influence on economy: they resulted in work stoppages, lower salaries 
and a worsening of the general mood. Losses in production were frequently 
made up for on Saturdays, which almost became a regular workday, and infu-
55 AIPN, 0365/2 t. 1, Information regarding the state of internal 
security of the country in April 1980, k. 64.
56 For more on the activities of the opposition, see A. Friszke, Czas KOR-u.
57 AAN, KC PZPR, 3566 (working catalogue number), Information no II/354/79, 15 X 
1979, b.p.
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riated people even more. Not enough goods being produced resulted in many 
market shortages and longer lines in front of shops, which was all the more 
reason to be angry.
Paradoxically, the year 1979 was a record one when it comes to the amount 
of coal mined, but most of it was exported, as that was practically the only way 
for a country in debt to earn some money. This short-lived prosperity was char-
acteristic of the first half of the decade. Emblematic of its second half was the 
abundance of faulty goods, second-rate products made of cheap materials that 
broke down soon after they were bought and became a symbol of economic 
chaos and carelessness. Shops were full of broken washing machines and TV 
sets and other ‘non-exportable goods’, suits without buttons or shirts with 
badly sewn sleeves. According to the official data, the levels of faultiness were 
highest in electronic goods, at 28.7per cent. For example, in the case of Rubin 
714p TV sets 91.9 per cent of the sets produced were faulty. 58
In order to obtain goods that were usable people had to resort to diverse 
strategies. One of these, besides relying on people that one knew, was bribery. 
Since World War II bribery and corruption in Poland had enjoyed ‘full civil 
rights,’ and they were treated as objectionable but acceptable ways of dealing 
with life during times of shortage. The OBOP investigated attitudes towards 
this phenomenon in 1964 and 1976. In 1976 giving small gifts to gain a favour 
was perceived as occurring quite often or very frequently by 72 per cent of re-
spondents. In 1964 it was 71 per cent. Bribery, that is giving money or expensive 
presents in return for positive outcomes, was seen as a frequent occurrence 
by 42 per cent of respondents in the Gierek era, although 42 per cent found 
it rare. 19 per cent of respondents admitted to bribery at some point in their 
lives, and 31 per cent claimed that they were suggested to do so in order to ob-
58 AAN, KC PZPR, 3559 (working catalogue number), Information no II/210/79, 28 V 
1979, b.p.
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tain a positive outcome of their matter. According to the respondents, bribes 
were most necessary when admitted to hospital (52 per cent), if one wanted 
to be granted a flat (52 per cent), to buy such goods as furniture or a washing 
machine (51 per cent) or be given building materials (47 per cent). 59
Because of the constant economic crisis and persistent shortages of goods, 
by the end of the decade corruption became commonplace. A Party member 
wrote to the authorities:
Bribery has been awarded full rights in this country. 
It is particularly worrying that it does not concern 
only ordinary people any more, but also enterpris-
es and institutions – it is impossible to buy allocated 
goods without a bribe. Goods are available, but with-
out a bribe they are either sold or reserved for someone.
The level of moral schizophrenia was so high that Poles did not object to brib-
ery when they needed to obtain goods or services, but were highly critical of 
anyone from the authorities or management for accepting bribes. One could 
say that all authority was seen as corrupt. 60
In December the OBOP conducted an annual opinion poll regarding the 
international and internal situations. China’s aggression in Vietnam, the rev-
olution in Iran, and above all the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan made the 
opinions regarding the international affairs very pessimistic. Opinions on 
the situation within the country were also far from optimistic in comparison 
with previous years.
59 Zjawisko łapownictwo – jego zasięg i ocena w opinii publicznej. Komunikat z badań, OBOP, 
Czerwiec 1976.
60 AAN, KC PZPR, XXVII-42, Letters and Inspections Bureau KC PZPR, Wybór listów 
nr 35, styczeń 1979 r., k. 219.
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Chart no. 2 Opinions on the international situation 1977-1979 (in per cent)
Opinion 1977 1978 1979
good 51 45 29
neither good nor bad 27 28 31
bad 4 7 21
no opinion 18 20 19
Chart no. 3 Opinions on the situation in the country 1977-1979 (in per cent)
Opinion 1977 1978 1979
good 43 46 32
neither good nor bad 33 33 39
bad 15 13 21
no opinion 9 8 8
Opinions in 1979 were quite different from the evaluation of previous years, as 
only one third of respondents believed that this year was good for the country. 
The following year was to be a better one according to 28 per cent of respondents 
and neither better nor worse according to 42 per cent. 61 Nobody could see the 
revolution coming, although the results of the polls could be seen as food for 
thought in this respect.
61 Ocena roku 1979 i prognozy na rok następny. Komunikat z badań, OBOP, maj 1979.
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Boiling
On January 4, Jimmy Carter announced sanctions against the USSR. The 
world entered another stage of the cold war. In Poland, the main event of the 
beginning of the year was the preparations for the February 8 – Polish com-
munist party Convention. It began with the First Secretary’s four-hour speech, 
in which he implicitly attacked the government, which was unprecedented. 
He opposed power abuses and announced that those guilty of such behaviour 
would be punished. The speech was in fact a prelude to the removal of Prime 
Minister Piotr Jaroszewicz, who was subsequently not chosen as a member of 
the Central Committee. On February 18, he was officially replaced by Edward 
Babiuch. For the past 25 years there had been only two heads of government: 
Józef Cyrankiewicz and Piotr Jaroszewicz. Thus, removing the ‘iron prime 
minister,’ who had worked in tandem with Gierek for the past ten years, was 
perceived as an important and extraordinary event. The hitherto monolith of 
power was starting to crack. It is probable that the prospect of the guilty ones 
being punished made a percentage of Poles happy, as the indicators of social 
optimism went up. However, this could have been caused by the propaganda 
campaign which accompanied the convention. The trust in the government, 
as measured by OBOP, also rose from 37 per cent (the average from the second 
half of 1979) to 50 per cent. 62
On March 23, 1980, elections to the Sejm and National Councils took place 
on the regional level, with an official turnout of 99,87 per cent. In Sosnowiec, 
99,97 per cent of voters cast their ballot for Edward Gierek. The opposition 
organized the biggest leaflet distribution action in their history – in Warsaw 
alone two thousand leaflets were distributed. 63 Gdańsk saw the appearance of 
62 Poprawa nastrojów społecznych po VIII Zjeździe PZPR. Komunikat z badań, OBOP, 
marzec 1980.
63 For more, see: A. Friszke, Czas KOR-u, p. 479.
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posters which said: ‘Voter, stay at home – Brezhnev will vote for you’ and ‘No 
more hypocrisy – we want free elections.’ The opposition illegal party KPN even 
tried to register its leader – Leszek Moczulski on the list of PM candidates. The 
levels of social conformism remained high. The underground periodical Biuletyn 
Informacyjny of the Workers’ Defence Committee conducted a survey, in which 
it asked for reasons why people voted. A student answered: ‘I’m going to apply 
for a passport in May.’ A wife of a retired university professor: ‘My husband 
had a second heart attack, and we applied for a sanatorium for him.’ A young 
worker: ‘My pals told me not to go, but I am going to apply for a technical high 
school referral.’ A farmer: ‘I am old, I have to do everything by myself, because 
my mother is ill. I mustn’t anger the authorities, so that I can keep my farm.’ 64
The Party did not manage to use the change of prime minister to their ad-
vantage. Babiuch, an apt second-line activist, was completely unknown to the 
public. He lacked charisma and the faith in success that Poles had so loved in 
Gierek and Jaroszewicz at the beginning of the decade. But it was too late for 
new beginnings, it seems. The time for decisive moves, which was best after 
the June 1976 crisis, had been wasted. The awareness of this fact grew, as did 
the frustration resulting from growing disparities between the real world and 
that of the socialist narrative.
Press and television propaganda of success irritated Poles, who felt cheated 
by the show put up by authorities and tired of the rituals of the Gierek era. 65 
These moods are well reflected in the letters to the Central Committee in 1978:
In all the speeches of the Party authorities as well as in 
the media it is constantly emphasized that our society 
is prosperous, people have high salaries and high life 
standards. However, no one admits that there is a huge 
64 “Dlaczego głosowałem?,” Biuletyn Informacyjny 2 (36) (1980), p 5-6.
65 Polacy ’80, p. 109a.
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gap between the rich and the poor, and that the prices 
of goods are constantly on the increase. The media just 
keep saying how good we have it. Allegedly, the prices 
are stable. This is not true.  66
The propaganda campaign before the VII Convention lifted the social mood 
for a while. But a boomerang effect soon settled in: instead of increasing the 
trust in authorities, the propaganda was found irritating, and even hostile. 67 
In this way, Gierek’s propaganda of success partially led to the success of the 
revolution of Solidarity.
The social mood started worsening in the spring of 1980. Andrzej Wer-
blan, a secretary of the Central Committe, predicted in March that ‘the explo-
sion may happen any minute.’ 68 In some regions of the country rumours were 
spread that prices would increase and the national currency would be replaced 
by the rouble in all countries of the socialist bloc. Together with these fears, 
the demand for lasting goods, like cars, TVs or washing machines, grew, 69 but 
the shops lacked practically everything. One had to queue to buy toilet paper, 
school accessories, medication, furniture, etc. A letter sent by a worker from 
Rzeszów to the Party’s Central Committee in April 1979 shows what shopping 
for meat was like:
Where I live, the butcher’s opens at 9 a.m. and af-
ter a few minutes the shelves are completely empty. 
People had been queuing since 5 a.m. to buy anything. 
66 AAN, KC PZPR, XI/1064, Biuro Listów i Inspekcji KC PZPR, Wybór listów nr 22, 
March 1978, k. 20, 26.
67 M. Zaremba, “Propaganda sukcesu. Dekada Gierka,” in Propaganda PRL. Wybrane 
problemy, ed. P. Semków (Gdańsk 2004), p. 22-32.
68 M.F. Rakowski, Dzienniki polityczne 1979-1981 (Warszawa 2004), p. 169.
69 AIPN Rz, 00268/34, t. 5, Meldunek operacyjny Wydziału III-A KWMO in Tarnobrzeg, 
13 II 980, k. 15.
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Many leave work before noon, because they know that 
in the afternoon there will be nothing to buy. People 
who have time may be able to buy something, but we, 
workers, cannot leave our workplace. In the afternoon 
it is only possible to get black pudding or pork fat. 70
Since the year 1974, OBOP had been conducting polls to track social moods 
regarding the availability of food items. From year to year, more respondents 
had a negative opinion on this matter. In June 1976 after a price increase was 
announced and then called off, the drop in polls was very clear: 71 per cent of 
respondents believed that shop supplies were inadequate, and only 6 per cent 
evaluated it as good. After the Winter of the Century, in March 1979, 15 per cent 
of respondents believed it was good, 34 per cent said it was acceptable and 50 
per cent – inadequate. In June 1980 the results were even worse, respectively: 
11, 27 and 61 per cent. The sale of basic food items like butter, cheese, flour, eggs, 
vegetables and chicken meat was interrupted. Formula milk for infants was 
sold only on the basis of a child’s medical record book. Ham and beef were 
described as available by 1 per cent of respondents. 71 Somebody wrote in a letter 
intercepted by the Ministry of Internal Affairs:
I cannot offer much, because all we manage to get is 
2 kilos of flour, rice or groats at a time. Sometimes I 
manage to buy something using my connections. In 
this way Jarosław got tomato puree and waffles. I my-
self have a couple of kilos of flour and 3 kilos of rice. If 
70 AAN, KC PZPR, XXVII/43, Biuro Listów i Inspekcji KC PZPR, Wybór listów nr 38, 
April 1978, k. 61.
71 Zaopatrzenie żywności w II kwartale 1980 r. w opinii społecznej. Komunikat z 
badań, OBOP, czerwiec 1980.
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you need anything, tell me what it is, so that I know 
what to get. 72
On the one hand Poles grew accustomed to the constant need to wait in lines 
for hours, and on the other, they stopped believing in an improvement of their 
situation without any radical changes. But nobody knew what these changes 
could consist of. The dominating moods were boredom, fatigue, pessimism 
and increasing impatience with the authorities for not handling the problem 
and stealing instead. Everyone knew stories about the son of the Prime Min-
ister, Andrzej Jaroszewicz, who was a symbol of leaching personal gains from 
his father’s position. 73
In May 1980 rebellious tendencies were on the increase, and more people 
expressed fears of subsequent price rises. The Security Service noted an
…increase in peoples’ displeasure and critical com-
ments regarding supplies in shops, price politics and 
activity of authorities, caused by lasting shortages of 
food and other goods, price rises, production disrup-
tions in some production plants, as well as growing dis-
cussion and rumours about further price rises, which 
has become a reason for buying up the entire stock of 
certain items.  74
The country saw five strike incidents, the most important one being at the Polam 
light bulb factory, where three employees stopped work for 2,5 hours. The SB 
also noted 44 workplace conflicts, 36 of them in April, in the Lenin Steelworks 
72 AIPN Rz, 00268/34, t. 5, Information, k. 149.
73 M.F. Rakowski, Dzienniki polityczne 1979-1981, p. 157.
74 AIPN, 0365/2t. 1, Information regarding the state of internal 
security of the country in May 1980, k. 79.
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in Krakow, the Adolf Warski Szczecin Shipyard, WSK PZL Warszawa II and 
Feliks Dzierżyński Warsaw Building Machines Works. The reason for most 
of them were payment issues: decreasing salaries, withholding bonuses, etc. 75
In the summer the social indicator of optimism fell to 22 per cent (from 44 
per cent in February). On July 8, OBOP interviewers asked the question: How 
would you describe the present economic situation of our country? 65 per cent 
respondents answered that they found it bad. Interestingly, members of the 
Party were just as pessimistic as people who had nothing to do with politics. 
Their loss of hope in the Party’s ability to rescue the country from crisis should 
be seen as one of the important signs of the storm to come. 76
Meanwhile social tension was growing, mainly as a result of fears of yet 
another price increase. Since January 1979 the price of petrol had increased 
three times. Most of the price rises were introduced quietly so that the public 
would not find out. In June 1980 the prices of newspapers and magazines, 88 
titles altogether, went up, as did the prices of cloth, by 10 to 30 per cent. After 
the prices of sugar had increased to 26 zlotys per kilo, the prices of pastry, cakes, 
ice cream and carbonated drinks rose accordingly. Poles had the right to be 
irritated. Somebody wrote in a private letter:
I’m returning to work on September 1, because life in 
this city is getting harder and harder. Everything is 
getting more expensive, and you can hardly buy any-
thing. Up to now only meat and sausage was lacking, 
now there is no flour, no rice, not even sugar! It seems 
that things will not be getting better, because this year’s 
floods destroyed all the crops. 77
75 AIPN, 0365/2t. 1, Information regarding the state of internal 
security of the country in May 1980, k. 89.
76 Zmiany nastrojów społecznych w roku 1980 na tle okresów poprzednich. Komunikat z 
badań, OBOP, maj 1979.
77 AIPN Rz, 00268/34, t. 5, Information, k. 149.
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A Summer that Was Cold and Hot at the Same Time
In the last week of June Edward Babiuch dismissed the Minister of Building 
Industry, Adam Glazur. This decision was well received by a part of the public 
who understood it as a step on the road to remove corrupt authority figures. 
Perhaps if this dismissal had been better played in terms of propaganda and 
followed by other similar moves, the feeling of deprivation would not have been 
so acute. It is possible that this could have been used to mitigate the effects of 
another price rise, which was to come into force from July 1. This was the spark 
which ignited the revolutionary process.
The prices of meat products such as beef, bacon, pate-sausage, knuckle of 
pork, turkey, goose and duck rose, and these products were moved into the 
category of foods sold at ‘commercial’ prices. The rises also affected the can-
teens and workplace eateries, where people ate their meals or took them home. 
The trick that the authorities used to hide price rises was the one that they had 
used in June 1978, when availability of goods decreased and lines in shops 
lengthened: they moved some of the products to the delicatessen departments 
or shops. 78 The public mood worsened in 1978 and, according to OBOP, the 
78 This is an example of Information provided by the Organizational Department in June 
1978: ‘The proof that meat deficits exist are the long lines in front of shops many hours 
before delivery times, the impossibility of maintaining continuous sale of most meats, 
excluding black pudding and short time of sale, even if large supplies of goods 
are transferred to the stores. For example, in Bydgoszcz region no city is able to maintain 
uninterrupted sale. In Łódz region, despite increasing deliveries by 300 kg of meat in 
May, it was available in shops only for 30 to 60 minutes. In May the supplies of fish were 
also scarce – there were serious shortages of smoked fish, fillet, salted fish and herring. 
The situation aggravated in May, as there were even more shortages of vegetables – 
particularly potatoes – as well as butter and other dairy products. Most regions, 
including large cities like Warsaw, Kraków, Łódź and Bielsko-Biała feel 
the shortages in the supply of potatoes. […] KW assume that market shortages that 
have been aggravating for some time and especially those regarding food supplies 
cause the increase of social discontent. Many critical remarks are spelled out in shop 
lines, and also among shop staff.’ (AAN, KC PZPR, 3558, Information no. I/70/78, 1 VI 
1978, b.p.).
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authorities lost the trust of 20 per cent of respondents. People were angry not 
only at the increase in prices, but also because it divided the society into those 
that could afford to shop at a delicatessen and those who could not. Research 
conducted in the 1970s shows that respondents described social cleavages 
as serious or very serious. 79 Blue-collar workers and pensioners especially 
perceived the divisions as unjust, because, as people said then, ‘we all have 
similar stomachs.’ In 1978 there were no serious protests, because the level of 
social optimism and trust in the authorities amounted to 40 per cent. These 
factors formed a cushion safeguarding the authorities after price increases. In 
July 1980 society was tired. The percentage of optimists decreased to 20 per 
cent, and the trust dropped to the lowest recorded levels since 1976. In the 
OBOP research conducted on July 8, 25 per cent of respondents had the same 
or higher level of trust than last year, and 61 per cent had lower levels of trust. 
The July price increase turned out to be one step too far, as it was introduced 
without diagnosing social feelings.
The protests were increasing gradually. On July 1, strikes at WSK PZL-
Mielec factory and the Polmet Metallurgy Works broke out. The drivers of 
Transbud Tarnobrzeg Company also decided to go on strike and stopped 
their vehicles. A day later they were joined by 2 000 people in the Engine De-
partment at Ursus Mechanical Works, as well as the employees of two other 
factories in Tczew and Warsaw. There was nothing unusual in that, as every year 
the country saw a dozen strikes, which would break out for a couple of hours 
and rarely involved the whole staff. The only aspect that could be worrying 
was that these strikes were rather persistent. As soon as one production plant 
79 More on the subject can be found in: E. Otawska, Wstępny raport z badania pt. 
„Nasze miejsce w społeczeństwie,” OBOP (Warszawa 1976); J. Koralewicz-Zębik, 
“Potoczna percepcja nierówności w Polsce w latach 1960-1980,” Studia Socjologiczne 
3 (1983), p. 147; M. Gadomska, “Polaków świadomość struktury klasowej: 
nierówność nieusprawiedliwiona,” in Społeczeństwo polskie przed kryzysem, p. 13-45.
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halted a strike, another started. On July 8, workers at the Communication 
Equipment Production Plant in Świdnik walked off work. The main reason 
was a 60 per cent increase in the price of canteen meals – for example, the price 
of a pork chop rose from 10,20 zloty to 18,10 zloty. On July 9, Róża Luksemburg 
Electric Lamps Works in Warsaw also went on strike. The day after, it was the 
FSO factory in Żerań. By July 12, even 34 strikes had taken place all over the 
country, in which 57 000 people participated. 80
The demands were similar everywhere: pay rises to make up for growing 
costs of living, special bonuses for the poorest, meat rations at workplaces 
and a reversal of price increases. First strike committees started appearing, 
which decided to undertake negotiations with the management. The man-
agement promised pay rises just to get staff back to work again. The spreading 
news of striking staff, as the Ministry of Internal Affairs noted in their report, 
and their partial victories (as some of their demands had been met) was often 
an encouragement to pressurize the management of other workplaces which 
had not yet seen strikes. It was then that the saying ‘you won’t get anything if 
you don’t stop working’ was coined. 81
Jacek Kuroń did his best to collect the news of all the about strikes and 
broadcast it abroad. Later, thanks to ‘enemy radio stations,’ the whole country 
learned about them. Whoever could, listened to Radio Free Europe. On July 
2, Workers’ Defence Committee (KOR) appealed to workers to conduct or-
ganized protests and to maintain solidarity among striking workers. Special 
issues of the magazine Robotnik issued by the KOR circulated, but it is difficult 
to say how many were in fact distributed to striking workers. The fact that the 
democratic opposition lifted the information ban kept the strikes going. Be-
80 For more on July strikes, see: M. Dąbrowski, Lubelski lipiec 1980 (Lublin 2000).
81 AIPN, 0365/2, t. 1, Tezy dotyczące oceny sytuacji społeczno-
politycznej i operacyjnej powstałej w związku ze zmianą zasad sprzedaży artykułów 
mięsnych, Departament III MSW, 14 VII 1980, k. 114.
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sides Kuroń, many opposition activists from the whole country participated 
in gathering information about strikes.
In the second half of July, Lublin Region became the hottest spot in Poland. 
On July 16, 32 production plants were on strike there, including Locomotive and 
Carriage Works of the Polish National Rails, National Dairy, the City Water 
and Sewage works as well as Nitrogen Works in Puławy. On July 17, the strike 
at Locomotive Works, led by Czesław Niezgoda, signatory of the Workers’ 
Defence Committee Charter of the Rights of Workers, spread across the whole 
Lublin Railway Junction. It was the first railway strike of such magnitude in the 
history of communist Poland. 70 locomotives blocked all the train traffic. On 
July 18, Lublin was under general strike, with 79 workplaces and institutions 
participating. With municipal and railway transport stopped, the city was 
paralysed. Journalist Stanisław Jadczak noted:
Today is the first day of a complete standstill. No buses 
or red and white trolleybuses in the streets. No taxis. 
Women carrying children are walking the streets. […] 
Dramatic scenes took place in Clinical Hospitals No 1. 
and No.4 – kitchen staff went on strike, and hospital 
nurses had to shop and pay with their own money to 
prepare meals for sick children. Hospital laundries 
are also striking, and the lack of clean bed sheets and 
linen was noticeable. There was no oxygen, as the ox-
ygen provider also went on strike. […] A completely 
empty main railway station was a shocking sight. At 
noon a few people appeared, but everything was closed: 
ticket offices, eateries and the information desk. Rail-
way workers from Lublin called other railway stations 
demanding that they take up the strike as well, but 
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these were not eager to do so. For example, the station 
of Chełm answered that railways have never gone on 
strike, even before the war, and that they could not go 
on strike, because they must work just as doctors do. 
They were accused of strikebreaking. On this day an 
announcement from a sitting of the Political Bureau 
was read, and it said that ‘the tension was to the advan-
tage of Poland’s enemies’ and that ‘it creates a danger 
of a political provocation.’ These were routine an-
nouncements made during previous protests. 82
For the first time the authorities decided not to use force. But one must say that 
the striking workers did not give any excuse to do that; they did not take to the 
streets, as happened in June 1956, March 1968, December 1970 and June 1976. 
Only at two production plants, WSK Świdnik and Rolling Stock Repair Works 
in Ostrowiec Wielkopolski, did the workers come close to walking outside the 
gates. The management of the Party decided not to repress the opposition. It 
was feared that mass arrests would heat up the atmosphere, radicalise striking 
workers and turn the strikes into solidarity protests. This strategy turned out to 
be an error on the part of the authorities, as the lack of reaction only stimulated 
further rebellious behaviour. 83
The authorities were certain that they could stop the wave of strikes through 
negotiations and promises of pay rises. Conflicts were resolved, as the report of 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs reads, mainly through accepting some of the 
demands of workers and as a result of negotiations between the management 
of production plants with employees who decided to interrupt work or their 
82 S. Jadczak, “Diariusz lipcowych dni. Miesiące,” Przegląd Związkowy 1 (1981), p. 55-74, 
quoted in: M. Dąbrowski, Lubelski lipiec, p. 139, 140.
83 AIPN, 0365/2, t. 4, Information regarding the state of internal 
security of the country in July 1979, k.73, 135.
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representatives. These negotiations often lasted a few days and became quite 
turbulent. Mieczysław Jagielski, deputy prime minister and member of the 
Political Bureau who, as it later turned out, was the head ‘firefighter’ during 
this hot summer, went to Lublin and became the head of a special government 
committee. Party activists – which in Lublin consisted of over 800 people – 
were sent to convince staff and even individuals to stop striking. These activists 
even visited people at their homes. The First Secretary went to Chełm, as it 
seems that he was afraid to go to Lublin. It was not the same Gierek who ten 
years before asked striking shipyard workers in Szczecin to stop the protests. 84
The strikes started to die down. A day before the July 22 holiday, the workers 
of Stalowa Wola Steelworks, PKS Lublin and the car transport works in Warsaw 
were still on strike. In the Lublin region, 34 production plants had resumed work. 
This put Gierek off guard, who, along with twelve out of nineteen members of 
the Political Bureau and the Secretariat of the Central Committee (including 
Wojciech Jaruzelski, Stanisław Kowalczyk and Jan Szydlak) took a holiday 
in Crimea. Piotr Kostikow, who welcomed them in Simferopol, was terrified 
when a crowd of the Political Bureau members, their wives, children and grand-
children scattered out of the plane. 85
The Moscow Olympics and the holiday season started, bringing hope for 
the situation to calm down. But it was not to be. The country was still on fire. 
On July 31, two production plants in Ostrów Wielkopolski were still on strike, 
and the first shift of one of the port departments in Gdynia. ‘Still in many 
production plants the workers are disappointed because of low wages and 
difficult social conditions, and they threaten to interrupt work’, the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs reported. This is the attitude of the workers of the National 
84 AIPN, 0365/2, t. 4, Information regarding the state of internal 
security of the country in July 1979, k. 134.
85 P. Kostikow, B. Roliński, Widziane z Kremla. Moskwa – Warszawa. Gra o Polskę 
(Warszawa 1992), p. 235.
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Railways in Gdańsk-Sopot-Gdynia tri-city, the light industry staff in Kalisz 
and Żyrardów and at Walter Mechanical Works in Radom. 86 On August 14, the 
Lenin Shipyard in Gdańsk went on strike. Someone wrote in a letter intercepted 
by SB [Security Services]: ‘I also watch public TV news, and it seems that this 
summer is hot indeed, although the weather is cold…’ 87
86 AIPN, 185n/1, Informacja dla członków Biura Politycznego, sekretarzy KC PZPR i 
Prezydium Rządu, 31 VII 1980, k. 99.
87 AIPN Rz, 00268/34, t. 5, Information, k. 149, 155.
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Conclusion
In 177 production plants 81 thousand workers went on strike in July. This phe-
nomenon preceded the outbreak of the Solidarity revolution. It did not have to 
happen. Many factors contributed to this outbreak, the most important ones 
being, in my opinion, a significant deterioration of the public mood, measured 
by the low levels of optimism and trust in the authorities, which were the effect 
of the worsening economic situation.
In general, one may observe the existence of a revolutionary threshold 
of 20 per cent, which, when reached or crossed at three levels, increases the 
probability of the outbreak of protests, rebellion or a revolution. The first level 
was pointed out by Samuel P. Huntington, referring to the threshold of 20 
per cent in the context of the percentage of young people (15-24 years) in the 
overall population. In Poland young people (aged 15-29) formed over 25 per 
cent of society. 88
The second level was the drop in social optimism to about 20 per cent just 
before the revolution. In the first week of July in Poland about 22 per cent of 
respondents were optimistic about the future. The third level is trust in author-
ities, which was declared by about 25 per cent of respondents. The communist 
authorities in Poland were in a state of a deep crisis of confidence, as most of 
society believed it to be incompetent and corrupt, often alienated from the 
religious and national point of view (as it was strongly connected to another 
country – Soviet Union).
Certainly, the rule of 20 per cent must be regarded with caution, as 
only a sign of the probability of the occurrence of rebellious behaviour. It is 
not a recipe for revolution. What matters are not only cultural factors and the 
revolutionary tradition, but also a decrease in the level of public fear, which 
88 S. P. Huntington, Zderzenie cywilizacji (Warszawa 1998), p. 167. 
(Polish translation of The Clash of Civilisations by Samuel Huntington).
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enables the appearance of nonconformist attitudes. What is also needed is a vi-
sion of a good social order, created by the opposition inside the country or 
outside its borders – for example, democracy for Third World countries. The 
consequences of the Vatican conclave, the Papal visit and the actions of the 
opposition did not only lead to some disconnected strike events, but the wave 
of displeasure and defiance also gained an anti-system character and trans-
formed it into the national movement of Solidarity.
Translated by Anna Sekułowicz
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